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ABSTRACT
By choosing the Dreyer Fire Control Tables, the Admiralty is widely considered
to have rejected Pollen's Argo system for an inferior plagiarism which contributed to
Beatty's defeat atJutland. This thesis begins with a summary and critique of ProfessorJon
Sumida's influential work and argues for a re-examination of his conclusions. It then sets
out the general principles of long range naval gunnery: the different types of plotting: and
the limited accuracy of available target data. Next, it considers the progress in gunnery
made after 1900 and how the necessary instruments were invented, developed and
supplied. This establishes a context for Pollen's relationships with the Admiralty, which
are recounted after setting out the function and status of each component of his evolving
system. The development and operation of the Dreyer Tables are then discussed. After an
outline of German fire control, the Run to the South and the demands on the opposing
gunnery systems are described using the surviving gunnery data; finally, the lessons
drawn by the Royal Navy at the War's end, as embodied in a new generation of
Admiralty Fire Control Tables, are reviewed. The conclusions are threefold.
Influences. Both the Dreyer and Pollen clocks incorporated principles first
proposed for the other or anticipated in Service gear, yet their detailed designs were quite
different. The charges of plagiarism are unjustified and inappropriate.
Clzoices. When his monopoly ended, Pollen had no clear technical lead in clocks
or plotting. His own obduracy threw away the opportunity to become a normal
commercial supplier. The Admiralty's decision was the outcome of reasoned technical
and commercial choices.
Consequences. The conditions of the Run to the South did not favour Qieen Mary's
Argo clock. Beatty's defeat was due not to his fire control but to a badly-handled
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The first encounter between heavy ships atJutland is now known as the Run to
the South. It began as an engagement between five German and six British battlecruisers,
though, later, Hipper's squadron was also under long-range fire from four Qyeen Eliabeth
dass battleships. Yet, despite a superiority in ships and weight of fire, Beatty lost both the
Indefatigabk and Qyeen May to catastrophic magazine explosions. This defeat (for no other
description is appropriate) can be partly explained by the inferior armour protection and
the exposed and inflammable propellant charges of the British ships, and the effective
armour-piercing German shell.' However, these factors were only important because the
Germans gained a decisive gunnery superiority, Beatty's battlecruisers making no more
than 11 hits compared with up to 42 received.2
There is today a broad consensus on the main cause of this failure of British
gunnery and how it had arisen.
The British undoubtedly paid a severe penalty for the failure to adopt before the war
the system devised by Arthur Hungerford Pollen....The Pollen system would
undoubtedly have enabled the British battlecruisers to hit before they were hit in return,
thus offsetting their deficiencies in armour protection and unsuitable propellant.3
Instead of the effective Argo Clock, [Frederic] Dreyer had persuaded the Admiralty to
adopt a plagiarized and inferior instrument co-designed by himself and...Keith
Elphinstone.4
In taking observed and estimated data, and adding both manual delays and mechanical
errors, Dreyer's system deprived the guns of the responsiveness of direct observation,
Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnought to &apa Row, Volume HI (Oxford, 1978) pp.204-15. NJ M Campbell,
Jutland an analysis of the fig/ztiig (London, 1986) pp.369-87. Stephen Roskill, Admrral of the Fleet Earl Beatty
(New York, 1981) p.130.
2 Campbell, Analysis (op. cit.) pp.78 and 94. Campbell's tally of hits is assessed in Chapter 6.
Paul H Halpern, AXavalHistorj of World War I(London, 1994), p.328.




and yet failed to produce accurate results in conditions of fast-changing rates of change
of range and bearing.5
What the effects onjutland might have been if most of the British heavy ships had been
fitted with the Argo Clock is of course largely conjectural; but its obvious superiority to
the system actually installed, together with the fact that the Qyeen May, which did the
best shooting of Beatty's ships, was fitted with the Argo Clock Mark IV leaves one in
little doubt that they would have been substantial.6
All these distinguished naval historians base their conclusions on the research and
publications of Professor Jon Tetsuro Sumida. After his first paper in 1979, Sumida
edited the papers of Arthur Pollen (published in 1984)8 and, in 1989, brought out In
Defence of Xaval Supremacy. This book, now established as a classic of naval history, has
three principal themes. Firstly, it elucidates the financial restraints at the start of the
dreadnought era, and how they were overcome to pay for the construction of the Grand
Fleet. Secondly, it establishes Fisher's preference for battlecruisers over battleships, and
suggests that he was influenced by developments in fire control which promised to make
fire effective at long range. And, thirdly, it describes Arthur Pollen's campaign from 1901
to 1913 to persuade the Royal Navy to adopt his fire control system: and its eventual
rejection in favour of the Dreyer Fire Control Tables.
As its title implies, the main purpose of the present thesis is to re-examine the
Admiralty's choice, finalised in 1913, between the rival fire control technologies and their
respective suppliers, the Argo Company and Elliott Brothers: but it will also consider the
extent to which Dreyer and Elliotts were truly culpable of plagiarism, and the actual
consequences of that choice in the naval engagements of the Great War, especially the
Run to the South. Any attempt to argue for a reconsideration must begin by attempting to
summarise Sumida's own conclusions on these matters, although this is no easy task, given
his detailed and scholarly exposition. To begin with the question of plagiarism:
...a tribunal of the Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors...ordered that Pollen be
paid the sum of £30,000 compensation for the plagiarization [sic} of the Argo Clock
that had occurred in 1911, the fact of which had been exposed in hearings that had
taken place in August 1925.
Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game (London, 1996) p.12.
6 Roskill, Bea#y (op. cit.) p.192.
Jon Sumida, 'British Capital Ship Design and Fire Control in the Dreadnought Era: Sir John Fisher,
Arthur Hungerford Pollen, and the Battle Cruiser', Journal ofModern Jiistoy, 51 (June 1979) pp.205-30. This
was followed by Anthony Pollen, The Great Gunnery Scandal (London, 1980), a loyal defence of Pollen by his
son.
8 A balanced review of the Dreyer-Pollen controversy by Frederic Dreyer's son, Admiral Sir Desmond





After the many problems experienced during the Xatal trials in 1910, 'Pollen...had
decided to redesign the plotter and clock from start to finish in order to produce
instruments which could not be faulted on technical grounds'. 9 Work began on the clock
in early 1911. At that time, Elliott Brothers were already manufacturing the first
instrument which 'combined Dreyer's rate plotting elements with a dumaresq and
Vicker's Clock'. Shortly thereafter:
...Keith Elphinstone, an engineer at Elliott Brothers...began design work on an
improved dock...Hentey...Moore's assistant'0 had previously kept Dreyer fully informed
of confidential matters relating to the Argo Company, and by July at the latest, both
Elphinstone and Dreyer were familiar with the mechanical details of the [new] Argo
Clock. Elphinstone, in addition, was a frequent visitor to the Cooke's works at York,
and in October 1911 with Henley examined both the clock, which was then under
construction, and all the drawings.
The new model Dreyer-Elphinstone Clock was at best an imperfect development of the
dumaresq - Vickers Clock combination.....the dumaresq that was part of the Dreyer
gear...calculate[d] change of range of [sic] bearing rates that were then transmitted
automatically via a mechanical linkage to the dock. The basic mechanism of the clock
consisted of two disc-roller units, one of which generated ranges and the other
bearings....The generated bearings...controlled the bearing setting of the dumaresq,
which in addition could be altered by the action of a gyro compass whenever the firing
ship made a turn.
The clock mechanism bore an unmistakable resemblance to the disc-ball-roller
arrangement of the Argo dock, which in the light of the proceedings described above,
was probably not coincidental - this, in any case, was the judgement of a government
tribunal that met in 1925. The plagiarism of the Argo instrument, if such it was,
however, was incomplete and in operation thus far less efficient."
This is a serious indictment, but it also raises questions, both personal and technical.
Pollen had viewed Dreyer as a rival ever since the Ariadne trials of early 1908; why, then,
would he have allowed Elphinstone, the designer of the competing system based on
Dreyer's ideas, to see the new Argo clock and any, let alone all, of the drawings? And
what, exactly, had been plagiarised? A dumaresq was part of the Dreyer gear; but the
Argo clock was also 'equipped with a virtual-course-and-speed calculating mechanism - in
essence a dumaresq'. The Dumaresq, moreover, was an instrument which had been
invented in 1902 and was in service by 1906: so clearly this was not plagiarised from
Argo. As for the clocks, the Argo contained three variable-speed drives of the
disc-ball-roller (actually two rollers) pattern: while the Dreyer/Elphinstone apparently
Jon Sumida, In Dfence oJ7'faval Supremacy. Finance, Technology and Biuzsh Naval Policy 1889-1914 (London,
1989) pp.202-3 and 316.
'° Henley was the assistant to the Director of Naval Ordnance, Rear-Admiral Moore, with responsibility
for fire control: ibid. p.21 3.
ibid. p.2l9.
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used two, more conventional disc-and-roller drives, in which case the shape and function
of the rollers in the two types of drive were entirely different.
....the absence of adequate provision to reduce friction during the translation of the
roller along the diameter of the disc probably resulted in slippage that introduced errors
in the generation of ranges and bearings....the cast iron discs of the Dreyer/Elphinstone
Clock were undoubtedly more susceptible to wear than the hardened steel discs of the
Argo device....'2
The Argo mechanism was evidently better: but since neither the numbers nor the designs
of the drives were the same, where lay the 'unmistakable resemblance'? A study of the
functional and mechanical details of the two designs will be necessary in order to
determine how closely the Dreyer/Elphinstone really resembled the Argo: and, indeed,
whether Argo owed any debts to Service antecedents.
Sumida is in no doubt that the Dreyer Tables were inferior to the Argo system.
Dreyer's method could not have produced satisfactory results...if forced to contend with
the high and changing change of range and bearing rates, and interruptions in visibility
that Pollen and others believed were likely to occur in battle. Under such conditions,
the inability of the time-and-range and time-and-bearing plots to contend with the
changing rates would mean that the dumaresq would give an inaccurate indication of
the target speed'3, the occasional obscuring of the target would cut off the supply of
bearings required to reset the dumaresq, while continuous changes in the range rate
could not be represented accurately by the Vickers dock, whose drive speeds...could
only be altered in discrete steps.'4
In fact, Sumida now acknowledges that the Vickers clock contained a variable speed drive
which could be adjusted continuously for rate, but he still insists that:
Changes in the indication of the rate by the dumaresq had to be transferred manually
to the Vickers dock, and because such transfers could not be carried out continuously,
continuous change in the range rate was imperfectly represented by the dock....'5
The Dreyer Tables in Beatty's ships atJutland are characterised thus.
..Jnt*faigab1e and Xew zealand were fitted with the Dreyer Table Mark I whose
dumaresq/Vickers clock arrangement was incapable of taking account of a changing
thange of range rate with any degree of precision....Lion and Princess Royal...were fitted
with the Dreyer Table Mark ifi... Tger...with the...Mark IV, both of whose dumaresq/
Dreyer-Elphinstone Clock combinations were probably much superior...but still not
entirely satisfactory. Only the Qyeen Mary was equipped with the Dreyer Table Mark II,
12 ibid. pp. 74, 101, 169-70, 211-3, 219 and Plate 5.
13 A 'cross-cut' of the rates (slopes) from the range and bearing plots was used in setting the Dumaresq's
target course as well as speed:Jon Sumida (ed.) The Pollen Papers (London, 1984) pp. 371-3.
' LLWS' (op. cit.) pp.217-8.
15 Jon Sumida, 'The Quest for Reach: the Development of Long Range Gunnery in the Royal Navy,
1901-1912' in Stephen D Chiabotti (ed.) Toolingfr WarMilitary TranfomwIwn uz the Industrial Age (Chicago,




which incorporated an Argo Clock Mark IV...designed to deal with high and changing
change of range rates, and interruptions in the observations of the target...'6
However, some of these descriptions are inconsistent with those given elsewhere. Firstly,
the imperfections due to manual rate transfer were apparently confined to the prototype
Dreyer Table under construction in early 1911. In the Dreyer Table Mark I, the
'dumaresq and Vickers Clock were connected by a mechanical linkage which
automatically set the rate of the former to match the indications of rate on the latter
instrument'; in the Dreyer/Elphinstone clock of the Dreyer Table Mark ifi, the rates
were also transferred automatically, while the later Mark IV had a 'new model "electric
dumaresq" 'which, although not described, does not sound any less automatic than its
mechanical predecessors. Secondly, the Argo Clock could not always predict accurately
when target observations were interrupted.
...so long as the firing ship and target steamed on straight courses and constant speeds,
the clock would...generate ranges and bearings without the need for further bearing
corrections. If the firing ship turned the automatic setting of calculated bearings was
superseded by hand set bearings obtained by observation.
And, thirdly, while, in 1913, the Argo Clock Mark V (which was completed too late to be
considered by the Royal Navy) had been provided with a gyrocompass connection 'that
corrected the bearing setting of the clock when the firing ship was turning', this feature
had already appeared in the Dreyer/Elphinstone clock of 1911; Beatty himself later
assured Pollen that the Dreyer Table was helm-free, although this view is dismissed by
Sumida as 'mistaken'.'7
He also criticises the mechanical design of the Dreyer/Elphinstone clock: but
accepts that only the Dreyer Table allowed the predicted and observed ranges to be
compared directly.
...to compensate for inaccuracies in the speed and course settings of the dumaresq that
were the result of rate plotting - if not for the inherent defective operation of the clock
mechanism, which may not have been appreciated - the Dreyer-Elphinstone Clock was
made to drive a marking pencil that plotted generated ranges alongside the plot of
observed ranges. By this means, ranges...could be quickly compared...and the clock
settings a4justed whenever the plots diverged. This ingenious method of "feed-back"
correction did much to enable the various production marks of the Dreyer Fable...to
produce acceptable results under the unrealistic and easy conditions of Battle Practice,
and this was a major factor in the rejection of the far superior Argo system.'8
6 ILWS, p.300.
ibid. pp.213, 219, 247, 251, 283-4 and 306.
' ThILL pp.220.
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It is clear that a fuller understanding is needed of the functional and design characteristics
of the rival systems as they evolved through a succession of models, including the Argo
true-course plotter of 1913. Only then can a judgement be reached on whether the
Admiralty did in fact reject a far superior system.
However, whatever the technical issues, Sumida's account suggests that many
decisions were motivated mainly by opposition to Pollen and his ideas from the Naval
Ordnance Department. Even in 1905, when Pollen requested funds to develop a
gyroscope for correcting bearing observations, 'the Ordnance Department insisted that
yaw would not be a significant factor, and categorically refused to provide funds for the
project'. Nonethless, at this time Pollen established a good relationship with the new
Director of Naval Ordnance, Jellicoe, who initiated the negotiations for the contract
under which Pollen expected to be paid £100,000 for his system. In August 1907,Jellicoe
was replaced as DNO by Reginald Bacon, who was:
...opposed to the employment of complicated machinery for fire control
purposes....There is good reason to believe, therefore, that Bacon was determined from
the start to prevent the adoption of Pollen's mechanised system of fire control.
Bacon's objectives were undoubtedly also those of Lieutenant Frederic C. Dreyer...
Dreyer, already a member of the DNO's department, had previously served as Gunnery
Staff Officer to Sir Arthur Wilson in the Channel fleet: and Sumida proposes that:
It was while serving under Wilson that Dreyer's rivalry with Pollen as an inventor of fire
control instruments had begun.
Dreyer was now about to participate in the forthcoming trials of Pollen's new equipment
aboard Ariadne.
The selection of Admiral...Wilson to umpire the official trials insured that Dreyer's
desire to play a major role in the blocking of Pollen would be fulfilled...Bacon assigned
Dreyer to be [Wilson's] assistant. Wilson's nomination undoubtedly originated with
Bacon, who must have been aware of his dependence upon Dreyer for advice on all
gunnery matters.'9
Wilson soon became strongly opposed to the terms of Pollen's contract and conducted the
trials as a competition with a manual plotting scheme concocted by himself and Dreyer.
He declared that the results showed that his own method was 'vastly superior' and his
report recommended the rejection of the Pollen system. In March 1908, the Admiralty
acted on this advice, though not before some dubious dealings with Pollen. Sumida
suggests that, unlike in 1905, Fisher and the Controller, Jackson, had failed to support
i6IIL pp.84, 99, 121 and 123.
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Pollen because they had 'been persuaded by Dreyer that the service had produced a
cheap and effective alternative': and, furthermore, that, since Wilson's report was most
difficult to follow:
Fisher and Jackson had little technical understanding of the latest advances in gunnery,
which meant that they were incapable of exposing subtle prevarication when it came to
the arcana of fire control.2°
Although Pollen did not receive his £100,000, a further payment of £11,500
provided him with 'the working capital necessary for me to carry on'. Despite this
continuing financial support, Bacon is said to have maintained his 'opposition to
mechanized methods of gunnery [which] included mechanized gunlaying as well as
sightsetting' and that, in the Spring of 1909, 'Scott and PoIlen...found themselves sharing
the status of gunnery outcasts'. Yet, between April and June, the Admiralty negotiated
and placed an new order with Pollen's recently announced Argo Company for a set of
instruments for trial in J'Tatal: and also asked for a tender for a production order. Sumida's
account says that the delay in placing the order was due to 'Bacon's obstruction' and that
'the Ordnance Department retained both the means and the will to prevent a fair trial'.
Furthermore:
The new plotting table had been designed to allow plotting...while the ship...was
turning....The Ordnance Department, however, apparently did not believe that the
capacity to plot while turning justified the increase in mechanical complexity, and thus
the plotting table as supplied did not incorporate [this] feature.
Yet Pollen would soon see 'a dramatic improvement in his relations with his leading
opponent' when, on 8 July,' "the D.N.O. went arm in arm with Pollen to [the Linotype
factory in] Manchester and came back much impressed. He is now sincerely anxious for
the experiments to succeed" '. By November, Bacon was suggesting that Argo and the
Admiralty should 'come to a comprehensive agreement with regard to secrecy and the
purchase of Pollen's system'.2'
At the close of 1909, Bacon was replaced as DNO by Captain Archibald Moore,
while Wilson took over from Fisher as First Sea Lord.
Moore was critical of the mechanical reliability of the gyro-stabilized range-finder
mounting...and doubtful that plotting was of any value. The Contracts Department...
believed that Pollen's profit margins were excessive. These unfavorable assessments
were consistent with, if not in part, prompted by, the views of Admiral Wilson...who
was adamantly opposed to any monopoly agreement.
20 ibid. pp.124-36.
21 ibid pp.137-8, 153-4, 164-6, 170-1 and 174.
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Even though, subsequently, 'Pollen appears to have been told that Wilson's opinions were
not the obstacle that he supposed', Sumida states that 'Wilson remained adamantly
opposed to any purchase that involved secrecy terms'.22 Yet the final contract, accepted
on 29 April 1910, preserved monopoly and secrecy until the end of 1912, ordered 45
mountings and indicators at /J1 ,350 per set and included provision for an advance
payment of 15,000. These conditions are described as 'unfavourable terms of purchase
for only a portion of his [Pollen's] fire control system, which provided a margin of profit
that was too small to enable the Argo Company to carry on experimental work on the
other instruments'. During the Xatal trials in July: 'The Argo instruments suffered from
numerous mechanical and electrical failures', not excluding even the rangefinder
mounting, while the plotter proved to be 'faulty in design'. Yet it is suggested that
'Moore's rejection of the Argo plotter may in addition have been motivated by his
preference for an alternative plotting system that had just been brought to his attention'.
This was dual rate plotting, incorporated in the table patented by Dreyer in September
191 0.
By the end of 1911, the prototype Dreyer Table had been tried aboard Prince of
Wales (in which Dreyer was Flag Commander toJefficoe), while design of the new Dreyer
Table Mark Ill was proceeding at Elliott Brothers. At the Argo Company, the Argo
Clock Mark IV was nearing completion, while the 'delayed design work on the improved
helm-free/true-course plotter' was probably only just beginning.
The obstruction of Admiral A.K. Wilson had played an important role in the disruption
of the development of the Pollen system [but] he was forced to resign...in November
1911. Moore, on the other hand, kept his place as Director of Naval Ordnance, and
although his private relations with Pollen were friendly, he remained nevertheless a
determined opponent of true-course plotting and secrecy agreements with the Argo
Company.
Further on in his book, Sumida describes Moore as 'an inveterate opponent of Pollen's
approach to fire control', yet:
On 10 April 1912, Moore...informed Pollen that he would recommend the adoption of
the [Argo] dock for the five [sic] battleships of the King George V dass pending the
outcome of sea trials and an agreement over prices.	 -
However, Pollen refused to quote for this small number: asked for large orders or an
immediate release from secrecy: and was unwilling to consider maintenance of secrecy on
ibiL pp.196-8 and 269; the only source given for Wilson's continuing hostility is a draft but unsent letter
written by Pollen in September 1912.
23 ibid. pp.201-2, 205 and 218.
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only part of the Argo system. There then followed the obscure episode in which Pollen
was officially censured for imputations made against Dreyer in an earlier letter. Sumida
believes that:
...Moore was determined to block the advance of the Argo Company [and] that [their]
refusal to consider monopoly on an a la carte basis...in his mind might have justified
underhand action on his part.
Whether or not this episode was responsible for 'the development of a personal animus
against Pollen on the Board', on 13 August Moore (who was now Controller) advised his
colleagues:
...everything that the Argo Company professes to achieve with its instruments, can be
equally well performed by the Dreyer instruments....I do not see any reason for
continuing the privileged position of this inventor...it is full time that he was placed in
the same position as all other inventors....
However, despite taking Moore's advice to end the secrecy agreement, the Admiralty still
accepted Argo's tender for five (later increased to six) clocks.24
The trials of the new clock, held aboard Orion in November, were a success but,
despite further negotiations, 'the Admiralty...concluded that they could make no offer
which the Argo Company could accept'. In January 1913, Churchill was sent extracts
from letters of support which Pollen had received from supporters in the Service, which
were judged to be "grossly improper and offensive". In the next six months, relationships
between Argo and the Admiralty continued to deteriorate, exacerbated by a dispute over
rate-setting dials on the Argo Clock which, according to the new DNO, Captain F C T
Tudor, revealed the Service system of rate control.
Tudor appears to have demonstrated a hostility to the Argo Company that was at least
as great as Moore's....Tudor's views carried the day and his scheme of obstructing the
foreign sale of the Argo Clock officially adopted.
By June 1913, the rejection of the Argo system was public knowledge and questions were
about to be asked in Parliament. By late July, the Admiralty had prohibited all
communication with Argo and, in September, the company began its sales campaign
abroad.25
Sumida proposes two other influences on the Admiralty's decisions in 1912 and
1913. The first was the introduction of 'rangefinder control', in which the clock range was
continually corrected by the mean range-finder range of the moment obtained from a
24 ibüL pp.215, 219-25, 235, 262 and 276-7.
ibid. pp.231, 234-7 and 241-7.
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Dreyer range plot of several rangefinders. The second was their assessment that 'the
German navy would seek a short-range engagement' at ranges 'much less than 10,000
yards...by closing rapidly'. Sumida returns to this second theme in his more recent article
'The Quest for Reach'. He acknowledges that, in 1910, Pollen argued:
that the conditions of short-range gunnery favored the adoption of his mechanized
system because it was much more capable than any manual system of plotting range
and range generation for dealing with variation in the change-of-range rate.
but nevertheless concludes that:
In l9l2...the Admiralty rejected the Pollen system for Dreyer's cheaper but less capable
alternative on the grounds that state-of-the-art sight-setting equipment would not be
required to deliver overwhelming firepower in the first few minutes of the close-range
naval battle that it believed would be fought against the Germans....This ended the
quest for reach that had been initiated in 1901 .
In Defence ofJVwal Supreinay provides few explanations for the actions and choices
attributed to the responsible Admiralty officials. Why did the Naval Ordnance
Department reject yaw-correction for the Jupiter gear and helm-free plotting for the first
.Mital table? The decision of March 1908 not to purchase in quantities the AC rangefinder
mounting and plotter is explained by Bacon's rooted objection to complex instruments
and Wilson's hostile reaction to the terms of Pollen's contract; yet were they not also
influenced by being in the middle of a period of severe restraint on naval expenditure?27
Why, before he left office, did Bacon suddenly change from obstructing to supporting
both trials and a production agreement? The contract for the supply of 45 rangefinder
mountings appears to confirm that Wilson, as First Sea Lord, was not adamantly opposed
to a monopoly agreement with Pollen; consequently, it is not clear why Wilson is accused
of obstructing and disrupting the development of Pollen's system until his resignation.
Moore is shown to have been sceptical, when he took office, about the reliability of the
mounting and the value of the true course plotter: rightly, as the trials in Xatal were to
show. Yet no clear evidence is provided that he then became Pollen's inveterate
opponent; it was Moore who insisted on the purchase of five Argo clocks for the latest
class of battleship. His opposition to the continuation of secrecy and mpnopoly only
hardened after three months of fruitless negotiation, while his own words indicate that, in
the second half of 1912 he was opposed only to secrecy, not to Argo remaining a supplier,
though on more usual terms. The final breach did not come for almost another year.
ibid. pp.250-3. 'Quest for Reach' (op. cit.) pp.71 and 80.
21 LDM,p.113andTables6and8.
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Tudor, Moore's successor, is said to have used the question of secrecy as a pretext for
obstructing Argo's foreign sales: but Sumida's account does not hide that the breakdown
was also due to the provocative actions of Pollen and his associates.
These questions and doubts cannot be addressed while the Argo affair is
interpreted principally from Pollen's viewpoint. Direct evidence must be sought of how
and why the Admiralty made the choices which led, eventually, to the break with Argo.
Moore, and Wilson too,28 evidently considered that Pollen's treatment as an inventor was
exceptionally privileged; how, then were inventions (from within and outside the Navy)
normally developed into serviceable instruments: and what were the roles played by
Admiralty and industry in this process? A study of the evolution of the Royal Navy's
complete fire control system, of which clocks and plotters were but a part, will, it is hoped,
provide a technical and commercial context against which the Admiralty's decisions can
be assessed.
In analysing the consequences of their choice for the battlecruisers during the
Run to the South, Sumida condudes that:
...change of range rates must...have been a critical factor...the convergence and
divergence of the opposing sides resulted in change of range rates that were high -
between 4:00 and 4:10 the average change of range per minute was 350 yards - and
changing....
...the rate-plotting mechanisms of the Dreyer tables were incapable of producing
estimates of the...rates...when the...rates were high and changing rapidly. In addition,
the manual process of plotting and meaning ranges was so slow that corrections to the
dock...probably lagged significantly behind the actual instantaneous range.
Similarly, in the second phase of the engagement:
converging paths...between 4:10 and 4:19 gave an average change of range of nearly
600 yards per minute. Between 4:19 and 4:28 both sides altered course several times
and the Germans reduced their speed. The change of range under these circumstances
was unquestionably high and changing. At 4:26, the Qyeen Ma?y was sunk by two hits
amidships
...The change in the change of range rate factor was again probably critical....
In this phase, the 5th Battle Squadron was also firing but for them:
...speeds were nearly equal and the angle of convergence moderate, the change of range
rate was well under 200 yards per minute and probably nearly constant.29
Yet they were required to contend with the same changes of German courses as the
battlecruisers, while, after 4.19, they were on much the same course as Beatty's ships.3°
28 ibid. p.125.
29 ibid pp.300-3.
3° FDSF III (op. cit.) Chart 5.
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Also, Sumida's description of the German fire control system states that ranges from the
stereoscopic rangefinders were meaned by a calculating machine, not plotted: that they
had 'nothing better than the German equivalent of the dumaresq...and Vickers clock';
and that the clock ranges were not even transmitted to the guns; he does not explain why:
The absence of a [range} plot...may have enabled the German fire control team to
respond more quickly, if not precisely, to changes in the range rate.3'
Once again, many questions are raised. What were the courses and speeds, and hence
ranges, rates and changes-of-rate, throughout the engagement? Were the values too high
for the different marks of Dreyer Table in Beatty's ships? Did the conditions unduly
favour the German rangetakers? And why did Hipper's ships shoot so much better, even
though, apparently, they were equipped with a fire control system more rudimentary than
the Dreyer Table Mark I? All these issues require a detailed, quantified analysis if the true
causes of Beatty's defeat are to be determined.
At the very end of the War, Beatty set up the 'Dreyer Table Committee' to
consider improvements and standardisatIon of existing tables and to make
recommendations for future developments. Respecting existing tables:
the rectification of a number of problems made "a considerable alteration in design"
necessary. "Many complaints"...had been received with regard to the unsatisfactory
performance of the clock drive'.
However, like the earlier Phillpotts Committee, they explicitly rejected true-course
plotting. The new Admiralty Fire Control Tables incorporated 'the infinitely variable
speed drive of the Argo Clock' but the plotting arrangements remain unclear. The text of
In Defence ofJfava1 Supremacy refers to: 'the adoption of both automatic rate and true-course
plotters - which in effect was what was done after the war' but a footnote states:
...Pollen's final true-course plotter...may or not have been practicable....The
incorporation of rate rather than true-course plotting in the post-war British fire control
system does not necessarily signify much....it could be argued that [this] was influenced
by the view that future naval engagements would involve much more frequent changes
in course and speed on both sides than had previously been the case, under which
circumstances a true-course plot might be of less value than a rate-plot.32
Thus the question remains open of whether the Argo true-course plottei could have
obtained enemy course and speed as both sides altered course several times during the
Run to the South.
In his closing chapter, Sumida reaches the following conclusions.
31 LLWc,p.3o1.
32 ibüL pp.310-3,315, 331 and 339.
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Consistent results with optical rangefinders were difficult to achieve, high speed and
changing courses resulted in ship motion that interfered with gun-laying, even when
director firing was employed, and neither rate nor probably true course plotting by
themselves were capable of producing satisfactory results under difficult conditions. It
cannot be doubted, however, that full Admiralty cooperation with Pollen's efforts would
have resulted in the putting into service of a fire control system that was far superior to
that...actually adopted [and which] almost certainly would have enabled British ships to
hit more often - perhaps even much more often - when range and bearing rates were
high and changing.
Several factors contributed to the rejection of the Argo system.
Admiralty objections to the cost...arose from a failure to recognise...that Pollen's prices
of necessity had to cover high research and development expenses, and the purchase of
manufacturing facilities...In retrospect, his financial demands seem to have been
reasonable.
However, Sumida concedes that Pollen:
...was probably ill-suited by nature to work easily with naval officers [and his]
communications with political leaders, businessmen and journalists...while of great use
of occasion in overcoming opposition, was undoubtedly feared and resented by his
service opponents.
On the other side:
...the Admiralty was generally distrustful of inventors, and though more open to the
adoption of perfected new weapons than is perhaps generally supposed, was as
unwilling as other departments then were to support research and development. Most
naval officers, by education and experience were not equipped to deal with technical
issues....
The negative effects of Pollen's background and personal shortcomings...were much
exacerbated by...the obstinacy and technical ignorance of Wilson and Bacon, and the
zeal and ambition of Dreyer [while] Fisher...lacked the technical knowledge to make
informed decisions on his own....
...The Ordnance Department [was] overwhelmed with routine paperwork [allowing]
little time to give important policy matters proper consideration....In addition [it] lacked
a permanent staff of technicians expert in fire control....
In the absence of firm direction from the top and consistent direction from the
Ordnance Department, Pollen's work was disrupted and delayed by the action of a
powerful service clique....By the time Pollen was able to put forward a practicable set of
instruments [his] opponents..were able to obfuscate the technical issues by offering an
alternative, which if derivative and inferior, was nonetheless an improvement on
existing instruments.
..:the resulting lack of an effective system of fire control, in combination' with the
deployment of inadequately protected battle cruisers and the excessive volatility of
British ammunition, was to have disastrous consequences at the battle ofJutland.33
Yet even this admirable summary raises further issues; the limitations imposed by
rangefinder accuracy: Pollen's financial management: his frequently antagonistic
' ibieLpp.331-5.
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relationships with Admiralty officers: and the level of resources available to the Ordnance
Department and the extent to which they were able to support research and development
on unperfected new instruments. Lastly, there is the imputation of technical ignorance
amongst senior officers. This is an unexpected criticism of a naval elite which is usually
said to have been much too concerned with material and technical matters. 34 In fact,
Fisher had an aptitude for mathematics, had been responsible for early experiments in the
electrical firing of guns and mines and had been Captain of HMS Exelknt and Director of
Naval Ordnance. Both Wilson and Bacon were torpedo specialists and so were familiar
with some of the most advanced technology of their time, including gyroscopes and
applications of electricity: while Wilson is elsewhere allowed sufficient understanding of
the arcana of fire control to be accused of 'subtle prevarication'. Jackson qualified as a
torpedo lieutenant and was Assistant DNO (with responsibilities for torpedoes) before
becoming Captain of Vernon in 1904: while his pioneering work on wireless earned him a
Fellowship of the Royal Society. Only Moore is omitted from these strictures, but he was
a gunnery officer who had specialised in mathematical theory and had a reputation for
cleverness.3 None of these officers would have had difficulty in understanding either the
technical principles or the mechanisms of the fire control instruments.
This introduction has posed many questions: on the influences, in both
directions, between Argo designs and Service instruments: on the choices made by the
Admiralty at several critical stages in the evolution of the Argo system: and on the
consequences at Jutland of the final decision in favour of the Dreyer Tables. However,
before addressing these issues, the essentials of long range gunnery at sea and, in
particular, the fundamental concepts of rate and change-of-rate, must first be considered.
K G B Dewar, The Xavy from W'itlthz (London, 1939) pp.58-64. Gordon, Rules of the Game (op. cit.) p.381.
Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volume I(London, 1961) p.401.
Ruddock F Mackay, Fisher of Riverstone (Oxford, 1973) pp.22-3,44-6,100,173,187 and 193. ILWS', pp.91
and 121. Gordon, Rules of the Game, pp.167,369 and 383: Beatty thought Moore 'too clever'. Moore's
Service Record, ADM 196/42, p.64. Adrian Blond, 'The Papers of Sir Henry Jackson 1855-1929' in Xew
Researchers in Mar,iime History, Papers presented at the Third Annual Conference 18 March 1995, Royal Naval
Museum, Portsmouth. LWB 1922-1930, pp.448-45O.
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2LONG RANGE NAVAL GUNNERY
The simplest possible conditions for gunnery at sea are found when the opposing
ships are steaming on identical courses at equal speeds; hence both the range and the
target bearing remain constant. At all but point-blank ranges, a shell follows an
approximately parabolic trajectory; thus, to hit, the gun must be elevated at the correct
angle relative to the line-of-bearing that joins the point of aim on the target to the centre
of the gun's trunnion axis. Also, the rifling imparts a stabilising spin which, in British guns,
caused the shell to drift to the right, by several hundred yards at long range;' a
corresponding deflection to the left was therefore necessary. Accurate fire at long range
demanded precise telescopic gun sights (Plate 1) for the gun layer (who controlled his
gun's elevation) and the trainer. 2 Relative to the gun axis, the telescopes were deflected
horizontally by an equal but opposite angle to the required deflection angle: and
depressed by the required angle of elevation. Thus, the guns would be correctly elevated
and deflected relative to the line-of-bearing if they were fired only when the point-of-aim
lay under the telescopes' cross-wires. From a ship at once rolling, pitching and yawing,
accurate shooting in salvoes required continuous aim: that is, as far as possible, the guns
were elevated and trained to keep the telescopes always on the point-of-aim. 3 In British
turrets, the guns were aimed hydraulically, each gun having its own elevating cylinder,
while a hydraulic engine trained the whole turret; good shooting by the heavy guns
demanded powerful hydraulics yet easily manipulated and responsive controls.
Text Book of Gunnery Patti, compiled at the Ordnance College, Woolwich, London, 1907, p.72, NMM.
2 For the layout in turrets, see John Roberts, The Battleship Dreadnought (London, 1992) pp.218 and 222
(copy, courtesy of the author, gratefully acknowledged).
Manual of Gunnery VoL ilIfor His Majesty's Fleet 1911, p.3,Ja 254, AL.
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Gun sights were calibrated directly in ranges so that, for any range set on the
sight, the angle of the layer's telescope to the gun barrel equalled the angle of elevation in
the gun's standard range table. Of course, when shooting at sea, the conditions were
almost always different from those in use when the tables were compiled. The ranging of
all guns was affected by differences in atmospheric temperature and humidity (and hence
drag) and cordite temperature. The trajectory of the shell was also influence by wind
along the range, although the necessary corrections could not always be estimated
accurately from the wind-speed at sea-level.4 The performance of individual guns was also
affected by barrel wear and manufacturing tolerances. Thus the gun ranges actually set
on the gun sights were usually different from the true (or geometric) range, and
incorporated the common corrections (the 'error of the day') plus, for the older geared
sights like that in the plate, the corrections for individual guns.5
However, there was also considerable uncertainty in the true range itsell, which
could only be measured by optical rangefinder. Even atJutland, all the battlecruisers still
depended on the 9-foot Barr and Stroud FQ2 coincidence rangefinder. In theory, the
uncertainty of observation for these instruments was 85 yards at 10,000 yards, increasing
to 190 yards at 15,000 yards. 6 However, in use, random errors in range could be much
larger. In 1913, Thunderer, taking eight ranges per minute with three rangefinders,
observed an average spread of 700 yards at 9,800 yards: 7 while, at Jutland, Iron Duke
noted: 'Error reported by Rangefinder Plot was 500 yards. Range 11,000 yards'. 8 In
post-War trials, a consistency (assumed to be equivalent to half the mean spread) of
1 85330 yards was obtained when taking about 3¼ ranges per minute between 12,500
and 14,000 yard. 9 Consistency and spread were measures of the random errors about the
mean of a single series of observations; however, every observation in a series could also
' For a range of 16,000 yards, a 13.5-inch shell reached an altitude of 2,664 feet: Admiralty, Gunnery
Branch, Range Tables for His Majesty's Flee1 1918, VoL 1, pA5O, ADM 186/236, PRO. Likewise, deflection
required correction for wind across the range: ibiL pp.1O-17.
Arthur Pollen, 'A.C.: a Postscript', 1905 in Jon Sumida (ed.) 77,€ Pollen Papers (London, 1984), pp.59-60.
6 TheBarrandStroudRangefi.nders issued by Barr and Stroud ... Glasgow, 1906, p.19,Ja 190,.AL
'Summary of Results' and Thunderer, 'Report on Firings carried out at "Empress of India" 8 November
1913' in 'Gunnery Practice at Sea: Sinking of HMS Empress of India 4/11 / 13' in ADM 1/8346.
8 Commander Blake, Iron Duke, 'Notes made in the...Gun Control Tower' in ADM 137/302. 'Error' here
is assumed to be the same as 'spread'.
Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Prvgress in Gunne1y Material 1922 and 1923, p.38, ADM 186/259. Although
these consistencies were obtained in a destroyer at high speed, they were 'only very slightly increased' from
those obtained by the usual method of rangetaking, which 'has been found to provide just over four ranges
per minute under vibrationless conditions'. Consistency was the average variation (deviation) from the
mean of a series of ranges: ibid p.47.
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be skewed from the true value by a systematic error. Thus both random and systematic
errors may be included in the warning that: 'a single range observation may [he] at
16,000 yards easily as much as 600, 700 or even 800 yards from the truth'.'° Later in the
War, systematic errors of up to 1,000 yards or more, high and low, were sometimes
obtained, although the relative changes of range within a single series were normally not
serious affected. These phenomena were investigated during and after the War; the rather
tentative conclusion was that they were due to a combination of the effects of atmospheric
refraction and temperature, aggravated by uneven heating of the rangefinder tube, if the
instrument was in direct sunlight.
Thus, when fire was opened, even if the true range was unchanging, the range
on the gunsights was unlikely to find the target with the first shots.
We know that, broadly speaking, the initial range is never right.'2
It was then necessary to correct the unknown (and unknowable) errors by observing the
fall of shot and systematically correcting first the deflection (so that the shots were falling
on the line-of-bearing, either in front of or behind the target) and then the gun-range.
This process, called spotting, was only practicable if the guns were fired in salvoes; the
splashes from the individual rounds could then be judged as a group, in which the
inevitable variations due to aiming, propellant and other ballistic factors could be
averaged by eye. At 12,000 yards, the typical salvo spreads for range were 200 yards for
15-inch guns, 300 yards for 13.5-inch and 400 yards for 12-inch.' 3 Spotting was regarded
as a necessary evil.
In all fire-control systems, good spotting is the first essential of hitting. This, however,
does not alter the fact that the less a system is dependent on spotting the better, since
spotting in its turn is dependent on a clear view of the object fired at.'4
Spotting for range used the system called bracketing, which is illustrated in Fig. 2.1.
Essentially, whenever the target was crossed (i.e. two successive salvoes fell on opposite
'° F C Dreyer and C V Usborne, Pollen Aim Correction System. Part L Technical History and Technical Comparison
with CommanderF.0 Dryer's Fire Conbvl System, printed May 1913, p.19, P.1024, AL
Grand Fleet Gunnery and Torpedo Orders, 312. 'Rangefinder Errors', 29 December 1917 and 106,
'Rangefinder errors', 5 October 1918, ADM 137/293 (new numbering sequence from May 1918).
Admiralty, Technical History Section, 'Fire Control in H.M. Ships' (TH23), pp.33-4 in The Technical Hisoiy
and Index, A Serial History of Technical Problems dealt wzth by Admiralty Departments, 1919, AL Admiralty,
Gunnery Branch, Progress in Gunnery Material 1921, p.9, ADM 186/251 and PGM1922-3 (op. cit.) p.53.
12 Reginald Plunkett, 'Notes on "Rate" ',March 1911 in DRAX 3/4, CC.
Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Spotting Rules 1916, p.4 inJa 011, AL. See also ADM 137/2028.
Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Manual of Gunnery (Volume III)fr His Majesty's Fleet 1915, p.1 4,Ja 254, AL
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FIG. 2.1: WORKING A BRACKET
sides of the target) the spotting correction applied to the next salvo was in the opposite
direction and half the amount of the previous correction. As the figure shows, if the initial
range error was 1,000 yards, as many as five salvoes might be required to find the target.
Since the interval between spotted salvoes could reach 50 seconds or longer at battle
ranges,' 5 this might take 3 /2 minutes; the disadvantage of an inaccurate opening range is
clear.
Smwy CouRsis
Normally, a firing ship and its target would be on different courses at different
speeds. Thus both the ranges and bearings of the target changed with time; even though
AtJudand, Iron Duke opened fire just after 6.30 p.m. and fired her first spotted salvoes with intervals of
35, 40 and 50 secs. at a range of 12,000 yards: 'Notes made...in "B" Turret of H.M.S. "Iron Duke" ',
ADM 137/302. The intervals between Derffluzzger's initial spotted salvoes at Qyeen Mary were 40, 65 and 35
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El
S3	 S2	 SI
Courses of own s1ip S and enemy E converge on point C.
Speed of S and E both 25 knots.
Angle between courses 309
Enemy bearing angle remains constant at 750
Range SE falls by 427 yds/min.
FIG. 2.2: CONsTANT RATE AND BEARING
courses and speeds were steady. While the target remained visible, the trainers could
follow any change of bearing: but, to keep hitting, it was vital to predict the change of
range between salvoes. Furthermore, at long range, each round took about 30 seconds to
reach the target;' 6 thus the gun range also needed to be corrected to allow for the change
of range in the time-of-flight.
To calculate both changes of range required a knowledge of the rate of change of
range: or, more concisely, the range-rate. Consider first the simple case of two 25-knot
ships on courses converging at 30° such that, eventually, the two ships would collide (Fig.
2.2). The target bearing of 75° remains constant, but it can be calculated (see below) that,
in each minute, the range falls by 437 yards: that is, the range-rate is 437 yards per
minute closing i.e. -437 yds/min. From the viewpoint of an observer on the firing ship,
the target appears to be moving towards him at this rate along the line-of-bearing; since
one knot equals 33.78 yds/min., the apparent or virtual speed of the target.is 12.9 knots.
Notice that, despite the shallow angle of convergence, this speed is more than 25% of the
maximum possible value, the 50 knots closing (-1689 yds/min.) experienced if both ships
were headed directly for each other.
6 25.7 secs. for a 13.5-inch shell at 16,000 yards: Range Tabl€s 1918 (op. ciL) p.150.





Enemy first sighted at El when range RI
Ships pass at S2, E2. minimum range R2.
enemy bearing 90














FIG. 2.3: OPPosrrE CouisEs: VIRTUAL SPEED AcRoss
Except in special cases, the relative motion of two ships causes changes not only
in ranges but in bearings. Fig. 2.3 illustrates an extreme example, again of two 25-knot
ships but now on opposite, well-separated courses. Before they pass, the range falls,
reaching its minimum value when the ships pass beam-to-beam; then the range begins to
increase. If these ranges are plotted against time, the curve ha the characteristic shape of
a hyperbola, with the greatest curvature at the moment of passing. The range-rate at any
time equals the slope of the tangent to the curve; thus the range-rate is initially negative, is
momentarily zero and then rises towards the maximum value of + 1689 yds/min. As the
ships pass, to an observer on the firing ship the virtual speed of the target along the
line-of-bearing is zero: but, in contrast, the target appears to be crossing the
line-of-bearing at a virtual speed of 50 knots. This large 'speed-across' inauces a rapid
rate of change of target bearing (a rapid bearing-rate); the resultant change in bearing
during the time-of-flight must be allowed for by applying a suitable additional deflection
(in this case to the right) on the gimsights. As Fig. 2.4 demonstrates, at short ranges the
:/
F
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E and E' represent enemy ships at two ranges R and R' from own ship.
This is a virtual course diagram representing movements relative to
own ship S. which therefore appears stationary.
Let the component of the enemy's virtual speed across the line-of
bearing be x (any component of speed along is disregarded here). EF
and E'F 1 represent the travel of the enemy perpendicular to the
line-of-bearing in the time of flight of the shells.
Let the muzzle velocity be m. At short ranges, the trajectories are flat
and there is no significant loss In velocity in flight Therefore, the times
of flight at the two ranges are -- and
Thus	 EF = -	 and	 E'F' =




deflection angle is range-independent and must be proportional to the speed-across; for
this reason, gunsights and other instruments were calibrated for deflection in knots of
speed-across: 17 even though, at long ranges, the actual speed-across had to be adjusted
upwards to obtain the correct gun deflection to put on the sights.
Fig. 2.5 introduces the general case of two ships on different courses at different
speeds; it is drawn thus to make all angles positive (when measured clockwise in the
manner of compass bearings) and less than 90°. The change of the ranges and bearings of
the enemy (target) ship as seen by an observer on own (firing) ship can be represented
mathematically in two ways. The first is in terms of virtual course, which expresses the
apparent direction and speed of movement of the enemy relative to own ship. As shown in
Fig. 2.6, the virtual course is found by the triangle of velocities which subtracts own speed
and course from enemy speed and course. Then, as in Appendix I, it can be shown that
the apparent enemy movement along the virtual course line results in a time-and-range
curve which is always a hyperbola. However, the examples in Fig. 2.7 demonstrate that
the curvature depends greatly on the magnitude of the virtual course and the minimum
possible range for the courses being considered. In many cases, the curvature is small;
either because the hyperbola is flat: or because the action ranges always lie on a part of
Peter Padfield, Guns at Sea (London, 1974) p.199.
)wn ship S, speed s.
Enemy ship E. speed e.
(3 is the enemy bearing from own ship's
:ourse line.
t is the inclination of the enemy course
From the line-of-bearing
0 is the angle between courses
6'	 1+8
R (the length of SE) is the True range.
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FIG. 2.5: STEADY Coui.sEs un Sos
v is virtual speed
v1 = s2 +e2 —2escosO
From the right angled triangle SPE
R2 = R02+(vt)1
where t=O when R=R0.




Own speed s subtracted froi the velocities
of both ships.
Relative motion is preserved but own ship is
rendered as though stationary
FIG. 2.6: VIRTuAL COURSE
Converging near-
collision courses















FIG. 2.7: RANGE-TiME HYPERBOLAE
the hyperbola which is nearly straight.' 8 However, when ships are passing on (roughly)
opposite courses and the range is close to the minimum value, the action ranges fall on a
sharply curved part of the plot.
Another way of looking at the rates and change of rates is to resolve the virtual
speed into separate components, the speeds along and across the line-of-bearing (as in Fig.
2.8). The speed-along (a), when converted from knots into yards per minute, is a direct
measure of the range-rate, which can be represented in the Newtonian notation by j
('R-dot'). The speed-across (x), after adjustment for range, gives the deflection for the
gunsights and is also used to calculate the bearing-rate, . Using the symbols defined in
Fig. 2.5, the following equations are derived in Appendix II:
a = e cos 1— s cos fi
	
knots	 -	 (2:1)
it =33.78a	 yds/min.	 (2:2)
x = e sini + s sin/I
	
knots	 (2:3)
= 1935.	 °/min.	 (2:4)
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FIG. 2.8: SPEEDS ALONG AND AcRoss
9= flu- i	 0 constant when courses steady
	 (2:5)
where e and s are in knots and R is in yards.
A simple equation can also be derived for the rate of change of range-rate j
('R double-dot'); this is at once a measure of the curvature of the time-and-range plot and
of how fast the speed-along is changing (i).
j==1I41.fr yds/min/min. 	 (2:6)
Similarly, , represents the rate of change of speed-across, while
	 is a measure of the




Equations 2:4-6 establish that, when the speed-across x was high, the bearing fi,
inclination z and range-rate j all changed rapidly. In action, there was no time for
trigonometrical calculations but an instrument to keep the rates automatically, named the
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PE = e, enemy speed.	 CR = s, own ship's speed.
PM perpendicular to LCM.	 RN perpendicular to CNX.
CL=ML-CM
	 CX=CN + NX
= ecosz—scosfl	 =ssinfl+esini
FIG. 2.9: PRINCIPLES OF ThIE DUMARESQ
Fig. 2.9, which demonstrates that it was an exact analogue of equations 2:1 and 2:3. In
use, the sliding pivot was positioned at a distance from the centre proportional to own
speed. The enemy bar was rotated about the pivot so that the angle between it and the
fixed fore-and-aft bar equalled the angle between courses; it was also pulled out so that the
distance from pointer to pivot was proportional to enemy speed. If the dial plate was then
rotated until the large arrow pointed at the target, the enemy bar pointer indicated, on the
dial's engraved lines, the present values of range-rate and speed-across; the latter was also
called the Dumaresq deflection. Furthermore, if any change in target bearing was





If the range-rate was almost constant, keeping the range from salvo to salvo was
not too difficult: but, if the rate was changing rapidly, a range-keeping instrument was
essential. This function was provided by the Vickers clock (Plate 3), on which a hand
rotated against a circular range scale at a speed which was set, if necessary at frequent
intervals, to be proportional to the range-rate from the Dumaresq. Thus the clock
integrated the range-rate to give the range.' 9 When fire was opened, the clock was set with
a gun-range based on the latest rangefinder ranges corrected for the error of the day.
Although this was unlikely to find the target immediately, if the Dumaresq had been set





















FIG. 2.10: RUN TO ThE Soum, 4.15 - 4.22
The errors arising from the stepwise setting of the range-rate are discussed in Chapter 3.
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subsequent changes of range. Thus the spotter could use the method of brackets, as
already described for fixed ranges, to eliminate the opening error and straddle the target.
Furthermore, as discussed in Appendix II, the same procedure was the best that could be
done even if the initial values of enemy speed and course were wrong; however, while in
most cases the target could still be straddled, the rate errors meant that it would be lost
again. Further spotting corrections were then necessary to correct first the deflection and
then both range and range-rate together. This 'rate spotting' used simple rules of thumb;
those recommended in 1915 accompanied each range correction by a rate correction of
half the magnitude 2° e.g. UP 200 (yards) and OPEN 100 (yds/min.). If the spotted
corrections for deflection and range-rate were also put on the Dumaresq by adjusting the
enemy bar, the corrected enemy speed and course were closer to the true values; thus,
subsequently, the instrument could keep the rate more accurately. Rate spotting was also
the quickest method to correct the rate if it was lost because the enemy altered course to
avoid further Fj^21
The fire-control equations can be used to calculate the actual values of rate and
change of rate experienced during the wartime engagements. For example, as described in
Chapter 6 and tabulated overleaf, at the start of the second phase of the Run to the South,
while LI2tow steered SbyW at 23 knots, Lion made a steep SE'ly approach, speed 24 knots;
then, at 4.18-19, both turned away to courses of S and SSE, respectively (Fig. 2.10).
	
Time Lion's LiAtow's Lion's	 Range	 x
course course	 target	 yards	 Is/ijn yds/minlmin knt 1mm	 °/min/min
_____ _____ _______ bearing _______ ________ ___________ ______ _______ _________
4.15 SE
	 SbyW	 -80°	 18,500 -702	 6.25	 -7.73	 -0.81	 -0.06
4.22 SSE
	 S	 -109°	 15,300 -251	 2.23	 -5.47	 -0.69	 -0.02
Courses were converging, so that the speed-across was quite low, though not insignificant.
However, j , being proportional to x 2 , was very low; so long as Lion held her course,
was essentially constant. Similarly, 	 was also small, so that deflection also remained
constant. Thus, in this typical tactical sequence of an approach followed by turns onto
courses suitable for opening fire, the only cause of rapid change of range-rate was the turn
20 Manual of Gunnery 1918 (op. ciL) p.15.
21 Manual of Gunnery 1915, p.15 and Spottmg Rules 1916 p.14. (both op. ciL).
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itself, which almost halved the range-rate. Notice also the much smaller proportionate
change in speed-across.
C-IGm.rG Cou1sEs
Small course changes (normally two points but one point at high speed) could be
made without interfering with gunnery: 22
 provided, of course, that the rates were kept by
adjusting the Dumaresq angles, at least approximately, for the changes both in target
bearing and the angle between courses. However, larger and faster turns were much more
disruptive. Firstly:
...at speeds from 12 to 16 knots the loss of speed is from 5 to 8 knots for turns over 4
points. When steadied...speed...is gradually increased by about one knot per minute
until the original speed is attained.25
Secondly, under more severe helm, the ship tended to slip sideways, so the course line no
longer corresponded with the keel-line; this could result in range errors of one to two
hundred yards. Thirdly, heel and vibration could cause other difficulties, notably in taking
ranges and bearings from positions aloft; in the battleship Bellerophon at full speed, 'our
mast-head shook like an aspen each time the helm was used'. Aiming was also more
difficult.24
Even under helm, equations 2:1-3, which give instantaneous speeds and rate, still
apply. However, the change in bearing due to speed-across can no longer be expressed
relative to own-ship's course-line, which, due to the turn, is itself swinging relative to the
line-of-bearing. A new diagram (Fig. 2.11) is needed to introduce a fixed directional
reference line pointing North (e.g. as indicated by a gyro compass). If x represents the
target compass course, then the momentary change in z is due only to the momentary
speed-across and is independent of the change of course.
= 1935.	 °/min.	 (2:9)
Similarly, whether a ship is on a dead steady course, yaws about a nominal course or
turns, the speed-across, after correction for range, can always be used in determining the
gun deflection.
22 
'80. Further remarks on action of 24 January 1915' in Secret Packs of the C.-in-C. Grand Fleet.
Operations', ADM 137/1943.
23 Manual of Gunnery 1915, p.173.
24 Technical Comparison (op. cii.) pp.l8, 20 and 36. C V Usborne, Blast and Counterbiast (London, 1935) p.9.
Lord Chatfield, The Xavy and L)efence (London, 1942) pp.109 and 134.
K is own ship's compass course.
x is the enemy's compass bearing.
X13+K
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FIG. 2.11: COMPASs Biurs t CoLSES
In Appendix ifi, extended equations are derived for j, and when courses
are changing. Although approximate (they assume no change of speed in a turn), they
confirm a conclusion implicit in the values for Jutland in the above table. In all tactical
circumstances, turns of a point or more result in substantial changes in range-rate,
deflection or both; in contrast, when courses are steady, rapid changes in range-rate occur
only in limited (and rather uncommon) circumstances, when the speed-across is close to
the sum of the speeds of the two ships. For example, if a 25-knot ship alters course at
20°/mm. with a target abeam, 25 the rate of change of range-rate j due to the turn is
±295 yds/min/min. (the sign depending on the direction of the turn); in contrast, when
Lion's rate of turn did not exceed this value during the Run to the South: 'Record of events during action
of May 31st compiled from records kept in Control Position and Transmitting Station. H.M.S. Lion' in
BTY 6/6, NMM.
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two such ships pass on opposite courses at 16,000 yards, the value of	 due to
speed-across is oniy + 178 yds/min/min.
PLOTTING PRINCIPLES
Keeping the range and deflection required knowledge of enemy speed and
course. Until the invention of inclinometers late in the World War 1,26 neither could not
be measured directly but could only be deduced from observations of enemy ranges and
bearings. As already remarked, ranges when long were liable to spreads of many
hundreds of yards. As shown by the table forJutland, target bearings could change by less
than one degree per minute; yet they had to be measured from ships which, in bad
weather, could experience yaws of as much as 6° in two or three seconds. 27 Clearly, some
form of gyroscopic yaw correction was needed but, even after the adoption of the first
gyrocompasses, accuracy was limited. Despite extensive design changes after it entered
service with the Royal Navy, the Anschütz model still tended to wander slowly by 5-10°
in anything except smooth water. 28 Furthermore, the virtual meridian of any gyrocompass
(the direction in which it settled) was influenced by own course and speed; in the North
Sea, it could change by as much as 2° following a course alteration of 4 points by a
25-knot ship. During the War, Anschütz were replaced by Sperry gyrocompasses, but
the Phillpotts Committee concluded in 1918 that they did not yet 'enable own ship's
motion to be accurately dealt with'. 3° Another source of uncertainty in bearings was that,
until late in the War, bearings could only be transmitted in rather coarse steps of i/o31
British fire control systems experimented with various forms of plotting, either of
enemy course (from which a speed could also be measured) or of target ranges and
bearings separately against time. 32 The latter is also called rate plotting, since the rates can
3° Tec/mira1Hstmy, 1919, pp.30-i.
27 PP (op. cit.) 'The Jupiter Letters' (1906) p.83. 'Fire Control. An Essay by Captain C Hughes-Onslow,
completed August 1909, Section IV, p.5, PLLN 1/5, CC. 	 -
28 A E Fanning, Stea4yAs She Goes (London, 1986) pp.177-8.
3° The Anschiuz Gyro Compass (London: Elliott Brothers, 1910) pp. 69-70 and 91-2, Elliott Archive.
Automatic course correction was available, but only from some makers, by the early 1930s: Fanning (op. cit.)
p.232 and The Gyro-Compass and Gym-Aiot (London: Sperry Gyroscope, c. 1931), author's collection.
3° Fanning, pp.180 and 196-7. Philpotts Committee, 'Report of inspection at York of Pollen Fire Control
System', n.d. but 1918 in DRYR 2/1, CC. A fully satisfactory gyro compass for gunnery purposes was not
developed until WW2: Fanning, pp.233-5.
Technical Histoiy, 1919 (op. cit.) p.27.
32 See Chapters 3 to 5.
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be obtained by measuring the slopes of the plots." Whatever the method, the spreads in
ranges and bearings resulted in a scatter of plotted points; as more points were plotted, a
mean line approximating to the true 'underlying graph' would begin to be perceptible. As
plotting continued, the mean line became a more and more accurate estimate of the
underlying graph;3 " a more precise estimate of angle or slope could be expected if the
underlying graph was a straight line rather than a curve. An advantage of plotting over
calculating the average (manually or mechanically) was that, once the mean line could be
made out, each point could be assessed visually against the general trend and given less
weight if it appeared at all anomalous.
In all four variants of course plotting, the enemy course was represented by a
series of plotted points; as soon as the underlying course could be discerned, the course
angle and speed were measured directly off the plot and set on a Dumaresq or some form
of range-and-bearing clock. All course plots relied on range-bearing pairs, each pair of
values being taken simultaneously. The easiest variant to describe, though the hardest to
implement, was true-course plotting (Fig. 2. 12a).35 On a single sheet, which represented
the sea's surface, the plotter drew own ship's course as a line which reproduced all
changes of direction, whether due to yaw or actual course alterations. Each enemy point
was drawn relative to the position on the plot of own course where the range-bearing pair
had been recorded. The graph underlying the enemy plot was a straight line while he held
his course; if he turned, the new course would be perceptible after a time as a new mean
line. If own ship altered course, in theory the enemy course direction would be
unchanged: though this depended on the meridian of the gyro reference remaining
undisturbed.
A course plotter was much simpler if own course was plotted as a straight line;
this line represented the mean of own course, and, initially, enemy bearings were
measured relative to a gyroscopic reference set parallel to this mean course. Any
subsequent alterations by the enemy could be registered as on the true-course plot.
However, if own ship altered course, the plotter, by design, could only continue to draw a
straight line, advancing the plotting point at a speed proportional to own-speed. In one
" Jon Sumida, In Thfence ofXaval Supremay (London, 1989) p.21 7.
' 'The best that...mathematical processing [like plotting] can do is to reduce uncertainty in inverse
proportion to the square root of the number of (independent) measurements processed': P G Pugh,
'Dreadnought fire control' (unpublished, 22 November 1993), copy gratefully acknowledged.
The choice of these particular relative courses is explained in Chapter 4.
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variant of this 'straight-line' plotting, the bearings continued to be measured relative to the
old course line; thus the technique required a gyroscopic reference which remained
undisturbed by the turn. Fig. 2.12b shows how the true courses illustrated in Fig, 12a
would appear on this type of straight-course plot. The enemy course plotted after own
ship's turn was not the actual course; however, Appendix IV shows that, if a Dumaresq
was set with the apparent enemy course and speed and the enemy bearing measured from
the plot, the instrument showed the correct virtual course and speed: and hence indicated
the correct range-rate and deflection. In a second variant, the gyroscopic reference was
reset to the new course once it had steadied. Through the turn, the plot could trace
approximately the resulting large change in target bearing relative to the keel-line (Fig.
2.1 2c); however, no useful information could be extracted from this portion of the plot; in
effect, plotting began again after the turn was completed.
The simplest course-plot to make was that of virtual course, in which the plotting
ship was represented by a single point. The virtual enemy course was plotted using ranges
and enemy compass bearings: so the directional reference was a compass meridian. Any
change in course or speed by either ship resulted, in general, in a change in virtual course
and speed (Fig. 2.1 2d).
While courses and speeds were steady, the underlying graphs of all course plots
were straight lines. The plotted points were scattered from their correct values by both
range and bearing errors, but, even so, the angle of the enemy course could be measured
directly once the mean course line was perceptible. In contrast, enemy speed could not be
obtained as a graphically-determined mean; estimates had to be calculated from the
distance and time separating pairs of plotted points. However, as shown in Appendix V,
in the worst case, the errors of two points, even if separated in time by two minutes, could
combine to give speed errors of as much as ±50%; thus it was necessary to repeat the
calculation on sufficient pairs until the average of all the calculated speeds converged on a
reliable value. The accuracy of the calculations also depended on how precisely the times
of the individual points could be inferred from information recorded on -the plot (for
Argo's use of minute marks, see Chapter 4).
The alternative to course plotting was rate plotting (Fig. 12e). The two plots were
made independently, so range and bearing observations did not need to be synchronised.
As explained when introducing equation 2:8, the bearing-rate required to determine
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deflection was the rate for target compass-bearings. Ranges from many rangefinders could
be used for the time-and-range plot; furthermore, the range clock, which generated
predicted ranges, could be treated as just another range source. When speed-across was
low, the underlying graphs were almost straight. These were the easiest conditions for
discerning first a mean range and then the mean slopes which indicated the range-rate
and bearing-rate. Once the bearing-rate had been converted (by equation 2:4) into
speed-across, the two rates could be used to set (or to adjust the existing setting of) the
Dumaresq by means of a 'cross-cut'. The instrument was set first for enemy bearing and
own speed. The enemy bar was then pulled out until its pointer lay at the intersection of
the dial graduations for range-rate and speed-across which corresponded with the values
obtained from the plot. This automatically set the Dumaresq for the enemy speed and
course that would produce those rates. 36
 As the plots were continued, their slopes could be
compared with the Dumaresq settings in case the latter required further correction;
predicted ranges could also be compared with those from the rangefinders. If the enemy
altered course, the Dumaresq could be adjusted (in small steps in the manner of rate
spotting corrections) as soon as the changes in the slopes were perceptible. If own ship
turned, the Dumaresq could indicate, at least approximately, the expected changes in the
rates; thus any additional substantial divergence of the plotted rates from those on the
Dumaresq would suggest a simultaneous turn by the enemy. However, a turn by own ship
could also disturb the gyrocompass, which could render the bearing plot of little use;
nonetheless, time-and-range plotting (unlike course plotting) could continue even when
bearings were unavailable.
When courses were steady, course plots were always straight. In comparison, if
the courses were nearly opposite and the two ships were close to the minimum range, the
time-and-range curve was a segment of a sharply curved hyperbola. Thus, with the rate
changing rapidly, it was necessary to measure not the mean slope of the whole plot, but
the slope of the tangent to the most recent part of the mean line. This may have been
possible at medium ranges, where ranges were plentiful and accurate: especially since 'the
observer always has the knowledge of which way the curve must be bending theoretically
to help him'. For example, if the slope was negative, the curvature was greatest for the
36 pp
31 Technical Comparison, p.61. Dreyer and Pollen discussed hyperbolic curves and a 'hyperbolic clock' in
1909 (Chapter 5).
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most recent section of the plot, and the tangent could be drawn accordingly. However, as
ranges increased, so too did their scatter; the worst case arose when plotting began close
to the minimum of the hyperbola and the scatter made it impossible initially to make out
any slope at all. Appendix VI shows that, for two 25-knot ships passing at 16,000 yards,
the rate from the plot could then lag behind the true rate, though by no more than 180
yds/min. At these ranges, the uncertainty in rangefmder ranges was some 300-400 yards;
thus it might take a few minutes before the error became apparent, either in the curvature
of the rangefinder plot or its divergence from the dock (predicted) ranges. It could then be
corrected by stepwise adjustments to range and rate.
In these special circumstances only, rate plotting was slow in obtaining a
sufficiently accurate range-rate. Otherwise, however, rate plotting possessed two distinct
advantages over course plotting. Firstly, the scatter of points on the course plot was
greater because they were displaced by the errors in both range and bearing; furthermore,
since the time-and-range plot could record ranges from many sources, it also had many
more points. Thus the mean lines through the rate plots could normally be discerned well
before the mean enemy course line of the course plot. Secondly, and more decisively,
even after the mean enemy course could be made out, it was very unlikely that a reliable
enemy speed could be obtained immediately; a further delay was required to average out
the speed errors over additional pairs of points sufficiently separated in time. Thus, except
perhaps when the speed-across was exceptionally high, the Dumaresq could be set sooner
from rate plots than from a course plot: and, subsequently, the rate plots would continue
to give more accurate values.
HIT OR MISS
At the long range of 16,000 yards, the angle of impact of a 13.5-inch shell from
Lion was 15°. Assuming that the enemy was broadside on, any shell with a trajectory
between that ending at the engaged side's water-line and that grazing the top of the
superstructure on the opposite side would make a hit. Fig. 2.13 shows That this was
equivalent to a spread in range equal to the target width plus the danger-space e.g. for
Lutow as target, about 67 yards at 16,000 yards (138 yards at 8,000 yards). Thus the
effective target lay in the area covered by the target waterline extended on the
non-engaged side by the danger-space. Since Iions salvo spread for range was at least 300
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Target beam Danger space I
Target width
Target width 67 yds.
Range variation not affecting
probabilityof hitting — 100 yds.
Salvo spread 300 yds.
FIG. 2.13: DANGER SPACE
yards at 16,000 yards, the gun-range could vary by about 100 yards with little effect on
the probability of hitting. This, not the danger space alone, provides an indication of the
accuracy to which the range had to be determined. 38
 In any case, there was no point in
striving for accuracies better than the errors detectable by spotting. Wartime experience
established that the minimum spotting correction for range should normally be 200 yards
(though 100 yards was allowed if the target had already been straddled) and for rate, 100
yds/min.39
 The uncertainties in ranges and bearings, and the additional errors arising
from the use of some form of plotting to obtain rates, meant that the initial errors were
likely to exceed substantially these minimum corrections. Success in battle then had to
rely on the skill of the control officer in reconciling the imperfectly predicted ranges and
rates with what he could see of the target and the fall of his salvoes. Long range gunnery
in the dreadnought era was, quite literally, a hit and miss affair.
Danger space was defined as the distance beyond a 30 ft. high target (a typical superstructure height):
Range Tables 1918, p.7. However, in 'The Quest for Reach' Sumida. states: 'For the purposes of this paper,
the plus-or-minus margin for [range] error was considered to be half the danger space' and concludes that
the range tolerance at 15,000 yards was only 13 yards: Stephen Chiabotti (ed.) Toolthgfr War: Militarj
Transformation in the IndustrialAge (Chicago, 1996) pp.50 and 82.
Spoethzg Risks 1916, pp.8 and 14. See also '14. Fire Control Organisation', Home Fleet General Orders,
5 November 1913, p.3, DRAX 1/9.
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RAtIO OR RANGE RACK TO RANGE PINION 	 45t1
DEFlECTION ARS RADIUS	 IS 25'
OCRIEC1ION WORN FIlCH I ISIS OIJUDRURI.0 lUNEP.0
RATIO OF OEFLIC1ION UIALTO oerI.LcFION WORN 70 TO I
I. DIRECT-ACTION Gur'4 SIGI-rr
To eliminate mechanical backlash, the whole sight was damped directly on the gun trunnion. As
the range-drum was rotated to set the range, the telescope elevation was altered by the action of a
pinion on the curved rack.
Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Addenda (1909) to Gwuzey Manual Vots. I (Part)) and III, November 1909, Plate
XXVA, NMM.
2. Durvtuus
The Dumaresq Mark I was very similar to the instrument as patented.
As shown in ig. 1, the instrument is set for a target directly on the starboard beam. The enemy
course is either parallel (enemy model drawn with solid lines) or diverging at about 600 (dashed
lines).
The disc is graduated for deflection in knots and for range-rate in 'seconds to change 50 yards'.
On later versions, range-rate was shown in yards-per-minute.














Inner and outer range scales were graduated in 25-yard steps. One of three sets of numerals were
visible through the small windows; thus the scales could be read from 2,000-6,000: 6,000-10,000
or 10,000-14,000 yards.
Scales and numerals were rotated together with the handle shown to the left; this was used to
apply spotting corrections with the aid of the outer range scale. One turn of the handle changed
the range by 100 yards.
Range-rates (by 1909 expressed in yards-per-minute) were set by means of the handle and scale
shown to the right.
Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Addenda (1909) to Gunnery Manual Vols. I (Pan I) and III, November 1909, p.54
and Plate XXXVII, NMM.
3PROGRESS IN GUNNERY
I suppose the years from 1904 to 1914 covered more real material progress in naval
weapons and equipment than any other ten year period, before or since.1
At the start of this decade of progress in gunnery,2
 few ships had more than a short-base
rangefmder and some sight telescopes to use in their long-range firings. By its close, the
latest dreadnoughts were being fitted with Dreyer Tables and Directors. However, most of
the battle-fleet depended on a simpler, manually-worked system comprising instruments
which, in several cases, had their origins even before 1904. The purpose of this chapter is
to examine how these devices originated and were developed by the Royal Navy and its
suppliers: and thereby to establish the technical and organisational context in which the
rivalry between Pollen and Dreyer was played out.
Under the Controller, the Director of Naval Ordnance and Torpedoes
(customarily abbreviated to DNO) 'is generally responsible to the Board of Admiralty in
regard to...the armament of the Fleet [and] all matters connected with the Ordnance and
Torpedo material of the Navy'. His deputy, the Assistant Director of Torpedoes, had his
own staff to deal with torpedo matters; the DNO also had a large staff concerned with the
inspection of guns and mountings. However, only a few officers within his department
Hugh Clausen, 'Design and the Conditions which Influence It', Notes based on two lectures to the
N 0 D in March 1947, p.!, CLSN 3/1, CC. Clausen designed the prototype GDT gear with Lieut.J S
Dove during WWI and afterwards the M-type receiver motor and the Admiralty Fire Control Clock. From
1936, he was Chief Technical Adviser to the Director of Naval Ordnance. See also Lord Chatfield, The
Xazy andDçfence (London, 1942) pp.30-1.
2 From July 1903, the Half re4y Summaries of Paigress m Gunnei'y kept the gunnery officers of the fleet
informed of the latest developments. There is an incomplete run, the earliest issue being No. 7 ofJuly 1906,
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were assigned to the development of new material; 3 for example, under Captain H D
Barry, DNO from October 1903 to February 1905, Commander Lynes had sole
responsibility for experimental work on non-transferable mountings, sighting gear,
rangefinders, firing gear and communications. The DNO and his assistants 4 could,
however, call on the resources of the gunnery and torpedo schools at Portsmouth, HMS
E'xellent and HMS Vernon, the latter providing special expertise in all electrical matters.5
The Captain of Excellent was also regarded as 'the principal Admiralty Experimental
Officer',6 a role in which he was assisted by his Experimental Commander. 7 One of their
duties was to examine and report on the 'innumerable inventions' submitted to the
Admiralty.8
An annual long range gunnery practice at 6,000 yards had been introduced in
1901 but, without proper instruments or training of gun crews, Percy Scott was probably
justified in describing it as 'trying to run before we can walk'.'° In April 1903, Scott was
appointed Captain of Ercellent." In September, the Admiralty agreed to trials of 'the
various methods of Controlling, Directing and Ranging Gun Fire in Action' then in use
afloat,'2 the ships selected being Victorious (Channel Squadron) and Venerable
(Mediterranean fleet). Their Joint Report,' 3 with some qualifications submitted by Scott,'4
established the requirements which led to the first complete set of instruments for long
range gunnery: and, with one exception, these were ready for the first, experimental
cruise of HMS Dreadnought in early 1907.
They appear in the Nazy List as 'Assistants to the DNO'.
Their dose working relationship is described in Frederic Dreyer, The Sea Hentage (London, 1955), p.57.
C I Thomas, Insttiictions for the Director ofaval Ordnance and Torpedoes and Assistant Director of Torpedoes, 24
September, 1907. Paper prepared by the Director ofjVaval Ordnance and Torpedoes for the Infoimation of his Successor,
February, 1905, p.25-6. Professor Surnida has lodged a set of copies of these reports by DNOs for their
successors in the Admiralty Library and the present author is most grateful for the opportunity to make his
own copies.
6 Lord Selborne to Senior Naval Lord, 12 May 1904, MS. Selborne 41, f.158, Bodleian Library, Oxford.
R Travers Young, The House that Jack Built (Aldershot, 1955) Chapter 10.
8 Reginald Tupper, Reminiscences (London, 1929) p.183.
Manualof Gunnery (Vom)forHisMajesy'sFket 1901 (London, 1901) p.382,Ja254, AL
'° Percy Scott, 'Remarks on...Straight Shooting...' 28 February 1902 in Gunnery (lectures privately printed
1905), p.11, copy in the Craig Wailer papers. The author is most grateful to Commander Michael Craig
Wailer for the opportunity to examine his father's papers.
Peter Padfield, Aim Straight (London, 1966) pp.95-107.
12 Admiralty letter 5 September 1903 in 'Communication and Control of Gunfire in Action' in ADM
1/7756. DNO's submission 7 June 1902 in '3116: Systems of Communication to Guns' in Principal Qyestions
dealwith byL ectorofXavalOrdnance,JanuarytoDecemberl905, p.418, PQ16, HRO.
' 3 joint Report of the Mediterranean and Channel Committees on Methods of controlling Gun Fire in Action, 16 May 1904,
p.12 in ADM 1/7758.
' Percy Scott, Remarks of the Captain of "Excellent" on the Joint Report of the Mediterranean awL Channel Committees on
the Control ofEwe, 2July 1904 in ADM 1/7758.
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ARETHUSA TO DREADNOUGHT
RANGEFINDERS
Following the developments in gun materials, construction, propellants and
mountings made in the later 1880s,' 5 the Admiralty took the first step towards increasing
the range at sea by issuing a requirement for a rangefinder accurate to 3% at 3,000
yards)6 In comparative trials in HMS Arethusa in April 1892, the Barr and Stroud
coincidence rangefinder, which had been designed in 1888, proved superior. With orders
in hand from the British and foreign navies, the two professors were able to establish their
company in Glasgow; 'by March 1898 the firm had sold over 150 of their rangefmders
around the world'.'7
The Manual of Gunneiy 1901 confirms that Barr and Stroud instruments, mainly
the improved Mark H, otherwise FA2, were then in full service, 18 though they were
inadequate at long range' 9 and, since 1899, the Admiralty had been attempting to procure
a more accurate rangefinder.2° In 1903, Barr and Stroud introduced a new model, the
FA3, with nearly twice the previous accuracy; the Joint Reports of both Committees
recommended that it could 'be usefully employed up to even 8,000 yards', particularly if
given fmer graduations, 'but for the longer ranges...it is necessary that an even better one
should be obtained'. 2 ' In 1904, the Admiralty decided to advertise again; the products of
several suppliers, including Barr and Stroud, were being considered in 190523 and, by July
1906 'satisfactory trials have been carried out with a rangefinder produced by Barr and
' Peter Padfield, Guns at Sea (London, 1971) pp. 194-7. Ian Hogg and John Batchelor, .1'faval Guns (Poole,
1978) pp.93-101. lain McCallum, 'Achilles Heel? Propellants and High Explosives, 1880-1916' in War
Studies Journal, Volume 4, Issue 1, Summer 1999, pp. 65-9.
' Jon Sumida, InDejènceoff'favalSupremacy (London, 1989) p.72.
' Michael Moss and lain Russell, Rarge and Vision (Edinburgh, 1988) pp.24-32.
' Manual of Gunnerj (IWwne 1) for His Majesy's Fleet 1901 (London, 1901) p.138.
19 
'Schemes of Communication', n.d. but 1903, f. 10 in 'Communication and Control' (op. cit.). Admiralty,
Gunnery Branch, Interim Report of the Mediten-anean Committee on the Control of Fire, &c, forwarded 18 February
1904, pp.20 and 21 in ADM 1/7756.
20 
'We have been now for the last five years been trying to get a more accurate rangefinder'. Admiral W H
May (Controller), 1 3July 1904 in 'Report of Committees on Control of Fire' in ADM 1/7758.
21 Joint Report of the Mediten-anean and Channel Committees relative to the System of Finng and Allocation ofAmmunition,
30 May 1904, p.2 in ADM 1/7759. Joint Report...conhv&ng Gun Fire (op. cit.) p.12. From 6-10,000 yards, the
Mark III was graduated in 500 yard steps.
F C Dreyer and C V Usborne, Pollen Aim Corrector System. Part k Technical Histwy and Comparison unth
Commander F.CDryer's Fire Contivl System, February 1913, p.4, P. 1024, AL
DXO for Successor (op. cit.) February 1905, p.14. The other suppliers were Dunlop & Grubb, Stevenson
and Lawrence & Capper.
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Stroud having a 9-foot base...'. 24
 Sufficient were ordered to fit two of these instruments
(designated FQ2) in the latest all-big-gun ships. 25 The new instrument further secured
Barr and Stroud's position as, in effect, the monopoly supplier; at £325, the FQ2 was not
inexpensive, but the firm refused to compromise on quality or price.26
GUN SIGI-rrs
On 4 May 1898 (just over a year before the famous prize-firing by Sylla, Captain
Percy Scott),27
 the Ordnance Committee decided to seek the advice of Dr A A Common
FRS, a Past President of the Royal Astronomical Society and an eminent optician, on the
best form of telescope for use with automatic sights. From 1900 onwards, telescopes were
purchased in quantity, either through Common or direct from manufacturers, including
Barr and Stroud? Initially, priority was given to fitting the more mobile hand-worked
guns before turret guns but, by the end of 1903, the supply of 'one [telescopic sight] per
gun, 12-pr. and above, is now nearly complete...' while 'Money has been provided in the
1904-05 Estimates for...the supply, to all existing 6-inch guns, of a second telescope (the
variable power [by Ross])'.3°
Unfortunately, fitting telescopes to old mountings only served to emphasise the
mechanical imperfections of their indirect sights. 3 ' After the introduction of a semi-direct
type for the King Edward VII class, a new direct-action sight was designed for the paired
9.2-inch and 12-inch turrets of the Lord Yelsan class; since it was mounted directly on the
trunnions, backlash due to mechanical linkages was eliminated. 32
 In reality, the first five of
24 Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, HdfThly Summary ofProgress in Gunnery, Mo.?, Juy 1906, p.15,Ja 238, AL.
23 SPG (op. cii.) January 1907, p.23. DM0for Successor,July 1907, p.26.
3° Range and Vision (op. cit.) pp.39,44 and 54-6.
27 Percy Scott, Fj/ly r in the Royal .Wazy (London, 1919) p.88. These memoirs must be treated sceptically:
John Brooks, 'Percy Scott and the Director' in David McLean and Antony Preston (eds.) Warship 1996
(London, 1996) pp.15 I-2 and 167-70.
3° Report by Lt. Craig and DNO to Captain of Excellent, 30 November 1900 in 'New Pattern Telescopic
Sight for Barbette and Turret Guns' in ADM 1/7686.
3° 'Proceedings of the Ordnance Council...26th February 1903' in Ordnance Council Cases 1901-1902-1903 in
ADM 1/8222. An award of £1,000 to Dr Common was recommended in connection with the use of his
patents. At £4/il / 10, Barr and Stroud's was the lowest price.
3° Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Manual of Gunnery for Flu Majesly's Ships VoL I, 1901, Addenda (1902),
December 1902, p.26, Ja 254, AL DM0 for Successor, December, 1903, p.1 4. For the build-up in
expenditure on sights, see Jon Sumida, 'The Quest for Reach' in Lt. Col. S D Chiabotti (ed.) Tooling for
War Military Transfonnation in the IndustnalAge (Chicago, 1996) p.56 and footnote 24.
' Joint Report...Allocation of Ammunition and Scott, Fj/iy rears. pp.1 82-5. For delays to resighting older ships
caused by Scott's interference, see Brooks, 'Scott and the Director', p.152. (All op. cit.)
' DYOfor Successor, February 1905. p.15.
PROGRESS Th4 Guism y 	 53
the B.VIH mountings were installed in Dreadnought,33 which was therefore the first ship
afloat with this new type of precision telescopic sight (Plate 1).
More accurate sights warranted precise calibration for the individual
characteristics of each gun. An allowance of ammunition for calibration had been
authorised in October 1904 but, once again, Scott considered this premature. In 1905, as
soon as a ship with accurate sights was available (Commonwealth of the iCing Edward VII
class), a Calibration Committee was appointed, with Scott, now Inspector of Traget
Practice (ITP) as President. In August 1905, their recommendations were promulgated to
the FleetM and, by 1907, six calibration ranges had been established world-wide.35
ELECTRICAL Fu Coi'moL INSTRUMENTS
While the Royal Navy was still dependent on voice-pipes for the communication
of range and orders, in 1894 Barr and Stroud began the development of electrical
instruments for this purpose. Their first customer was the Imperial Japanese Navy in
1898, the Royal Navy ordering their first set a year later. 36
 Further sets were purchased
for the experiments in Venerable and ctoiiou,37 but the Joint Report described them as
'somewhat complicated and cumbersome'; it also recommended that the instruments of
other manufacturers should be tried and that, in future, ranges should be displayed 'as on
a cyclometer' rather than on circular dials. 38
 Barr and Stroud had already submitted
proposals for a double-dial range instrument which could transmit ranges in 25-yard steps
up to 12,000 yards. 39
 For the moment, this improvement was enough to retain the
Admiralty's custom; in February 1905, the outgoing DNO reported that Barr and Stroud
range and order instruments were being bought as quickly as possible and, eventually,
fifteen ships were fltted. However, they were judged 'clumsy and not all we would
" Peter Hodges, The Bg Gun (London, 1981) p.51. John Roberts, The Battleship Dreadnought (London, 1992)
p.28.
Captain of Excellent to DNO, 7 March 1903, Scott to DNO, 17 October 1904, etc. in 'Calibration of
Guns. Report of Committee &c in ADM 1/7835. Compare with the later account in Scott, Fyy Tears,
pp.180-i.
D.WOforSuccessor,July 1907, p.26.
Range and Vision, pp.34-5. 'Schemes of Communication' (op. cit.) p.10.
Controller to Admiral Superintendent, Chatham, 25 October 1903 in 'Communications and Control'.
Mediterranean Interim Report (op. cit.) p.5.
JoiztReport...coninilling Gunfire, pp.11-12.
Correspondence in 'Barr and Stroud electrical Transmitters and Receivers... 1903-04' in ADM 1/7760.
Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Handbookfor Fire Conimi Inrtruments 1906, pp.8-10 in PLLN 1/8, CC.
4° DI'/OforSuccessor,July 1907, p.18.
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wish',4' probably because, although on the step-by-step principle (which required only a
few wires between transmitter and receiver), the instruments relied on spring-powered
clockwork and an electrically-operated escapement.
Barr and Stroud were not, however, without rivals. Even in 1902, the Admiralty
were considering fire control instruments from Messrs. Cory of New York (as fitted in the
Illinois), Eversheds and a design by Captain Grenfell. 42
 By February 1905, Vernon had tried
types by Effiott Brothers, Watkin, Thorp, Chatham E.E. and others, though none had
proved satisfactory. Siemens Brothers were offering direct-working (synchronous)
instruments 3
 invented by a Mr Grimstone but, despite promising early trials, a different
design from the German Siemens-Halské firm was selected subsequently for use in
nineteen pre-dreadnoughts. Meanwhile, in early 1905, trials were beginning of a new
step-by-step instruments submitted by Vickers, though the design was strongly influenced
by Percy Scott. 45
 The electric pulses from the transmitter alone powered the receiver
motor, while its rotor could take up only four stable positions.° This technical advance
enabled Vickers to supplant Barr and Stroud and, eventually, 42 ships had complete
Vickers installations; an installation for HMS Illustrious (Majestic class) cost £1,242. The list
was headed by Dreadnought herseli47
TI-LE DUMARESQ
Lieutenant John Dumaresq may have invented his instrument in 1 902 but he
was still developing it in May 1904, after it had been tried by the fire control committee in
DXOfor Successor, February 1905, p.19.
42 Minutes by the Controller 1 August and DNO 18 September 1902 in Principal Qj.estzons by IWO 1905 (op.
cit.) pp.41 8-9. For Grenfell's instruments, see also 'Schemes of Communication', p.9.
Synchronous instruments, unlike the step-by-step type, could not get out of step but they required many
more wires between transmitter and receiver.
" W H May, 13 July 1904 (op. cit.). 0Report on Range and Order Telegraphs and on Sight Moving Gear',
12 August 1904 in 'Barr and Stroud's Transmitters and Receivers' (op. cit.). DXO for Successor, February
1905 p.1 9,July 1907 p.18 and November 1909 pp.14 and 19. Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Handbook ofFire
Control Instruments, 1914, pp.1 1-3, NMM and ADM 186/191.
Scott, 'Gunnery Lecture No. IV', 28 February 1905 in G'unneiy (op. cit.) p.53. Principal Qesti4nzs by IWO
1905, p.460. For Scott's royalties on these instruments, see Brooks, 'Scott and the Director', p.1 52.
Fuw Control Instruments 1906 (op. cit.) p.19.
Principal Qyestions dealt with by Director ofNaval Ordnance January to December 1906, p.749, PQ 16, HRO. IWO
for Successor, November 1909, pp.14 and 17. The Vickers installation comprised range, order and deflection
instruments. For the Dreadnought installation, see Captain R H Bacon, Report on Experimental Cruise, March
1907, pp.27, 83, 85, 101, 103 and App. HG V, ADM 116/1059.
'Recommendation of the Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors', 30 October 1925 reproduced in
Anthony Pollen, The Great Gunnery &andal (London, 1980) p.252.
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his own ship, the ñous. Although two other 'Rate of Change' instruments were
mentioned by the Mediterranean Committee, 5° the Jciint Report recommended the
adoption only of the Dumaresq, for control tops, turrets and 6-inch groups, noting
specifically that it 'combines rate of change and deflection'. 5 ' The first Service model
Dumaresq (Plate 2 - later known as the Mark 1) was graduated for deflection in knots but
the range rate was expressed in seconds to change 50 yards,52
 the most convenient units
while the range was kept only with the aid of a stop-watch. 53
 This and later models were
manufactured by Elliott Brothers, who paid the fees when the device was patented
(though in Dumaresq's name) in August, 1 904? This marks an early success for a firm
which was later to supply many more of the Royal Navy's fire control instruments.
By mid-i 906, 'a design is also being got out of an instrument of greater size'
though this was not, apparently, ready in time for Dreadnought's first experimental cruise.
By mid-1907, 'from two to six of these instruments are supplied to electrical fire control
ships...half being of the large Mark II size and half small Mark
Scorr/VIcKs CLOCK
In a lecture delivered in December 1903, Percy Scott gave the first description of
a range clock comprising an indicator hand moving round a circular range scale at a rate
which could be continuously adjusted (Plate 4); the range scale could be rotated to set the
initial range and to apply spotting corrections. In April 1904, Scott's associates at
Vickers applied for a patent which described a number of alternative designs, all based on
variable speed drives, including the disc-and-roller eventually adopted. 59
 Despite Scott's
hopes,6° no clock had been completed for trial by the committees on fire control, though
'Draft Report of the Channel Fleet Fire Control Committee', 21 April 1904, p.4 in 'Report of
Committees on Control of Fire' in ADM 1/7758.
5° Mediterranean Intenm Repoil, p.16.
Joint Repot..consrolllng Gu, pAl. At the time, Dumaresq was serving aboard HMS Victorious.
SPG, July 1906, p.23 states that a description was promulgated in the summary forJuly, 1904. A patent
(17,719) was applied for on 15 August 1904.
5°JoüzL Report, p.11. Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Fue ConbvL A Summary of the &esent Positwn of the Sulject,
October 1904, p.8 in ADM 1/7760.
' G K B Elphinstone, 'Dumaresq Designs & Patents. Notes as to History',January 1916 in 'Fire Control
Apparatus, Various Patents', ADM 1/8464/181. Patent 17,719 of 1904, applied for 15 August 1904.
5° SPG,3I4Y 1906, p.23.
5° Experimental Cnise (op. cit.) pp. 28 and 95.
JJNOfir
 Successor,July 1907, p.20.
5° Scott, 'Remarks on Long Range Hitting', 15 December 1903 in Guimezy, p.27 and Plate II.
5° Patent 9461 of 1904 applied for 25 April 1904, complete (with figures) 24 February 1905 though without
any details of the dockwork drive.
° Scott toJellicoe (Captain of Drake) 2January 1904 in 'Report of Committees...' in ADM 1/7758.
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the Channel Committee still recommended his proposal rather than an earlier design by
Lieutenant Fawcet Wray. 6 ' The first Scott/Vickers clock was probably completed in 1905
while, by mid-1906, delivery was awaited of the first, large production order of 246.62 On
her experimental cruise, Dreadnought had several (probably three) Vickers clocks in her
transmitting station, sufficient to allow some of her turrets to be controlled independently
if required.63
Of the Dumaresq, Scott remarked:
I do not think that machines to calculate the rate of change in distance will be of much
use, their working must depend upon what you estimate the relative speeds and courses
to be.
Instead, he proposed that the range rate should be 'obtained by Range Finding and
timing, or guessed'; by 1906, fmding the rate by timing was accepted as one 'of the two
principal methods of ascertaining and keeping the rate',65
 though, at long range with
4'/2-foot rangefinders, it was considered no more accurate than using a Dumaresq with
estimated enemy speed and course. Scott also suggested that: 'If the fall of shot shows that
too much or too little change in range is being applied, the rate can be altered'; this is
the first mention of what was later called rate spotting: but Scott did not say how the rate
might be altered, any more than he explained how to obtain an opening deflection
without a Dumaresq. Scott concurred with the view in Venerable's interim report that the
contemporary 4'/2-foot rangefinders could give an approximate indication of the opening
range, but that the target could only be found by spotting.67
6! 
'Channel Draft Report' (op. cit.) p.6. Report by Lieut. A V Vyvyan in R A Burt, Bntish Battleships
1889-1904 (London, 1988) p.45-51. The writer is indebted to Professor Sumida for this reference.
62	 Ji4y 1906, p.22. The clock is not mentioned in DJ'fOfor Successor, February 1905. 'Quest for Reach'
(op. cia) p.11, citing Scott's lecture, states that the first clocks had been tested by the end of 1903.
63 Progress in Gunnery, January 1907, p.3!. Experimental those, pp.83 and 101.
Scott, 'Long Range Hitting', pp. 27-8.
SPG, July 1906, pp.39 and 42. See also 'Memorandum by Director of Naval Ordnance on Towing
Targets' inXa?yEstwzates Committee. Report upon Xauy Eslomatesfor 1908-9, Admiralty, November 1907, FISR
8/11, CC.
Scott, 'Long Range Hitting' (op. cit.) p.27.
67 Mediterranean Inteijen Report, p.22. Scott, Remarks on the Joisu Report (op. cit.) pp.2 and 12. For the necessity to
spot shorts, see Scott, 'Lecture IV' (op. cit.) p.51. Scott's reservations about contemporary rangefinders and
the Dumaresq (the latter set by estimation and used with a stop-watch to keep the range) seem insufficient
grounds for Sumida's view ('Quest for Reach', pp.1 0-11) that opinion was polarised into 'spotting and
instrument factions'.
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DREADNOUGI-IT
By 1906, the supply of almost all the fire control instruments for Dreadnought had
been arranged. However, after successful experiments aboard Duke of Edinburgh, it was
decided that, in future, the clocks and the range and deflection transmitters to the
individual turrets should be moved below to a Transmitting Station (TS), protected by
armour, near the base of each mast. The TS would be connected by a large diameter
voice pipe to its top, where the rangefinder and Dumaresq remained, 'the initial range
and spotting corrections and deflection being passed by voice pipes and the "rate" by
special electrical transmitters'. On her experimental cruise Dreadnought was fitted with an
improvised TS above the armoured deck; also, she had to rely only on voice pipe
communication from the top, the new range-rate instruments not being yet available. But,
with this one exception, Dreadnought was fitted with all the new fire control instruments
which had been developed in the preceding years.
Despite her many novelties, in one respect Dreadnought was no different from her
predecessors. In October 1906, the report on Dreadiiwught's gun trials noted that 'it is
extremely difficult to readily obtain a slow movement of the guns in elevation which is
required to follow the small roll or to keep the sights on at the bottom or top of a larger
roll', while the training gear was 'not good enough to keep the sights continuously on for
fire at a moving object when the ship is under way'. 69
 Thus the continuous aim necessary
for salvo firing was impossible with any motion on the ship. Even in the calm conditions
of the Experimental Cruise, on two runs Dreadnought ranged with a single gun and fired a
single salvo: but then, presumably due to induced roll, followed after more than a minute
with a four-gun ripple.70
SPG,Janwy 1907, pp. 26-8.
'Report of Gun Trials' 23 October 1906, Ship's Cover 21 3A/82, Dreadnought, NMM.
70 Expenmental Cruise, pp.96-9. The intervals between the salvoes and the first rounds of the subsequent
ripples were 65 and 63 secs., respectively. The duration of the ripples were 16 and 12 secs. In The Sea
Henkige (op. cit.) p.57, Frederic Dreyer claimed that the guns could be reloaded every 30 secs. (the reported
average was 33 secs.) and that salvoes could be fired every 15 seconds, but the latter figure is not
substantiated by the report on the cruise or any other known source.
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INDOMiTABLE TO THE INDEFATJGABLFS
LAYING ANt) TRAINING
Even before Dreadnought had been laid down, CaptainJohnJellicoe, DNO since
February 1905, fully appreciated that effective fire control for the new ships depended on
salvo firing7 ' and he had already initiated a programme to improve the hydraulic
elevating and training gear, so that turret guns could be aimed continuously. 72
 While the
Manual of Gunnery 1907 (written, of course, for a pre-dreadnought fleet) admitted that 'no
facilities exist at present for keeping "continuous aim" with turret guns', 73
 in July1907,
Jellicoe was able to report to his successor, Captain Reginald Bacon, that experiments by
&cellenl had established that:
...with suitably shaped elevating [valve] ports, worked by wheel elevation gear, it is
possible to "hunt the roll" with hydraulically controlled mountings to the same extent as
is at present possible with hand-worked mountings.74
Fisher was able to claim 'a tremendous irnprovement...in the controlling apparatus for
power-worked guns' and to announce that 'Provision has been made in the 1908-09
Estimates to fit this gear to all the hydraulic turrets in the Service'. 75
 Development
continued76
 and, by May 1912, the outgoing DNO could report that 'it is arranged for
1911-12 ships [Iron Duke class and liger] to have a speed of elevating of 50 per second with
one turn of handwheel'.77
Continuous aim also depended on continuous training of the whole turret.
Dreadnought's turrets were trained by a pair of 3-cylinder hydraulic engines. 78
 These
engines were controlled by a lever-operated reversing valve and a separate 'creep-valve',
worked by a wheel; this proved 'very awkward' in use, making 'continuous laying for fire
'Admiral Scott's proposals for "Dreadnought", 17 August 1905 in 'Director for Turret Firing' in ADM
1/7955. Brooks, 'Scott arid the Director', p.l55.
72 Correspondence between the Admiralty and Vickers,July to December 1905 in 'Dreadnought and Lord
Nelson & Minotaur Class. Fitting of Single Lever gear and Creep valves to 12" and 92' Mountings' in
ADM 1/7896.
" Manual of Gunnery VoLIIIforHisMajesy's Fleet 1907, p.37,Ja254, AL
DXOfor Successor,July 1907, p.15. SPGJz4y 1907, p.10 and January 1908, p.6.
" The One Calibre Big Gun Arnamen:for Ships, priritedJune 1908, pp.11-12, ADM 1/7898 and FISR 8/31:
confirmed by DXOfor Successor, November 1909, p.7. See further John Brooks, 'All-Big-Guns: Fire Control
and Capital Ship Design 1903-1909' in War Studies Journal, Vol.1, Iss.2, pp.36-52.
76 D.WOfor Successor, November 1909, p.1 1. .STG 1910, p.5 and 1911, p.6.
" DJ'/Ofor Successor, May 1912, p.8.
78 Roberts, Dreadnought (op. cii.) pp.218-221 and 225.
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almost impossible except under very favourable conditions'. 79
 Eventually, Portsmouth
Dockyard designed a satisfactory training control in which a single wheel operated both
the reversing and creep valves; by November 1909, both Dreadnought and InJlexibk (the
latter having the same training arrangements) had been refitted with wheel training gear
on these lines.80
To obtain more even training torque, in 1906 Elswick (EOC) developed a
6-cylinder rotary engine, which was first installed in HIJMS Kashima. For British ships,
Portsmouth again worked out a design for a control valve operated by a single wheel. The
new control and engine, the latter rotating the turrets through a worm drive, was adopted
for the battlecruiser Indomitabk, the Bellerophon class and later ships. 8 ' During gun trials in
1908, the new gear in Indomitable showed a marked reduction in throw-off and good
control of starting, stopping and creep with little effort on the handwheel; whereas, with
Inflexible's Vickers turrets, which retained the older 3-cylinder training engines: 'a marked
feature...was the poor training control. The creep...is jerky: the turrets do not start or stop
with precision [and] the reversal of direction is erratic'. 82
 A further improvement in
"sweetness" of control' of training was obtained with the introduction (again by Elswick)
of the swash-plate engine, 83
 7-cylinder engines of this type being adopted for the turrets of
Hercules, Colossus and later classes.
Thus, by 1912, the guns mobility was transformed, so that that:
...in "Orion" all gunlayers [are] able to follow a roll of 12 degrees out to out without
difficulty and some a roll of 16 degrees to 18 degrees out to out.
Fu Co1moL INsTRuMENrs AND GuNsIGJ-rrs
By mid-1907, Barr and Stroud had recaptured the lead in fire control
instruments; compared with the Vickers instruments in Dreadnought, their Mark [1
Commander A W Craig, 'Hydraulic Training Gear', H.M.S. "Excellent", 23 December 1907, para.20.
This report is the principal source for this section. The author is indebted to Commander Michael Craig
Wailer for a copy of this report, written while his father was Experimental Commander in Excellent.
80 SPG, January 1909, p.'1 and IJWOfor Successor, November 1909, pp.7-8.
Craig, Hydraulic Traimng Gear (op. cit.) paras. 31F and 35. DNO's Minute 13 March 1906 in Ships' Cover
222, Bellemphon Class.
82 
'Reports of Gun Trials of HMS Indomitable 23 April 1908 and HMS Inflexible 18 June 1908' in Ships'
Cover 215A/51 and 52, Ini,incible class.
83 SPG, July 1909, pp.27-29 for the experimental 10-cylinder engine in Superb.
84 DXOfor Successor, November 1909, p.11. Hodges, Big Gun (op. cit.) pp.54 and 62.
Captain A. Craig, 'Rough Weather Test Firing, HMS Orion', 15 November 1912 in Craig Wailer
Papers. 'The term "continuous laying" is used in the sense that the sights are kept approximately laid and
can be brought exactly on by a small movement when about to fire.'
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instruments were judged to be better electrically than and generally very satisfactory.
They were chosen for the Invincible class and a later variant, the Mark JJ*, for the
Belkrophon and SL Vincent classes: while, by the end of 1909, the unsatisfactory Mark I
range and order instruments were being replaced by Mark us, a process which had been
completed by 1912.87 However, Vickers fortunes would soon revive and Xeptune was the
last dreadnought to be equipped entirely by Barr and Stroud.
In the transmitting stations of the first dreadnoughts, a clock operator would 'call
the 25s and also call the range every time a full hundred yards is reached': while the
transmitter men (one per turret) would rotate the transmitter handles at each 25 yard step.
At the guns, the sight-setters then had to read the ranges and deflections off the receivers
and set the sights accordingly. It must have been difficult to keep up when the range-rate
was high; for example, if the rate was 600 yds/min., the range changed by 25 yards every
2½ seconds. Some help could be provided in the TS by connecting the multiple
transmitters mechanically; this was first tried in 1908,89 after which this 'cross-connecting
gear' (Plate 5) was widely fitted in pre-dreadnoughts and in dreadnoughts up to Xeptune.9°
However, the greater problem was at the guns, as had been recognised since 1904. Two
proposals were then under consideration for setting sights automatically with ranges and
deflections transmitted from the TS. The first was due to lieutenant A V Vyvyan and Mr
L Newitt, Electrical Engineer at Chatham Dockyard; the second was initially from
Siemens Brothers, though, encouraged by the Admiralty, they soon reached a
collaborative agreement with Vickers. 9 ' Unfortunately, despite several years effort, neither
group was successful; by mid-1907, a Siemens-Vickers electrically set sight had been
tried but rejected and the Vyvyan-Newitt sight was also about to be abandoned.93
D.VO for Successor, July 1907, p.21. The Barr and Stroud did not use a commutator in the receiver:
Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Handbook ofFire Control Instruments 1909, p.23,Ja345a, AL Patent 4422/1906.
87 DJ1Ofor Successor, November 1909, pp.14 and 17 and May 1912, p.14.
Errors in sight ranges of 50 yards were common: Staff of Inspector of Target Practice, 'Battle Practice,
1909', Lecture 1, f.7, MS 19, Excellent Historical Library, copy courtesy of Prof. Sumida.
Experzmental Cruise, pp. 83-4. Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Fm' Control, 1908, pp.3Z.3, 45, 49 and
Enclosure XVin ADM 1/8010 and T.173/91 Part I.
9° Fire Control Instruments, 1909 (op. cit.) p.34 and Plates 46 and 47. Cross connection gear was supplied by
both Barr & Stroud and Vickers for use with their respective instruments.
DNC's minute 'Report on Range and Order Telegraphs and on Sight Moving Gear', 12 August 1904 in
'Barr and Stroud's Transmitters and Receivers'. Correspondence and reports in 'Vyvyan-Newitt, Siemens
& Vickers Electrically Controlled Gun Sights' in ADM 1/7832. For later recognition of Vyvyan's and
Newitt's work, see Viscount Hyde (ed.), The Xaval Annual 1913 (reprinted Newton Abbot, 1970) pp.322-3.
° SPO, January 1907, p.17 for Vyvyan-Newitt.
' DXOsforSuccessoir, February 1905, p.19 andJuly 1907, p.22. See also Fire Conbol, 1908 (op. cit.) p.5.
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However, Vickers had already submitted a simpler alternative in conjunction with the
new cam-sights on the Vickers P. II 4-inch mountings for the light cruiser Boadicea? This
was the follow-the-pointer sight, which still used the sight-setter's muscle power to set the
sight, but required him only to keep a pointer (driven by a new brushless step-by-step
receiver motor connected to a transmitter in the TS) continuously aligued with an
index-marker.95
In dreadnoughts, periscopic sights, in which the sight elevation was controlled by
a cam and roller (rather than the previous curved rack with pinion), were introduced for
the St. Vincent class. Then, for HeTcules, Colossus and Indefatigabk, the sights were fitted with
Vickers follow-the-pointer gear, an arrangement (Plate 6) which became the standard
thereafter;97
 by 1916, it was considered that:
The outstanding improvements of the whole Jpre-War] period are the introduction of
the cam system and its adaptation to "follow-the-pointer" .
The technology of the follow-the-pointer sights was also essential to the development of
the Director, of which Vickers commenced production deliveries in 1913. That year
marked the beginning of a monopoly in the supply of devices on the circuits to the guns
which the firm still held even after World War 11.100 However, Barr and Stroud continued
to supply the instruments for communicating all other ranges, rates, bearings and
orders.'°'
TARGET BEARINGS
Following tactical exercises by the Home fleet in early 1910, the C.-in-C.,
Admiral Sir William May, requested action on the 'very general desire...for some accurate
and reliable means of pointing out at the gun positions the ship to be attacked'.'° 2 As a
DNOforSuccessor,July 1907 pp.22 and 24.
'Tickers, Sons and Maxim Ltd., Fire Control System 1910. The Vwktrs Mark 111 Follow-the-Pointer InstnimenLr,
p.3,Ja 391, AL
DJiOjir Successor, November 1909, pp.9, 14 and 18.
DNOfor Successor, May 1912 P.14. Fire Control Instniments 1914 (op. cit.) pp.18 and 72. Admiralty, Gunnery
Branch, The Sight Manual 1916, pp.6-7, ADM 186/216. Sights were normally designed with. the mountings:
LWOforSuccessor,July 1907, p.25.
Sight Manual 1916 (op. cit.) p.4.
The development and use of the Director is fully described in Brooks, 'Scott and the Director'. For the
positions of Director sights, see John Brooks, 'The Mast and Funnel Qj.iestion: Fire-control positions in
British Dreadnoughts, 1905-1915' inJohn Roberts (ed.), Warship 1995 (London, 1995) pp.40-60.
'00J D Scott, Vwkers, A Histoty (London, 1962) pp. 115, 166, 220 and 354.
'°'Fzre Control Insiniments 1914 (op. cit.) p. 72 and diagrams of the fire control instruments in St. Vincent (plates
65 and 66), Orion and Iron Duke (plates 68 and 69).
'°2 May to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 25 April 1910 (H.F.No.802/071) in 'Gunnery: Effects
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result of Admiral Wilson's recommendations after the Ariadne trials, instruments for the
transmission of target compass bearings (designated Mark I) had been obtained from Barr
and Stroud.'°3 These were soon superseded by the Mark II, which indicated relative
bearings to port or starboard. Both designs, of the usual step-by-step cyclometer type,
indicated in steps of 1/0 • 104
A new type of bearing instrument, based on a different method of transmission,
was under consideration even in 1908.'° In 1907, the firm of Evershed and Vignoiles had
submitted range, order and deflection instruments working on the balanced-bridge
principle, which the firm had used previously in helm indicators. Although judged too
large and expensive for their original purpose,'° 6 the technology proved adaptable to
target bearing indication; the first prototype Evershed installation was ready in January
1910 for trials aboard HMS Superb:'°7 though supply of the more elaborate production
version did not commence until December 1912, with Belkrophon.10°
The Evershed transmitter was coupled to an optical target indicator, which could
be a telescope, periscope (Plate 7) or the gyro-stabilised Argo rangefinder mounting. One
form of receiver (Plate 8) was mounted on the telescope of the turret trainer's sight; it
indicated directly the direction in which the turret must train to bring the designated
target into the field of view of the sight telescopes.' 09 By the outbreak of war, all the
12-inch battleships and battlecruisers had been supplied, except for JVptune, Australia and
Xew 2jealand: although, of the 13.5-inch ships, only Lion and Princess Royal, Orion, fling George
V and Centurion had been fitted. After the start of the war, priority was given to 15-inch
ships as they were completed, so (with the exception of Conqueror in February, 1915) no
more installations were made in the earlier ships until after Jutland."° Ships without
on...plotting...etc. of new developments in Fleet Tactics' in ADM 1/8051.
'°3 Fie Conini4 1908, p.4. DNO's minute, 27 May 1908 in ' Experiments in "Vengeance". Report of
Admiral Wilson' (op. cit.).
'°4 Fire ()mtrollnstniments 1909, p.32.
'°5 Drer to Hughes-Onslow, 19 October 1908 in T. 173/91 Part VII.
106	 Clausen, 'Invention and the Navy - the progress from Ideas to Ironmongery' in The Inventor, Vol.
10, No. 1, March 1970, CLSN 3/7. EWOforSuccessor,July 1907, p.21.
'°'flWOfor Successor, November 1909. At that date, the trial installation was intended for Dreadnoight.
108 
'Details of Bearing Indicators, Main Armament' in 'Gunnery Information derived from or confirmed by
the action of 31st May 1916, Report of Dreadnought Battlefleet Committee', June 1916, ADM
1/8460/149. Minute from DNO received 4 May 1910, in 'Gunnery: Effect...of new developments' (op. cit.).
'°9 Fv-e Control Instruments 1914, pp. 30-42.
"°'Bearing Plates...in Night Control Positions', 25June 1914 in 'Important Questions dealt with by DNO',
Copies, precis, &c. Volume III, 1914, p.633, AL. 'Bearing Indicators, Main Armament' (op. cit.)
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Eversheds or Directors had to rely on Barr and Stroud Mark II bearing receivers to keep
all turrets on the same target."
RANGEFINDERS AND Mour.rrirs
As first mounted in D readnought, the 9-foot rangefinder was elevated and trained
by the one operator who also took the ranges." 2
 By the end of 1909, improved mountings
with separate training gear - the rangetaker remained responsible for elevation - were on
order for the SL Vincent and later classes, together with conversion kits for existing ships."3
By early 1912, deliveries had begun of the Argo gyro-stabilised rangefinder mounting."
In the Lion and Ring George V classes and later, the rangefinder was placed beneath a
revolving armoured hood (the Argo Tower) atop the conning tower. In earlier classes
(except Hercules), the Argo mounting was located aloft, where necessary in an enlarged
(fore) top."5
However, by the time it entered service, the Argo mounting was no longer the
only source of ranges. In 1908, Bacon began the search for a suitable means to fit
rangefmders in turrets." 6
 In 1910, supply had started of 9-foot armoured rangefinders for
one turret in all ships from DTeadnought to the Orion class, and for two turrets in Lion and
Princess Royal. However, consideration was then being given to the local control of fire,
which would require a rangefmder for every turret." 7
 By mid-1912, such provision had
already been approved for the Ring George V class, Qyeen Ma?y and later ships" 8 while, by
the next year, it had been extended to the turrets of all dreadnoughts."9
Also in 1908, an order was placed with Barr and Stroud for a trial FR
rangefinder of 15-foot length.' 2° On handing over to his successor, Captain Archibald
Ul1e Contml Instruments 1914, pp.25-6 and Plates 65-6, 68-9. Annual Report of Torpedo &hool 1912, pp.64-5,
1 09M91 /ART2, HRO
US LWOforSuccessorJuly 1907, p.26.
"3 DXOfor Successor, November 1909, p.19.
4 Delivery was scheduled to begin in September 1911:J C W Henley to Dreyer 13 August, 1910, DRYR
2/1, CC. 15 of the 45 sets ordered had been delivered by February 1912: LLWS', pp.196-201 and 214.
Sufficient mountings had been purthased for 'one per ship for battleships and battle-cruisers,
"Dreadnought" and later': flWOfor Successor, May 1912, p.15.
' Brooks, 'Mast and Funnel Question' (op. cit.) pp.44-50. In Henules, the Argo mounting was on the
compass platform. See also John Roberts, Battlecruisers- (London, 1997), pp. 28 and 69, copy courtesy the
author gratefully acknowledged.
116 FU G,ntrol, 1908, p.6. DjVOfor Successor, November 1909, pp.5 and 19.
Minutes on 'Local Control of Turret Gunfire', Oct.-Nov. 1910 in 'Local Control of Turret Guns.
Special Fuing by HMS Vanguard....' in ADM 1/8 147.
UB DM0for Successor, May 1912, p.7.
9 Home Fleet General Orders, '39. Local Control', 15 September, 1913, p.2. in DRAX 1/9, CC.
' 20 Range and Yicwn, p.79. SPG,Januaiy 1908, p.17.
PROGRESS IN GUNNERY	 64
Moore, Bacon reported that it 'has given good results. It is being returned to the makers
to remedy certain defects before further trials take place'.' 2 ' However, when Moore was
promoted to Controller in May 1912, he informed his successor (Captain F C T Tudor)
that:
Some two years ago Barr and Stroud submitted a 15-foot range-finder for trial...but the
gain in accuracy was not as great as might be expected.
A second 15-foot, much improved, has been purchased for the B turret of the
This improved model was probably of the recent F1' design, which the Glasgow firm then
used as the basis for their standard 15-foot instrument, the F11'24, in production by
1913.' Thus it seems that Barr and Stroud had taken several years to eliminate the
unspecified defects found in the FR. However, although, from 1913, they were regularly
supplying foreign navies with 12- and 15-foot models,' 24
 the Admiralty showed little
urgency in procuring these more accurate instruments. Apart from the single trial
instrument (later moved to (ion), the 1 5-foot FF24 was only ordered in quantity for the
Qjieen E/iabeth class.125
Jellicoe and his two successors all invited Thomas Cooke and Sons to submit
rangefinders for trial.' 26
 A principal motivation is made clear by Bacon.
The trials of the Cooke 10-foot range-finder showed this to be an excellent instrument,
but the price was found to be prohibitive. This is regrettable, as the introduction of this
range-finder would have started competition with Barr and Stroud's.'27
After comparisons between 12-foot instruments from the two firms, Moore concluding
that:
...the Cooke appears to have better light-gathering capacity, and possibly, owing to this
cause, greater accuracy.'
There is no reason to doubt that the Cooke-Pollen rangefmder' 29
 was an excellent if
expensive instrument; the Russian Navy preferred it to the Barr and Stroud even though
' 21 DNO for Successor, November 1909, p.19. For the very favourable trial report, see Admiralty, Gunnery
Branch, Progress in Gunnery Materuz4 1922 and 1923, p.4O, ADM 186/259.
'DNOfor Successor, May 1912, p.7 and 15.
Range and non, pp.78-9.
' 24XavalAnnual 1913 (op. ciL) pp.315-7.
' 25 Admiralty, Technical History Section, The Tethni€al History and Index, 'Fire Control in H.M. Ships',
TH23, December 1919, pp. 32-33, AL.
H Dennis Taylor to DNO, 4June 1907, in 'Invention of 15' Range Finder, Sea going tests of', in ADM
1/8051.
flWOfor Successor, November, 1909, p.19.
'DNOfor Successor, Mqy 1912, p.15. See also PGM 1922-3 (op. cit.) p.41.
'	 30,090 applied for 31 December 1912.
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it cost three times as much.' 3° However, the Admiralty's policy of fitting many
rangefinders in each ship, and Cooke's close association with Pollen, made it doubly
difficult to secure orders. Eventually, in March 1918 when Dreyer was DNO, 30 Cooke
rangefinders were ordered but, overburdened with other work, the firm was only able to
deliver ten by the time hostilities ended,' 3 ' so Barr and Stroud's monopoly position still
remained unassailed.
Even the latest and best rangefinders could only generate accurate ranges if
worked by trained and experienced range takers. In early 1910, the Inspector of Target
Practice (Rear-Admiral Richard Peirse) insisted on the need for proper training and
regular courses of instruction, while the DNO urged the Board, unsuccessfully, to
introduce the non-substantive rating of range taker. t32 The conference convened after the
unsatisfactory 1911 Battle Practice concluded that: 'The supply of a properly qualified
Seaman or Marine Rangetaker for every 9-ft. rangefinder...is urgently required' and again
proposed the introduction of the rating of rangetaker.' 33 The DM0 made the same
submission in April 1913' and repeated it yet again in December after the Empress of
India firing had shown that 'the Range-takers...are at present the weak spot in our fire
Control personnel'. Even then, another six months was to pass before, at last, the Board
gave its approval on 19th July, 1914} Thus, there must be some doubt about the
standard of training of the Royal Navy's rangetakers as hostilities began.
DUMARESQS
In February 1908, while serving as an assistant to the DNO, Lieutenant Frederic
Dreyer suggested an arrangement of gearing which would enable the main dial and the
enemy bar of a Dumaresq to rotate together during an alteration of own course, but,
although the mechanical details were worked out by Elliott Brothers' 36 after consultation
' 30 Correspondence between Pollen and AJ Balfour 29 February - 3 March 1916 in T.173/91 Part VII.
131 Technical History, 1919 (op. cit.) p.33.
' 32 Minute ITP to DNO, 18 May 1910 in 'Gunnery: Effects.., of new developments'. DNO's minute, 18
October 1910, 'Local Control of Turret Guns (op. ciL).
'"'Report of Conference on Gunnery', para.38 in 'Gunnery in the Royal Navy, Conference at Admiralty,
Dec, 191 1/Jan 1912, Report and action' in ADM 1/8328.
4 'IQ/DNO III, 1914', (op. cit.) p.60.
'"Admiral G. Callaghan to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 8 December 1913, para.12 and DNO's
remarks and actions thereon in 'Gunnery practice at Sea. Sinking of HMS Empress of India 4/11 / 13',
ADM 1/8346. 'Increase to G & T Complement of Battleships and B'Cruisers, 23 July 1914 in IQ/DNO
III, pp.39-60.
'	 Elliott's early history, see Gloria Clifton, 'An Introduction to the History of Elliott Brothers up to
1900' and H.R. Bristow, 'Elliott, Instrument Makers of London, Products, Customers and Development in
PRoGiss IN GUNNERY	 66
with Dreyer, no experimental instrument was then constructed.' 37 By 1909, the Mark II
Dumaresq had been modified by the addition of two circular scales to indicate own and
enemy compass courses; these were intended to assist in keeping the rate through a turn
by own ship, though all adjustments had to be made by hand. In addition, the new dial
plate was graduated for range-rate in yards per minute, while the straight deflection lines
were supplemented (for use with a bearing plot) by curved lines of constant bearing rate.'38
This design was the basis for the Mark III, the designation Mark 11* being used for Mark
II instruments modified to the same standard.'39
The Mark IV Dumaresq was developed during 1910 for use in turrets under
local control. After conferences in June with Commander R Backhouse (Experimental
Commander at Whale Island)'4° and with Commander J Henley at the Admiralty, the
design 'was worked out into practical form by Elliott Brothers'. While the Mark IV was a
simplification of Dreyer's original idea from 1908, the Mark VI Dumaresq, for control
tops, was a complete realisation. The initial design was developed at Whale Island by
Lieutenant Prickett, a model being shown to Keith Elphinstone of Elliott Brothers, in
December 1910; Elliotts then added a 'considerable number of minor points of
improvement in design'. The gearing was arranged so that, as the operator followed the
target by rotating the dial, the enemy bar and the course scales revolved through the same
angular amounts. This was, in fact, an approximation. However, as explained in
Appendix VII, the errors were only significant when the speed-across was high: and, even
then, were correctable by reference to a compass. The instrument was designed for easy of
use rather than theoretical exactitude.
In March 1914, Elphinstone proposed a number of detailed improvements
mainly concerned with setting and reading the scales; they were incorporated in the Mark
VI*, first ordered in October 1914. Up to 6January 1913, Elliotts had supplied a total of
the 19th Century' in Bulletin of the Scienqfic Instnanent Society, No. 36, March 1993, pp.2-1 1, copy courtesy of
Mr Ron Bristow.
'7 E1phinstone, 'Dumaresq History' (op. ciL). Where not otherwise cited, this is the source for the statements
in the remainder of this section. A copy of Elliott's drawing E.S. 1165 of 6 February 1908 is in T. 173/91
Part HI (with a quote of £19 to 20 for manufacture).
"8 Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Inforrnatwn regardüzg Fu Conzw4 Range Finding and Plotting, 1909, pp.1 4-17 in
'Miscellaneous Gunnery Experiments 1901-191 3',JaO 10, AL
Admira1ty, Gunnery Branch, Manual of Gunne,y (Volume III) for His Majesty's Fleet 1915, p.17!, AL
' 40 Travers, House That Jack Built (op. cit.) p.166.
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1,042 Dumaresqs at the modest cost of £9,539; simple models like the Mark IV turret
instrument cost only JJ4/1O/0.''
Ti-LE VIcRs CLOCK
By mid-1907, two or more Vickers clocks (Plate 3) had been supplied to ships
with electrical fire control) 42
 A complete rotation of the range pointer registered a change
in range of 4,100 yards but 'the graduations are numbered through windows in the face so
that 3 ranges are available, 2,000-6,000 6,000-10,000 and 10,000 to 14,000 yards') 43 The
first production models were calibrated for rate both in knots (maximum 38.6) and in
seconds to change 50 yards (minimum 2.3 seconds); these limits correspond to a
maximum rate of 1304 yds/min. By 1909, rangekeeping by stop-watch was evidently
considered unnecessary, since the rate graduations of Dumaresqs, clocks and rate
instruments were all changed to the more convenient yards-per-minute) 45 Thus the Barr
and Stroud Mark II rate instruments fitted from the St. Vincent class onwards showed the
rate in steps of 10 up to a maximum of 1990 yds/min. increasing or decreasing.'
In Defence of jVaval Suprenaçy states categorically that the 'motor [of the Vickers
clock] could not be made to vary in speed continuously....the speed...was altered in
steps'.'47
 In fact, the clock was based on a conventional disc-and-roller variable-speed
drive (Fig. 3.1) with springs driving the 'rotating disc at a constant speed controlled by a
govemor'.' The variable speed was obtained by moving the roller along the diameter of
the disc: and it is clear from the clock's mechanism (Plate 9) that the roller could be
moved continuously by means of the threaded rods coupled to the rate handle. In 'The
Quest for Reach', Professor Sumida attributes his earlier interpretation to some
misleading statements by Arthur Pollen. However, the same article states:
Changes in the indication of the rate by the dumaresq had to be transferred manually
to the Vickers clock, and because the transfers could not be carried out continuously,
continuous change in the range rate was imperfectly represented by the clock to a
'Local Control of Turret Guns', 1910 (op. cit.). Elphinstone, 'Dumaresq History'. Manual of Gunnery 1915
(op. cit.) pp. 172-5; the Marks V and VII were for use in control towers. Claim 1999 Form 3 by Major R G
F Dumaresq to Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors in T.173/91 Part XL
' 42 SFG,January 1907, p.18. LWOforSuccessoi,July 1907, p.20.
143 Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Addenda (1909) to Gunnery Manual VoLs. I (Part I) and ill, November 1909,
p.54 and Plate XXVII, Ja254, AL.
&PG,3lt1y 1906, p.24.
'Fi,e Control and Plotting, 1909 (op. cit.) pp.17 and 31.
t46 Fj,T onlrollnstrumenLc 1909, pp.10 and 28.
41 LDT'i1(op. cit.) p.75 and also pp.217-8.
A&enda (1909) to Gunnery Manual (op. cit.) p.54.




The rate of rotation of the roller shaft is proportional to the rate of rotation of the disc
and distance r of the roller from the disc's centre.
If the disc rotates at constant speed and if the roller's distance from the centre is proportional
to the range-rate:
OR
Thus the rotation-rate of the roller shaft is proportional to range-rate: and the rotation of the
shaft is proportional to the change of range.
Oi — Oi xR2—R1
where the suffices indicate values at times t2 and t .
The variable Speed drive integrates range-rate to give change of range.
FIG. 3.1: VARIABLE SPEED DRIVE
greater or lesser extent depending on the rapidity of change and the time intervals
between resettings.'49
It also establishes that, when necessary, the rate was altered as frequently as every
quarter-minute; this gave time to read the latest rate from the Dumaresq, set it on the rate
transmitter, read it off the rate receiver and adjust the clock rate accordingly. Nonetheless,
the clock-rate and, therefore, the clock-range lagged behind the true rate and range: but
by how much? While in some cases the rates may have been transmitted at fLxed intervals,
it must have been much easier to transmit the rates in fixed steps; when the rate was
changing especially rapidly, the only practicable method was to alter the rate each time
the Dumaresq pointer crossed a major rate division on the dial i.e. in steps of 100
' 49 'Quest for Reach', pp.12 and 39. 'For a revealing indicator of the dangers of manual transfers...',
Sumida cites but does not quote Fire Contro4 1908 pp.48-9; the relevant passage only advises: 'Clock
operators should be carefully trained. There should be no chance of their setting the rate in the wrong
direction. A convenient way...is to paint a red patch next each of the "increasing" divisions on the rate scale
and also...next the [engraved] words "range increasing". Similarly black patches on the "decreasing" side'.
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yds/min.'° Appendix VIII gives a detailed analysis of two 25-knot ships on opposite
courses passing beam-to-beam at 8,000 yards. It shows that, whenever the rate was
changed frequently in equal steps, the lagging error of the clock-range behind the
true-range can be expressed very simply. To a good approximation, it increased at a rate
of half the amount of each rate-step. Thus, if the rate-step was 100 yds/min., the lag
increased by 50 yards in each minute. However, the rate changed by as much as 100
yds/min. in a quarter-minute only when the range was close to the minimum value on a
sharply-curved range-time hyperbola; in most cases, steps of 50 yds/min. would have
been practicable, halving the lagging error rate to 25 yds/min.
In use, the Dumaresq could only keep the rate if the target bearing arrow was
kept pointing at the target: that is, if the target remained visible. But in that case, before
opening fire the clock could be tuned to the rangefmders: and, once firing began, it was
continually corrected (in steps of not less than 100 yards) by spotting. Thus, if a significant
lagging error did accumulate after several minutes, it could always be corrected by
observation.
'The Quest for Reach' also notes that 'the disc-roller drive of the early
production Vickers clocks is known to have been mechanically unsatisfactory' and refers
to 'the weakness of the drive, which meant that it could not be connected to a
transmitter'.' 5 ' However, since the clock had been designed as a self-contained instrument
powered by springs, it had never been intended to drive step-by-step transmitters directly.
Appendix IX describes what is known of its development history, which shows that
problems arose not in the disc-and-roller mechanism, but in keeping the disc rotating at a
constant speed, irrespective of the rate setting. By 1909, satisfactory speed regulation had
been achieved by assisting the governor with a 'compensating brake'.' 52
 The appendix
also analyses the slippage between disc and roller while the rate was changing: and
discusses the probable causes of the 'check' or 'little stoppage', as observed during the
post-War RCAI hearings when the rate was altered.' 53
 It concludes that the separate
errors due to these effects were usually negligible: that they were always less than those
due to the stepwise setting of the rate: and that, in some circumstances, they could tend to
cancel out. The Vickers clock was by no means a perfect mechanism: but its accuracy was
' 50 Tedznieal Companson, Chapter V, Fig.6 shows the dial graduations.
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'Quest for Reach', pp.87 and 60.
' 52 Fzre Control 1908, p.5. SPG, July 1908, pp.8-9. Addenda (1909) to Gunnery Manual, p.54.
'"Examination of Mr R H Ballantyne in T. 173/547 Part 12, pp. 54-5 and 92-3.
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sufficient for its purpose: which was to keep the change of range in the intervals between
corrections to the clock range derived either from the mean rangefinder range or from
spotting.
OTHER Fu CONTROL INSTRUMENTS
Several calculators, some quite elaborate like Captain John Dreyer's Direct
Reading Range Corrector, were devised to remove the need to consult ballistic tables or
make calculations during firing.' In 1909, Macnamara time-of-flight watches were
mentioned in a report on concentration experiments, though they were not available to
the ships taking part) By 1913, they were considered 'indispensable' for concentration
firing ss
 and were recommended for use in main and local control positions.'57
Finally, three more instruments show how the firm of Elliott Brothers
successfully expanded their business as a supplier of fire control devices to the Admiralty
by manufacturing designs which, probably in all three cases and certainly in the last two,
originated elsewhere. In 1909, they were making the Robinson anemometer (which gave
a direct reading of apparent wind speed and direction and of the wind-you-feel along and
across the line of fire) 1 ° and the first examples of the Forbes speed log. By 1912, speed
logs were standard in all dreadnoughts for keeping the Dumaresqs correctly set for own
speed.'59
In 1910, Elliott Brothers signed an agreement to manufacture and sell the
Anschütz gyro compass in Britain and the colonies. Technology transfer was not only one
way, Elliott's granting Anschütz a licence for the Forbes log in 1911.160 However, as
explained in Chapter 2, the Anschütz gyrocompass was not sufficiently accurate for all
'54Addenda (1909) to Gunnery Manual, p.19 and IWO for Successor, November 1909, p.1 8. For Dreyer's
Calculator, see DXOfor Successor,July 1907, p.22 and Fire Control 1908, p.44 and Endosure XIVa.
'55 Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, F7eet Fire Control and Concentration of Fire Experunenzc, 1910, p.7 inJaOlO AL,
copy courtesy MrJohn Roberts.
° Captain, Aiiig George V to VAC Second Battle Squadron, 7 November 1913 in ' Empress of India', 1913
(op. cit.).
' 57 Home Fleet General Orders, '14. Fire Control Organisation', 5 November 1913, p.4 in DRAX 1/9. See also
Dreyer, Sea Heritage, p.75 and Manual of Gunnery 1915, p.21.
' 58 Addcnda (1909) to Gunnery Manual, p.19.
'59 DNOfor Successor, November 1909, p.16 and May 1912, p.13. For a full description, see Elliott Brothers
(London) Ltd., Forbes' Ships' Log and Speed Indicator, London, n.d. in the Elliott Archive (2.61) Its inventor,
Professor Forbes, had previously but unsuccessfully submitted a design for gun sights: IWO for Successor,
February 1905, p.17 andJuly 1907, p.24.
'60 Fred T.Jane (ed.), Fighting Ships 1911 (London) pp. 519-21. This article uses part of the text of G K B
Elphinstone, The Ansc/züt Gyro-Compass (London: Elliott Brothers, 1910) Elliott Archive (2.23). The archive
also contains copies of the 1910 and 1911 agreements between AnschUtz and Elliotts.
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gunnery purposes and, in comparative trials with a Sperry compass conducted in 1913,
showed both a larger error and rate of change of error.' 6 ' Once the War had severed
Elliott's connection with their licensor, Sperry replaced them as the established supplier
and even Anschütz compasses already in service were replaced.'62
MAr .Tw. Fii ComoL AND PLOTTING
Until they were eventually fitted with the Dreyer Tables Mark I (Chapter 5), the
fire control systems in British 12-inch dreadnoughts relied at several points on the unaided
manual transfer of data between instruments: specifically from Dumaresq (latterly the
Mark Vi) to clock, from clock to the cross-connecting gear, and, in the earlier ships, to the
gun sights. This manual system also used manual plotting, but it required a three-year
'experimental plotting period" 63 from 1908 to 1911 before manual course plotting was
discarded in favour of manual rate plotting.
A towed target was introduced for the 1908 Battle Practice. In May 1908, after
the rejection of Pollen's automatic plotter, the first recommendations were issued to the
Fleet on the use of manual plotting to determine target course and speed. The pamphlet
Fire Control contained Wilson's description of the virtual course system tried in Vengeance.
Bearings were taken simultaneously with ranges by means of a Chetwynd liquid compass
mounted on the rangefmder mounting. This type of compass was 'constructed so that the
card might be affected as little as possible by the motion of the bowl'; it was, therefore, not
unpromising as a cheaper alternative to Pollen's gear: even though, in the Vengeance
experiments, the bearing errors had been too great to make a useful virtual-course plot
when the bearing-rate was low.' Dreyer contributed to the pamphlet a separate section
which included a description of time-and-range (and time-and-rate) plots and the setting
of the Dumaresq by a cross-cut of rates; however, bearing-rate was to be obtained from
'61 44,aj Reports of the Torpedo &hool 1912, p.69 and 1913, p.121 in 109M91/ART2, HRO. 'Very severe
rolling and pitching was imparted to the compass[es]...both...indicated a rapid "yaw effect" of over a
degree'. However, longer-term meaned fluctuations were 1°/5.7° for error while the time for the error to
change by 10 was 20/4 minutes in favour of the Sperry.
'62 T/mi4 Histoiy, 1919, p.20. In 1916, the Anschütz gyros were reused in the first 17 sets of Henderson
gyro firing gear for Director sights. For the history of the Anschütz compass in the Royal Navy, see A E
Fanning, Steady as She Goes (London, 1986) pp. 175-180, 195-199.
' 63 Captain Tower's evidence to the RCAI, T.173/547, Part 11, p.8.
'Report of Admiral of the Fleet Sir A.K.Wilson' in Fire Control 1908, pp.26-7. Chetwynd's Patent Liquid
Compass, pamphlet, n.d. and compasses ACO 163, 164, 168 and 168A, NMM, examined courtesy of Dr.
Gloria Clifton. The card diameter in this type of compass is about three-quarters that of the bowl.
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timed bearings, not a plot. 165
 Wilson advocated his own scheme only as 'a guide for
officers carrying out further experiments' and for further trial in 'not less than six ships
with different descriptions of armament'. Similarly, Dreyer's 'Hints' began: 'It is not
advisable to lay down any exact rules [which] would probably tend to fetter initiative and
delay improvement'. The DNO, Reginald Bacon, while agreeing that six ships should
be completely fitted for virtual course plotting, hoped that 'in a very short time the time
curve method will be in general use and good practical results in firing at moving objects
should be obtained'. By May 1908, the Board had approved the purchase of training gear
for rangefinders and of 142 roller boards, T-squares and squared paper for
time-and-range plotting.' 67
 However, neither they nor any other special Service plotting
gear were ready for that year's practice,' although fifteen to twenty gunnery lieutenants
obtained manual straight-course plotters from Pollen, which were also copied by others.'69
Thus, for 1908: 'makeshift arrangements were necessarily practised this year i.e. Plotting
Boards were often employed aloft etc., and the bearing arm kept actually trained on the
target'.'7° The outcome was summarised as follows.'7'
Plotting method







Enemy Course	 33	 4	 18
Virtual Course
	 8	 3	 4
RangeandTime	 13	 5	 4
Indomiiable and Dreadnought, which were ranked first and fourth in the Home fleet, may
have used virtual course, since they were among the six ships nominated by the DNO to
be fitted according to Wilson's recommendations.' 72 Yet an essay on fire control for the
War College declared that: 'no instance has come to light of any Ship making successful
I65 
'Hints on Battle Firing' in Fv-e Control, 1908 pp.50-4. For Dreyer's authorship, see Technieal Companson,
p.10.
Pii Control 1908, pp.26, 35 and 47.
'67 DN0's minutes of 18 March and 27 May 1908 in 'Experiments in "Vengeance". Report of Admiral
Wilson'. See also IDiMS. p.136; however, 'Quest for Reach' (p.65) implies that Wilson's system was more
generally adopted.
'Fu Control and Plotting, 1909, p.31.
l69I)3', p.149.
' 70 'F,re Control', An Essay by Captain C Hughes-Onslow, n.d. but 1909, Section II, p.21, PLLN 1/5, CC.
' 11 Yu Control and Plotting, 1909, p.30.
' 72 Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Results of Battle Practice in His Majesr,'s Fleet 1908 in Ja 156, AL DNO's
minute 27 May 1908 (op. cit.).
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use of the Virtual Plot combined with Time and Range diagram' and that 'experience.. .in
1908 shows this system to be difficult and un-natural') 73 As Dreyer later recalled, in 1908
rate-plotting was also 'badly received afloat, as "straight-line" plotting, with the power to
forecast the range for some minutes ahead was...considered far superior by the
majority')74
A new pamphlet issued before the 1909 Battle Practice confirmed that the Fleet
would soon be issued with new equipment, including the time-and-range boards:
Chetwynd compasses and the fittings to modify the rangefinder mountings: and the gear
to adapt rate instruments to the transmission of ranges from aloft. However, it said little
about time-and-range plotting but concentrated on course plotting with a new
Admiralty-pattern plotting instrument. This used a cone-and-wheel continuously variable
speed drive to rotate the lead screw advancing the pencil plotting own ship's course; since
the screw was positioned along one edge of the paper, the pencil could move in both
directions.' 75 Pollen also supplied thirteen more 'slightly improved' manual plotters;'76
assuming that these resembled his patents of 1908-9, the lead screw ran down the centre
of the plot: but its speed could only be changed in steps, by means of interchangeable discs
of different diameters. Both these instruments were essentially straight-course plotters.
However, the Admiralty pamphlet and the Argo patent each proposed similar methods to
plot while own ship was turning; these depended on knowing the diameter of ships'
turning circles at different speeds and angles of helm, and on pivoting the paper on the
plotting boards about appropriate centres of rotation. Particularly with the benefit of
hindsight, both proposals seem equally impractical.'77
Lectures by the staff of the Inspector of Target Practice on the 1909 practices,
prepared at the end of the year, stated that all but one of the ships inspected 'plotted the
true course and speed of the enemy': though these must actually have been straight-course
plots. Thus virtual course seems already to have been abandoned. Of 39 ships, 11
obtained the course to within half a point and 16 to within one point, although the
' 73 Hughes-Onslow, 'General Remarks...on Plotting', p.1 and Section HI, p.1.
Short History of Range Plotting in the Royal Navy' appended to 'Some comparisons made between
the Argo Clock and the Fire Control table in "Monarch" ', n.d. but 1912 in T. 173/91 Part VII. The style,
with its frequent underlinings, is unmistakably Dreyer's.
Fzre Consrol and Plottrng, 1909, pp.10-12, 31. Tedmical Companion, p.7.
I76 II2IVS p.150.
' 77 Patent 5031 of 1909 (applied for 2 March 1909) references 25,654 of 27 November 1908, which
describes the drive with interchangeable discs: see further Appendix XII, Note 5. Fire Conirol and Plotting,
1909, p.9.
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average time to complete the plot was 5.2 minutes. Taking simultaneous ranges and
bearings proved especially difficult in a seaway, while results were also noticeably
inaccurate if plotting was continued after opening fire. The ITP's staff concluded that:
Plotting is not yet sufficiently developed to be of practical use under general service
conditions....
The future of plotting depends upon the development of the rangefinder mounting, a
more accurate method of obtaining bearings and measuring the observing ship's
speed...'78
They also described the difficulties with continuous aim experienced by Injlerible and some
pre-dreadnoughts: with range transmission and sight-setting when the rate was high: and
with target indication.
Sumida cites these lectures as evidence that 'the entire Inspectorate had been
transformed into a bastion of opposition to the policy of the Ordnance Department'.'79
Yet the second lecture begins:
The opinions expressed must not be taken as fundamental, but contingent to the
progress in materiel.
The ITP's staff also found that 'a large number of ships' achieved 'considerable success'
more quickly with the help of the range-rate plotting preferred by Bacon.
The Dumaresq is first adjusted to the estimated course and speed of the target, the
range-finder observations are plotted with the times on squared paper, and the clock is
started with the meaned range and rough rate. The amount the clock gains or losses
[sic] on the meaned range is the error in rate; the clock and Dumaresq are then
corrected accordingly.'8°
Further, by the time the lectures were delivered, all the Inspectorate's concerns were
being addressed. The production order for Argo mountings was being negotiated
(Chapter 4); laying and training gear was being improved in both new and old ships;
Xeptune, laid down in January 1909, was the last dreadnought without Vickers
follow-the-pointer sights; Forbes logs were already under trial and the first Evershed
installation imminent. To represent the departments of the DNO and ITP as
fundamentally opposed' 8 ' is an exaggeration which obscures their true relationship. The
position of ITP had been created to ensure 'that improvements are quicl4y carried out
' 78 1TP, Battle Practice 1909' (op. cii.) if. 2-3, 7-8 and 17-18.
179fl, pp.154-5.
°flP, 'Battle Practice 1909', if. 9 and 11.
'81 K G B Dewar was one of the 1TP's staff but, while criticising the 'most favourable conditions' of Battle
Practice (pp. 112-4), he does riot mention any rift between ITP and DNO: The .Wavy from Within (London,
1939).
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and new ideas promptly taken up'.' 82 Thus he and his staff were expected to criticise
systems and equipment provided by the Admiralty, and to report on experimental
techniques like manual course plotting. These lectures are, therefore, evidence only of the
expected tensions within the naval hierarchy between supply departments and a
department established to assess the shooting of the Fleet and to improve its material and
technique.
During the tactical exercises conducted by Admiral Sir William May in early
1910 with the Home fleet, it was found that, with practice, enemy course could be
estimated to within a point by eye, which error was equivalent to only about 100 yds/min.
This was as accurate as all but the best course plotting, yet incurred no delay. Admiral
May concluded that, in poor visibility, fire could not be withheld to give time to plot:
while, in good visibility, tactical manoeuvring largely negated the results from plotting
before they could be used. He also confirmed that the system described by the ITP's staff,
in which the clock range and rate were 'tuned' to follow the mean rangefinder ranges, was
'used very generally now' and the 'rate. ..has almost invariably been arrived at some time
before any "plotting" results'.' 83 All manual course plotting çmcluding virtual course) was
also rejected by the Colville Committee in July 1910, even though the alternative under
consideration (Pollen's first attempt at a true-course plotter then under trial in Xatal) had
failed to work.' 8" After the conclusion of the J'Iatal trials:
...the Admiralty ordered a further comparative trial between "Africa" using virtual
plotting and "Superb" using Time and Range plotting assisted by clock tuning. From
this trial, "Superb" emerged victorious....1
The conclusions from these trials came too late to influence the 1910 Battle Practice. Of
61 ships witnessed by the ITP, 43 still used course-and-speed plotting,'° while 10
preferred time-and-range. The important change was that 8 ships employed dual-rate
plotting.' 87
 Even Dreyer acknowledged that the first dual rate plots of ranges and bearings
were made by lieutenant (N) A H Norman of Arrogant in 1908 and later used in her
'82 Padfjeld, Aim Straight (op. cit.) p.146.
'83 Captain Richmond (Dreadnought) to C.-in-C. Home Fleet, recvd. 24 March 1910 and Admiral May to the
Secretary of the Admiralty (H.F. No. 803/0194) 25 April 1910 in 'Gunnery: Effects...of new
developments'.
'84 Enclosure I, p.2 with Colville Committee to C. in-C. Home Fleet, IJuly 1910 in DRAX 3/3.
'85 Technical Comparison, p.8.
Despite widespread dissatisfaction; see Jon Sumida (ed.) The Pollen Papers (London, 1984) pp.260-2 for
letters to Pollen from gunnery officers.
' 81 Summ', p.11 in DRYR 2/1.
PRoGRESS IN GUNNERY	 76
delayed 1908 battle practise on 24 February 1909: and also in her 1909 practice.'88
Norman presumably plotted bearings from a Chetwynd compass: but, by August 1910, it
was expected that:
The plotting of ranges and bearings will be greatly facilitated when Pollen's rangefinder
is supplied as the two [plotting] operators will have the ranges and bearings
automatically transmitted to receivers in front of them.'89
With accurate bearings in prospect, by early 1911 opinion had swung decisively in favour
of rate plotting.
The system now recommended is Time and Range and continually tuning up the
Range Clock with the Range Finder, in addition the Rate on the Range Clock being
manipulated as necessary in order to make the Range Clock run in agreement with the
Range Finder thus obtaining the rate...
When a reliable bearing instrument has been obtained, the system...which most
commends itself is... to plot *
Time and Range and Time and Bearing on two diagrams and from these data setting
the Dumaresq to the Course and Speed of enemy.
The most convenient method of plotting the Time and Range diagram is to utilise the
Admiralty Plotting instrument...
The Admiralty Time and Range Board is also suitable for Time and Range or Time
and Bearing Plotting.'
Another factor encouraging the adoption of a fire control system based on rate was a
wider use of rate spotting. This was not new' 9 ' but the Manual of Gunneiy for 1911 provided
the first official guidance on the method.' 92 However, it was another two years before the
rate spotting rules were simplified so that the rate was altered in fixed steps: of 100
yds/min. for targets abeam.'93
INNOVATION AND PROCUREMENT
The completed British manual fire control system incorporated many new
instruments, most of which had not even been conceived when the first attempts at long
'Technical Comparison, p.10. Dreyer and Tower to RCAI, T. 173/547 Part 11 p.8, Part 17 p.43 and Part 18
p.20. ITP, 'Battle Practice 1909' f.12 mentions Norman but not dual-rate pIotting, it also describes a
dual-rate scheme due to Lieutenant Burke of Suffolk, in which two clocks were tuned to the ranges and
bearings without the aid of plots.
'89 Admiral May to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 1 August 1910 in 'Invention by Commander Dreyer -
improved method of obtaining the range...' in ADM 1/8147.
'°	 Secretary of the Admiralty to Commanders-in-Chief and Officer Commanding, 15 February 1911:
copy of DRYR 2/1, CC and reproduced in Technwal Comparison, p.9.
Previous to the introduction of Rate Plotting early in 1908...in a few ships spotting corrections for Rate
were also made': 'Remarks by Commander F.C.Dreyer R.N. on the question of how to best obtain and
maintain the gun range in action', 22Ju1y 1910 in T.173/91 Part III.
Manual of Gunnery for His Majesy's Fleet 1911, pp.1 1-12, Ja254, AL. See also 'Long Course Lecture Notes,
1910-11', 4 March 1911 in Papers of Commander D T Graham Brown, Excellent Historical Library.
Home Fleet, 'Fire Control, 1913 (op. cit.) p.4.
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range firing were made at the turn of the century. The progress in material had been
accomplished with largely unchanged resources. In 1912, just one of the DNO's
assistants, Lieutenent C V Usborne, remained responsible for:
1. Fire control and communications.
2. Range-finders and plotting.
3. Sights.
4. Calibration.
5. Ballistic questions and range tables.
6. Alterations and additions, including estimates.
7. Attends gun trials.
as well as for handbooks on fire-control and other matters. He did at least now share the
assistance of one warrant officer, while one of the torpedo assistants dealt with
'experimental and new designs of electrical fittings [including] fire contro1'.' By 1914,
the DNO's gunnery assistants remained at five, one attending to fire control, another to
the Director. In a post-War report, the DNO was described as 'heavily and consistently
overworked', which must also have applied to his assistants;' 95
 with considerable
understatement, Reginald Bacon recalled that:
The whole of the DNO's staff was none too large to deal with the work in hand'.'
With such limited manpower, the procurement of the new components could not have
been accomplished had not much of the design and development been done by the
Admiralty's industrial suppliers, both established and new. Though with some delays,
Barr and Stroud introduced more accurate rangefinders as they were needed. While the
firm enjoyed an effective monopoly in rangefmders, both Siemens and Vickers provided
effective competition in fire control instruments, Vickers eventually establishing
themselves as the sole source of follow-the-pointer and director gear. Eversheds brought
new technology to the problem of target indication.
The vital advances in sighting and aiming were achieved by several means. A
scientific consultant developed the first purpose-designed sight telescopes, but better sights
and turret training engines were largely due to the mounting manufacturers. In contrast,
the improvements to the hydraulic elevating and training controls were mainiy achieved
by Excellent and Portmouth Dockyard. Unfortunately, other attempts at development
'1)JvOfor Successor, May 1912, pp. 28-29.
'95 DN0's minute 28 November 1918 and 'Naval Ordnance Department: Proposed Post-War
Complement' p.4 in 'Naval Ordnace Department 1918-1920', ADM 116/1849. Jon Sumida, 'British
Naval Administration and Policy in the Age of Fisher', juurnal ofMiitay History, Vol. 54 January 1990) pp.
20 and 22.
'°Reginald Bacon, From 1900 Onwards (London, 1940) p.162.
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within the Navy, like the Vyvyan-Newitt automatic sight and the early elevation-only
directors, were not successful.' 97
 The record was much better when the inventions of
naval officers (including even the DNO's assistants)' 98 were developed by industry. Percy
Scott's special relationship with Vickers may have been anomalous,' 99
 but it was certainly
productive. Elliott Brothers under Keith Elphinstone were particularly successful as a
manufacturer of instruments invented by others. In some cases, they added to their
product range by licensing designs from inventors like Professor Forbes or, in the case of
the gyro compass, from an overseas firm. They were also willing to redesign the
inventions of naval officers, even though they were not always successful. 20° Above all, the
firm participated from its inception in the evolution of the Dumaresq, not only developing
the ideas of naval officers (like Dreyer, Prickett and others) but also incorporating its own
improvements into the fully developed production versions.
The commercial and contractual conventions between the Admiralty and
industry were also well understood by both sides.
Usually inventions of importance...are brought to the Admiralty in a more or less
complete state...ready for trial....
If the inventor, or the firm which has taken up the invention, are bearing all the
preliminary cost and risk...they are naturally entitled to substantial profits....
Nevertheless, it is not uncommonly found that...firms...are content with...quite
reasonable rates of proflt....merely stipulating that they shall have the orders for any
gear required by the Admiralty.20'
Thus, the evolution of the manual fire control system reveals the normal sources of
technical innovation and the usual processes and commercial relationships by which ideas
were turned into instruments for supply to the Royal Navy at acceptable levels of profit.
These norms will be used in the following chapters for comparing and contrasting the
very different ways in which the Pollen and Dreyer systems were developed. However,
what had actually been achieved with the manual system which preceded them?
the latter, see Brooks, 'Scott and the Director', pp.155-160.
For Usborne's pointer accelerator for gun-sights, see Fire Control Instntmenzs 1914, p.21
As was long recognised: Captain H D Barry to Lord Walter Kerr, 13 May 1904, MS. Selborne 41, f. 146.
C V Usborne, Blast and Counterblast (London, 1935) P.15.
a 1910 attempt at a true-course plotter, see 'Fire Control Instrument devised by Asst. Paymaster
Noyes R1'4, Reports, &c.' in ADM 1/8145.
2°'Admiralty, Pollen Aim Correction System. General Grounds of Adnuralty Po&y and Historical Record of Business
Xegotiatwns, February 1913, p.2, P.1024, AL.
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PRACTICES AND RANGES
It might be expected that the results of the annual Battle Practice, held in the
second half of each year,202
 would provide some numerical indicators of progress in
gunnery. The limited available data are reviewed in Appendix X. In 1908, when the
towed target was introduced, Indomitabk, despite a large turn of 18 points half way through
her practice run, made 58% hits at over 8,300 yards. 203
 Yet, in 1912, at much the same
range and with only a two-point turn at the start of the firing run, the average result was
only 17.7% hits and the best about 25%: though, unlike the earlier results, these figures
exclude ricochets. 204
 Unfortunately, there are no obvious explanations for this apparent
decline. However, it is clear that the Battle Practice was intended not only as a test of
gunnery but to 'resemble actual conditions of battle as far as can be done under peace
circumstances'.205
 Thus, probably even in 1908, it included simulations of damage and
casualties in order to test alternative systems and personnel: and it was made 'more
difficult year by year'.206
 It was also conducted as a competition for the whole Fleet, large
cruisers as well as capital ships, and for the crews of the secondary (6-inch) armament as
well as the turret guns. This imposed restrictions on maximum range and appears to have
influenced the conditions in other ways; in 1911, when pre-dreadnought battleships still
outnumbered the all-big-gun ships by 22 to 14, only 4 of the latter appeared in the top 20
ships. 207
 Yet, when these disappointing results were reviewed, no blame was attached to
fire control equipment.208
Sumida charges that, because the Dreyer Table was 'able to produce acceptable
results under the unrealistic and easy conditions of Battle Practice...this was to be a major
factor in the rejection of the far superior Argo system'. 209 However, the limited evidence
suggests that, after 1909, more emphasis was given in Battle Practice to general
preparedness for action, while the 'Commander-in Chief's Special Firings', introduced in
1910, were employed to exercise the fire control to its limits.
202 ManualofGunney 1911 (op. cit.) p.121.
203 Rear Admiral Inglefield to Admiral Fisher, l8January 1909 quoted in LDNS, p.160.
Admiralty, Naval StalE Gunnery Division, Progress in Naval Gunnely, 1926, Plate 1, ADM 186/271. 'HMS
ORION, Battle Practice Run' and 'Class I Ships', both 1912, Craig Wailer Papers.
205 DNOfor Successor, July 1907, p.30.
206	 Atlantic Fleet to the Secretary of the Admiralty 18 December 1911 in 'Gunnery Conference
1911-12' (op. Ca).
201 Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Results ofBattle Practice in Hit Majesty's Fleet 1907 to 1913 inJal 56, AL
208 
'Conference on Gunnery', report n.d. but early 1912 in 'Gunnery Conference 1911 / 1912' (op. cit.).
209 LEW1, p.220.
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Conditions and scheme of practice to be as ordered by the Commander-in-Chief.210
During the appointment of Admiral Sir George Callaghan as C.-in-C. Home Fleets (from
December 1911), opportunities were taken to conduct firings at unprecedented ranges. In
November 1912:
...the "COLOSSUS" carried out practice at a towed target (l5Oft. by 3Oft.) at ranges
between 14,000 and 15,000 yards spotting from her own top...seven rounds out of 40
[17'/2 o/] being direct hits on the target.211
It had been intended that Xeplune and Hercules should carry out long-range runs at up to
15,000 yards during the firings against the Empress of India in November 1913. However,
squadron firings were held first and the old ship was so damaged that she sank. Callaghan
could only report that:
It was most unfortunate that it was not possible to carry out the long-range runs...as
although everyone is agreed as to the great desirability of hitting first we have little to
guide us as to the range at which we can open fire with good prospect of hitting.212
In the Spring of 1914, the C.-in-C. authorised (reluctantly, according to Chatfield) the
Battle Cruiser Squadron to:
...fire at two large towed targets at ranges of 16,000 yards and steaming at not less than
twenty-three knots. All five ships fired simultaneously at the two targets, the firing was
not too good, nor altogether bad. Our rangefinders could only just measure such ranges
and were very inaccurate at them.215
These special firings are, therefore, the best available indications of the capabilities of the
pre-War manual fire control system at long ranges.
In 1914, the Admiralty issued specific orders that, during the renamed 'Special
Gunnery Test':
Certain ships of each class should open fire at the extreme range of their guns.214
As the quotations in Appendix XI show, this new emphasis echoed the
frequently-expressed expectations of Callaghan and other fleet commanders that, in good
210 
'Revised Instructions for the Expenditure of Heavy Gun Ammunition', February 1910 in 'Revised
Instructions for the Expenditure of Heavy and Light Gun Ammunition' in ADM 1/8065. In 1913, the
rounds allowed per gun were 4 for Battle Practice and 3½ for both the C.-in-C.'s and squadron firings:
Enclosure III with Secretary of the Admiralty to Commanders, 6 March 1913 in IQ/DNOJI, 1913, p.63.
DNO's Minute 13 February 1913 in IQ/DNO I, 1912, p. 337-8, AL. See also L(WS', p.250.
212 Adral Cailaghan, memorandum 'Firings to be carried out at "Empress of India" ', and letter to the
Secretary of the Admiralty 8 December 1913 in ' Empress of India', 1913.
213 ChatfIeld,Xaty and Defence (. cit.) p.1 13. Sumida, LDNY, pp.251-2 and 284-5, citing descriptions of high
speed exercises in DRAX 4/1 (CC) states that these firings 'actually took place in 1913 and not in 1914' at
ranges of 12,000 yards. In fact, the 1913 exercises were of rate and range keeping between ships of the
BCS, without firing.
214 'Insctlom for Annual Gunnery Practice', 1914 and draft of 5 April 1914, referencing Board decision
of 1913, in IQ/DNO, Vol.111, 1914, pp.1-5 and 324.
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visibility, fire would be opened at ranges up to 16,000 yards; however, 'effective range'
was generally considered to be about 8,000 to 10,000 yards, the range of Battle Practice.
Opinion in the Admiralty was similar; Captain F C T Tudor (DNO sinceJune 1912) held
that, since modern ships could knock themselves out at 9,000 yards, they would open fire
at much greater ranges. 215 However, the new orders came too late and the Royal Navy
entered the War with little experience of firing at extreme ranges.
Professor Sumida attributes the abandonment of 'The Quest for Reach' chiefly
to the Admiralty's belief, not shared by the commanders of the Fleet, 'that a battle against
the German fleet could be won by rapid fire at relatively close range'. This conviction, he
proposes, derived from intelligence reports of the secondary armament of the new
German dreadnoughts.
The adoption of medium-calibre quick-firers...suggested that the Germans would seek
to engage at shorter ranges than were being contemplated by the Royal Navy....A
knowledgeable British naval officer later recalled that "so firm was the conviction" that
the Germans would fight at dose range that "our whole tactics were based upon it".216
This quotation is taken from a lecture delivered by Captain H G Thursfield in 1922: but it
is incomplete, the passage concluding:
...therefore we must endeavour to avoid it [a close range action]: we must develop and
practice the game of long bowls.217
This does seem a more rational response; why press in with less well armoured ships to
ranges at which the German 5.9-inch guns (and, indeed, the latest torpedoes) were more
likely to be effective?218 However, since Bacon had been DNO and May commanded the
Home Fleet, there had been agreement that poor visibility in the North Sea could force
encounters at short range, when fire would have to be opened immediately. 'The Quest
for Reach' does not provide any other strong primary evidence of an intention, held only
by the Admiralty, to engage at short ranges even if the visibility was good. 219 Both
commanders at sea and the Admiralty recognised that a fire control system had to meet
2 DNO's minute 18 November 1913 in IQ/DNO II, 1913.
216 
'Quest for Reach', pp.22-3.
211 Captain H G Thursfield, 'Development of Tactics in the Grand Fleet', Lecture No. I, 22 February 1922
in THU 107, NMM. Attached to the text is a copy of Callaghan's 1913 memorandum stating that 'fire
may well be opened at 16,000 yards'.
2t8 Alsc), the maximum range of the German 5.9-inch secondary armament was a long 13,500 metres (about
14,700 yards). Erich Groner, revised Dieter Jung and Martin Maass, German Warships 1815-1945, Vol I
(London, 1990) pp.23-8 and 53-7.
219 p.93, the firings at Empress of India at 9,800 yards are cited as evidence that in 1913 this was regarded
as 'very long range'. The footnote does not mention either that 13.5-inch ships fired shell from the old
Royal Soverei,gns with reduced charges, or the intention for Neptune and Hercuiss to fire at up to 15,000 yards




two requirements. When visibility was good, fire must be opened at long-range (13,000 to
16,000 yards): but, if visibility was poor, at as little as 7-8,000 yards. These expectations
had influenced the choice of rate plotting for manual fire control: and, as the following
chapters will show, they were also to be important considerations in the decision between
the Dreyer and Argo systems.
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The metFu'd of uai, the jn.sts-u,neat is as/'oltosvS. The Rate of Chwe oJF?an haying
been. obtthect liy RaneibLcisr & 7imin,g oraeseeö, the instrument is set to that speed.
The Distance ha .ing been. obtcd,n.ed, the dial 6zce is set with the diet a.n.ce oppo.site to
the pointer, çer#lat' speed., hare been correctly assumed, and 9'tke initial (itetanco
wits corr'ec iFtPoi.n2er wifl conttnus to ghe,r the tts.81€yjwe 	 .hshou2d bepu.t On. tiLe 8Lltt
if the fall of the shot 8/LOWS I/tat toomuch' or too z?111.e chwtjee in ,we is totn qpiicd
M,o ra2e can. be altered'.
If zheftlZ of the shot shoWS that the distance is vn.corj-ec& the perimeter of t.4e dial
is moved round until the correct distance ta opposite the pointer; thus the pointer
should always stand at the ctclaa2 dislaiwe sv4icit is to be passed to the .guns and the
indicato the lelraphs and tgun. sh.tsshoitld always agree.
4. RANGE INDICATOR PROPOSED BY PERCY SCOrF
As originally proposed by Scott, the maximum range on the scale was 6,000 yards.
The range-rate calibrations were in knots, even though early Dumaresqs were calibrated in
'seconds to change 50 yards' and rates from timed ranges were more conveniently expressed in
yards-per-minute.
Percy Scott, 'Gunnery Lecture II. Remarks on Long Range Hitting', 15 December 1903 and Plate II in
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The periscope established the line-of-sight to the target.
A turret was correctly trained when the axes of the guns were appropriately deflected from the
line-of-sight to correct for drift and deflection. In the Evershed transmitter, the transmitter (a
rheostat) was coupled to the bearing plate. The deflection and drift handles introduced the
required angular displacements between the periscope and the bearing plate.
Some transmitters could also be equipped with receiver rheostats and indicators (Plate 8).
Transmitters could also be coupled to telescopes or to the Argo rangefinder mounting.











Indicators contained a galvanometer needle which indicated ON when the electrical 'bridge'
formed by the transmitter and receiver rheostats was balanced. The system was accurate to 1°.
In turrets, the receiver rheostats were geared to the turret trunks.
The gun sight indicator was mounted on the sight telescope used by the turret trainer (the
right-hand sight of the left gun). The trainer could view the indicator with his left eye while
watching the target through the sight with his right.





















































































































This chapter addresses two themes. The first concerns the technical capabilities
of Pollen's fire control instruments and, in particular, the extent to which, at different
times, they could claim to be helm-free (Here, 'helm-free' means that operation is the
same whether own ship's course is steady or changing.) The second is the troubled and
unusual relationship between the Admiralty and Pollen and his Argo Company: and the
personal, financial and political factors which shaped it. Both themes are explored against
the convenient time-frame fixed by the four trials of Pollen's gear aboard Jupiter (1905-6),
Ariadne(l907-8),ifata1(l909-l0) and Orion (late 1912).
TEci-iNIci
In February 1900, after witnessing a practice at 1,400 yards (which must,
therefore, have been a gunlayer's test), Pollen recalled being 'told that no practice was
carried out at any much greater range', and concluding that the short ranges were due to
'the absence of an accurate range-fmder'.' As Managing Director of the British Linotype
Corporation, he was able to use their resources to start development of a two-observer
rangefinder. In early 1901, he made his first approach to the Admiralty, submitting only
drawings of the machine that calculated ranges from each pair of simultaneously-taken
bearings;2 he also claimed that '...observing to within eight seconds...with telescopic
sights...should not be a difficult feat' 3 and that 'important inventions have been made...for
Arthur Pollen, 'The Gun in Battle', February 1913 in Jon Sumida (ed.) The Polfrn Papers 1901 - 1916
(London, 1984) p.308.
2 Jon Sumida, In Defence ofXaval Supremacj (London, 1989) pp.78-9. A first patent for a calculating machine
(subsequently abandoned) was applied for on l8July 1900 (p.102).
' Even the verniers of precision theodolites, used in land-based surveying, were divided only to 10 seconds
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combining the telescope with one or more gyrostats'. His letters were followed by a
pamphlet which acknowledged that, with 150 feet between observers, the claimed bearing
accuracy could still lead to range errors of 621 yards at 20,000 yards. The pamphlet made
no mention of gyrostats, but, like the letter, it proposed that the enemy's position should
be plotted manually on a navigation chart, thereby obtaining his speed and course.
The primary use of this device...would be for tactical and strategical purposes....The
secondary use...would be as a range-finder for guns...at ranges hitherto considered
impractical at sea.5
Thus these sources do not substantiate Pollen's later claim that it was already clear to him
that the chart could be used for 'the forecasting of future ranges and the angle of
deflection'.6
The Admiralty rejected Pollen's proposal but he continued work, principally on
the calculating machine; it was probably completed before the end of 1 902. He and his
engineers then turned to the much more difficult problem of taking and transmitting
simultaneous bearings. In 1904, two pamphlets produced in July and December described
not just the rangefinder and calculator, but a charting table and clock. 8 A figure from the
second pamphlet (Plate 10) illustrates clearly the difficulty of observing bearings with
sufficient accuracy.9 The chart or plot was to be made on a broad paper ribbon moved by
clockwork at a speed proportional to the speed of the firing ship, enemy position being
plotted manually with the pin sliding on the plotting arm. Own course was traced by a
second 'pricker' beneath the pivot of the plotting arm (Plate 1 1).'° Since own course could
only be represented by the straight line at the edge, this was a straight-course plotter. Yet
the second patent seems to imply some notion of helm-free working:
...the ribbon carrier may be, and preferably is, mounted to turn on a suitable pivot so
that it can be swung according to a change of course'.t'
of arc:J A Bennett, The Divided Circle (Oxford, 1987) Plates 107 and 229.
FP, 'The Pollen System of Telemetry', February 1901, pp.8-13.
Pollen to Selbome, 4 February 1901 in RCAI Claims Files, T.173/91 Part VII, PRO. Excerpts from the
letters in PP, pp.210-i.	 -
6 PP, 'Gun in Battle' (1913) p.309.
1 Patent 6,838 of 1902, applied for 20 March, complete specification 22 December.
8 Patents were also taken out for the bearing transmission system (11,535/1904) and the table
(23,872/1904), applied for 19 May and 4 November respectively.
PP, 'Fire control and long-range firing an essay to define certain principia of gunnery...', December
1904, pp.35-7 and 52 and patent 23,872/1904, p.3.
I° PP, 'Memorandum on a proposed system for finding ranges at sea and ascertaining the speed and course
of any vessel in sight',July 1904, p.17 and patent 23,872/1904, p.6.
" Patent 23,872/1904, p.5.
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although this arrangement could not have produced a true-course plot. In contrast, if a
figure from the second pamphlet (Plate 12) is compared with Fig. 2.12b, it appears that
Pollen may have been thinking of the version of straight-course plotting which depended
on a directional reference to hold an initial steady course; however, no such reference
(gyroscopic or otherwise) is mentioned in the documents.
Even by July, Pollen was clear that a plot of enemy course could average Out the
errors in individual observations: although, by December, he claimed, extravagantly, that
the range could be 'accurate probably to 1-10th of 1 per cent'.' 2 Injuly, he also described
for the first time a 'clock' which was intended both to forecast ranges and transmit them
to the guns. However, it was little more than an initial, incomplete concept, since it had
dials for setting speeds and enemy course but not for enemy bearing or for ballistic
corrections.' 3 Nor does the pamphlet contain a single reference to deflection. At about the
time of its publication, Pollen was given permission by Vice-Admiral Lord Charles
Beresford to seek advice from gunnery experts in the Channel fleet,' 4 after which the
December pamphlet shows a greater appredation of all the factors affecting hitting at long
range. It also displays a knowledge of the latest Service instruments, notably the
Dumaresq, the Scott/Vickers clock and an appliance by which the 'range may be put
upon the sights with great rapidity';' 5 this was probably the Vyvyan-Newitt direct
sight-setting gear, which was under trial in the Channel fleet in the last quarter of 1904.16
For his own system, Pollen now proposed a 'change of range and bearing
machine', though no hints are given of its mechanism. Having been 'set to own and
enemy's course and speed', this would keep both range and target bearing and transmit
them to dials in the gun positions '[s]o long...as the courses and speeds remain unaltered'.
The difference between true and gun range was to be determined by using the
two-position rangefmder to measure the distance of the fall of ranging shot. The fmal
element of the system was a separate deflection machine which was 'in the course of
design'.' 7 In mid-1905, Pollen produced a further pamphlet in which he first named his
system 'Aim Correction'. He dropped any idea of 'ranging the splash'. Instead, he
12 PP. 'Fire Control' (1904) pp.54 and 39.
' PP. 'Proposed System' (1904) pp.18-I 9.
14 LLWS' (op. ciL) p.80.
PP, 'Fire Control' (1904) p.29.
16 Captain of Vwtonous to Rear Admiral Second-in-Command Channel Fleet, 7 December 1904 in
'Vyvyan-Newitt, Siemens and Vickers Electrically Controlled Gunsights' in ADM 1/7832, PRO.
' PP, 'Fire Control (1904) pp.40-41.
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proposed that the range and deflection machines would calculate the known ballistic
corrections and that bracketing (with single shots) be used to correct for unknowable
factors.'8
JUPITER
Only the rangefinding system and plotter were ready for trials in Jupiter from
November 1905 to January 1906.19 Conditions were sometimes severe, but Pollen
acknowledged that:
It has, however, to be stated without any reservation that the instruments have failed to
carry out the requirements of the system under weigh...
He blamed the means for training the telescopes and confusion between the transmitted
bearings. 20
 In fact, as shown in Appendix )U1, Note 1 (XII-!), the range accuracy
promised so confidently required synchronisation within milliseconds between bearing
observations, impossible demands on the observers and the electromagnetic transmission.
Manual plotting proved too slow and prone to error. Pollen later admitted that: 'Our first
experiment was a complete failure' and that:
Now that I know the difficulties involved, I can realise that no crazier scheme was ever
put forward.
However, Pollen also claimed that lack of time and money before the trials prevented the
development of '[g]yroscopic correction, a plotting table adjustable for the turn and the
change of range and bearing machine'. 2 ' He blamed the Admiralty for advising that
gyroscope control 'was not indispensable' and for being unwilling to fund 'prolonged
and...costly experiments'. In fact, after the brief reference to gyrostats in 1901, they are
not even mentioned again until improvised experiments in Jupiter for yaw correction.
Furthermore, Pollen had no settled scheme for a helm-free plotter: and, while the
Admiralty were prepared to purchase a range-clock, Pollen had been unable to develop it
in time.
Undaunted, in February 1906 Pollen suggested:
18 PP, 'A.C.: A Postscript', mid-1905, pp. 56-63.
19 LLWI, pp.85-7.
20 PP. 'Jupiter Letters': III,January 1906, p.83 and IV, 2 February 1906, p.88.
21 PP, 'Gun in Battle' (1913) pp.309-1 1.
PP, 'Notes, Etc. on Atiadne Trials', April 1909, pp.212-3. See also PP, 'The Quest of a Rate Finder',
November 1910, p.265.
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...that as the final development of the two-observer system must take some time, the
Aim Corrector System should be tried with one-observer range finders in the
meantime.23
by which he meant the new Barr and Stroud 9-foot instrument. The unworkable
two-observer system was soon dropped and, with the help of Harold Isherwood 24, the A C
system was transformed into a gyroscopically-controlled rangefinder mounting
transmitting simultaneous ranges and bearings to an automatic plotting table. The
description of the 'One Observer System of Charting' submitted in June 1906 also
included a 'change of range' machine which could be set for 'yaw correction' and
transmit elevation and deflection angles, preferably direct to the gun sights; 25 however, no
range clock of any description was made at this time 26 nor was one included in the
agreement concluded in October for the supply of a prototype mounting, transmission
system and plotter. In the same month, Pollen and Isherwood applied for a patent 27 on
the dual-gyroscope directional reference (Plate 13 and XIT-2). In a remarkably short time,
by November 1907, the trial gear were ready for installation inAñadne.28
ARIADNE
On 3 August 1907, in writing to the new DNO, Pollen claimed that '...it would
not be difficult...to make [the clock] calculate and transmit the deflection as well as the
range....'? In the same month, he prepared lecture notes which described the complete
Aim Correction system as it might be installed in Inuincible. The rangefmder pedestal was
trained by 'a gyroscopically-controlled electric drive, which...consequently neutralises...
changes of course due to the yawing of the ship'. Ranges and bearings were transmitted to
the 'charting table' and plotted automatically. Enemy speed and course were then set on
the change of range machine (this also kept the target bearing) and on a separate
deflection machine. 30 Range and deflection were then transmitted from the machines to
23 PP, 'Jupiter Letter IV' (1906) p.86.
24 Their first joint patent (13,082) was applied for on 6 June 1906. However, in his evidence to the first
RCA! hearing, Isherwood said that his assodation with Pollen began in 1902: RCA! Minutes of
Proceedings, T.173/547 Part 3, p.25.
Pollen to the Secretary of the Admiralty, l8June 1906 with 'One Observer System of Charting' l5June
1906 in T.173/91 Part VII.
'No clock was ever made until the Natal clock'; Pollen's counsel to the RCAI, T.173/547 Part 7, p.37.
23,846 applied for 26 October 1906.
IDM,p.123.
Pollen to Bacon, 3 August 1907 in T.173/91 Part VII.
SO The means of generating deflection were evidently undecided.
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the automatically-set sights; and both machines worked 'on the assumption that both ships
are maintaining a steady course and a level speed'.3'
After the Ariadne trials, Pollen printed a detailed description of the rangefinder
mounting, the complex, synchronous transmission system and the plotter. The mounting
was trained by a pair of electrically-activated counter-rotating clutches; as might be
expected (Xll-3), the mounting tended to 'hunt' around the correct training angle, Pollen
himself stating that the observer was 'relieved...of everything except a rhythmical motion
for the training by the gyro correction'. 32 As in Jupiter, the plotter worked on the
straight-course principle, but the plotting arm and the pencil for plotting enemy course
were now positioned automatically using the ranges and bearings transmitted from the
rangefinder. These bearings were relative to the mean course as defmed by the pair of
gyroscopes in the mounting (XII-4). If the course altered by more than 12 1/20, both
gyroscopes were clamped parallel to the keel-line and not released until the new course
was established;33 thus plotting was suspended while the gyroscopes were clamped,34 and
the type of plot produced was like that shown in Fig. 2.1 2c. The Ariadne plotter was
yaw-free, but not helm-free.
The criterion for success in the trials, which had been agreed in October 1906,
was that, two minutes after the target range had fallen to 8,000 yards, the range should be
predicted to within 80 yards for a further three minutes. 35 In the absence of an A C clock,
the enemy speed and course from the plot were to be set on a Dumaresq, the rate then
being applied to a Vickers clock. These demanding requirements were tested on 11 and
13 January 1907 in Torbay, where the courses could be accurately surveyed. 36 Pollen
declared that his gear had come 'successfully through the Torbay tests for exactness in
results'. 37 In fact, his own printed notes (reproduced in Appendix Xffl) show that, out of
five runs, four obtained the enemy course to within 70 yards of the surveyed results, but it
PP, 'An Apology for the A.C. Battle System; being notes for a lecture to the War Course College,
Portsmouth', printed December 1907; see especially pp.140 and 145-150.
32 A H Pollen, 'Notes on Charts, made before Christmas, sent to Admiral Wilson' pp.2-3 in JVes,
Cornspondence, Etc. on the Pollen A. C. System installed and tried in HMSAriadne, December 1907 -January 1908 in
DRAX 3/1, CC: but not in the abridged version in PP, pp.1 59-171. For the transmission system and
clutches, see also patent 14,415/1908.
'The Pollen Aim Corrector' in..Wote Coriespondence on A. C. (op. ciL) but not in PP.
' Professor C V Boys to Pollen, n.d. but November 1912 in T.173/91 Part II: see IDXS, p.230.
" 'Pollen Aim Correcting System. Points discussed at an interview with Mr Pollen...' with Ewan
Macgregor to Pollen, 29 October 1906 in T.173/91 Part VII.
LnM.c,.l28-9
PP, Pollen to Wilson, 24January 1908, p.166.
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is not certain that, even then, the Dumaresq and clock correctly predicted the range.
Pollen declared:
It was no part of the plan of the designers to consider chiefly facilities for getting the
data off the chart with rapidity; it appeared that this was a matter in which only
experience could indicate the best method.
Yet the complete A C system itself depended on setting the clock from the plotted results.
In the Torbay trials, the maximum rate was 'not 500 yards a minute' but on 15
January, in 'the only experiment made at sea, there was no change of range at all'. 39 In
such conditions, the A C gear must have given accurate results but, although Wilson's
report has not been found, there can be no doubt that he recommended rejection in
favour of manually-worked alternatives. From Pollen's subsequent riposte, it is clear that
Wilson also criticised the performance of the A C equipment. Most seriously:
(a)A change of course throws the instruments out of gear. An operator has to stop the
gyroscopes... and release them again when the ship is on her new course.
(b)The gyroscopes creep....
(e) The instruments were shown to be unreliable.
The first point was perfectly valid, despite being rejected by Pollen because 'the
gyroscopes, after...a change of course, automatically select and keep the new course'.
Respecting the gyroscopes, Pollen unwisely asserted that 'the gyroscopes do not and
cannot creep', particularly since he had already admitted that:
...in the experiment carried out by Admiral Wilson on the 12th [December] with the
ship anchored...it was found that the creep of the gyros was...some 2 or 3 degrees in 4
or five minutes.4'
Whatever the extent of the creep at sea, the dual-gyroscope design, despite its many
ingenious features, was superseded within the year. Finally, as for general unreliability,
Pollen claimed that 'the gear...never once broke down, or failed in a single particular'.42
Yet, only one year later, he admitted that the Añadne gear was not 'in all respects fitted for
its purpose' and to defects in the plotting devices. 43 While Wilson's report probably
exaggerated the gravity of the defects, it is unlikely that the A C gear was yet fit for
service. And, as Pollen admitted in private correspondence:
A H Pollen, 'Notes of the Torbay Trials of the A.C. System', in Yoles, Correspondence on A. C. (op. cit.) but
not PP. The Ariadne plots gave 'substantial accuracy in from one to 2½ minutes': Boys to Pollen (1912).
Pollen to Wilson (op. cit.) p.165.
4° PP, Pollen to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 25 March 1908, p.235.
' 'Notes on Charts' (op. cii.) p.4
42 Pollen to Secretary, 1908 (op. cii.).
" Pollen to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 5January 1909 in T.173/91 Part II.
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The Ariadne thing...is...ofcourse...exceedingly incomplete as a fire control system... and
I reckon it will take me a full year to get the other instruments...running to my
satisfaction.'
After the Ariadne trials, Pollen received further funds to continue development. In
January 1909, he announced:
...the completion of the drawings of the entire system....The mechanical devices we shall
employ...have all, during the last twelve months been exhaustively tried and proved to
be reliable.... The system is now no longer in a tentative stage.
The principal instruments of the 'Pollen A C Battle System' were as before. In the
rangefinder, the dual gyroscopes had been replaced by a single, continuously-running,
air-driven gyroscope which also used air jets to correct for precession. 45 However, the
gyroscope was still clamped during any substantial course change, so the mounting
remained only yaw-free.
Pollen's description of the system indicates that the charting table was being
completely redesigned to plot on both broadsides; it was also intended to place marks at
one minute intervals along the enemy's course as an aid to measuring his speed. While
plotting on moving paper is mentioned, the preference was that:
Our position on the Charting Table will be driven instead of the paper.
The Chart will be rotatable about an adjustable centre at the moment of change of
course [by own ship]. The extent of the turn can be controlled by the rangefinder or by
hand.47
Just such an adjustable centre (a pin sliding in a carrier pivoting about own-ship's pencil)
was described in the contemporary patent for the manual course plotter, but, before a
turn even commenced, the pin had to be positioned according to the expected radius of the
turn. This scheme evidently proved unworkable, since Pollen stated subsequently that
the table as originally designed could represent own course only as rectilinear.
To plot a turn, or to plot during a turn, was consequently impossible. We had long
been of opinion that this was a grave omission.
To justify the latter claim, he harked back to his 1904 patent, even though he had to
admit that it 'would certainly not have given us the results we wanted'.49 He blamed 'the
' LDMS, p.138.
'The Pollen A.C. Battle System' with Pollen to Secretary, 1909 (op. cit.). For the gyro, see patent
11,795/1909 applied for with complete specification 19 May.
Draft letter concerning "Natal" pattern mountings with proposal 'R-F Bearing transmitter', 1911 in
DRAX 3/4.
'A.C. Battle System' (op. cit.)
' Patent 5,031/1909 applied for 2 March, pp.3 and 5-6 and Figs. 3-5.
PP, Pollen to Admiral Colville, 1 July 1910, pp.245-6.
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cry, that the gear was too complicated already' for the original J(atal plotter being on the
straight-course principle: 50 but in fact there is nothing to show that, prior to the 1909
trials, Argo had any worked-out scheme for true-course plotting.
The 'change of range and bearing machine' as described inJanuary 1909 was set
with own speed, enemy's speed, course, range and bearing, and the time of flight. It
generated and transmitted gun angle and deflection to automatic sights. Its settings could
be corrected if they differed from the plotted values: but spotting corrections were
transmitted directly from the spotters to the sights. 5 ' No specific mention is made of
change of own course. However, a description of the 'range and deflection clock', which
was probably written a little earlier, stated:
Any dial can be altered while the Clock is running including own speed. If own Course
is changed it has the effect of altering the angle between Target Course and Own
Course so the alteration due to the change of Own Course is made on the Target
Course Dial.52
Clearly, Pollen had given the impression that the clock could keep the range and bearing
through a turn.
NA TM
No detailed description has been found of the straight-course plotting table
which, with the rangefinder mounting and transmission equipment, were delivered to
Xatal on 21 September 1909. However, as explained in Xll-5, its general arrangement
resembled that of the patented manual plotter (Plate 11), though it plotted the transmitted
ranges and bearings automatically. In the first trials, the equipment impressed the Captain
ofatd, despite a 'few minor mechanical difficulties'.53 However:
Captain Ogilvy, almost as soon as the gear was installed...pointed out to us that the
military importance of plotting during a turn seemed to him to be overwhelmingly
critical... He urged us therefore to ignore all the complication objections and adapt the
table forthwith'.TM
By 15 January 1910, Pollen and Isherwood were able to submit a provisional patent
specification for true-course plotters. They claimed widely for various outline designs, but
° PP, 'Quest of Rate Finder' (1910) p.265.
'A.C. Battle System'.
52 
'Fire Control. An Essay by Captain C. Hughes-Onslow RN', Royal Naval War College, n.d. but 1909,
PLLN 1/5, CC. For the influence of assumed fire control capabilities on the decision to built the Lion class
battlecruisers, see John Brooks, 'All Big Guns: Fire Control and Capital Ship Design 1903-1909' in War
Studies Jouina4 Vol. I, Iss. 2, p.45-50.
5° ll2M,p.l72.
Pollen to Colville (op. ci&) p.246.
ACARco	 100
the only arrangement described in the complete patent specification (Plate 14) was
similar to that of the Xatal table after it had been modified for true-course plotting. The
moving plotting point was now fixed at the centre of the table, while the paper was driven
from below by a pair of wheels, one on either side of the fixed plotting point. In the Xatal
table (unlike the patented design) the driving wheels were provided with short spikes,
while the paper was pinned to a wooden board of a weight sufficient (it was hoped) to give
these 'prickers' sufficient purchase. When the table was returned to Xatal in early May
1910, it had also been fitted with its own gyroscope; by following its directional indication,
an operator set course changes manually. The mounting must have been modified at the
same time to transmit target bearings relative to ship's head, as required to position the
enemy plotting arm correctly. The mounting's own gyroscope continued to stabilise it
against yaw while the course was steady: but, when it was changing, the true-course plot
depended on the rangetaker's unaided skill in keeping on the target.
Meanwhile, the long-delayed Argo clock had finally been completed in January
1910 and delivered toi'fasal.57 Two early clock patents from 1906 and 1908 had described
mechanisms employing linkages which, by forming a triangle of velocities, obtained
virtual course and speed; some clock drawings seen by a naval delegation to the
Linotype works in June 1907 were presumably based on these principles, but: 'The
manufacture was not begun at this time of the finished clock'. 59 In contrast, by July 1909,
work was well advanced on what was later called the Argo Clock Mark J•60 The
subsequent patent shows that it too relied on a 'simulacrum' of virtual course, now
derived by adding together the components of virtual course along and perpendicular to
own course (Plate 15 and Xfl-6). These components were generated by variable speed
drives, their discs being driven by a speed-regulated electric motor.61 A variable speed
" Patent 1,111 / 1910 applied for 1 5 January, complete specification 12 August.
Pollen to Colville, p.247-8. Patent 1,111/1910, p.8 and Fig. 8. The table's gyro was probably the same
as that used in the rangefinder mounting: Isherwood to the RCAI, T. 173/547 Part 3, p.25.
' Pollen told the RCAI that the clock was delivered in April (T.173/547 Part 2, p.64 and Part 15, p 38)
states; but it may have been February (IflNS, p.1 98).
Patent 595 ofJanuary 1906 was subsequently abandoned but the description in ILWS', p.82 indicates that
it was similar to 2,497/1908.
Pollen before RCAI, T.173/547 Part 14, p.82. This contradicts IDJ'IS p.121 which apparently cites the
same source, Part 14 for 1 August 1925 being also labelled Day 9. Dreyer, a member of the party, denied
seeing any clock drawings: T.173/547 Part 16, p.39.
60 Dreyer before RCAI, T. 173/547 Parts 16, pp.39-40 and 17 pp.58-9.
' Patent 360/1911 applied for 5 January, Figs. 3 and 4 and pp.3-4 (the complete specification of 28 June
was identical).
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drive of very similar design was also shown in the patent for the true-course plotter.62
These mechanisms are significant as the first Argo drives based on a disc, a ball and a pair
of rollers (Fig. 4.2). However, at this stage of development, the rollers were stationary so,
to change the rate, the ball had to be forced sideways against sliding friction at its points of
contact with disc and rollers.
After preliminary experiments from 24 May and 9 June 1910, the actual 'Aim
Corrector Trials', conducted by a committee presided over by Rear-Admiral S C J
Colville, followed between 16 and 29 June. 63 They were intended to compare Xatal
automatic plotting with manual plotting of true and virtual course by, respectively, Lord
Xelson and Africa: and to verify 'the general suitability and reliability of "NATAL'S"
installation for use in action'. Unfortunately, even the preliminaries established that:
...in their present form, the instruments are neither reliable without more skilled
attention than they can get in a newly commissioned ship nor in many of their
unessential details suited to ship or sea conditions.....
That many of elements...need radical alteration has already been recognised...in the
case of the rangefinder mountings....The case...is more obvious and stronger in the case
of the other instruments.ss
Electrical terminals and 'rubbing contacts' (on which the relays throughout the system
depended) failed.67 Pollen had to accept that the rangefinder mounting was still 'seriously
defective', both the gyro and its relay proving unreliable. The worst problems were with
the hastily-modified plotter. The pricker wheels lost their hold on the wooden board; both
board and table-top had warped, but also the weight of the board caused it to 'take
charge' if there was any motion on the ship. These sudden movements also broke the
already temperamental plotting pens. The table's gyroscope wandered. And the minute
marks along the enemy course were little help in estimating enemy speed, because they
were made automatically, whether or not the rangefinder had a good 'cut'.69
62 Patent 1,111 / 1910 Fig.6 and pp.7-8. In the plotter, the drive generated the linear movement of the
paper at a rate proportional to own speed.
63 IDNS', p.202.
' Admiral W H May, 'Aim Corrector Trials', 31 May 1910, DRAX 3/3.
65 Natal had recommissioned before the beginnirg of the new trials (LDNS, p.202) but, while she had a new
Lieutenant (I'), Reginald Plunkett, she retained the same Lieutenant (G), Ralph Eliot: The )iaziy List, June
1910.
PP, Pollen to the Secretary of the Admiralty l7June 1910, p.253.
67 Report by lieutenant R Plunkett ofJVata4 4July 1910, p.2 in DRAX 3/3.
Pollen to Colville, pp. 245 and 248-9. Pollen to Director of Navy Contracts, 25 November 1912 in
T.173/91 Part VU. PF, 'Quest of Rate Finder' (1910) p.265-6.
Plunkett's report (op. ciL) pp.4-5.
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Except for an adjusting nut working loose, the clock was reliable but 'the
backlash is excessive' and, functionally, it was far from satisfactory. If wrongly set, its
range and bearing could not be altered without stopping it and disconnecting the drive
screws. For the same reason, there were no means during a turn of applying the large
change in the target bearing relative to own course. 7° In any case, the variable speed
drives were 'not capable of [driving] while the speed was being altered'. 7 ' Thus the design
of the Argo Clock Mark I restricted it to steady-course working; it was in no sense
helm-free.
Admiral Colville's committee concluded that:
The installation as at present fitted in "NATAL". and as tested in these trials [sic] is
unsuitable and unreliable for use in action.
Yet they recommended the adoption of the rangefinder mounting (which was already on
order) and the 'improved model [clock] as proposed by the makers'. They decisively
rejected both forms of manual course plotting but proposed new trials of the A C
automatic plotter when 'further developed'. 72 The Admiralty, however, decided to reject
the plotter outright; but they also invited Pollen to submit 'detailed designs of an improved
and reliable clock' which could 'transmit to Follow-the-Pointer sights with unequal
graduations'. They also informed him that the drum-type indicators in Xatal's turrets had
failed to maintain synchronism.73 In reply, Pollen confirmed that:
We are already engaged in re-designing the gear, and our present intention is to rebuild
it in its entirety....we shall, so soon as the range finder mounting and indicator drawings
are complete, put the clock in hand before any other devices.74
Meanwhile, by 2 August, Lieutenant Plunkett of Xatal was already experimenting
with time-and-range plotting using the Argo plotter, while the method was used
successfully in her Battle Practice on 16-18 August. Isherwood wrote to Plunkett: 'I am
interested to hear that you are trying "Time and Range" plotting...', 75 while Argo
personnel may have plotted range rates (though not dual rates) while aboard X&aL 76 By
November, Pollen conceded that, when used with the Argo mounting, dual-rate plotting
° Pollen to Colville, p.249 and 'Quest of Rate Finder' (1910) p.268. See also IX-6.
hl Argo Company, Memorandum', 6 May 1913 in T.173/91 Part II.
72 Colville Committee, Enclosure with letter to C.-in-C. Home Fleet, IJuly 1910 in DRAX 3/3.
" Secretary of the Admiralty to Argo, 19 August 1910 in T.173/91 Part VII.
Pollen to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 25 August 1910, in T.173/91 Part VII.
" Isherwood to Plunkett, 11 August 1910 and Reginald Plunkett, 'Notes on Plotting', n.d. but after Natal's
1910 B.P., both in DRAX 3/3. Excerpts from Natal's log, ADM 53/23982 courtesy Prof. Sumida.
76 Pollen before RCAI, T.173/547 Part 2, p.21.
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was 'a good alternative means of getting and keeping rate - alternative, that is, to straight
line plotting'.77
OM0N
Pollen and Plunkett continued to correspond privately while Xatal's table was
modified for semi-automatic dual-rate plotting. 78 Although unsuccessful, 79
 the experience
must have been useful for the dual-rate plotter which Argo supplied as part of the system
for trial in Orion. It was delivered in early 191280 and patented in the following October
late 1 6). In this table, the complex synchronous transmission system was replaced by
much simpler step-by-step gear. However, the receivers still used counter-rotating
electromagnetic clutches (Plate 17) to drive the plotter's pencils. 82
 As might be expected
(XII-7), these were never entirely satisfactory83
 and, in 1918, the Phillpotts committee
found that the 'magnetic clutches...fltted in the plotting table, in H.M.S. "ORION" have
given considerable trouble at times'.
Before the end of 1910 (perhaps for the Xatal trials) the Argo mounting had been
fitted with a variable speed power training drive; thus the position of the controlling lever
gave a direct indication of the bearing-rate. Pollen then proposed that, if a similar drive
were attached to the rangefinder adjustment head, range-rate could be obtained directly.85
This required a continuous 'cut', the very opposite of the normal method of working a
coincidence rangefmder. LieutenantJ C W Henley, who replaced Dreyer as the DNO's
assistant responsible for fire control, wrote privately to his predecessor:
Mr. P. has tried to push this forward into the 45 sets several times but we have opposed
it as absolutely impmctical.
Even so, Pollen persisted and the power-cut device was included in the Orion trials, but it
did not prove satisfactory.87
PP, 'Quest for Rate Finder' (1910) p.269.
78 Pollen to Plunkett, 22 February and 30 March 1911 in DRAX 3/4.




F C Dreyer and C V Usborne, Pollen Aim Corrector System, Pail I: Technwal History and Technical Comparison
with CommanderF CDryer's Fire Control System, February 1913, pp.11 and 34, P.1024, AL
84 Phillpotts Committee, 'Report of inspection at York of Pollen Fire Control System', n.d. but 1918, p.2 in
DRYR 2/1.
Pollen to Henley, 9 December 1910 in T.173/91 Part VII. Patent 362/1911, applied for 5January.
Henley to Dreyer, 24Ju1y 1911 in DRYR 2/1.
87 Technical Comparison (1913) (op. cia) p.12.
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The production rangefinder mountings only required receivers which could
display ranges and bearings, and Argo were able to adapt their original synchronous
transmission switches to control arrays of lamps, each lamp projecting one transmitted
digit onto a ground-glass screen. 88
 In July 1911 (two months before the contracted date)
Henley inspected the prototype of the improved design.
The Training Control is excellent and the Air Gyro is satisfactory but his [Pollen's]
mechanical Clutch relay between Gyro and Mounting gives a jerky motion of about 1/40
each way. An electrical relay which we tried however improved this enormously.9°
In the production mountings (Plates 18 and 19), the clutches were finally abandoned in
favour of a sophisticated electric relay; this increased the restoring torque delivered by the
training motor in three steps as the mounting deviated further from its correct bearing. By
February 1912, the first 15 sets had been delivered, another 10 being in manufacture.
These retained the air-driven gyroscope, which could only stabilise the mounting against
yaw and small course alterations up to 15°. In the remaining 20 sets, it was replaced by an
Anschütz gyrocompass receiver which could maintain the directional reference even
during large course changes. 9° Thus for the first time these final models were helm-free.
In principle, to keep on the target the rangefmder operator had only to set the
power training lever to correspond with the target compass bearing rate. He then used his
right hand both to elevate the rangefinder and adjust the cut. With the failure of the
power-cut device, all this proved too much and the mounting was modified for a separate
trainer, who would also have been better able to correct for wander by the gyros and any
residual hunting by the electric relay. Nevertheless, the conclusion after the Orion trials
was that:
The arrangements for training are very good and are universally liked....
With these alterations [for a separate trainer], the instrument is suitable for service use
and is a decided improvement on the Barr and Stroud Mounting.9'
However, this level of satisfaction appears to have been short-lived.
The 45 sets...ordered had the Argo Gyro fitting in them, but except when first installed
were never used as they proved unsatisfactory and were never incorporated in the
Admiralty Fire Control System.92
Patent 14,302/1911. For electrical details of the transmitters (which are similar to those in the patent
14,415/1908) see Annual Report of Torpedo &hool 1912 pp.75-7 and Plate 40, 109 M 91/ART2, HRO.
9° Henley to Dreyer, 1911 (op. ciL).
9° Admiralty, Handbook of the Aio A.0 Range-Finder Mounting 1912, 18 October 1912, PLLN 1/3. JEWS,
pp.21 3-4.
Technical Comparison (1913) p.34.
9° Untitled summary of the Admiralty's case in DRYR 2/1. See also similar statements in 'Answer to the
Statement of the Claimant's Case', 25 July 1925, 'Outline of the Admiralty Case', n.d. and 'Claimant's
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Perhaps this refers only to the mountings with the air-driven gyros. While, as late as 1921,
most ships still retained their Argo mountings, 93 the Anschütz gyrocompass installations
had long since been replaced. However, even if gyro stabilisation had been disabled in
all the surviving mountings, the efficient power training gear was almost certainly still in
use.
Isherwood next turned to the new clock. Starting from the earlier type of
variable speed drive, his inspired innovation was to mount the rollers in a sliding carriage
(Fig. 4.1, Plate 20 and XII-8); thus the rate could be changed with minimal force and
without disrupting the rolling friction between the ball and the disc and rollers. 95 On 15
May 1911, Argo submitted to the Admiralty a proposal for 'the A.C. Range and Bearing
Clock Mark H': although it actually described in detail a design with only one of the new
drives, for the generation of ranges. To set its rate, the roller carriage was coupled directly
to the rate generating mechanism (Plate 21). The latter changed considerably as the
design developed (XII-9), but from the start it embodied the essential Dumaresq
principles: the vector addition of enemy-speed and own-speed-reversed to obtain
virtual-speeds along and across the line of bearing. However, to simplify mechanical
transfer, the line of bearing was fixed, with rotating slots or links to represent both courses.
In the Mark II, target bearings were set by hand, even when courses were steady. If own
course changed, it was also necessary to throw a lever, which held the enemy inclination
fixed until the turn was completed. This was the same approximation used in the
Dumaresq Mark VI. Pollen usually insisted that the effect of change of bearing on rate
and range must not be neglected: 97 yet here it was largely dismissed.
This [approximation] neglects the change of bearing due to alteration of position
during turn but at long ranges the error introduced is very small.
Submission and Observations', all in T. 173/91 Part Xl. These statements should be treated with reserve,
since the Admiralty's evidence to the RCAI was intended to establish that that the Service system owed
nothing to Pollen: but they cannot be ignored.
ss Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Handbook of J'/aval Range-Finders and Mountings 1921, ADM 186/253
(reference courtesy Mr.John Roberts). The Iron Duke class were the exception.
Admiralty, Technical Historical Section, The Technical Historj and Index..., 'Fire Control in H.M.Ships',
TH23, p.20, AL See also A E Fanning, Steadj as She Goes (London, 1986) p.195.
Patent 17,441 / 1912 applied for with complete specification 4 April.
'The A.C. Range and Bearing Clock Mark II' accompanying a letter from I E Brown, Secretary, Argo
Company to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 15 May 1911 in T.173/91 Part III.
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The Mark II proposal also described a mechanism for calculating the
change-of-range in time-of-flight: and the spiral range scale which was to become a
feature of all later Argo clocks. It also declared that:
By the addition of a simple linkage and another variable speed drive, "Bearings" can be
operated automatically....the Mark H Clock will [then] do all that the A.C. Mark I
Clock will do...but will also indicate deflection due to speeds.
but it admitted that:
...subsidiary portions such as "transmitter drive", "spotting corrections", "motor speed
control" etc. are but vaguely indicated, as the problems introduced by them are the
ordinary problems incidental and usual in Engineering design.9°
The importance of the new design was recognised immediately in the Admiralty.
On 22 May, Pollen wrote to Isherwood:
While it is fresh in my mind, I had a talk with Henley today and explained to him the
proposed additions and alterations to the Clock. He suggested we should send a
sketch...showing a dock with automatic bearing generating and that could be set either
by speed and course or by rates of change.9°
Henley himself wrote privately to Dreyer on 24 July: 'I think their [Argo's] new design is
going to be a great improvement on the old and hope to get one for trial')00
Pollen and Isherwood applied for a patent on 4 September but the provisional
specification added little to the earlier proposal.'°' Nevertheless:
On 11th October 1911...Henley inspected the working drawings of the Argo Clock at
York and the Clock itself which was then under construction.102
The finished instrument (Plate 20) was ready for inspection by the end ofJanuary 1912,'°
while a complete patent specification was left on 4 Apri1.'° Isherwood had introduced two
more variable speed drives to integrate speed-across and to divide by the range to get a
change-of-bearing, which was then applied to the durnaresq-mechanism (Fig. 4.2 and
Plate 22 and 23). By this 'cross-connection' of the integrators and the Dumaresq, the clock
could, while courses were steady, solve 'the ever-changing triangle of velocities'
9° 'A.C. Clock Mark II' (op. cit.).
9° Pollen to Isherwood, 22 May 1911 inT.173/91 Part III.
'°°Henley to Dreyer, 1911 (op. cit.).
101 Patent 19,627/1911, Provisional Specification in T.173/91 Part III. Because this patent was not
reassigned to Pollen, it was never printed by the British Patent Office.
102 
'Statement of the Claimant's Case' in T.173/91 Part XI.
'°3 Argo to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 26January 1912 in T.173/91 Part II.
'°4 Patent 19,627/1911, Complete Specification in T.173/91 Part Ill. The Argo patent later taken out in
the United Staxes (1,162,510, filed 5 September 1913) contained essentially identical drawings and text
(except for the final claims).
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continuously and automatically) 05 However, if own-course altered, target bearings had to
be set by hand, while the control lever (labelled STEADY-TIJRNING) held the
inclination constant (XII-1O). Despite its mathematical elegance, the new clock was
neither helm-free nor exact in a turn.
The range dial now had two hands, for both rangefinder and gun ranges, the
difference between them being set by means of a spotting-correction pointer and scales.'°6
The clock was also supposed to drive a follow-the-pointer transmitter to send gun-ranges
to the sights. However, the patented design was flawed, most seriously in that the
transmitter shaft did not register the spotting corrections (XII-lO); perhaps, after the
earlier airy dismissal of these issues, they had been given insufficient attention.
Since the five Argo clocks ordered later in 1912 were designated Mark IV, it
may reasonably be supposed that the clock eventually tried in Orion was the only Mark ifi.
Unfortunately, it is not clear how far its actual construction advanced beyond the
patented design. The spotting pointer and scales appear to have been added later, while,
since the clock was still in the factory in the third week in July, there was certainly time for
further alterations. The trials were delayed partly by Orion's participation (with ThundereT)
in the director trials' 07 but also 'by alterations necessitated to the clock as a result of
suggestions by various Naval Officers'; also, even after the trials, the arrangements for
transmitting ranges to the sights had 'not yet been settled'° 8 and, as finally implemented
for the Mark N, they were of some complexity. Whatever its exact build state, the
experiments and trials were successful (XII-!!).
The Clock [was] thoroughly tested in..."Orion"...and has worked welI....On the
whole...it solves in an efficient and reliable manner the problem which it undertakes.'°9
In the Argo Clock Mark IV (Plate 24 and XII-12), the arrangements for applying
spotting corrections had been elaborated, while a pointer showing enemy inclination had
been added. Internally, the mechanism controlled by the STEADY-TURNING lever had
been redesigned so that the inclination was maintained exactly through a turn: provided
'°'Boys to Pollen (1912) (op. ciL).
'°	 change-of-range in time-of-flight was now set as a spotting correction, the special calculating
mechanism having been dropped.
107 IIW, pp.222 and 229. The spotting pointer and scales were evidently last-minute additions to the
patent, since they are not mentioned in the text.
'°8 Technical Comparison (1913) pp.1 1 and 33.
'°9 ibiiL p.34. For the conditions of the tests, in which any inclination errors would not have been apparent
(XII-! 1), see Rear-Admiral Craig Wailer before the RCAI, T.173/547, Part 12, p.13: 'Full Charge Run'
and '3/4 Charge Run' in the Craig Wailer Papers and ILWS', pp.231-2.
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that, as before, the target bearing was set correctly by hand throughout. The most obvious
external change was the addition of the side extension carrying a follow-the-pointer range
receiver with two hands (Plate 25). The associated transmitters and gearboxes enabled the
clock to transmit ranges without operator intervention, but only until a range or spotting
correction was put on the clock. This caused the two receiver hands to diverge, and the
correction was only transmitted when an operator worked a handle to bring the hands
back into alignment." 0 Thus these clocks were still neither helm-free nor fully automatic
in transmitting ranges to the latest turret sights.
A C COMPLETED
Design work on an entirely new Argo true-course plotter did not restart until the
turn of 19 11-12. Detailed drawings were ready by the following September but the
prototype plotter itself was not completed until April 1913, after significant amendments
to the design)" This Mark IV plotter (Plate 26) charted enemy course with a fixed pencil,
but, while the design was theoretically correct, there are several reasons for doubting its
accuracy and utility. Firstly, bearings were transmitted in rather coarse steps of 1/40: and it
used the same magnetic-clutch receiver motors which were troublesome in the Oiion rate
plotter. Secondly, the Phillpotts committee concluded:
The Gyro compass and Forbes log [are] not...even yet...sufFiciently reliable...to enable
own ship's motion to be accurately dealt with. Hence a confused plot results."2
Thirdly, the chart was both rotated and advanced by the action of long trains of
differential gears; these lacked any apparent provisions to minimise the backlash which,
especially at long range, would have resulted in significant errors in the position of the
chart under the enemy pencil. Fourthly, the plotter was always connected to a single Argo
rangefmder mounting. Since the power-cut had not worked, the transmitted ranges
fluctuated between cuts, which must have scattered the majority of minute marks intended
for determining enemy speed." 3 These would have confused the plot while providing little
help in speed measurement (XII-13). Argo proposed a multi-pointer range receiver (Plate
UI) Gunnery Branch, The Argo Range and Bearing ClockMarklV, lOjanuary 1914, AL
'"ILWS' pp.2 I 5, 225 and 230. The provisional specification for patent 23,349 applied for 12 October 1912
was, unusually, accompanied by detailed drawings. The complete specification left on 11 April 1913 had an
additional Fig.4 showing two extra differentials.
"2 1hillpotts Committee, 'Report' (op. cit.) pp.2 and 6.
is The description and illustrations of the Mark IV plotter in Technwal Comparison (1913) pp.25 and 28-30
are similar to the patent. See p.36 for obtaining speeds from pairs of plotted points.
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27) for meaning the ranges from several rangeflnders; it might, perhaps, have been
workable with continuous ranges from a power-cut, but not otherwise, and it never
progressed beyond a cardboard model." 4 Finally, there was no convenient means of
measuring the mean range from the plot, while enemy range, course and speed could only
be transferred to the clock manually."5
The Mark IV plotter was never tried by the Royal Navy, but Pollen claimed
complete success for the whole Argo system in trials by the Russian Navy in June 1914.
Although the firm then received an order for five complete installations, in October they
shipped to Russia only three rangefmders and mountings and two Mark V clocks with
gyroscopes." 6 The cancellation of the plotters does nothing to dispel the doubts about the
Mark IV as a practicable helm-free plotter.
The final Argo clock, the Mark V of 1913, was at last truly helm-free. A compass
ring was placed around the main Dumaresq dial (Plate 29). By means of a connection to a
relay motor controlled by a gyro-compass receiver, the internal links representing own
and enemy courses were maintained automatically at the correct angles." 7 The
mechanism for generating change of bearing was also completely redesigTled."8 The
changes appear to have been made to avoid the risk of slippage in the second variable
speed drive when it was dividing by exceptionally low ranges (XII-14). However, there is
no evidence for such slippage in the Mark IV clocks. The Phillpotts Committee had
nothing but praise for the clock as a mechanism. Their main criticism was of its lack of
integration with the plotter.
There is no record on paper of what the clock is doing in comparison with the
information given by the plot."9
" 4 The averaging receiver was patented by Pollen and Lieutenant Gerard Riley (see LDM, pp.215-6) as
25,768/1912 applied for 9 November. The cardboard model was seen in 1918 by the Phillpotts
Committee, who thought it 'very doubtful if this method could cope' with wartime conditions: 'Report',
pp.1 and 3
Technical Comparison (1913) pp.35 and 41. Phillpotts Committee, 'Report', p.1. Boys to Pollen (1912).
" 6flV'J pp.247-8, 282 and 295-6. For the Russian order, see A H Pollen, 'Memorandum on Fire
Control', 1916 in T.173/91 Part II
11,009/1913, applied for 9 May, complete specification 8 December; also U S Patent 1,162,511,
filed 14Apr11 1914.
Patent 16,373/1913 applied for 16 July, complete specification 16 January 1914: also US Patent
1,232,968, filed 11 July 1914. In August 1914, the Admiralty believed that this patent 'describes the
mechanism of the latest type of Argo clock...already...on the open market': DNO's minute of 18 August
1914 quoted in Admiralty to C.-in-C. Home Fleets, March 1916 in 'Fire Control Apparatus: Various
Patents', ADM 1/8464/181
" 9 Phillpotts Committee, 'Report', p.6.
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By 1913, the three essential components of the A C system had reached their
final forms. Yet, in the middle of that year, Argo were removed form the list of Admiralty
suppliers. It is now necessary to trace the commercial relationship between Pollen and the
Admiralty from his first proposal to the final rupture.
COMMERCIAL
Even Pollen's earliest approach to the Admiralty went straight to the top. In
putting forward his two-position rangefmder in 1901, he wrote directly to the First Naval
Lord, Lord Walter Kerr, a family friend and fellow Roman-Catholic.' 20 Presumably
following Kerr's advice, Pollen then approached Lord Selborne, the First Lord, but
insisted that:
Before submitting...drawings...we shall have to ask that a binding pledge of secrecy shall
be given and an undertaking in no way to imitate or use the entirely novel mechanical
and mathematical principles incorporated in the machine.12t
Since both Watkin and Fiske two-position rangefmders had been found wanting during
the Arethusa trials, Pollen's claims were probably treated sceptically and, on 7 February,
he was informed that his invention 'does not seem to the Admiralty to offer them
advantages sufficiently good to warrant their buying the secret'.'23
On 9 May 1904, SirJoseph Lawrence MP, Pollen's father-in-law and Chairman
of Linotype, wrote to Selborne announcing that the calculating machine had been
perfected.
People who have heard...of the invention have made approaches with a view to
acquiring the Patents, possibly for foreign navies.
while, as in 1901, the accompanying Memorandum emphasised that knowledge of enemy
course and speed
...would enormously simplify all cruiser tactics....The secondary use which this device
could be put to would be as a rangefinder for guns.
By 27 May, after Pollen had seen the DNO, Captain H D Barry, Lawrence again wrote
to the First Lord, urging
Is it not worth some experimenting with, or must it be dealt with on purely commercial
lines, which would necessarily deprive the Admiralty of any opportunity of getting a
monopoly of the system when it is evolved.
°Information on Kerr courtesy Professor Andrew Lambert.
121 Pollen to Selborne, 4 February 1901 in T.173/91 Part VII.
'Peter Padfield, Guns at Sea (London, 1974) p.221.
' 23 LDNS', p. 79.
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However, Barry considered that Pollen's instrument 'is in no sense a rangefinder' for
shipboard use.
I explained the whole case clearly to Mr. Pollen...& said it was not the instrument that
the Admiralty wanted. He replied that he wanted - "the Admiralty to take what they
didn't want".
Imay sayl know the Pollen family personally and they are all pushing and persistent.'24
Barry's opinion was confirmed when Pollen succeeded in going over his head to meet
with Lord Walter Kerr and Admiral May, the Controller. Because of problems with
procuring more accurate one-observer rangefinders, May was prepared to consider a
'double-observer instruments with good communications at all events for trial', but Pollen
was told that any experimental installation must wait on the completion of the other
instruments.' 25
 In November, Pollen daimed in two letters to the Admiralty that 'it may
be confidently said that [the system] has passed the experimental stage' and the 'system
has now been completed'.' Barry preferred to leave a decision to his successor, Captain
JohnJellicoe,' 27
 DNO from February 1905. On 3 April, Captain Edward Harding RMA
(one of the DNO's assistants) wrote a highly favourable report on preliminary experiments
iniVarci&sus with the observation units;' 28
 a month later, Pollen was informed that his terms
had been accepted for the supply by 1 October at latest, or earlier if possible, of two
observation units with bearing transmitters, the machines for computing range from the
bearings, and a charting table. The 'Rate of Change machine was:
To be put in hand as soon as the final designs are decided upon and delivered as part of
the order at probably a later date....'
Pollen was to receive £1500 for manufacturing costs, £2000 for expenses incurred in the
preceding five years plus £1000 for his services during the trials) 30
 He subsequently
received all these sums, though, instead of the clock, he deftly substituted a 'tactical
' 24 Lawrence to Selborne with 'Memorandum', both 9 May 1904: Lawrence to Selborrie, 27 May and
minute by H D Barry, 31 May 1904 in 'The Pollen Rangefinder' in ADM 1/7733.
'' Pollen to V W Baddeley, 5July 1904 in 'Pollen Rangefinder' (op. cit.). Minute by W H May 1 3July 1904
in 'Report of Committees on Control of Fire' in ADM 1/7758.
to First Lord, 14 November and Pollen to Skinner received 24 November 1904 in 'Pollen
Rangefinder'.
' 27 Harding before RCAI, T.173/547 Part 3, p.31.
LDN, p.84.
Secretary of the Admiralty to Pollen, 3 May 1905 in T.173/91 Part VII.
'FP, Pollen to Tweedmouth, 27 August 1906, p.217.
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change of range machine" 3 ' which was 'not a machine for shooting" 32 but a tactical aid
for predicting future relative positions (XIV- 1).
JUPITER TO ARLIDNE
Shortly after the Jupiter trials, on 13 February 1906, Pollen wrote to Jellicoe
proposing the use of the 'best one observer rangefinder that the market can supply';' 33
 the
letter was also copied to the First Lord, now Lord Tweedmouth. Despite the inevitably
unfavourable report on the trials, Pollen was encouraged to submit his new ideas and, by
18 June, had completed a proposal entitled the 'One Observer System of Charting'. In
late June, at a conference of experts, Harding (supported by Percy Scott) argued
successfully in favour of secrecy; afterwards, Harding wrote describing the discussions, so
he was now serving Pollen inside the Admiralty as both advocate and informant. After the
conference, at the insistence of the Controller, Rear-Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, Jellicoe
raised the possibility of plotting by non-automatic methods but Pollen was able to
persuade him that such an attempt would be futile.'34
On 9 August, following a decision of the Board, 135 negotiations began on a new
agreement to purchase equipment for trial and, in the event of success, for supply in
quantity (X1V-2). Pollen initially demanded £8,000 for the trial system, although this
figure included £3,600 towards his earlier development costs; the Admiralty side was
reluctant 'to make good his losses on a trial that was unsuccessful'. He was also told that
his hope for a guarantee to equip 12 ships a year for 15 years, worth, it was estimated,
some £300,000, was out of the question. This sum was intended as a consideration for
giving up his foreign markets, but, when it was pointed out to Pollen that 'inventors
usually have to perfect their inventions at their own expense', he declared that he would
be seeking much more for a completed system and that 'he had had offers from a Foreign
Government and from large firms to take it up'. The Admiralty representatives then
expressed their concern that Pollen:
'' Pollen to the Secretary of the Admiralty, l8June 1906 in T.173/91 Part II.
Pollens counsel before RCAI, T.193/547 Part 7, p.27.
'	 toJellicoe, 13 February 1906 in T.173/91, Part I.
"4 L1WS, pp.90-i. PP, 'Note on the possibility of demonstrating the principle of Aim Correction without...
instruments designed for the purpose...', pp.101-4. The copy of this paper in T.173/91 Part VII is dated 21
July 1906.
'Admital1y Board Minutes, 7Augustl9O6inADM 167/40.
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...could not fail to acquire further knowledge of range-finding in general and of British
Naval methods in particular, in addition to that which he already owes to us, and that it
might be serious to us if we then decided to let him go abroad with that knowledge....
which explains why they had insisted that Pollen was:
...to attend preliminary trials to see any necessary adjustments carried out...and to
demonstrate the utility of his invention...but not to be present at the final trials.'
On the following day, Pollen informed the Admiralty that 'The smallest sum
which would enable me to carry on is £6,500'. He also proposed conditions which, after
the Ariadne trials, were to prove much more to the Admiralty's advantage than his own.
The Admiralty to decide, after two months working of the instruments.., whether or not
they wish to acquire a monopoly of my system.'31
On 21 August, the Admiralty agreed to £6,500 for the trial instruments, but, at some
point, Pollen was also paid an additional £802/10/- towards 'expenses which he had not
anticipated' for the earlier trials.
In their letter of 21 August, the Admiralty refused to entertain more than
£90,000 for monopoly; by this time, a clock no longer figured in the negotiations, the
agreement relating only to the supply of the rangefinder mounting and plotting table.'38
On 27 August, Pollen again wrote directly to the First Lord, still asking for a total
payment of255,000, on the grounds that:
...what I have to sell is not instruments but a system, the embodiment of certain laws of
gunnery which I was the first to codifj'....The monopoly of instruments is only
incidental.'39
While these exchanges had been taking place, Captain Harding had been preparing a
'Memorandum upon the Professional and Financial Value of the AC. System'. This he
submitted toJellicoe on 4 September, while informing Pollen that:
I have got out a regular snorter for the D.N.O., if it doesn't convince him nothing
will.'40
As might be expected, his arguments are often similar to Pollen's.'4'
LIWS, p.92. 'Pollen Aim Correcting Apparatus. Notes of a meeting held at the Admiralty in the Board
Room on 9th August 1906', T.173/91 Part II.
' 37 Pollen to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 10 August 1906 in T. 173/91 Part VII.
'Secretary of the Admiralty to Pollen, 21 August 1906 in T.173/91 Part II. Poll€n Aim Con-eciwn System
General Grounds of Admira4y Policy and HistonsalReconi of Business Negotiations, Admiralty, February 1913, p.7,
P.1024, AL Alan Rae Smith of Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths & Co., 'The Argo Company Limited', 9
October 1923 in T.173/91 Part I.
' 9 PP, Pollen to Tweedmouth, 27 August and Tweedmouth to Pollen, 3 September 1906, pp.218 and220-1.
140 LD,y5', p.95.
141 Pollen himself was handed the manuscript of Harding's report and also acquired the typewritten copy
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Throughout the negotiations he [Pollen] has laid more stress on the principles
involved...on the j, that is to say, than on the details of the mechanism.'42
His technical assessment relied on the false assumption that, by course plotting, the 'errors
of individual readings of the Range Finder [may be] eliminated': and, therefore, that
geometric range could be found without observation of fire and, consequently,
concentration would be more effective. Concerning the originality of the system, Harding
affirmed that 'the necessity for some form of gyroscopic control is probably totally
unrecognised' elsewhere: but he acknowledged that:
...the solution of plotting only occurred incidentally to Mr. Pollen and it was not
immediately that he recognised its technical application and importance.
and that:
Probably every Coast Artillery Control system in the World employs some form of
chart, but it may be said with safety that not one of them uses it exactly in this way.
Notwithstanding these reservations about the originality of Pollen's plotter (XIV-3),
Harding gave his full support to the inventor's negotiating stance.
IN CONCLUSION the system will be of immense national value as a monopoly.... the
sum thus spent must be looked upon as an insurance against the possible acquisition of
the invention by other powers or as money spent on research, and not as relieving the
inventor of financial risk.'43
Despite Harding's uncritical assessment of the Jupiter bearing instruments and his close
association with Pollen since before the trials,' his superiors appear to have been
persuaded by his recommendations. Sumida makes a convincing case that his
memorandum (or a précis by Jellicoe) was instrumental in persuading Fisher that a
monopoly of Pollen's gear must be obtained.' 45 Thus, on 21 September, the Admiralty
agreed to Pollen's two-month limit for a decision: and, for exclusive rights, offered
£100,000 (on top of manufacturing cost plus 25°/o profit) for the first 40 installations.' By
29 October, provisional agreement on contractual terms enabled the Admiralty to pay the
£6,500 for the trial instruments.' 47 Furthermore, the report of the Naval Estimates
thJellicoe's marginal notes: Pollen's counsel before RCA!, T.173/547 Part 13, pp.69 and 89.
' 42 Harding's description of the 'present system' - which did not mention rate plotting (pace ILWS, pp.91 and
96)- and his evidence before the RCA! (T.173/547, Part 14, pp.9, 11-2 and 34) are quoted in XIV-3.
' 43 Harding, 'Memorandum upon the Professional and Fmancial Value of the A.C. System' vith Harding
toJefficoe, 4 September 1906 in T.173/91 Part VII.
Harding acknowledged to the RCA! that from the autumn of 1904 onwards he saw a good deal of
Pollen (F. 173/547 Part 14, p.26) and that 'I was very enthusiastic...possibly over enthusiastic' ('1'. 173/547
Part 3, p.31).
IflN3', pp.95 and 98-9.
Secretary of the Admiralty to Pollen, 21st September 1906 in T.173/91 Parts II and VII.
I47 LDNS, pp.' 15-6.
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Committee of 26 November included in the 1907-08 estimates a provision of £62,500 for
'Pollen's aim-correcting apparatus', despite the adverse effect on attempts to reduce
expenditure.
With the immediate urgency removed, the Admiralty did not send Pollen a draft
contract until 11 March 1907, but this only initiated another protracted round of
negotiations. At one point, Pollen seems to have been accused of sharp practice, while, on
31 July, he declared that 'the whole purpose...of the Admiralty has been...to leave us in
the position of an expropriated patentee'.' 49
 Thus the temper of the discussions had
deteriorated even whileJellicoe was still at the Admiralty. Pollen later admitted to Bacon:
Your predecessor took the line (which undoubtedly was right) that, until the Service had
made up its mind about the A.C. gear, I had to be regarded as a person who might at
any moment be making his knowledge and experience of gunnery available to the
world.'50
Although the formal contract was still unsigned, Ariadne had been nominated as the trial
ship' 5 ' and, by 20 November, the instruments had been installed aboard and were
inspected by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson. Initially, his relations with Pollen
were cordial.' 52
 Furthermore, in November the Admiralty were still anticipating a
favourable outcome to the trials, since the Navy Estimates Committee assumed that, for
the year 1908-9:
50,0001. [L50,000] has to be re-provided...to meet the liability in respect of the Pollen
Aim Corrector which will not mature during the current year.'53
However, on 8 December, Wilson asked Pollen for 'a written statement showing exactly
what are the advantages you claim for your system...'. Pollen responded with a copy of
'An Apology for the A.C. System' but this only helped Wilson to appreciate both that the
system was incomplete and that the Admiralty's rights were limited to only a part of it.
Shortly afterwards, at the end of a second inspection, Wilson turned on Pollen
demanding:
"8 vy Estimates Committee, Report upon JVavy Estimates for 1907-8, 27 November 1906, FISR 8/10, CC.
The sum allowed suggests that the Admiralty assumed Pollen would be ready to supply production models
in 1907-8: but that they intended to pay for monopoly in instalments, as stipulated by the fmal contract.
' 49 IüM1, pp.116-9.
'°PF, Pollen to Bacon, 27 February 1908, p.1 74.
Pollen to Bacon, 3 August 1907 in T.173/91 Part VII.
' 52 LQiVS, p.124.
'53 Navy Estimates Committee, Report upon Xaiy Estimatesfor 1908-9, p.4, FISR 8/11. See also.Mny Estimates
1908-09, 18 December 1907, CAB 37/90/112, PRO. /J50,000 was to be paid within one month of Pollen
being notified of a decision, then two payments of £25,000 after 12 and 24 months: 'Indenture of
Agreement between the Commissioners of the Admiralty and Mr. A. H. Pollen, 18 February 1908' in
T.173/91 Parts II and VII.
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You will have to explain to me sometime or other why on earth the Admiralty should
pay you £100,000 more than to Barr and Stroud or any other maker of Fire Control
instruments that have got to be used for your system. t54
There can be no doubt that, by the turn of the year, Wilson had concluded that Pollen's
exceptional treatment was unjustified and that the trials must demonstrate that the
inexpensive manual system in Vengeance could produce satisfactory results. By the luck of
the draw, the conditions on 15 January 1908 were so easy that neither ship had any
difficulty in keeping the range: but the results allowed Wilson peremptorily to call a halt
and order Ariadne's return to port. It is hardly surprising that, ever afterwards, Pollen was
convinced that he had been cheated of the opportunity to demonstrate the superiority of
his gear in more demanding circumstances.
ARLIDNE TO NATAL
In his comments on the trials, Pollen assumed (and Wilson does not seem to have
disagreed in his own report of 31 January 1908) that the 'complete success' conditions had
been met.
The sum the Lords Commissioners have agreed to pay for monopoly...can now neither
be increased by my system being shown to be better than has already been proved, nor
diminished, as partial failure might have caused it to be.... If I had such attractive offers
from foreign navies when nothing was proved, is it likely that they will not materialise
when everything is established.'
On 25 February, Pollen wrote to Bacon about an idea for a mechanism which could
indicate enemy speed and course if set only with two positions and the time between
them. Bacon replied:
The mechanism...must be most ingenious but how far mechanisms should supersede the
human brain involves serious practical consideration.
which must have added to Pollen's concerns about the attitude of the DNO, who refused
to meet him} Pollen wrote back, arguing for a complete automatic system and
declaring, with his usual assumption that a concept was as good as a finished design:
My change of range clock was designed before we left the Jziter, and the sight setting
mechanism, to be run straight from the range clock, very shortly after.
IM LLWS, pp.124-6. See aIsoPP, Pollen to Wilson, 17 December 1907, p.168.
'55 FP, Pollen to Wilson, 24January 1908, pp.159-160 and 165. 1LW, p.13!.
' Pollen to Bacon, 25 February and Bacon to Pollen, 26 February 1908 in T. 173/91 Part VII. LDN3,
p.132.
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Pollen also printed extracts from his letter for circulation to senior members of the
Admiralty hierarchy' 57 but Bacon was not intimidated into changing his views.'58
The formal contract with Argo had not been signed until 18 February, a month
after the trial had been terminated. It stipulated that:
If complete success can be obtained at the trials and if the Commissioners thereupon
decide to acquire the sole and exclusive rights, to use the Pollen Aim Correction
System...and shall give to the Inventor within one calendar month from the...completion
of the...trials notice in writing...the Inventor shall forthwith grant [said] rights [present
author's italics].
Thus Pollen could still hope for a decision in his favour: yet the Admiralty could reject
exclusive rights even though complete success had been attained. In fact, other political
pressures had already made this the most likely outcome. On 26 November 1907, the
Cabinet had refused to accept the proposed Navy Estimates, which represented an
increase over the previous year of2,150,000. After spirited discussions, by the beginning
of February the increase had been reduced to only jJ900,000;' 60 thus Pollen's award must
have been a tempting candidate for the inevitable cuts.
Even so, no decision had been taken by 2 March, when Pollen wrote to
Tweedmouth asking to see the parts of Wilson's report dealing with 'matters of fact' and
directly criticising the Admiral.
On certain mechanical questions, he [Wilson] seemed not to have given himself time to
understand either the principles or actual working of the instruments.
Pollen also risked causing further serious offence by comparing his present situation with
'the straightforward and honourable way in which their Lordships treated me on the
occasion of the Jupiter trials'. Nonetheless, on 6 March the Admiralty offered further trials.
In his reply of 9 March, Pollen only 'noted' the proposal, regretted that other business
would prevent his continuous attendance, and also questioned why the Admiralty
assumed that the contract of 18 February made provision for additional trials)6'
However, he undertook to make Isherwood and his engineers available 'at a moment's
notice'; he was therefore dumbfounded to receive the letter of 10 March in which the
Admiralty purported to infer that:
' 57 Editor's introduction, PP, pp.172-5.
158	 Bacon's reply and the extent of his scepticism regarding mechanised gunnery, see XIV-4.
'Indenture of Agreement 18 February 1908' (op. cit.).
'°ArthurJ. Marder, From the Dreadnought to &apa Flow, Volume I (London, 1961) p.1 37-8. R F Mackay, Fisher
oJ7i1verstone (Oxford, 1973) pp.386-392.
161	 agreement only provided for new trials if complete success had not been achieved initially but new
designs were submitted subsequently.
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By your letter of the 9th March, you do not appear to wish these further trials to take
place. In the absence of such further trials, the Agreement between yourself and the
Admiralty will expire on the 14th instant.
He was informed that:
My Lords have...decided not to exercise the option...of acquiring the sole rights of the
'Aim Corrector System'.
...as from your letter to Sir A. Wilson of the 24th January they understand you wish to
enter into negotiations with certain Foreign Powers, they would be glad to know if you
are desirous of re-purchasing the [Añadne] instruments....162
Atjust this moment, the First Lord's position had been fatally weakened after, on 9 March
in the House of Lords, he had failed to defend his correspondence with the Kaiser about
the British Navy Estimates.' 63 Tweedmouth, not unnaturally, refused to see Pollen on the
10th; by then, the First Lord was in no position to force yet another change in policy.
Further, if the new trials were indeed outside the Agreement, the expiry date was now
very close (it was ironic that, in 1906, it was Pollen who insisted on a two-month
deadline). And, Pollen's imputations against the present Board and particularly his attack
on Wilson probably undermined any remaining support, since he found it necessary to
declare:
I am most anxious that no member of the Board should think that I wish in any way to
reflect on Sir Arthur Wilson.'
While Pollen's 100,000 was lost for good, the Board were agreed that he should
receive an award to cover his expenses and contribution to the development of fire
control, though they were still divided on the question of secrecy.' 65 After new
negotiations, by 18 June it had been agreed that secrecy would be maintained for a
further 18 months, that the Aiiadne instruments (including the rangefinder) would be
returned, and that Pollen would receive a payment of 11,500. ' least at first, he took
a remarkably sanguine view of this outcome.
In binding myself...not to approach any foreign power for a year, I am not in the
slightest degree hurting the commercial development of the thing, and...I am getting the
working capital necessary to carry on with it without the necessity of making it public.
162 printed the correspondence from 2 to 10 March in his 1909 pamphlet: PP, 'Notes on Aijadne
Trials' (1909) pp.225-230. Note that, at some point, the deadline for a decision had been extended from
one to two months after the end of the trials.
' 63 FDSFI(op. cii.) pp.140-2.
1 PP, Pollen to individual members of the Board of Admiralty, 25 March 1908, p.231.
'Admiralty Board Minutes, 31 March 1908, ADM 167/42.
The correspondence leading to the new agreement is in T. 173/91 Part VII.
ACDA10
	 120
This is virtually understood, I think, at the Admiralty...byJackie & Co. that the thing
will be reopened.'67
With funding secured, Pollen and Isherwood were free to tackle the defects in the
Ariadne gear and to begin work on the clock. Pollen also found time to write 'Reflections
on an Error of the Day'. This pamphlet began with a critique of time-and-range plotting,
especially when used in conjunction with a second 'curve of rate'. Nevertheless, Pollen still
claimed to have been the first to think of range-rate plotting, though we 'did not
proceed...for the reason that it seemed to us both unscientific and impracticable'.'68
However, no mention was made of plotting bearings against time
On 5 January 1909, Pollen announced the formation of the Argo Company,
although, in fact, the company had been registered on 31 December 1907, with Pollen as
the only major shareholder.' 69 He declared:
Unlike the devices tried in the Jupiter and Ariadne, which were experimental sections of
the system, the gear we are now building will be in all respects fitted to its purpose as
integral parts of a fighting ship's equipment...
...the AC. system owed its complete development largely to the /J22,000 of public
money voted to Mr. Pollen.. .and the exceptional opportunities for study and
investigation that the experiments in H.M.S.Jupiter and H.M.S. Ariadne afforded.'7°
Pollen had submitted his Argo prospectus just as the Navy Scare of early 1909 was
coming to the boil.' 7 ' Despite this not inconsiderable distraction, on 12 February his
proposal for further trials was discussed by the Admiralty Board, on which Jackson had
been replaced as Controller byJellicoe.
A circular letter to the Fleet to be prepared informing the Service that Mr. Pollen
having formed a commerdal company was now in the position of an ordinary
manufacturer.'72
At a meeting with Bacon on 15 February:
The DNO informed me [Pollen] that it was desired to make further investigation into
the value of the Gyroscopic Control of the Range finder...! am not to quote for the
Automatic Charting devices...it had been decided not to re-open the question of
monopoly or a possible extension of the period of secrecy'.'73
However, having obtained Pollen's acceptance that the agreement of February 1908 had
expired, on 4 March the Board overruled the DNO.
'67 Lfl\'$, pp.137-B.
'PP, 'Reflections on the Error of the Day', September 1908, pp. 180-1 and 183.
'69 R Smith, 'Argo' (op. cit.).
' 70 PoUen to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 5January 1909 in T.173/91 Part II.
'71FDSFI, pp. 159-71.
72 Admiraltj Board Minutes, 12 Febnla7y 1909, ADM 167/43.
'73 Pollen to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 15 February 1909 in T.173/91 Part VII.
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The First Sea Lord [Fisher] to see the Director of Naval Ordnance who is to arrange for
the purchase of a complete set of apparatus.'74
However, Pollen had heard nothing further by 22 March. By this time, the demands that
'We want eight, and we won't wait' were reaching their crescendo and a vote of censure
on the Government's dreadnought programme was to be held on 29 March. Pollen seized
his opportunity for a piece of blatant political arm-twisting, writing to the First Lord,
Reginald McKenna, of his fears that:
...those who succeeded in turning the Ariadne trials into a mockery last year may do
their best to prevent my getting a prompt and fair trial now.
...for the last three days, I have been doing my utmost to prevent this matter being
brought up in the Unionist Press and the House of Commons....the Front Bench
Unionists, who were formally members of the Board, are perfectly familiar with...my
inventions....it is believed a very strong polemical value would attach to bringing the
matter out in the forthcoming vote of censure.
.1 hope...that I have prevented this matter being publicly discussed. But naturally I
should like to hear from you whether this assurance I have given has any foundation.
At a brief meeting with Jefficoc on 24 March, Pollen was given to understand that he
might be asked to tender for a trial of his complete Battle System' 75 and Argo received a
formal request to tender for a complete trial on 2 April.'76
Fisher probably assented only reluctantly to this invitation. Pollen's relations with
Beresford and Custance were cordial and of long standing, while, in 1908, Beresford had
unsuccessfully sought permission for Pollen to attend a Battle Practice and had declared
that 'Pollen's manual time-course plotting scheme was superior to the methods
recommended by the Ordnance Department'.' 77 The letter to Tweedmouth of 22 March
then revealed that Pollen was in touch with the Conservative opposition, though its
implied threats evidently could not be ignored. Fisher's antipathy was quickly reinforced
when, also on 2 April, the First Sea Lord was criticised both in an anonymous Times
article: and then in a speech by Sir George Armstrong.' 78 Fisher believed Pollen was
involved in both attacks.
' 74Admiraisy Board Minutes, 18Febivay and 4March 1909, ADM 167/43. LD/, p.164.
' 15 Pollen to McKenna, 22 and 25 March 1909 in MCKN 3/14, CC. He may have received more definite




"8 FDSFI, p.190. Mackay, Fisher (op. cit.) p.412.
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I have been told that Pollen's ramifications are extraordinary and his newspaper
influence very considerable and his being a Roman Catholic of immense support to
him. I have consistently refused to have anything to do with him or see him.'79
Pollen had previously estimated that the trial instruments would cost about
£6,800. Now, apparently forgetting the prospectus claim that the instruments were 'no
longer in a tentative stage', he declared that a complete set could not be delivered until
well after secrecy expired in November 1909. He demanded £4,150 for additional gear
plus £6,540 to extend secrecy for another year, while blaming the increases on the
Admiralty for delaying a decision and demanding more extensive trials than he
anticipated. The Admiralty would not entertain such an increase and asked for new prices
with and without automatic sights. On 21 April, they accepted Argo's delivery dates (in
June andJuly) and a price of £6,400 for.
I Gyro-controlled Rangefinder
I Charting Table
1 Change of Range Machine with transmitting and Observer's correction attachments
I Set of Observer's Correcting mechanisms.
In place of sights (which almost certainly were never constructed), they asked the
company to quote for the supply of two range and two deflection indicators: and agreed to
pay £545 per month to prolong secrecy. A formal order was placed on 8 June, while,
even though the delivery dates had already slipped, on 21 June the Admiralty invited
Argo to tender for a production order of at least 30 rangefinder mountings.'°°
Just before receiving the Admiralty's acceptance of his tender, on 20 April Pollen
wrote to McKenna blaming Bacon for the present delays and, with Wilson and Dreyer,
for 'the farce' of the Ariizdne trials.' 8 ' He repeated his allegations at even greater length in
the pamphlet 'Notes, Etc. on the Ariadne Trials', although it may not have been circulated.
In any case, Bacon refused to be drawn into a quarrel. Indeed, by July there had been a
remarkable improvement in relationships, when 'the D.N.O. went arm in arm with Pollen
to Manchester [probably on the 8th] and came back much impressed'.' 82 The Assistant
DNO, Captain Arthur Craig, and Dreyer also visited the Linotype works on 12 July.
Dreyer's technical report on the A C instruments was favourable and recothmended that
' 79 Fisher to Arnold White, 4 April 1909 in Arthur Marder (ed.) Fear God and Dread Xought, Volume II
(London: Cape, 1952-9) pp.241. See also Fisher to George Lambert, 5 April, pp.240-i.
'80 ILW, pp.164-5. Secretary of the Admiralty to Argo, 21 April 1909 in T. 173/91 Part VII. There are no
indications that the observer's correcting mechanisms were ever completed.
'°'Pollen to McKenna, 20 April 1909 (op. cit.).
' 82 PF, p.195. ILMS, pp.169-71.
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all were well worth a trial; this was endorsed by the ADNO, though he hoped 'the prices
can be made more reasonable', and he was not very impressed by the clutch-operated
training gear of the rangefinder mounting.' 83 On l6July, Bacon wrote to Pollen:
I sincerely wish you every success with your apparatus....My definition of success may be
too flavoured with a hatred of complications but this will do no harm as an antidote.LM
Yet Sumida alleges that, as late on 21 June, 'the Ordnance Department retained
both the means and the will to prevent a fair trial,' his main ground being that, on 4June,
Pollen protested to the Admiralty because 'the trials would again take the form of a
competition with service equipment, that he and his employees would be excluded from
the ship during trials and that he would not be allowed to test his gear at sea or train
officers in their use before the trials'. In fact, in the Admiralty letter of 21 June, he was
assured that thorough training would be arranged for:' Moreover, since Pollen had
declared that the gear was no longer experimental, the Navy was entitled to insist that it
be worked only by Service personnel. And, furthermore, the secrecy agreement was due
to expire in only five months, unless extended temporarily month-by-month. Thus
exclusion was no more than a continuation of the cautious policy first laid down by
Jackson andJellicoe in August 1906 and expressed most recently in the February letter to
the Heet.'
The rangefinder mounting, transmission equipment and straight-course plotter
were eventually delivered to Xatal on 21 September. Plotting exercises were conducted
during October and, by the end of the month, Xatal's Captain, Frederick Ogilvy, was
impressed by what Pollen had already achieved and urged him to make the plotter
helm-free.'87 Pollen later alleged that:
Save on the first day [our gear] was put together, I have not been permitted to see it
running.
Sumida accepts this at face value, but himself provides several instances of Pollen writing
from J'TataL It was not until 10 November that Pollen and Isherwood were ordered off the
ship before the start of gunnery exercises. Further successful tests were then made until,
' 83 Dreyer before RCAI, T. 173/547 Parts 16, p.40 and 17, pp.59-61. Unfortunately, Dreyer's report was
only introduced at the hearings and a copy was not included with the other written evidence.
'84 LDMS, pp.171.
LLNS, p.166.
'The letter emphasised the 'importance of observing strictly the regulations as to the secrecy of fire
control apparatus'. Record ofBusiness (op. cit.) p.9.
181 ffjj pp.171-2.
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apparently as a results of mishandling, the gear broke down. An Argo engineer was then
allowed back on board 'to make repairs and to supervise subsequent operations'.'88
Once ashore, Pollen was able to resume negotiations on a contract to supply his
instruments in quantity. On 23 June, he had responded to the Admiralty's invitation to
quote for the supply of 30 rangefinder mountings with a price of 1 ,9 15 (with indicators),
though he also proposed a royalty of £250 per ship per annum)° 9 In November, Bacon
advised his successor, Captain Moore:
The really useful portion of Mr. Pollen's apparatus appears to be the gyroscopically
controlled range-finder....but there is no reason why he should be paid any large
royalties on the instrument....If Mr. Pollen can be put on the same basis as all other
Admiralty contractors a difficulty which has existed for the last two years would be
successfully removed.'°
On 10 December, at a meeting with the ADNO (Captain Craig), Pollen was invited to
quote for 75 rangefinder mountings with indicators and for 50 plotters; while he asked for
a fixed royalty of £1,000 on each mounting or table. He also revealed that the Linotype
Company had quoted only £275 for the manufacture of each mounting with transmitters:
and that 'it cost about £5,000 to £6,000 a year to run the Argo Co.'. He also proposed
that:
...if the Admiralty saw its way to paying £20,000 in advance, it would enable Mr.
Pollen to obtain a Controlling interest in the firm of Cooke & Son of York, where the
apparatus could...be manufactured under Mr. Pollen's direct control.'9'
This meeting was held six days before Moore took up his position as DNO,' while
Wilson was about to supersede Fisher as First Sea Lord. In October 1909, apropos the
latest Battle Practice, Fisher had gloated that 'the new system of Fire Control is quite
excellent and knocks Pollen into smithereens'; yet Pollen seems to have been unaware that
he was in Fisher's black books and feared that Wilson would be hostile. However, in the
following March, 'Pollen appears to have been told [probably by Jellicoe} that Wilson's
opinions were not the obstacle that he had supposed'.'93
Po1len to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 13 April 1910, T.173/91 Part VII. LDNS, pp.122-S and 183. At
the RCAI hearings, Pollen's counsel accepted that Pollen had been present on JIatal until November:
T.173/547 Part 8, p.63.
'LDMS, p.165. Record ofBusiness, p.10.
° Paper prepared !y the Director ofXaval Ordnancefor the Infonnatzon of his Successor, November 1909, p.4.
' 'Pollen Aim Correction System. Notes of what took place at the Conference...on... 10th December 1909'
in T.173/91 Part VII. The Linotype Company, which made Pollen's early instruments, had come under
American control: Pollen's counsel to RCAI, T. 173/547 Part 8, p.74.
'9°Service record, ADM 196/42 p.64.
'93 llN3' pp.161, 174-5 and 197-8.
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Moore followed Bacon's advice, further negotiations focusing solely on the
mounting, with transmitters and range and bearing indicators, and on a single inclusive
price for each set. On 22 January 1910, Pollen proposed £1,750 each for 75 sets supplied
over five years with monopoly, a price to which he then held through most of the
following negotiations (XIV-5). Even after allowances for contingencies, the very large
difference between the manufacturing and selling costs may well explain the 'fraudulent
contractor theory' apparently held by some in the Admiralty. In January, the Admiralty
had warned Pollen that no decision could be expected before the start of the next financial
year' 95
 but their opening counter-offer, of 11 April, was for only 15 sets at £1,000 each,
without secrecy.' Following the advice ofJellicoe, who had returned to the Admiralty as
Controller, Pollen's formal rejection was temperately worded:' 97
 but in a private letter to
the First Lord, also dated 13 April, he declared, not for the first time, that:
We have never contemplated giving foreign - and perhaps hostile - governments the
benefits of the experience and skill we have acquired at the cost of the British
Admiralty...unless...we were driven to do so by compulsion.
He also sought an advance of £25,000 since:
...owing to my having understood before Xmas, that an order for 75 units was virtually
decided, I entered...into an obligation to acquire a share in an important factory...and
have consequently to find £15,000 beforejune l5th.'
Even before writing to McKerma, Pollen had expressed his disappointment in a
letter toJ A Spender, the editor of the liberal Westminst€r Gacette, which ended with much
the same implied threat which he had used a year earlier.
P.S.
You know the grounds I have for being quite certain that the giving up of the monopoly
will be raised by the Front Opposition Bench in Parliament, and in the Press.
Since this letter is now in the McKenna Papers, it evidently reached the person for whom
it was really intended. However, it did not produce the desired effect and, after a meeting
on the 19th, McKenna received another letter leaving him in no doubt of the
consequences if Pollen did not get his way.
LLWS', pp.197-8. Minute by Director of Navy Contracts to Controller, 18 April 1910, p.1 in MCKN3/15.
'9 DiVS pp.197-8.
Secretary of the Admiralty to Argo Co. 11 April 1910 in T.173/91 Part VII.
'97 LDM5, p198. Pollen to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 13 April 1910 in T.173/91 Part VII.
Pollen to McKenna, 13Apr11 1910 in T.173/91 Part VII.
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As the responsibility for the Board's decision to abandon secrecy and its defence in
public will fall on you alone...you ought to know why this interest [in secrecy] is so
great.
However, Pollen also offered some reduction in price, proposing £1,600 each for 45
sets.' Meanwhile,Jellicoe had asked the Director of Navy Contracts (DofC), F W Black,
to recommend what would be a fair price. Black concluded that, without secrecy, a price
of £1,200 would be necessary to yield a 'substantial and liberal' profit. 20° By 27 April, the
parties were close enough for the Admiralty Board to give its general approval. 20 ' On the
29th, Argo were sent the Admiralty's offer to purchase 45 sets over the next three years at
£1,350 each, while secrecy was to be maintained until the end of 1912; the first £15,000
of the value of the contract was to be paid in advance. The price covered payment by the
Admiralty of all the Argo Company's charges of £6,000 per annum for the three years. In
consequence, any other parts of the A C system would be supplied at the cost to Argo plus
'a fair commercial rate of profit only'.202
Although the 'Argo Company accepted the conditions "without qualification" on
the day they were offered', Sumida proposes that:.
...Pollen's acceptance of the Admiralty's unfavorable terms of purchase for only a
portion of his fire control system...provided a margin of profit that was too small to
enable the Argo Company to carry on experimental work on the remaining
instruments...203
In fact, there was little difference between Black's estimate of the manufacturing cost of
each mounting (/J600) and that actually achieved (645, which included Cooke's profit of
3O%). Therefore the Admiralty were offering a good 'ordinary trading profit' but, in
addition, were prepared to pay Argo's running costs, at the rate of expenditure declared
by Pollen, while the remainder of the A C system was developed;204 thus their terms were
by no means ungenerous.
With the production order settled, Pollen and his colleagues were able to prepare
for the trials aboard .JIata1. Once again, after the preliminary tests, the Argo
representatives were ordered off the ship. Pollen made a formal protest, but, apparently
' Pollen to Spender, 12 April 1910: Pollen to McKenna, 19 April 1910 with Enclosure, 20 April 1910: in
MCKN 3/15.
18 April 1910 (op. cit.) p.6. On the same day, the DNO provided his own similar estimates (also in
MCKN 3/15) in which the corresponding figures were £470 and £85; however, he used Pollen's estimate
without contingencies but assumed, wrongly, that it did not include a manufacturer's profit of 25%.
201 ardMim 27Apr11 1910, ADM 167/44.
202 Secretary of the Admiralty to Argo Co. with enclosures, 29 April 1910 in T.173/91 Part VII.
203 1LW5, p.201.
204 Record ofBusiness, p.17. DofC, 18 April 1910, p.6
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forgetting earlier boasts that the system would be 'ready for war', 205 admitted that the
instruments could only be run reliably by his own engineers. The Admiralty insisted on
the trials, which were to make comparisons with Service methods, being carried out by
naval personnel; Pollen's recent threats to take his system and experience to 'foreign - and
perhaps hostile - governments' confirmed yet again that he could not be trusted with
Service secrets.
NATAL To OM0N
Pollen, like Isherwood, was quick to appreciate the significance of the rate
plotting experiments being made by Plunkett in Mud. To the concern of Lieutenant
Joseph Henley, now the DNO's assistant responsible for fire control, by 13 August he had
declared that he was preparing 'a scheme for Automatic Time and Ranges Plotting'. 206
 By
November, he was also describing a time-and-bearing curve and the use of a Dumaresq-
like linkage by which 'the two rates could be resolved into speed and course of the
enemy'.207
 Since discussions were still proceeding on modifying the Xatal table for
dual-rate plotting, on 20 December, the Admiralty took the precaution of informing Argo
of 'an instrument for automatically plotting Time and Range and Time and Bearing,
devised by another inventor...and protected by secret patent'. The company was also
asked whether their receivers could be adapted to work rate plots. In his reply, Pollen
displayed an over-eager interest in Dreyer's rate plotter:
...we shall be very glad to be informed of what his means of plotting are, so that we can
give you finished designs for experimenting with it....it is a matter of entire indifference
to us...whether we use the inventions of others or our own.
This most uncharacteristic declaration could not in a moment reverse the Admiralty's
wary attitude to Pollen.
You have asked for certain particulars of the...invention...but my Lords...do not see
their way to complying...as the secret invention goes a good deal further than the plain
Time and Range and Time and Bearing which your Company propose to fit in HMS
"Natal" and their Lordships prefer that the two methods should be developed
independently and then tried in comparison with each other. 208
to McKenna, 20 April 1909 in T.173/91 Part VII.
206 Henley to Dreyer, 13 August 1910 in DRYR 2/1 (Appendix XX1).
2°'PP, 'Quest of Rate Finder' (1910) p.269. This linkage was patented (7,382/191 1); it was not itself
suitable for use in a clock and it was not subsequently regarded by Pollen as important, even though the
patent was not reassigned to Argo: Secretary of the Admiralty, 30 April 1913 and Argo, 'Memorandum'
(1913) (op. cit.). The linkage was 'substantially the same invention as the Dumaresq': Pollen's counsel before
RCAI, T.173/91 Part 12, p.103.
208 DofC to Argo, 20 December: Pollen to DofC, 22 December 1910 and Secretary of the Admiralty to
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Although the modified 1%/atal plotter was not a success, the same policy was extended first
to the Argo rate plotter and later to the clock. On 2 May 1910, Argo were invited to
quote for a rate plotter, though they were also reminded that it would be covered by
Admiralty secret patents; their price for the plotter that was subsequently tried in Orion
was £550.209
By the end of 1911, the Argo Clock Mark ifi was also nearing completion.21 ° On
7 December, while the DNO submitted that five ships should be equipped with Dreyer
instruments, he also noted that it had already been decided to fit Orion with the Argo
plotter and clock even though the rough estimates of costs were £1,200 for a complete
Argo installation compared with £300 for the Dreyer. 211
 On 11 December, the Controller
(now Rear-Admiral CJ Briggs) minuted that:
Before committing ourselves to one type of instrument I think it would be desirable to
carry out comparative trials with the two systems and I suggest Argo Co. should be
requested to quote a price.
This prompted the drafting of a letter to Argo requesting a quotation for one trial clock
and for a further five sets; this draft was concurred in by Moore on 18 January 1912.212
However, as soon as the clock had been demonstrated at the Argo London offices, on 18
March Pollen offered to loan it for trials, so the question of purchase of the prototype did
not then arise. On 10 April, he was informed that Moore would recommend the adoption
of the Argo clock for the next five capital ships to be completed, subject to the outcome of
the trials and an agreement on prices. 213 However, the subsequent negotiations were to be
dominated by a crisis in the company's finances which had its roots in decisions taken in
1909 and 1910.
During the RCAI hearings in 1923, Pollen and Argo presented a set of accounts
which had been prepared from the company's books for the six years ending 31
December 1913 (Appendix XV). It shows investments of £12,650 at the end of 1910,
increasing to £15,650 a year later. 214 Thus Pollen had carried out his intention of
obtaining a major holding in Thomas Cooke and Sons of York. The shares gave him an
interest in the manufacturers of his instruments as well as access to Cookes rangefinder
Argo, l9January 1911 inT.173/91 Part VII.
209 DofCtoArgo,2May 1911 inT.173/91 PartVII.LLWS,pp.2O5and274andRtcordofBusiness,p.15.
2IOO to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 17 November 1911 in T.173/91 Part II.
211 DNO's minute, 7 December 1911 in T.173/91 Part III.
212 Typed transcript of draft letter, DNO's marginal note and Controller's minute in T.173/91 Part IV.
213 LDM, p.22 I
214 Rae Smith, 'Argo' with attached statements.
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expertise. 2t5
 However, they also tied up funds which could otherwise have been used to
meet some of the large commitments, to design and manufacture, which lay ahead. The
accounts confirm that Argo's expenses in 1909 were indeed close to the £6,000 estimated
by Pollen: but, thereafter, they increased each year to a maximum of12,807 in 1913. At
first, Pollen was able to raise sufficient funds by means of bank loans (which reached
£13,730 by 1911) and, in 1911, by the issue of Preference shares, which made £11,700.
The share offer had been backed by letters from a number of prominent naval officers,
including Vice-Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg and Rear-Admiral Richard Peirse;216
long afterwards, Peirse admitted:
I told him [Pollen] I should be only too pleased to give him my opinion in writing if it
would help matters in the way of raising capital....I may say I very much regret if my
opinion misled any money [sic]217
Despite these cash injections, by December 1911 there were clear signs that Argo were
experiencing a significant cash-flow problem.
...Argo company appealed to the Admiralty to pay for the first 15 sets in full, as
delivered, instead of deducting from the price of each a proportion of the 150001.
advanced....218
The Admiralty agreed, but, when Moore attempted to obtain a price for five clocks in
April 1912, Pollen's response suggests that Argo were stifi in difficulties. Having declined
'to quote because it is impossible to make so small a number at commercial prices', he
suggested three alternatives.
The first is for the Admiralty to acquire the monopoly of our system, the second is to tell
us at once that we are free to supply our devices elsewhere and the third is to give us a
sufficiently large order for plotting tables, rangefinders [presumably he meant the
Pollen-Cooke model] and mountings to enable us to raise the capital requisite for
manufacturing the clocks on a commercial basis.
On 20 April, Moore assured Pollen that he intended to place an order for five clocks
'without waiting for results of the trial one': but, the 22nd, Pollen responded by proposing
an order for some 170-180 clocks, enough for one in every transmitting station and every
turret of all dreadnoughts built and building. 219
 This might seem a surprising expectation,
except that discussions were probably already taking place on ways to i1-nprove local
2 Anita McConnell, Instrument Makers the World (York, 1992) p.74.
"6 R Smith, 'Argo', Balance Sheet. LD, p.208; p.272 footnote 129 implies that the 250 shares were all
sold and 1000/0 paid.
217 Peirse before RCAI, T.173/547 Part 9, pp.37-8.
218 Record ofBusiness, p.15.
219 fl y5 pp.22 I-2.
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control in turrets. A month later, an Admiralty conference attended by Moore
recommended that both the Argo clock and 'somewhat modified' Dreyer apparatus could
be suitable: while, as late as 7 August, commanders of the Home fleet were advised that
both instruments were to be included in comparative trials of local control
arrangements?° Thus, on 7 June, Argo were asked to quote for clocks and rate plotters in
numbers up to 96 each. Separate figures were requested with and without the
maintenance of secrecy. Without secrecy, for five clocks and five plotters 221 , they quoted
£2,400 and £500 each, respectively, the prices falling to £1,350 and £400 for quantities
of 96 each. However, the company refused to quote for the maintenance of secrecy either
for a limited period, or for only a part of the system, which 'must be regarded in its
entirety'.
Meanwhile, Argo's fmancial crisis appears to have deepened further, since, on 13
May:
They...asked the Admiralty to pay them an additional 26,0001. or else to release them
from secrecy obligations in advance of the agreed date so as to enable them to raise
capital outside.m
However, the Company's request led to an examination of Argo's books. Expenses were
considerably heavier than those estimated in 1910, due to the 'high salaries to directors
and skilled designers &c [while] a large part of their work was upon other features of the
A.C. system not included in the 45 sets': and also to high spending on experimental and
prototype gear and on offices. 3
 The company also claimed that it 'was about 80001. to
the bad at the time when the order for the 45 sets was given'; yet Pollen himself admitted
to being at least £5,700 to the good in May 1908; Argo also represented the purchase of
the shares in Cooke's as an expense rather than an asset. 4 By 23 July, Pollen announced
that his financial embarrassments had, somehow, been resolved, while by the end of the
year, with the mountings delivered, Argo was once more in profit.V5 Thus, in attempting
°DNO and JTP, 'Local Control in Turrets' 24 May and Secretary of the Admiralty to Officers
Commanding Home Fleet, 7 August 1912 in 'Important Questions dealt with by DNO', VQ1.I - 1912, AL
Described as 'Range Plotters only - that is, Range and not Bearing Plotters'.
Recoid of Business, p.17. Contrary to the impression given in LLWS, pp.20! and 222, the contract for the
mountings did not give Pollen any right to renegotiate the price.
223 Pollen had awarded himself £2,500 and Isherwood 1,000 per year. For comparisons with Admiralty
salaries, see X1V-6.
ReCo?T1 of Business, pp.14 and 17. The 1923 accounts show an accumulated loss at the end of 1910 of
£5,558 but, as explained in Appendix XV, this was not a true representation of the Company's
profitability.
LDN3', pp.222 and 276. Rae Smith, 'Argo' with Profit and Loss Account. The profit in 1912 was
£15,081 while the accumulated profit since 1908 was £1,991.
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to justify additional payments, Argo appear to have exaggerated their losses.
Unfortunately, the outcome was the opposite of that intended, since they succeeded in
convincing the Admiralty that 'there had been serious extravagance in expenditure'. On
22 June, the firm was informed that 'the Admiralty [had] decided not to pay the extra
260001. ...and not to release the Company from the agreed period of secrecy'.
Moore (now a Rear-Admiral) was about to join the Board as Controller, while
his successor as DNO was Captain F C T Tudor. Despite Argo's difficulties, there was no
change in the policy on trials.
It is proposed to purchase five Argo clocks combined with automatic time and range
plotters for the "King George" class, to enable a very thorough comparative trial
against the Dreyer gear to be carried out.
But, after Pollen had himself asked twice to be released from secrecy:
...the question of whether it is worth renewing it is under consideration. It is desired to
treat the Argo Company similarly to all other contractors, and to dispense with secrecy
agreements in future as far as possible.7
When the question was raised:
The Argo Company offered to continue secrecy for 50001. per month...
...They suggested the Admiralty should make them an offer for permanent secrecy or
refer it to arbitration. From conversations, however, it was dear that the Company
would want much more than the 140,0001. conditionally agreed...in 1908...
Thus, Argo's 'exorbitant terms'228 left no reasonable alternative but to dispense with
secrecy, a policy which also promised to bring down Argo's prices.
After he became Controller, Moore retained responsibility for the negotiations
with Argo, as might be expected given his familiarity with the case and Pollen's habitual
lobbying at the highest level. However, Sumida proposes that Moore 'was determined to
block the advance of the Argo Company' and resorted to 'underhand action' to damage
Pollen's standing with members of the Board. 9 The reality, as shown by his minute of 13
August (Appendix XV1), was that Moore was now openly determined that the secrecy
agreement with Argo must end. 23° Although there is no record of discussion at a formal
Board meeting, Moore's advice was accepted and, on 20 August, Argo were informed that




pp.223-4 and 276-7. However, the principal source is an unsent letter toJ A Spender drafted by a
disappointed and angry Pollen nearly three months after the event.
°A G H W Moore, Extract from 3rd Sea Lord's Minute in MB 1 /T22/ 174, Papers of Prince Louis of
Battenberg in Mountbatten Papers, University of Southampton Library: reproduced in Appendix XVI.
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monopoly and secrecy would cease on 31 December and that arrangements would be
made for the prompt reassignment of patents; a new quotation for five clocks was
requested 'at a price greatly below the £2,400 originally quoted'.23'
As on previous occasions, Pollen's response was to lobby hard to have the
Board's decision reversed. In his support, Rear-Admiral Peirse wrote to the Second Sea
Lord, Prince Louis of Battenberg, who in turn asked Moore for his comments. 232 Moore's
handwritten letter of 19 September (also in Appendix XVI) repeats and expands on the
points in his minute. His view was that, as Pollen gained more confidential knowledge, he
could press for yet higher monopoly prices and that it was time to shake off 'a chain being
forged...more and more relentlessly'. Moore considered that the rival fire control systems
were functionally about equal: except that, while he was prepared to try Argo's new
true-course plotter, he remained sceptical that Pollen would be any more successful than
he had been previously. But Moore also emphasised that:
I am so far from being opposed to Pollen's Clock that I have begged him for his own
sake to push on with it & perfect it, as I knew Dreyer was going ahead & I believed Argo
Company's work would be more accurately carried out. I have been for nearly a year
trying to get contracts placed for 5 Argo Clocks...but Pollen has held out always on a
prohibitive price based on Monopoly terms.233
The Admiralty quickly discovered the difficulties of shaking off Pollen while
maintaining secrecy on the dual-rate principles embodied in the Dreyer Table. Beginning
in September, Argo began the process of patenting their course and rate plotters and,
despite the Admiralty's request to withdraw the application for the latter, it was registered
as a provisional specification on 12 October.2M At a conference with Commander C V
Usborne235
 on the 15th, Pollen further declared, on the basis of the mention of range-rate
plotting in 'Reflections on an Error of the Day' and the adaptation of the Xatal table to
dual-rate plotting, that he had invented rate-plotting independently and that the
Admiralty had no claims which could invalidate his application. He did undertake to keep
rate-plotting secret until it was made public by some other source, 236 but this was of only
231 Secretary of the Admiralty and C A Oliver for DofC to Argo, both 20 August 1912 in T.173/91 Part
VII.
232IIs,
 p.227. Peirse to Battenberg, 7 September 1912, MBI/T20/142.
to Battenburg, 19 September 1912, MB 1 /T20/ 147. Excerpts in LEWS, p.227.
"Patent 23,351/1912.
"S Now the DNO's assistant responsible for fire control.
Po11en to DofC, 25 November 1912 in T.173/91 Part VII.
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temporary value, since, while the provisional specification would not be published, it was
the initial step towards open publication as a Complete Specification.237
Following his usual practice, in June Pollen had already opened a
correspondence with the First Lord, now Winston Churchill, to protest that secrecy was
not to be renewed. On 21 October, he sent Churchill an all too characteristic letter.
Pollen began by damning the Service system which he had seen while demonstrating the
Argo gear in Orion, thereby confirming that it was impossible to keep Service secrets while
he and his staff were allowed aboard. Then, confusing present capabilities with possible
future improvements, he claimed that his clock could keep the range 'with perfect
accuracy...when we are under helm with the target obscured': which was not true either
of the Mark Ill or Mark IV clock. And, he threatened that:
The day my system becomes public property you have no secret of any kind left in your
naval gunnery. In as far as you have adopted a restricted and mutilated form of my
system you have obviously no secret of any value.2
Yet, despite Pollen's claims and threats, the Admiralty persisted with the intention of
purchasing five more clocks for comparative trials; on 26 October, even before the
successful trials in Orion on 19-20 November, a not greatly reduced price of £2,133 for
each clock was agreed. 239
 Meanwhile, Churchill, like his predecessors, appears to have
had second thoughts about ending Argo's monopoly agreement. On 6 December, during
an interview with Pollen's brother, Colonel Stephen Pollen, Churchill requested a
quotation 'for a large number of Clocks, the price to be calculated on the basis that the
Admiralty should be our only customer'. Moore, who was also present, acknowledged
that the Argo clock was mechanically superior, but insisted that its price and the price for
monopoly were excessive. Nonetheless, on 11 December Argo quoted £1,600 each for
150 clocks to be supplied over the next three years, £50,000 to be paid in advance.
Battenburg informed Pollen that, with such prices, there was 'no possibility of coming to
an agreement'. 2 ° The Director of Navy Contracts noted that Effiotts won the order for
five range-rate plotters (for use with the five Argo clocks) with a price of138.10.0: while
their price for five complete Dreyer tables (which combined two rate plotters and a clock)
was only £635 each. He therefore urged that the earlier decision to end monopoly should
7 T H O'Dell, Inventwns and Official Secrecy (Oxford, 1994) Chapter 6 (reference courtesy of Dr. Anita
McConnell).
2'PolIen to Churchill 24June and 21 October 1912 in T.173/91 Part II.
239 p*S p.229. The Orion clock was purchased later at the same price: Record ofBusizzess, p.I6.
24o LQ/S, pp.233-5.
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be adhered to.2 On 19 December, Argo's offer was declined and the decision to end
secrecy confirmed; any future orders were not ruled out but they would only be placed on
'ordinary commercial terms'.
1913-1918
Although the patent for the rate plotter remained contentious (Argo were warned
that it might fall within the scope of the Official Secrets Act), 242
 there was for a moment a
chance that Argo might establish a new relationship as a normal Admiralty supplier. On
lOJanuary 1913, Pollen informed the Dof:
...we have now completed the jigs and special tools necessary for manufacturing Argo
clocks in quantities and are therefore able to make you a more favourable quotation
than that submitted some six months ago...
£1150 in lots of 25.245
Unfortunately, Pollen was also gathering letters criticising the abandonment of secrecy.
While Reginald Plunkett noted on Pollen's letter:
The request contd. in this letter, wh. I consider wrong, I replied to saying that I found it
impossible to comply with'.2
other officers were more forthcoming and extracts were sent to Churchill by Stephen
Pollen on 20 January. The letters contained direct attacks on Dreyer,Jellicoe and Moore
and strong criticisms of the Admiralty, which was accused by one correspondent of 'crass
stupidity'. The day after they were sent, Arthur Pollen seems to have suddenly recognised
the danger and attempted to withdraw them, but the damage had already been done. On
22 January, Churchill's secretary informed Pollen that his action in soliciting criticisms
from officers afloat was 'irregular', that the worst extract was 'grossly improper and
offensive in its character', and that 'the First Lord was unable to reopen the question of
monopoly or the clock'. Then, on 4 February, Pollen approached the Conservative E G
Pretyrnan, a former Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, with a view either to raising his
case privately with the Prime Minister or 'making a front bench question of it'. Pretyrnen
consulted Jellicoe (who had returned to the Admiralty as Second Sea Lord) and then
241 Minutes 'Pollen Aim Correction System' çmitialled by Churchill): and 'Argo Company, Present
Situation' with 'Details of Clocks and Rate Plotters on order' by F W Black (DofC), n.d. but December
1912 in MBI/T22/174.
242 Secretary to Argo, 19 December 1912 in T.173/91 Part VII and in MB1IT22/174.
243 Pollen to DofC, 10 January 1913 in T. 173/91 Part II.
2 Pollen to Plunkett, l7January 1913 in DR.AX 3/4.
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declined to take any further action. 245 After these incidents, there were no further
discussions about additional orders.
In January, the DNO, Tudor, began to take a more active part in dealing with
Argo, initially by raising with Pollen the concern that the clock features for setting the
bearing rate gave a clear indication of the Admiralty's dual-rate system.2 On 18
February, Tudor opposed a suggestion by the DofC, F W Black, that Pollen might be
persuaded by a payment for services rendered to forego sales to foreiga governments.
Sumida suggests that:
Tudor's views carried the day and his scheme for obstructing the foreign sale of the
Argo Clock officially adopted.247
In fact, after Pollen's recent crass attempts to force changes in policy, it is unlikely that he
had any support remaining in the Admiralty: while the question of the bearing-rate dial
was not just a ploy. The Navy's opinion was that the clock controls for setting range and
bearing rates 'are in no way germane to the Aim Corrector system but were evidently
fitted to admit of the clock being used on the Service system'. 2 Pollen maintained that
they were 'merely the expression of mathematical truths' and, for good measure, that 'you
[sic] cannot publish my system without publishing yours, because the whole of your
system is involved from mine'. 249 He would yield nothing to the Admiralty's concerns and,
once his lawyers became involved, the correspondence degenerated into lengthy,
point-by-point claim and counter-claim. 250 Relations, already bad, grew worse, especially
after the dispute became public. The J'Iaval Annual for 1913, published in late May or early
June, described the main features of the Argo table and clock and pronounced that:
Mr. Pollen...has apparently succeeded in perfecting instruments of incalculable value
for finding and keeping the rate at long range.'
In mid-June, Pollen informed editors of the end of secrecy and, from 19 June, articles of
varying degrees of accuracy appeared in a number of papers, including The Times, whose
owner (John Walter) had until recently been a major Argo shareholder. Then on SOJune,
245 fl, pp.235-7.
2 PollentoDofC, l8January 1913 in T.173/91 Part II.
247 RecordofBurnzess (1913) Annex p.!. LDN, p.237.
2 'Admira1ty to Argo, 21 February 1913 inT.173/91, Part II.
2 Pollen to Usborne, 29Apr11 1913 in T.173/91 Part VII.
°Correspondence between Coward & Hawksley Sons & Chance and the Secretary of the Admiralty in
April toJune l9l3inT.173/91 Part VII.
Viscount Hythe, The NavalAnnual 1913 (Newton Abbott, reprinted 1970) pp.319-20.
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a Liberal MP, Robert Harcourt, raised the matter of the Pollen system in the House of
Commons, in a question to the First Lord. Sumida proposes that.
the absence of evidence makes it impossible to establish the exact extent of his [Pollen's]
involvement with the press and with Harcourt's queries
but himself acknowledges Pollen's involvement with the owner and editor of The Times.252
Pollen's previous record also strongly suggests that he was behind the question in the
House: and, in the unlikely event that he was not, no one in the Admiralty would have
believed it.
On this, as on previous occasions, Pollen's actions had undermined Argo's efforts
to reach an accommodation with the Admiralty. On 10 June, the company's Board had
decided after all to omit the rate dials from their foreign patent applications, at least for
the moment; but this was only communicated to the Admiralty at a meeting on 30 June
(the day of Churchill's question in Parliament). The DofC then asked for more excisions
and, after further exchanges, Argo concluded that 'the views of the Company and of the
Admiralty are irreconcilable'. 253 By 4 August, the Argo gear had been shown 'without
reservation to foreign naval Attaches'.
The Admiralty...considered...that the action of the Argo Company was most
reprehensible....all business and other relations were to be broken off with the Company
and the Company's name was to be removed from the Admiralty list and the Fleet, and
the Australian Navy were informed that no further intercourse was to be held with it.
On 5 September, Pollen and Isherwooci included the clock in their applications for
French and American patents and, as the Admiralty had feared all along, described both
rate dials and their use. The American patent read:
means are provided for setting up either the target course and target speed or the rate
of change of range and rate of change of bearing. In order to determine the target
course and target speed, recourse must be had to one of the methods of plotting.5
Furthermore, despite Pollen's assurances in November 1912, the complete specification
for the dual rate plotter had been left at the Patent Office on 13 May 1913, even before
the final break; the only concessions to Admiralty concerns was that the specification
(23,351/1912) did not describe a separate pencil for clock range: and the company only
applied for foreign patents on its true-course plotter.2
252 11WS, pp.241-4.
"LD1V3, pp.241 and 244-5.
4 RecordofButhwss, Annex, p.7.
255 US Patent 1,162,510, filed 5 September 1913, p.1. French patent 464.049, demandé 5 Septembre 1913,
delivré 5Janvier 1914.
6 US Patent 1,123,795 and French patent 464.044; dates as above.
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The accounts show that, by the end of 1913, Argo had been fully paid for the
rangefinder mountings and clocks. Even if Pollen's profit before 1908 is ignored, in the
years 1908 to 1913, Argo made a loss of only £3,778 on receipts of some £103,000.
Following a 6°/o debenture issue in 1913, Argo had raised a total of £23,350 in shares and
debentures while their bank balance was £5,710 in the red. However, they still held
shares in Cooke's to the value of £16,650 while their stock of instruments had cost
£4,554; most importantly, they had completed the development of the Argo system while
their only significant income had come from the Admiralty. 257
 As for Pollen himself, his
salary as Governing Director increased from £1,500 to £2,500 sometime between 1909
and 1911 and he continued to draw it until 1918 or 191 9;8 thus his total income was
somewhere between £24,500 and £29,000. In addition, Pollen's own bank statements
showed that, when Argo was registered at the end of 1907, he had already made a profit
of £2,930 on his dealings with the Admiralty, while he also received Argo shares and
debentures to a value of £4,399 for the assignment of his existing interests and
obligations. All the debentures were redeemed in 1909, necessitating a payment to Pollen
of their value of £3,500. 259 Thus Pollen was well rewarded over many years at the
expense of his Admiralty contracts or, latterly, of the Argo shareholders.
The Argo Company began its overseas sales campaign in September 1913.
Discussions with Turkey, the United States and France eventually foundered on questions
of cost, while the French in any case preferred rate to course plotting. The Russian Navy,
however, accepted Pollen's analysis and he received an order for five complete systems:
although, as already mentioned, the delivery made in October 1914 was much reduced.
An agreement had also been made with Austro-Hungary, while negotiations were nearly
conduded with Brazil and Chile, but all were terminated on the outbreak of war.26°
However, the Russians remained convinced of the superiority of the Cooke-Pollen
rangefinder, for which they placed at least one more order, for eight instruments, in 1916.
257 1e Smith, 'Argo', Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss. IflNS, p.247. In addition to the Mark V clock
and the Mark IV plotter, the final system apparently included a new, two-observer mounting for the
Cooke-Pollen rangefinder: IDM9, Plate 2.
Rae Smith, 'Argo', Profit and Loss Account. 'Conference 10 December 1909' (op. CU.). Pollen before
RCAI, T.173/547 Part 15, p.62 (XIV-7).
9 Rae Smith, 'Argo', Balance Sheet and 'Payments made by Mr. Pollen between 1905
and...incorporation...'. The author is most grateful to Mr John Home, FAPA for explaining how to
interpret the accounts.
°IEW5, pp.247-8 and 295-6. For the Russian order, see A H Pollen, 'Memorandum on Fire Control',
1916 in T.173/91 Part II.
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The Admiralty went to some lengths to obstruct this delivery, 26 ' showing that the
bitterness left after the acrimonious break with Argo in 1913 was long-lasting.
AfterJutland, Pollen produced two long memoranda arguing for his system to be
reconsidered. Jellicoe submitted them officially to the Admiralty, urging in particular that
the latest Cooke-Pollen rangefmder should be examined. 2
 Thirty were eventually
ordered in 1918, even though the report of the Phillpotts committee noted that, in tests, a
15-foot model had not shown 'any marked advantage over the Barr & Stroud rangefinder
at present in use'. This committee had been convened after, for the last time, Pollen had
written to an incumbent First Lord, now Sir Eric Geddes; Pollen proposed that
instruments about to be despatched for trial to the United States should be inspected by
the Royal Navy. 3
 The committee was impressed by their 'near mechanical perfection',
although they concluded that the instruments were not 'as suited to the service
requirements as the present methods in use'. However, Pollen was evidently continuing to
hinder his own chances of acceptance:
Some of the knowledge and most of the experience required for the design...have been
gained in H.M. Service, and it is...unfortunate that these should be made use of to the
public depreciation of Service methods, for which there is no justification.
Nonetheless, the Committee concluded:
It is a matter for regret that the ingenuity and mechanical designing ability displaced is
producing these instruments have been lost to the Service....The question is for
consideration whether the services of the Inventor and his Staff could be utilized in
connection with the design of future fire control instruments'.
In responding to the report, Frederic Dreyer, now Director of Naval Ordnance,
began:
I had hoped not to have to minute an Admiralty Docket on the subject of Mr. Pollen's
Fire Control Apparatus as I am the inventor of the Dreyer Fire Control Apparatus...
He went on to concur with most of the committee's report, though he insisted that Harold
Isherwood could not be spared from the position he now held at Chief Designer in the
Mining School. He concluded:
First Lord made the excuse that Cooke's were seriously behind with Admiralty work;
correspondence between Pollen and Balfour in T. 173/91 Part VII.
262 
'Memorandum on Fire Control' and 'Memorandum II', Enclosures 1 and 2 to Summission...of 21.8.16
from C.-in-C. Home Fleet in T. 173/91 Part II. Since Jellicoe submitted the entire memoranda, he did not
'turn a blind eye to Pollen's analysis' in order to deflect criticism of his and Dreyer's part in the rejection of
the Argo system: LDM, pp.307-B.
263 LfliVS, pp.309-il.
Philipotts Committee, 'Report', p.6.
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Mr. Pollen is an enthusiast who always overstates his case...after..jutland he informed
everyone of the vast superiority of the Crooke [sic] Range Finder, views which were not
found to be justified when it came to be tried...
Mr. Pollen, no doubt with the very best of intentions produced a great feeling of unrest
in Naval Gunnery Circles when his instruments were on trial by his whirlwind
eloquence and his journalistic efforts.
I am most strongly of opinion that it would be a grave error to once more put him in
touch with the Service...
There were sufficient truths in these statements to convince the whole Admiralty
hierarchy, from Geddes and Wemyss downwards. The Deputy First Sea Lord,
Rear-Admiral George Hope, added a minute that:
Mr. Pollen has always claimed that his methods would produce great results, but he has
always underrated the practical difficulties to be met.
Thus Pollen had no significant support remaining in the Admiralty and he was sent a
noncommittal letter expressing only polite interest in the outcome of the American
trials. 5
 In June, he wrote to the First Lord asking for an enquiry leading to the
recognition which he believed was his due for the use by the Admiralty of his inventions:
but, on 18 December, his request was rejected. 2
 After this final exchange, Pollen would
have to wait for the sittings of the RCAI before, eventually, receiving his reward for the
Argo clock
The collapse of Argo's commercial relationship with the Admiralty, which
Pollen's own actions had done so much to provoke, prevented him from demonstrating
his complete A C system to the Royal Navy. The outbreak of the War then robbed him of
the opportunity to show, by successfully supplying foreign navies, that he had been right
all along about the superiority of his system. But was his conviction, on which he never
wavered, correct? To attempt to answer this question, it is now necessary to examine the
history and development of the rival Dreyer Tables.
'Pollen Fire Control Apparatus' in 'Monthly Record of Principal Question dealt with by Director of
Naval Ordnance', January to June 1918, pp. 308-310 and July to December 1918, pp.819-829. The writer
is most grateful to Professor Sumida for copies of these minutes.
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II. Si a-rr-cou1sE PLOTrER (1904) AI'D Muiu. PLO1TER (1909)
Fig. 1 was first used in patent 23,872 of 1904 and is probably similar to the Jip iter plotter.
The broad paper ribbon was moved by clockwork between rollers at a speed proportional to the
speed of the firing ship. Own course was plotted, as a straight line down one edge of the plot, by a
'pricker' in the centre of the pivot of the plotting arm.
Target position was plotted manually with the pin sliding against the range scale on the arm. The
angle of the arm was set to the bearing of the target relative to own course.
Fig.2 is the manual plotter patented in 1909. The charting paper was pinned to the board (while
own course was steady). The carrier for the plotting arm and the pencil plotting own course was
advanced at a speed proportional to own speed by the long treaded rod, which was by a
variable-speed drive (not shown).
The scale on the parallel linkage was used to measure target course and distance travelled. If the
times of the plotted target points were known, the speed could be obtained from the triangular
scale.
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12. Sm.AiGm CoURSE PLOT, OWN SHIP ALTERING Coui.sE
Although own ship alters course at B', there is no change in the plotted target bearing; the enemy
bearing continues to taken relative to own ship's original course.
Pollen's caption does not mention that the enemy course from B to C is not the actual course but
a virtual course which, with the virtual bearing, gives a correct rate.


























































IS. Aitco CLOCK MARK I
The fixed central pivot of the range hand represented own ship, while the motion of the
cross-piece P relative to the centre simulated the target's virtual course.
The rotation of the horizontal screw S 1 moved P horizontally at a speed proportional to the
component of virtual speed parallel to own course; likewise, the vertical screw S 2 moved P in
proportion to the perpendicular component of virtual speed.
The screws were driven by two variable-speed drives; the disc and ball of the upper drive can be
seen at the bottom of the diagram. The balls were positioned by linkages which generated
displacements proportional to these two components when set with own and enemy speed and the
angle between courses (Note Xll-5).
Patent 360 of 1911, applied for 5 January, complete specification 28 June 1911.
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16. Aio RAm PLOrIEK.
The ranges and bearings transmitted from the rangefinder mounting were plotted in tandem on
the one broad strip of paper moving at a constant speed. The range plot was to the right, the total
travel of the plotting pen representing a change in range of 6,000 yards. By changing the figures
visible through the windows in the scale, ranges to a maximum of 10-16,000 yards (or greater)
could be provided. Similarly, the span of the bearing scale was 1200.
The range and bearing rates were measured with the radial lines engraved on the celluloid strips
pivoted about the plotting pencils.
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17. Aio STEP-BY-STEP TRANSMISSION
Fig. 3 shows the simple transmitter; only one stud contact could be energised at a time.
Fig. 2 is a plan view of the receiver drum and the three spring contacts wired to the transmitter.
The drum and contacts are also shown in Fig. 1, together with the clutch plate and the pair of
continuously-driven, counter-rotating electromagnetic clutches. On the drum, light areas are
conducting, dark are insulating.
If the larger insulating gap on the drum lay under the spring contact energised by the transmitter,
neither dutch was energised and the receiver was in step with the transmitter. If the energised
receiver contact was touching a conducting area on the drum, power was applied to one of the
dutches; this would rotate the receiver in the appropriate direction to realign the receiver with the
transmitter.
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19. ARGO RANGEFINDER M0uNTIIsIG: SECn0N
The mounting comprised three tubes. The middle tube was fixed to the deck. The inner tube was
stabilised by the gyro control so that it remained fixed in space, even as the ship yawed. The
upper, outer tube carried the rangefinder and operator. By means of the power training, the
operator endeavoured rotated this tube at a speed proportional to the rate of change of target
compass bearing.
Dreyer and Usbome, Pollen Aun Cwrector System, Pail L Technical History and Technical Comparison with
CommanderFCDryerc Foe Control System, February 1913, Plate II, AL
A.D 19.12. Apiur. 4. Mr. 17,441.	 152








20. ARco VARIABLE SPEED DiuvE
The ball is located between the disc and the two rollers in the carriage. The carriage slides on ball
bearings. One of the rollers engages with the output shaft.
The side lever controls the position of the plate carrying the small control wheels; the
arrangement ensures that the ball is always correctly positioned relative to the rollers. The small
control wheels allow the ball to rotate about any horizontal axis without appreciable friction.





















21. ARGo CLocK: L)UMARESQ FROM ThE PROVISIONAL PATENT
SS' and TI" are courses of own and enemy ship, respectively.
Own speed reversed is represented by the displacement of the sliding piece in the slot 5, cut in the
large bearing dial. This sliding piece carried the pivot on which rotated together the smaller
'target course dial' and the bar 'or equivalent' beneath it.
As set, the angle between courses is 900.
The distance from the pivot A of the pin B sliding on this bar was proportional to enemy speed.
Pin B engaged with the T-shaped slide which was coupled directly to the carriage of the
variable-speed drive; thus the range-rate was set directly and automatically from the dumaresq
mechanism.
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26. ARGo TRUE CouRsE PLOTrER MARK IV: CRoss SECTION
The fixed left-hand pencil marked a point on the chart each time the rangetaker obtained a 'cut'.
The chart was gripped between the wheels of the upper and lower carriages to the right; the
pencil tracing own course was in the upper carriage. Both carriages always moved together. Their
lateral movement altered the distance between the pencils, which was proportional to the range
received from the rangefinder. They also rotated together by an amount equal to the change in
own compass course (from a gyro compass relay).
The differentials in the lower carriage generated and added two components of rotation. The first
caused the wheels to rotate in the same direction, at a speed proportional to own ship's speed
(from the Forbes log). The second caused the wheels to rotate in opposite directions, thereby
rotating the chart by an amount equal to the change in target bearing relative to the keel, as
received from the rangefinder mounting (in steps of 1/40).
Both pencils also drew small circles at minute intervals.
Patent 23,349 of 1912, applied for 12 October, complete specification (with Fig. 4 showing additional
differentials) 11 April 1913.
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27. ARco AviwIriG Rj INDICAToR.
The ranges received from up to four rangefinders were indicated by the four smaller coloured
pointers. The four coloured lights above the dial showed which pointers were indicating valid
ranges.
The operator had, by eye, to keep the large pointer (coupled to the side handle and a range
transmitter) in the mean of the valid ranges.
Patent 25,768 of 1912, applied for 9 November, complete specification 8 May 1913.
160
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28. ARGo CLOCK MARK V: THE DUMARESQ
The principal new feature is the compass ring around the dumaresq dial. The bearing pointer
(now located between the inclination and dumaresq dials) indicated target bearing on the scale
around the circumference of the dumaresq dial: and target compass bearing on the compass ring.
The large arrow indicated own compass course on the compass ring.
An additional handle (415) was used to set or correct own course. The lever for locking the angle
between courses has been moved from the dial to the top plate of the clock.




29. ARGo CLOCK MARK V: SCHEMATIC FOR CHANGE OF BEAIUNG MECHANISM
Both variable-speed drives are drawn as though of the conventional disc-and-roller type.
The upper drive, which integrates range-rate, determines the position of the spiral cam, which is
cut to generate the reciprocal of range. The pair of linkages multiply speed-across (from the
dumaresq) by the reciprocal of range to give the bearing-rate set on the second variable-speed
drive. Thus its output shaft of this drive is coupled directly to the bearing dials of the dumaresq.
Patent I 6,373/1913, applied for (with figures) 1 6July. Complete specification (essentially identical)
l6January 1914.
5Ti-rn DREYER TABLES
While Pollen always remained an outsider, Lieutenant Frederic Dreyer soon
gained a reputation as a promising member of the Royal Navy's gunnery elite.' Following
his 1903 appointment as Emouth Gunnery Lieutenant, his ship recommissioned as the
flagship of the Channel Fleet and Dreyer quickly became a valued adviser on gunnery
matters to Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson. 2
 He represented the C.-in-C. on the
Calibration Committee chaired by Percy Scott (Captain Edward Harding was also a
member)3
 and, in May 1905, first met Arthur Pollen, who had been invited to witness the
Bantry Bay trials, and gave Dreyer a copy of Fire ConiTol and Long Range liring. The two met
again in the spring of 1906, when Pollen presented plans of his system to a group of naval
officers, after which he was given a tour of Exmouth. 4 On 31 October 1906, he sent Dreyer
a copy of the Jupiter Letters with a request for 'any reflections you may have'. The latter
replied, apologising for the delay, on 15 December,
...but as regards giving you an opinion, as I have never seen your gear and do not know
how you have actually overcome the many great mechanical difficulties...I must put that
off until I have the pleasure of again seeing you.5
Dreyer came first (of three) in the demanding Advanced Course at Greenwich: examination certificates
in DRYR 1/2, CC. For his early career and inventions, see Appendix XVII.
2 Frederic Dreyer, The Sea Heritage (London, 1955) pp.32, 45, 47-8, 52-3 and 57.
Report of the Committee on Calibration, August 1905 in 'Calibration of Guns. Report of Committee, &c in
ADM 1/7835, PRO.
Jon Sumida, In Defence ofXaval Supremacy (London, 1989) p.1 22.
Pollen to Dreyer 31 October and Dreyer to Pollen 15 December 1906 in RCAI Claim Files, T.173/91
Part VII, PRO.
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In his memoirs, Dreyer claimed that the eponymous tables originated in a
proposal that he put forward on 10 December: which as Sumida points out, was just
before the belated reply to Pollen.6
In December 1906 1 submitted a memorandum...to Sir Arthur Wilson in which I
proposed a chronograph of range-finder ranges....He forwarded this to the Admiralty. I
expanded this later into a complete fire-control table.7
In fact, the device was originally called a 'Rate of Change Calculator' and it was designed
to obtain range rates directly from a series of ranges. 8
 As can be seen from Plate 30, the
device was in no sense a chronograph i.e. a means of plotting ranges against time: 9 nor, as
Dreyer and Usborne claimed in 1913, could it provide 'the mean range and rate of
change of range')° It was merely a rate calculator which, within the existing system,
provided a non-too-convenient means for obtaining momentary rates from successive
pairs of ranges." It was 'never used in the Service at all" 2
 and Sumida must be correct in
concluding that 'the Ordnance Department dismissed Dreyer's design as unworthy of
serious consideration'.'3
ASSISTANT TO Ti-IE DNO
By the close of 1906, it was already agreed that Dreyer's next posting would be
as an assistant to the DNO,Jellicoe. However, on leaving the Ermouth on 7January 1907,
he was first given a temporary appointment as gunnery adviser on the Experiment Cruise
of HMS Dreadnought.' 4 In his report, Captain Bacon called 'their Lordships' attention to
the great assistance rendered me by Lieutenant Dreyer, whose theoretical and practical
gunnery knowledge has been of very great value in carrying out the gunnery practices'.'5
6 IDTV(op.cit.)p.122.
Sea Heritage ((p. ciL) p.55.
8 Dreyer, 'Change of Range', 10 December 1906 in DRYR 2/I and T. 173/91 Part Ill.
The term was first used in 'Remarks on Local Turret Control by Commander F.C. Dreyer R.N....', 5
September 1910 in 'Local Control of Turret Guns. Special Firing carried out by HMS 'Vanguard'...' in
ADM 1/8147.
° Commanders F C Dreyer and C V Usborne, Pollen Aim Corrector System Past L Technical Histoiy and
Technical Comparison with Commander Ft2 Dreyer Th Control System, Gunnery Branch 1913, p.5 in P.1024,
AL
'It was a crude instrument, I confess....it was not actually a graph'. Dreyer's evidence in RCAI Minutes
of Proceedings, T.173/547 Part 16, p.13.
12 Captain Tower before RCA!, T.173/547 Part 11, p.7.
LLW, p.122.
" Jellicoe to Dreyer, 11 December 1906 in DRYR 3/2.
Captain R H Bacon, Report on Experimental Cnnse, 16 March 1907, p.5,ADM 116/1059.
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On Dreyer's return in April to join the Ordnance Department, Jellicoe made him
responsible for:
1.Non-transferable mountings except electrical
2. Sighting gear, rangefinders (except experimental)
3. Communications, including fire control....
When Bacon replaced Jellicoe as DNO in August, Captain Edward Harding was still
responsible for 'rangefinder experiments', including Pollen's Aim Corrector System.'6
Both Harding and Dreyer were in the party which visited the Linotype works on 11 June
1907:' but, shortly after taking up his new post, Bacon ended Harding's direct
involvement with the A.C. system,' 8
 which gave Dreyer full responsibility for the
forthcoming trials in Ariadne. Given his high opinion of Dreyer, Bacon probably saw no
reason to deny him full responsibility for rangefinders and mountings; also, the new DNO
may well have distrusted Harding's long and close association with Pollen and believed
that Dreyer would evaluate the A.C. gear more objectively.
Dreyer's new post gave him the opportunity to submit new inventions directly to
the DNO. In June 1907, he put forward two proposals written jointly with his elder
brother CaptainJ T Dreyer, RA.John Dreyer was well known as an inventor of gunnery
devices; in his reports to his successor,Jefficoe mentioned a range clock (though 'backlash
in the gearing has so far delayed the trial'), a sight embodying a number of range
corrections and a calculator for determining the difference between true and gun range.'9
The first of the Dreyers' new proposals was called, rather confusingly, a 'Position Finder
for determining Rate of Change of Range'. It is important as the first description of what
would later be called a time-and-range plot (Plate 31). However, Pollen's influence is
apparent in the idea of controlling the plotting pencil from the rangefmder, and in the
acceptance that the scheme must be able to cope with a rapidly changing range-rate.
Frederic Dreyer wrote:
Sea Heriiage pp.56-7. Paper prepared 4y the Director of Naval Ordnance and Torpedoes for the-information of his
Successor, July 1907, pp.27 and 49, AL The 'Aim Corrector System' is mentioned in the section headed
'Rangefmders'.
ILWS', pp.121 and 123. Pollen before RCA!, T.173/547 Part 14, p.82.18 Harding before RCA!, T. 173/547 Part 3, p.34. Harding remained in the DNO's department until 11
December 1908: service record, ADM 196/62, p.355.
DXO for Successor, July 1907 (op. cit.) pp.20, 22 and 23. The last two were subsequently adopted and
remained in service for many years: Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, 'Pamphlet on the Mark 111* Dreyer
Table 1930', Plate 1 in 'Guard Book for Pamphlets on Dreyer Tables', AL Admiralty, The Gunnery Pocket




...the impression might be that it would be better...to draw a smooth curve through a
number of ranges obtained, the inclination of this curve...giving a measure of the rate of
change of range at that point. We are, however, of opinion...that the best method of
smoothing the curve is to allow the Range Clock to do so....
It must be borne in mind that the rate of change of range is a variable which alters from
instant to instant, which fact makes the drawing of a smoothed curve through a number
of points an extremely difficult method and one of more than doubtful reliability.20
In fact, as shown in Appendix XVIII, Note 1 (XVIII-!), a range-clock would not smooth
out a fluctuating rate. Thus this fallacious assumption led Dreyer to reject explicitly what
was to be an essential feature of the later rate-plotting tables, while this latest invention
was left, like its predecessor, with no other purpose than to calculate rates from pairs of
ranges.2'
In his letter to the DNO, Dreyer also stated that: 'Our proposal to use three
operators for a 9 ft range Finder is now under trial in the "Excellent" ';the trial was to
determine only:
...whether two separate layers for elevation and training, and a third man observing and
reading off, will not give better results than are at present obtained with one man laying
the instrument, observing and marking off.
There was no mention of further adapting the mounting to take bearings. Dreyer
requested authorisation for Portsmouth Yard to prepare a fully-engineered conversion kit:
and also for Thomas Cooke and Sons (because they manufactured the Land Service
Position Finder) to tender for the supply of a 'Rate of Change of range instrument'. In the
Autumn, probably in November or December, both the rate instrument and the
rangefinder mounting were tried out in the Revenge by Lieutenant A T Johnstone of
Excellent. 23 Perhaps, at some point in this trial, when the rate was only changing slowly,
Johnstone found that the rate could be measured directly by aligning the bar with the
mean slope of the curve: but, in any event, this first rate instrument was not mentioned
again.
Dreyer appears to have had little time to participate in these trials. In July, on
Wilson's recommendation, he was chosen by Fisher to visit the nucleus crews of the
Home Fleet to check their equipment and advise on training for the forthcoming gunnery
tests.
20 Dreyer to DNO, 2 July 1907 and F C andJ T Dreyer, 'Position Finder for determining Rate of Change
of Range' in T.173/91 Part III.
21 A second variant resembled the earlier device in requiring only a narrow strip of paper: see XVIII- 1.
flWOforSuccssor,July 1907, p.26
" Technical Companson (op. czt.) p.5 and Tower before RCAI (op. cii.) pp.7-8.
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...I was on the move all the time, coming back to London for a few days every now and
again to inform the D.N.O. what gunnery gear [was] needed.
...In the end the nucleus crew ships' average for the Battle Practice was better than that
of the filly manned Channel Fleet. Fisher was delighted.24
Dreyer was probably on one of these visits when:
...In September 1907, Dreyer met Pollen while the inventor was on his way to
Portsmouth...and Pollen later recalled that Dreyer "told me he hoped it would be his
duty to crab me when the time came."
The selection of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Knyvet Wilson to umpire the official
trials insured that Dreyer's desire to play a major role in the blocking of Pollen would
be fulfilled.
The words in quotation marks are taken from the record of the 1925 RCAI hearing, but
there is a small but important difference between Pollen's testimon?6 and his letter to
Dreyer, of 4 January 1908, on which it was based (both are reproduced in Appendix
Xix).
On the occasion of our last meeting...you warned me that you hoped it would be your
job to crab it [the A C apparatus] if you could....
Personally, I am strongly convinced that, unless the system is crab proof...the Service
ought not to go to any exceptional expense to acquire it.27
Dreyer's declared intent to 'crab it' (the apparatus) rather than to 'crab me' (Pollen), and
Pollen's acceptance that this was his proper role, establishes that Dreyer was using the
verb in its colloquial sense of 'To criticize adversely. ..pull to pieces'. 28 He undoubtedly
intended to test Pollen's gear to the limits necessary to establish its fitness for service: but
that is not evidence of a preconceived intent to block Pollen by any means.
Once Wilson had been invited to supervise the Ariadne trials, Dreyer, who
remained the responsible DNO's assistant, acted as his adviser. However, Dreyer's only
contribution to the equipment actually used against the A.C. system in the final trial on 15
January 1908 was the improved method of taking ranges (though this had already been
simplified by making the rangetaker also responsible for elevating). After the War,
Dreyer insisted that:
24 Sea Hentage, pp.58-9.
ILWS.l2l-4.
Pollen before RCAI, T.173/547 Part 14, p.84.
27 Pollen to Dreyer, 4January 1908 in DRYR 2/1 and T.173/91 Part ifi.
Shorter Oxford Dictiona,y.
Admiral of the Fleet Sir A.K. Wilson, 'Rate of Change of Range Experiments' in Admiralty, Gunnery
Branch,IfreConbv1, 1908,p.28inADM l/8OlOandT.173/91 Part!.
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...Sir Arthur Wilson...was the deviser of this virtual course and speed scheme....I then
pressed him...that, in addition...he would authorise a time and range diagram...3°
and that:
I was not allowed to try my "Time and Range" apparatus until the "ARIADNE" trial
was complete.3'
The last claim is clearly confirmed by Wilson's report.
In the first experiment [on] the l5thJanuary...the "Vengeance" had found it impossible
to plot any virtual course owing to the small change in either range or bearing. This
had led to a proposal to deal with similar cases in future by plotting the ranges on a
time diagram....This I was anxious to try and also the Chetwynd compass.32
For bearings:
...we simply used a torpedo director, which had a telescope attached to it. They were
bearings not corrected by compass at all.
With only uncorrected bearings (relative to ship's-head) available, Wilson was probably
fortunate that, despite the flat calm, the almost parallel courses provided an excuse for not
attempting a virtual course plot. Since range-rate plotting was not used either, Vengeance
must have fallen back on the established method of getting a rate, by calculation from
timed ranges. Thus the trial with Ariadne was even more of a sham than has previously
been recognised.
Dreyer's main contribution was made in the experiments conducted by Wilson
in Vengeance between 17 and 21 January 1908. The aloft rangefmder was fitted with a
Chetwynd compass and what Wilson called Dreyer's 'push-pull training gear'. The
time-and-range plot was made on simple squared paper, but Wilson, like Pollen and
Dreyer before him, was concerned about curvature and insisted:
The object of this diagram was to give the rate of change when bearing is altering very
slowly...when the bearing is altering rapidly, the time diagram would give a very
erroneous forecast.
After the experiments, Wilson wrote a detailed report on his virtual course proposals, to
which Dreyer's 'Hints on Battle Firing' were appended. In both texts, the preferred
method for obtaining the rate from the time-and-range plot was not to draw a simple
meaning line; instead, the means of two successive groups of three ranges were to be
'° Dreyer before RCAI, T.173/547 Part 16, p.22.
3' Dreyer to Vice Admiral Sir Frederick Field, 12 November 1923 in DRYR 2/1. See also 'Some
comparisons between the Argo Clock and the Fire Control table in "Monarch" n.d. but late 1912,
T.173/91 Part VII and Technical Comparison, p.6.
32 Wilson, 'Rate Experiments' (op. cit.) pp.26-7.
Dreyer before RCAI (ibid.).
t LLW, p.130 for time-and-range plotting on 15 January.
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obtained graphically, after which the rate could be measured as the slope of the line
joining the two mean points. 35 The preoccupation with curving rate plots was still
apparent.36
Apart from the advice that:
Admiral of the Fleet Sir A. K. Wilson's report and recommendations...should be most
carefully studied.
in his 'Hints', Dreyer did not mention virtual course methods, but he took the range rate
ideas further. He recommended that, as in the previous year's rate instrument, the
plotting paper should be driven by clockwork. Also, he proposed a second plot on which
each mean range-rate (obtained from six ranges) should also be plotted against time; he
supposed that a changing rate would appear as a smooth curve.37
In later years, Dreyer made much of his third proposal, to set the Dumaresq by a
cross-cut (not a term then in use) of range-rate and deflection. 38
 However, he did not
suggest a time-and-bearing plot, but instead that a single bearing rate could be obtained
by calculation.
Take a series of bearings at intervals for a few seconds apart, noting the times, and after
a pause of about one minute, take another set of bearings and times.
Mean each of these sets...and take their difference.
Furthermore, the cross-cut idea is introduced almost as an aside.
The following method is one of many that can now be employed to keep the Dumaresq
properly adjusted.
Set own speed on the bar as usual.
Point the sighting vanes at the enemy...
Then pull out enemy's dummy ship until its stem is at the intersection of the line of...
deflection, and the line of the rate of change of the moment.39
Thus Dreyer placed much more emphasis on rates than Wilson, which was certainly in
accord with Bacon's recommendation to equip the Fleet with time-and-range boards as
the first step in the introduction of plotting (Chapter 3).
Wilson, 'Rate Experiments' pp.26 and 46. Dreyer, 'Hints on Battle Firing' p.52 in Fire Conhv4 1908 (op.
cit.); for Dreyer's authorship, see 'Remarks on Admiralty Counterstatement to Rear-&lmiral Dreyer's
Claim', n.d. but probably 1925, p.9 in DRYR 2/1.
The actual time-and-range plots made in Vengeanc€ on 17 January are in ADM 1/8010. There are
examples of slow and rapid change of rate, the 'means-of three' apparently lying close to the underlying
hyperbolic curve.
Dreyer, 'Hints' (op. cit.) pp.52-3
' For example, see Technical Comparison, p.10.
Dreyer, 'Hints', pp.50 and 53-4. Another means of keeping the Dumaresq adjusted was a cross-cut of
range rate and virtual course (speed not required). Dreyer later claimed that he had tried this in Vengeance
'Some comparisons...', 1912 (op. cit.) and Technical Comparison, p.6.
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While still aboard Vengeance, Frederic had written to his brother requesting help
with the mechanical details of a range-keeper working on the principle of virtual course;
...the reason why that arose in my mind was that I had Sir Arthur Wilson's instructions
to make virtual plots.40
John's sketches show what is in effect a mechanical realisation of Fig. 2.6, with a traveller
propelled at virtual speed by a long screw (Plate 32). This screw was driven by a variable
speed drive, for which John Dreyer proposed an arrangement of two cones, one driving
the other through a movable belt (Plate 33).41 Thus even this first Dreyer range-keeper
incorporated a variable speed drive, though of a type not found in other fire-control gear.
As discussed in XVffl-2, at this time Pollen and Isherwood did not consider
variable-speed drives suitable for range clocks; when, a month later, they patented a clock
also based on virtual course, a speed proportional to the length of a virtual-speed link was
generated using an entirely different principle, that of the inclined plane.42
In February 1908, Dreyer also corresponded with Elliott Brothers about his
proposal to modify the Dumaresq so that the rate could be kept (approximately) during a
turn.43
 At this early date, he was alone in showing a concern for rate keeping while the
firing ship manoeuvred (though his virtual-course range-keeper assumed steady courses).
Like Pollen, Dreyer was still a long way from realising his final system: but he had at least
initial conceptions for rate plotting, range-keeping and even rate-keeping under helm. It
must also have been clear to him that Wilson intended, by almost any means, to secure
the rejection of the A.C. gear. Thus early 1908, rather than in 1906 during his previous
service with Wi1son, seems much more likely as the moment when Dreyer first saw
clearly that he could be a rival to Pollen with a fire control system of his own.
In August 1908, he and his brother applied jointly for patents (which were sealed
as secret) for the three-operator range-finder mounting and for an improved Time and
Range apparatus. The latter confirms that Frederic had now accepted that a mean range
rate could be obtained by plotting a series of ranges against time and then measuring the
rate as the slope of the underlying curve. Thus the plotter was provided with a transparent
disc with engraved parallel lines, the disc being rotated until the lines were judged to be
4° Dreyer before RCAI, T. 173/547 Part 17, p.3.
John to Fred. Dreyer, 1 7 January 1908 with attached figures in T. 173/91 Part III.
42 Patent 2,497 applied for 4 February 1908 p.1 and Fig.6.
Elliott Sales Manager to Dreyer, 7 February 1908 with drawing E.S. 1165, 6 February 1908 in
T.173/91 Part HI.
' ILW,p.l21.
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parallel to the tangent to the mean range curve; this disc was the principal novelty in what
was later considered 'a very important patent'.45
 Although the patent itself has not come
to light, the device evidently resembled the 'Time and Range Table (as used in Excellent)'
which is illustrated in Hughes-Onslow's essay (Plate 34). This incorporated all of Dreyer's
ideas to date on rate plotting, including a motorised paper drive, the circular disc to
measure rate and plots of both range and range-rate. Three of the patented plotters were
made at Chatham in 1908 so, as in 1907, the resources of the dockyards and the
experimental section at Eccellent were used to try out ideas originating in the DNO's
department in the Admiralty.
In March 1908, Dreyer returned to normal duties with his reputation further
enhanced. In a letter tojulian Corbett, Fisher described him as having 'the brain of a
Newton!' although 'only 1 in a 100 could understand him'. 49
 Yet he recalled that his
situation was an awkward one: though he appears to have forgotten Bacon's insistence
that all ships should be equipped first with time-and-range boards.
The Admiralty in 1908 only accepted my "Time and Range" plotting for use as an
adjunct to "Virtual Course and Speed" plotting....Indeed, in 1908 and 1909, as an "ad
hoc" officer...in the Naval Ordnance Department...I felt constrained to do everything in
my power to develop and promote the official "Virtual Course and Speed" plouing.5°
In the Spring of 1908, he lectured to officers in training at Eccellent
...in language suited to our indifferent mental capacities, to explain to us benighted
"back-enders" the epoch making "Vengeance" method of fire control....in the heckling
which followed [Dreyer] refused to discuss Pollen's A.C.5'
This reception (which was reported to Pollen) 52
 seems to reflect the widespread hostility in
the Fleet to range-rate plotting. Pollen seized the moment when, in September 1908, he
circulated his pamphlet Reflections on an Error on the Day to a long list of naval officers. In the
later sections, he criticised, justifiably, the conduct of the Ariadne trials and argued at
The Tune and Range System, Report ofJ. Swuthunze, F.R..S., 5 March 1913, pp.3 and 8, AL (copies of this
report and related correspondence provided by Professor Sumida gratefully acknowledged). The patents
were 16,463 of 4 August and 16,912 of 11 August 1908, respectively.
'Fire Control, An Essay by Captain C. Hughes Onslow, RN', Section III, PLLN 1/5, CC. See also
'Notes re Admiralty Letter ...' 9 February 1916, p.! accompanying G K B Elphinstone to Director of Navy
Contracts, 14 February 1916 in 'Fire Control Apparatus, Various Patents', ADM 1/8464/181.
'Remarks by Commander F.C. Dreyer R.N. on the question of how best to obtain and maintain the gun
range in action', 22Ju1y 1910 in, T.173/91 Part III and ADM 1/8147.
During his absences, his work had been looked after by Lieutenant J C W Henley, seconded from
Excellent: Sea Heritage, p.58 and Henley before RCAI, T. 173/547 Part 3, p.66.
Fisher to Corbett, 10 March 1908 in IDXS', p.135.
° Dreyer to Field, 1923 (op. ciL).
IDN,p.l49.
Pollen before RCAI, T. 173/547 Part 14, p.65.
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length against manual methods. However, he began the pamphlet with an attack on range
rate plotting which, since it refers to a second curve of rate, was clearly aimed directly at
Dreyer's 'Hints'.53
That Autumn, Captain Constantine Hughes-Onslow wrote to Dreyer requesting
information on the latest fire control developments for his War College essay. Dreyer
replied directing him to 'the big Fire Control Pamphlet' but also expressing outrage at
Pollen's broadcast criticisms.
The latter has stirred up some agitators to believe his auto-system is best but a searching
analysis I think reveals that the simple kitchen table methods are better than the
complicated machinery game and produce the same results as the latter only does when
in adjustment.
Mr. P. has just issued a scurrilous pamphlet in which he has evidently been assisted by
some "failure".
his a great pity that trusting N.O's [naval officers] Jj go and discuss "Confidential"
matters with	 private man and tell him
	 Secrets.
It is hardly surprising that Dreyer was furious that Pollen was receiving confidential
information (including the Ere Con i-mi pamphlet) and using it to attack Service policy on
fire control, for which Dreyer was himself responsible within the NOD. However, his
arrogant language so offended Hughes-Onslow that the latter sought Pollen's
acquaintance, gave him Dreyer's letter55
 and, in his essay, described the A.C. system very
favourably. He also joined those prepared to pass confidential information to Pollen; the
surviving copy of his comprehensive essay on Service fire control developments is to be
found in the Pollen Papers.56
In his pamphlet, Pollen had also insisted that sights should be set automatically;
Dreyer's response was that:
We have tried [auto-sight setting] and now we are trying "follow-the-pointer" sights.
Alot of rubbish re auto-transmission to the sights is loosely talked of.57
" 
'Reflections on an Error of the Day', September 1908 in Jon Sumida (ed.) The Pollen Papers (London,
1984) p.1 80. For the list of recipients, see PP, pp.386-7; it included Wilson (but not Bacon or Dreyer).
' Dreyer to Hughes-Onslow 19 October 1908, typed transcript of what was probably a handwritten letter,
T.173/9l Part VII.
" JEWS', pp.151 and 178.
Hughes-Onslow, 'Ftre Control' (op. ciL) Appendix A. The Pollen Papers also contains the confidential
Handbookfor Fire Ornirol Instruments 1906.
PP, 'Reflections' (op. cit.) p.190. Dreyer to Hughes-Onslow, 1908 (op. cit.).
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The continuing failure of the Vyvyan-Newitt 58
 and Siemens automatic sights may well
have influenced Dreyer's preference for simple gear, particularly since the problems of
setting sights automatically are very similar to those of remotely controlling a plotter arm
from a rangeflnder. However, his remarks on plotting methods are more difficult to
explain.
Whether the plotting is "Virtual Course" or is "True Course of Enemy" is quite a small
issue and a matter of fancy waistcoats. The great thing is to use Range and Bearings. I
spent a lot of time trying to develop Range Plotting without bearings but happily
dropped it before the B.P. and told them all so.59
In the Autumn of 1908, without Chetwynd compasses, ships could only obtain compass
bearings with the Kelvin compass, which did not give good results for plotting purposes.
Dreyer had hoped that his scheme for plotting both ranges and range-rate against time
would avoid any need for bearing, though even he later described it as 'only an expedient
for the moment'. Unfortunately, &cellent found that the method of getting rates required
'a large number of ranges, which you were not likely to get when the guns were flring':6°
and, in any case, enemy speed and course could not be deduced from range-rate alone. It
seems that these objections, Pollen's attack and the widespread preference afloat for
course plotting together induced Dreyer to drop the more independent line which he had
taken in his 'Hints'.
The introduction to the 1909 Admiralty pamphlet on fire control emphasised
that plotting remained experimental, and warned that:
...the successful use of Plotting before fire is opened to set the Dumaresq correctly can
be greatly discounted by the enemy's Admiral altering course..."together" at the
moment that either side opens fire.
Nonetheless, much of the text was concerned with manual course plotting using the new
Admiraty-pattern plotter, including ingenious though impracticable manual methods for
plotting true courses while turning. It also described the new Dumaresq scales intended
for keeping the instrument set while altering course. 6 ' Dreyer certainly wrote the
introduction62
 and probably most of the rest of the pamphlet, and it appears that his
inventive energies were focused mainly on the new instruments and on methods for
" Commander Arthur Vyell Vyvyan also received a copy of Pollen's pamphlet.
Dreyer to Hughes-Onslow, 1908.
60 Dreyer before RCA!, T.173/547 Part 17, pp.18-9.
61 Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Information regardiizgFve Control, R eFindi.ng and Plotting, 1909 inJaOIO, AL
62 Dreyer to Field, 1923.
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dealing with course changes. Also, after the visit to the linotype works in July 1909,
Dreyer was very much in favour of Pollen's automatic instruments.
"The Apparatus consists of:- (a) An automatic plotting apparatus combined with a gyro
controlled...R.F. similar to that tried in 'Ariadne' but considerably improved. (b)...a
combined Range Clock and Transmitter....If this can be made to work satisfactorily it
should prove a very valuable piece of apparatus. (c) Range and Deflection Spotting
Correction transmitters....well worth a further trial now in view of the excellence of Mr.
Isherwood's electrical transmission gear....(d)...electncally controlling [sic] gun sight....
This idea has been tned...but is worth another trial."
Thus, given the widespread preference for course plotting and the high
expectations in the NOD of Pollen's new designs, Dreyer had neither the opportunity nor,
it seems, the inclination to revive rate plotting. Furthermore, he probably did not have the
time. Many important advances had been made in those other areas for which he was
responsible within the department (Chapter 3). He also claimed an important part in the
adoption of the 1 3.5-inch gun; however, this was probably an exaggeration and, indeed,
with such a heavy workload, Dreyer may have been relieved of responsibility for turret
mountings before he left the Admiralty (Appendix XX). Certainly, in September 1909, he
was able to design and take out secret patents on two new fire control instruments, of
which single examples were constructed by Elliott Brothers. The first appears to have
been some form of tactical plotter (XVIII-3), but its main interest is that, like the
Admiralty-pattern course plotter described in the 1909 pamphlet, it used a 'cone variable
speed apparatus'. The second described a 'form of range keeper'. 65
 When Dreyer visited
the Linotype works with Captain Craig on 12 July 1909, he discussed with Pollen his
suggestion for a 'hyperbolic clock' , which he was encouraged by the DNO to patent.
This device probably had a similar mechanism to that proposed by John Dreyer in early
1908 (XVIII-4), in which case its method of simulating virtual course was quite different
from the Argo Clock Mark I. Presumably, Dreyer was advised to seek patent protection in
case his own design should be developed subsequently. In the end, of course, neither the
Dreyer nor the Pollen virtual course clocks had any direct influence on later designs.
While, even in September 1909, Dreyer was still patenting devices based on
courses, Lieutenant Norman of Arrogant had made the next important advance by plotting
65 Extract from Dreyer's report read to RCAJ: T. 173/547 Part 17, p.60.
Sea Heritage, pp.59-60.
65 Elphinstone to Director of Navy Contracts, 18 March 1914 and 'Notes' 1916 (op. cit.) in 'Fire Control
Various Patents' (op. ciL). Swinbume, lime and Range, 1913 (op. cit.) pp.3-4 and 8.
Dreyer before RCAI, T.173/547 Part 17, pp.61, 64 and 108-110.
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bearings as well as ranges against time. On 11 June 1909, his report and the instruments
he used were forwarded to the Admiralty,67 while at some point he also went there to see
Dreyer. If their importance did not strike Dreyer immediately, by the time he left the
Admiralty to take up a sea-going appointment, he must have fully recovered his belief in
rate plotting.
VANGuARD AND m ORIGINAL T&iu
[In] November 1909 Commander Dreyer went to "Vanguard" as Executive Officer
and rigged up an "Embryo" Dreyer Table
Time and Range Plot
Time and Bearing Plot
Range Clock
Dumaresq fitted with 2 Cross Sliders, to enable "Cross Cut" of 2 rates to be used.69
This assembly of instruments (it was not yet an integrated table) was completed and tried
in the first half of 1910. By the beginning of July, the failure of the Argo true-course
plotter in the J'Tatal trials provided Dreyer with a particularly opportune moment to
propose an alternative based on rate plotting. His 'Remarks' of 22 July described the
Vanard system. Ranges were plotted on one of the three patented plotters made in 1908,
while a standard Admiralty-pattern course plotter was modified to plot bearings from the
Chetwynd compass against time. 7° The two 'cross-sliders' fitted to the Dumaresq were
celluloid strips at right angles, each with a centrally-inscribed black line. In good visibility:
The Range clock is kept set for "mean Rangefinder Range of the moment" as shown by
the Time and Range Instrument, and the rate as shown by a "Dumaresg" set by
guesswork is first put on. and later this is superseded by the Rate shown by the Range
and Time instrument.
However, Dreyer was equally concerned that his scheme should be able to deal as well as
possible with more difficult conditions.
The object of getting the "Dumaresg" set is to enable the Range Clock to be fed with
Rates during periods when Rangefinding is interrupted by smoke etc. but where
bearings...can be obtained.
...ALL systems of Plotting suffer from the defect that they rely on the enemy not altering
his course and speed during...periods of interrupted Rangefinding.
He announced that:
67 TechnithlCompañson, p.10.
Dreyer before RCAI, T. 173/547 Part 17. p.45.
Frederic Dreyer, 'Summary', n.d. but 1925, p.1 1 in DRYR 2/1.
° The range bar, fixed at right angles to the driving screw, was recalibrated in degrees.
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This system...is meeting with success in this ship, having been used to Ranges over
13,000 yards.
The Range clock is usually started with Rate and mean Range and the Deflection
passed to the Guns about 1 '/ minutes after the first Range is obtained.
With the advantage of practical experience with rate-plotting at sea, Dreyer was now in a
position to argue against its theoretical disadvantages.
...the general trend of thought afloat in connection with "Plotting" in the last two years
has been too much in the direction of magnifying the importance of small geometrical
deflciencies...instead of developing the most simple, practical and rapid system most
likely to stand the stress of action. Thus, until recently, the general opinion with regard
to the Time and Range system has been unduly biased against it by the fact that it often
describes a curve instead of a straight line; the fact that it most rapidly and simply
produces the mean Rangefinder Range of the moment...having been overlooked in
favour of this purely Academic point.
...the fact that the dots on the two time instruments [may] describe curves...does not
affect the accuracy...as the portions of the curves employed are small.
During the recent P.Z. [tactical exercise] when this ship was continually altering course,
a Time and Range instrument would have coped far more successfully with the
Range-keeping than any other Instrument now in existence.
However, Dreyer was evidently still concerned about clock errors resulting from the
transfer of rate from the Dumaresq to the clock only at intervals. His solution was to
obtain the clock-rate from an extra Dumaresq set each minute (by reference to the rate
from the bearing plot) to 'what the forecasted Bearing will be half-way through that
minute'.
Dreyer, once again the principal advocate of rate plotting, nonetheless
acknowledged that the Argo rangefinder mounting and transmission gear were the only
means available to make rate plots automatically; he proposed:
...that Mr. Pollen may be asked to fit a 9-ft. Barr and Stroud's Rangefinder with his
automatic Range Transmission, working a pencil to and fro on a Range bar...suitable
for being mounted by ship's artificers...in this ship. This action could be taken without
divulging to Mr. Pollen the nature of this instrument for which a secret patent is held...
Dreyer also recommended that:
As this system shows promise of being a very good one [and] and I was the first to
suggest this system which is clearly described at the foot of page 53 of the Pamphlet on
"FIRE CONTROL"...G.4023/08...7'
he should take out further secret patents covering the Time and Bearing Instrument and
the method of setting the Dumaresq. Perhaps this was a disinterested suggestion intended
to protect Service inventions: but, since the 1908 pamphlet did not mention a bearing
' Dreyer, 'Remarks', 1910 (op. ciL). The frequent underlining is typical of Dreyer's writings.
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plot, it looks more like a deliberate and successful ploy to appropriate Norman's
contribution to what, ever afterwards, were known as the Dreyer Tables.
On 13 August, Dreyer received a private letter (reproduced in Appendix XXI)
from Joseph Henley of the DNO's department. With the other private correspondence
between Dreyer and Henley, this letter demonstrates the close and friendly relationship
between the Service inventor and the officer now responsible to the DNO for fire control;
the contrast with Henley's suspicious attitude to Pollen is marked. 72
 Sumida has cited this
letter as evidence that Moore and others opposed automatic plotting, 'apparently
preferring manual methods'. 73
 The actual text shows that Henley (like Dreyer) was
prepared to make use of 'Mr. P's Auto Receiver' but that the redesigned Argo gear would
not be available for over a year. And, even if Moore questioned the practicability of
automatic rate plotting in the short-term, he was in no doubt that the idea needed
protecting. On the same day that Henley wrote to Dreyer, the DNO submitted:
...to direct Corn' Dreyer to take Out a Secret patent for the whole system of Time and
Range and Time and Bearing worked either automatically or manually....This action is
considered desirable to protect the Admiralty from any developments of Mr. Pollen or
others.74
In fact, Dreyer's next technical proposal was not the patent specification but
resulted from trials of secondary control, for which Vanguard had been selected. These had
been prompted by the provision of rangefinders in some turrets, which raised the
possibility that fire could be controlled by the officer-of-the-turret. The experiments were
conducted in August and culminated in a successful Special Battle Practice on the 3 1st,
during which, at ranges sometimes exceeding 7,500 yards, 10 hits were made from 39
rounds fired. On 5 September, Dreyer submitted his 'Remarks on Local Turret Control'
which recommended an installation comprising a 9-foot turret rangefinder in an
armoured hood, a turret Dumaresq and a local control instrument (Plate 35). For the first
time, he described a rate plotter which automatically recorded both rangeflnder and clock
ranges on the same chart. The device only had one differential gear (W) for correcting
ranges, so (as explained in XVffl-5) spotting corrections normally had to be set in two
steps, using I and then W. Nonetheless, Dreyer could claim that:
72 Henley to Dreyer, 13 August 1910 in DRYR 2/1.
" ILW,p.2l8.
DNO's Minute 13 August 1910 and Dreyer to Captain Eustace, Vanguard, 12 October 1910 in
'Invention of Rangefinding System' in ADM 1/8131.
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It is the only instrument yet designed which enables the Rangekeeper to be kept
instantly tuned up to the "mean Rangefinder Range and Rate of the moment" by
inspection and entirely without calculation.
In this first description, Dreyer even acknowledged that:
The advisability of fitting a red pencil to U to obtain a graphic record of the Gun
Ranges which might help in correcting the Rate was pointed out to me by
Rear-Admiral Peirse Inspector of Target Practice and flag Commander W.W. Fisher
when describing such a Time and Range fitting to them.75
However, when he resubmitted his proposal in October 1910, this frank admission had
already been suppressed, 76
 and it seems that he never mentioned it again. Like Norman's
bearing plot, this 'ingenious method of "feedback" correction' 77
 became yet one more
feature of the tables named after Frederic Dreyer.
While praising the local control trials conducted by Vanguard, Admiral May did
not support Dreyer's proposal for plotting instruments in turrets. 78
 Even so, Dreyer was
now able to use the local control instrument as the basis for a single instrument combining
the separate components of the Vanguard system on a single base-plate; his patent
application was submitted, as a Provisional Specification, on 23 September 1910. This
described two automatic piots, for ranges and bearings, placed side-by-side and sharing a
common paper drive with manual alternative. The bearing pointer (indicating on a sliding
scale) and pencil were mounted on a split nut engaging with the screw driven by the
bearing receiver motor. This allowed plotting to commence with the pencil near the
middle of the plot; thus the bearing plot could be made narrower. Bearings were to be
received either from a rangefmder or from 'an independent bearing apparatus'. The
instrument also incorporated a Dumaresq with celluloid 'cross-sliders'. The range part
was very similar to the local control instrument: including the clockwork drive to the
'gun-range indicator', for which the following advantages had been claimed.
The Rate of Change Clockwork can be direct and positive pinion drive as in the
combined dock and transmitter being made by Messrs. Elliott Bros. to the designs of
Captain Dreyer R.A. and myself, instead of by friction discs, cones and balls, as in other
clocks.80
' Dreyer, 'Local Control' (op. cit.).
16 
'Description' accompanying Dreyer to Eustace, 12 October 1910 (op. cit.).
IflTVS, p.220.
78 Admiral W H May to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 1 October 1910 in 'Local Control of Turret Guns'
(op. cit.).
Patent 22,140/1910, Provisional Specification 23 September 1910, Complete Specification 12 April
1911.CopiesinDRYR2/1 andRCAJ,T.173/91 Partill.
80 Dreyer, 'Local Control', p.21. Note XVIII-4 suggests that this drive was part of Dreyer's range keeper,
patented in 1909.
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It is apparent that Dreyer was still collaborating with his brother and, as in the previous
two years, working with Elliott Brothers to realise their ideas. However, this is the last
document in which John is given any credit for ideas adopted in Frederic's fire control
inventions.8t
When Jellicoe took command of the Atlantic fleet with his flag in Prince of Wales,
Dreyer, on 20 December 1910, became his flag Commander. Since 20 November,
Dreyer had been appointed temporarily to the Admiralty,82
 which gave him an
opportunity to work on the complete patent specification. On 14 December, he wrote to
Keith Elphinstone of Elliott Brothers about the 'rate of change clockwork':
...have you any objection to my using the sketch of this fitment which you are going to
send me shortly....the clockwork of the clock is after all the only part of this apparatus
which is yours and if you like I will have that out and put in a cone and roller...or a disc
and roller - any other sort of changeable speed gear in fact.83
Since clockwork normally drives directly at a single rate, it is difficult to imagine what
Elphinstone had in mind: but, whatever it was, the Complete Specification of 12 April
1911 described the gun range screw as being driven by a constant-speed electric motor
(the same which powered the plots) and 'a variable speed device [of unspecified type]
situated under the Dumaresq'. However, in the accompanying sketch (Plate 36), there
does not appear to be any space for such a device, while the remainder of the drive
mechanism looks very like that of the local control instrument. Firstly, it appears that, in
December, Elphinstone was still trying to devise a direct clockwork drive: but that, by
April, while this improbable idea had been abandoned in favour of some form of variable
speed drive, the details were then far from settled. Secondly, Dreyer's letter suggests that
he was largely unconcerned about which type of drive should be employed; since he was
at sea when the decision was made, the conventional disc-and-roller eventually used was
probably selected by Elphinstone alone.
Like the proposal for the local control instrument, the Complete Specification
describes only a single differential (now with a frictionally-coupled pointer 'which can be
re-zeroed at any time') for correcting the gun-range. As before, the gun-range screw and
pointer could be displaced laterally by an amount shown on the 'spotting scale'; thus
81 Frederic's son, Admiral Sir Desmond Dreyer, confirmed that the 'Dreyer Table. ..was developed by my
father vith considerable help from his brother...later Major GeneralJ. T. Dreyer': 'Early Development in
Naval Fire Control, The Xaval Review, July 1986, p.238. The present author is most grateful for advice on
this chapter from Commander Christopher Dreyer, the son ofJohn Dreyer.
82 Sea Heritage. pp.62-3.Jellicoe to Dreyer, 10 November 1910 in DRYR 3/1 and 3/2.
Quoted by Dreyer before RCAI, T. 173/547 Part 17, p.1 05.
THE DREYER TA1LES	 179
applying a simple spotting correction remained a two-stage operation. The Dumaresq
(apparently a modified Mark III) had a fixed bearing plate, while the fore-and-aft bar
(with the outer ring on which it was mounted) rotated. The clock-rate was determined by
the small pointer moving in the transverse slot cut in the bearing plate. Hence:
...the Rate need not be actually read off but can be set on the Gun Range Indicator [the
clock] by turning the [hand-wheel] so as to keep the pointer opposite to the bows of the
dummy enemy's ship.M
The essential features of this scheme had been put forward in October 1910 by GunnerJ
W Newland of Excellent as part of a proposal for a mechanical connection between a
Dumaresq Mark II and a Vickers clock. The DNO decided not to patent the idea, but
Dreyer might well have heard about it, or even read the papers, when attached to the
Admiralty in December.
This appointment also enabled him to learn about the Anschütz gyro compass
(Elliott Brothers were the British agents), which was about to undergo trials in his new
ship (as well as in Xeptune). On 2 December, Dreyer submitted a proposal for
...obtaining, transmitting and plotting...the bearings of an Enemy from an Anshutz [sic]
Gyro Compass Receiver Card mounted inside a Rangefinder mounting or on any other
suitable stand....
I described this fitting to Mr. Elphinstone of Messrs. Elliott Bros. when visiting their
works at Lewisham this afternoon with Lieutenant J.C.W. Henley to inspect the Gyro
Compass for the "Prince of Wales". Mr. Elphinstone informed me that he could easily
incorporate this in the set of Gyro Compass Gear now under manufacture.87
Dreyer's RCAI evidence confirmed that the transmission scheme (Plate 37 and XVIII-6)
was actually applied to the rangefinder mounting.° Then on 21 February 1911, Henley
wrote privately to Dreyer:
As the T&R & T&B will go to Prince of Wales I think it would be better to get a B&S
[Barr and Stroud] Transmission as we have already got the Bearing Trans. from the
Gyro Rec' [Receiver] .
At this time, Argo were still some months away from completing the prototype production
mounting and were still developing the step-by-step transmission scheme that would
eventually be used for the Argo plotters: and, in any case, it was not intended to supply
Patent 22,140/1910, complete specification (op. ciL) pp.6-7, 10 and diagram.
For correspondence, see 'Invention for a device for applying the Dumaresq to the Range Clock' in ADM
1/8131.
A E Fanning, &eady as She Goes (London, 1986) p.177.
Dreyer to DNO, 2 December 1910 in T. 173/91 Part III.
Dreyer before RCAI, T.173/547 Part 17, p.86.
HenleytoDreyer2l February 1911 inDRYR2/1.
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the Argo mounting to battleships earlier than I*eadnoughL 9° Thus, despite earlier
expectations, the ranges and bearings for this first Dreyer table were neither taken nor
transmitted with equipment from Pollen's company.
By 1 July 1911, Dreyer was able to advise Elphinstone that 'The Time and
Bearing Chrono' had arrived safely in Prince of Wales, although their correspondence
shows that the design of the range components of the table was still being finalised. Dreyer
also requested a 'Connection from Gyro compass to ship's head ring of Dumaresq'; as he
later insisted, this was the first mention of the feature that would make the Mark ifi Table
helm-free (though it remained dependent on the manual transfer of rates). Henley had
taken up the proposal by 4 July, but on the 10th, he informed Dreyer that, although
'Elphinstone...sees no difficulty...D.N.O. is rather opposed to making any further
alteration to your instrument.' Then on 19 July, Dreyer proposed another major
enhancement, the addition of a bearing clock though the mechanism he suggested, a
hand-worked variable-speed drive based on a simple cone-and-roller 'similar to the one
you fitted to the Ady. [Admiralty] Screw Bar plotting instrument', 92 was wholly unsuitable
for a rate which might be positive or negative. It is curious that this important proposal
was placed in evidence before the RCAI only as an extract from a letter to an unnamed
recipient: though 'you' was probably Elphinstone. 93 Thus the letter may have been a
private one containing some embarrassing remarks about the bearing clock already
proposed by Argo. In any case, for the time being Dreyer's impractical idea went no
further; on 24Ju1y, Henley reported only that:
Re: Gyro Connection for Dumaresg or Chrono
Elphinstone said that nearly all the parts of the present chrono are made and that if the
Gyro connection were fitted there would entail considerable delay. So D.N.O. decided
not to fit it...but concurs in the add" [addition] if any more instruments are ordered.
Elliotts were then able to complete the remaining components of the table, which was
installed in Prince of Wales on 30 September. After extended trials, and despite an
undistinguished placing in Battle Practice, 95 Captain Hopwood submitted a very
9° IWOfor Successor, May 1912, p.15.
91 Dreyer to Elphinstone, 1 July 1911, Elphinstone to Dreyer, 3 and 4 July and Henley to Dreyer, 10 July
1911 in T.l73/91 Part Ill. Dreyer 'Summary'.
92 
'Extract from Letter dated 19/7/11 from Corn. Dreyer' in T.173/91 Part III.
If it is assumed, as was probably the case, that Elliotts made the Admiralty course plotter.
Henley to Dreyer 24Ju1y 1911 in T.173/91 Part III.
9° Prince of Wales was a poor 7th out of 9 ships in the Battle Practice of the Atlantic fleet and 5th Cruiser
Squadron: Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Resides ofBattle Practice in Ths Majesv Fleet 1911, AL
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favourable report, which was fully endorsed by Jellicoe. The heavy underlining in the
Captain's letter suggests that the flag Commander had a hand in its drafting: but it also
quoted remarks 'included by the Inspector of Target Practice in his comments on the
"PRINCE OF WALES" Battle Practice carried out on 11 November'.
"Commander F.C. Dreyer's Fire Control Instrument appears to be of considerable
assistance in obtaining a correct Rate, and in maintaining the mean rangefinder range
until fire is opened. The Correct
	 . was obtained on ,kjl runs".
Hopwood's letter mentioned that, during Battle Practice, the lateral movement of the
gun-range screw had proved its usefulness when smoke interference forced a change from
the fore to the after rangefinder; '...the difference in adjustment between the two
rangefinders can be immediately absorbed without calculation'. Attention was also drawn
to '...the record of the instrument during the...firing...on 2 November 1911' which showed
'the success with which the Range was kept. ..during a 13 point alteration of own ship's
course'.97
In 1918, when Dreyer himself was DNO, a lavish Handbook on the Dreyer Tables
was produced; doubtless at his insistence, it included a photograph of what by then was
called the Original Table. The general layout and construction (Plate 38) was clearly the
same as that illustrated in the complete patent specification. The screws of both plotters
were driven by large receiver motors, permitting automatic plotting of ranges and
bearings transmitted from the Barr and Stroud rangefinder mounting. The Dumaresq was
now the latest model, the Mark VI, which probably explains why the rate could be kept
successfully even through large turns.99
 The Dumaresq had also been raised sufficiently to
accommodate the disc-and-roller variable speed drive: though nothing can be seen of the
clock mechanism, the tuning differential or the electric motor driving the clock disc and
the paper winding rollers.'°° Unexpectedly, the photograph shows clearly that the
gun-range screw was driven by a third receiver motor, apparently identical to those for
The ITP's emphasis suggests that there may have been systematic errors in the range.
Hopwood to VAC Atlantic Fleet, 20 November 1911 and VAC Atlantic Fleet to the Secretary,
Admiralty, 25 November 1911 in T. 173/91 Part III.
Handbook of Captain F.0 Drever's Fire Control Tables 1918, Plate 45, AL. Dreyer was DNO from 1 March
1917: Sea Heritage, p.234.
'The parts to complete the Dumaresq to Mark VI' were sent from Eiliotts before the end of October:
Elphinstone to Dreyer, 30 October 1911, T. 173/91 Part III.
°°tain Tower's evidence to the RCA! mentions the aijernative hand drive (Li 73/547 Part 11, p.22),
which suggests that, as in the complete patent specification and the Mark III table, the primary drive was
an electric motor.
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range and bearingi°' This feature is confirmed by a note (almost certainly by Dreyer) to
Hopwood's letter.
Although the instrument...worked excellently...it would be better...to have all future
instruments with direct mechanical drive for the range dock portion (instead of electric)
as originally designed by the Inventor. This appears likely to be more acceptable in the
Service, as Electrical gear is often looked on with suspidon.'°2
This might be seized on as an instance of naval prejudice against new technology: yet
Keith Elphinstone had already expressed exactly the same view.
Mechanical Devices usually have troubles you can see - Electrical Devices have the
same number of troubles which you can see [and] double the number...which you
cannot.
He also gave his reasons for initially adopting the indirect electric drive, in which the
clock roller must have driven a commutating transmitter switch:
...a mechanical drive is the thing to aim at, but it looked so awkward and cumbersome
on paper, and there seemed such a doubt as to whether the roller would really drive it
from a rotating disc including the Differential Gear and the Spotting Correction....Now
that one has seen the thing at work, I don't see the least difficulty in making the drive
mechanical...and this I propose to do in the new Drawings.'°5
Ti* MARJZ I B0A1W
Before describing these new table designs, it is necessary to mention a proposal
which Dreyer submitted formally through Jellicoe on 12 October. This described a 'Fire
Control Board' for use in less important ships, which, Dreyer proposed, should be
designated as Mark I to differentiate it from the 'Mark II' on trial in Pñnce of Wal€s
(Elphinstone later confirmed that the Original Table had been known for a time as Mark
I1) . 0
 Functionally, this 'board' (Plate 39) was very like the local control instrument from a
year earlier,'°5
 but with the addition of a Mark VI Dumaresq, modified as in the Original
Table. The range-rate pointer was coupled mechanically to a Vickers clock, on which the
range scale was replaced by a plain ring with an engraved arrow. By turning a handle to
follow the clock hand with the arrow, an operator also drove the screw of the range plot
through a tuning differential. The paper was moved by hand, while automatic plotting of
rangefinder ranges was proposed only as an option.'°6
 The surviving sources provide no
'° For Elliotts as the supplier of these motors, see XVIII-1 0.
'°2 Hopwood to VAC Atlantic (op. cit.).
'°3 Elphinstone to Dreyer, 11 October 1911 in T.173/91 Part III.
'°4 Elphinstone to Dof C, 1916 (op. cit.).
'°5 A drawing of the latter was attached to Dreyer's letter
'°6 Dreyer toJellicoe, 12 October 1911 with 'Description of the Apparatus' in T. 173/91 Part III.
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indications that any immediate action was taken on this proposal, probably because
priority was given to the new table for important ships; however, in the 'Mark I Board',
Dreyer had already laid down the principal features of the later Mark I Table.
DREYER TAiu MARK ifi
On 11 October, shortly after the delivery of the Original Table, Elphinstone
wrote to Dreyer:
I have already got instructions from the D.N.O.'s Office to prepare a specification and
Drawing..should another instrument be ordered as soon as a report comes in as regards
the first one.
I should be glad if you could criticise the Schedule sent as quickly as possible.
On the 30th, Elphinstone sent 'an amended specification...two copies of...a perspective
sketch I made and a couple of Schedules of the Parts'. In this letter, he also described his
only known visit to Argo's premises.
I was at York on Thursday - we sent up a Gyro Compass Receiver fitted with an
attachment to control the Azimuth position of an R.F. and from trials there it looks like
a successful application of the Gyro Compass Gear - I hope it will prove to be so in
practice at sea..'°7
This occasion, which was quite different from Henley's visit on 11 October to see the
Argo clock under construction, was clearly related to the co-operation between Argo and
Elliotts, the British agents for Anschütz, which was necessary to fit gyro-compass receivers
in the last 20 Argo rangefinder mountings. It is most unlikely that Argo would have shown
the new clock to their principal competitor in fire control, and, if they had, Elphinstone
would surely have at least mentioned it in his unofficial letter to Dreyer. Nor has any
other evidence been found that, at this time, Elphinstone was familiar with the
still-evolving design (let alone the drawings) of the Argo clock.'08
Elphinstone's sketch and schedule (both dated 28 October) were forwarded with
Captain Hopwood's letter to the Admiralty on 25 November. On 7 December, the DNO,
Captain Moore, added the following recommendation.
At a rough estimate the cost of the Argo Co's installation, i.e. rate plotter and dock will
not be less than £1,200 whereas the Dreyer instrument doing the same duties will cost
about £300.
It is considered most desirable that the "Orion" and "Lion" dasses should be provided
with these instruments at once. The "Orion" herself will be fitted with the Argo Co's
'°7 Elphinstone to Dreyer, 11 and 30 October 1911 in T.173/91 Part III.
'°°Compare these conclusions with ILWS, p.219 (quoted in Chapter 1).
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gear for trial so that it leaves five ships to be provided.
It is therefore submitted that Messrs. Elliott Bros. may be requested to tender for five of
the improved instruments....'09
In his specifications and schedules, Elphinstone called the new design the 'Seven Part
Recorder', to emphasise its modular construction. Different equipment schedules were
given for ships with and without either Argo rangefinder mountings or gyro-compasses
(XVIII-7). As may be seen from Plate 40, the general layout was very similar to the
Original Table; as previously, the gun-range screw could be shifted laterally by a rack,
though now the 'spotting correction' was set on the small circular scale 41. The
gyro-compass receiver 83A controlled the motor 83 which applied any change in course
to the Dumaresq's compass ring. The range clock was now coupled mechanically to the
gun-range screw through a tuning differential gearbox, while the new bearing clock was
connected (by means unspecified) to the Dumaresq. The bearing-rate scales were
arranged so that the rate from the bearing-plot could be easily set on the bearing clock.
Elphinstone did not mention the Dumaresq as an alternative source of bearing rate, and
the design had no means for converting speed-across in knots to bearing-rate in
degrees-per-minute.
The order for five improved tables was placed with Elliott Brothers on 27
February 1912; the actual price for each complete table was £635. "° In December 1911,
Jellicoe, on taking command of the Second Division of the Home fleet, had shifted his
flag to Hercules. Dreyer continued to serve as his Flag Commander and took the Original
Table with him;" it was probably still in that ship in February 1916, although, by 1918,
it had been replaced. 2
 Since he was at sea, Dreyer can have contributed little while
Elphinstone developed his ideas from the 'Seven Part Recorder' into a finished design.
Working drawings had been completed by May 1912," the first production model being
installed, probably in Monarch, before the end of the year; in February 1913, she was said
°9 Ellitt Bros. 'Seven Part Recorder' revised 28 October 1911 (with sketch): Jellicoe to Secretary,
Admiralty 25 November 1911 and DNO's Minute, 7 December 1911, all in T.173191 Part III.
"°Dreyer, 'Summary' p.13: 'Details of Clocks and Rate Plotters on order' attached to F W Black, 'ARGO
COMPANY, Present Situation' n.d. but probably December 1912 in Mountbatten Papers,
MB 1 /T22/ 174, University of Southampton.
lEW., pp. 220-1: Technical Comparison, pp.12 and 39.
" 2 'Ships in which Dreyer's Fire control is fitted or is being fitted' attached to 'Recommendations of the
Admiralty Members of the Ordnance Committee at a Meeting 10.2.16 concerning Dreyer's award',
DRYR 2/1. Here, the five ships which received the new table are listed under the heading 'Mark II', but
they are headed by Hercules, marked by an asterisk. By 1918, Hercules had a Mark I table: Handbook 1918,
(op. CU.) p.3.
"Dreyer, 'Summary' p.13.
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to have 'the most up-to-date set of this apparatus... afloat'. The remaining four units were
fitted in Lion, Princess Rqyal, Thunderer and (rather than in Conqueror as originally intended) in
ICing George V."4 By March 1914, the new design was known as the Mark III Table," 5
 and
it will be convenient to use this designation henceforward.
In December 1912, Dreyer was appointed to command the new cruiser Amphion,
but, while waiting for his ship to commission (in April 1913), he once again returned to
the Admiralty."6
 At this time, a number of reports were being produced to justify
Admiralty policy on the Pollen Aim Correction System. Dreyer collaborated with
Commander C V Usborne (the DNO's assistant responsible for fire control) on the
Technical Historj and Technical Comparison between the Dreyer and Argo systems: and himself
contributed a detailed description of the new instrument, which in turn quoted extensively
from its instruction pamphlet." 7
 As can be seen in Plates 41 and 42, Elphinsone had
rearranged the main components of the table; the Mark VI Dumaresq (modified as in the
Original Table), with the variable-speed drives of the range and bearing clocks beneath it,
was now placed between the two plots. Above the Dumaresq (XVIII-8), a fixed panel
carried, on its front, the speed indicator of the Forbes log and a gyro-compass receiver
rate 43). On the back, a 'relay device' controlled an electric motor which, through a
flexible drive shaft, rotated the fore-and-aft bar relative to the Dumaresq's compass ring
by an amount equal to the change in own ship's course." 8
 The relay was another example
of a 'bang-bang' servo and, in the form supplied by Elliotts with the Anschütz receiver,
the motor tended to hunt somewhat, probably by 1/40 or so." 9
 The resultant oscillations in
the indications of the Dumaresq were imperceptible except for the largest rates (XVffl-9):
but, even then, it should not have been difficult to judge the mean values when reading
the rates by eye.
Dreyer recommended that the Argo mounting 'should have a trainer's telescope
fitted to it to enable a separate trainer to be used' and he 'expected that the Training
" 4 Technical Comparison, pp.11,12 and 55.
'E1phinstone to DofC, 1914 (op. cit.).
116 Dreyer to DNO, 19 December 1912 in T.173/91 Part III. Sea Heritage, p.72. Dreyer toJellicoe, l4June
1913 in DRYR 4/3.
U7 Technical Comparison, p.39.
"8 T,4jnjl Comparison, pp.41-2, 46, 50 and Figs. V/1,3,6 and 7. Handbook 1918, pp.17, 49 and Plate 23. All
five ships with Dreyer Tables Mark III were early recipients of AnschUtz gyro-compasses: Fanning, Steady
As She Goes (op. cit.) p.178.
"9 Technical Comparison, Fig.V/9. 'Rate of Change of Bearing Instrument' appended to P M S Blackett,
'Naval Diary 1914-1918', transcribed by and courtesy of Dr NM Blackett.
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Number will get a far larger number of observations than the Range Taker will'. Thus the
pencils of the plots were controlled separately by the two rangefinder operators, so that all
ranges and bearings could be plotted automatically as they were received by the two large
receiver motors. Only the Argo mounting was mentioned as a source of bearings;
however, if ranges could not be obtained there, ranges from a turret rangefmder could be
plotted manually instead. Dreyer also suggested that:
It may be found possible to plot the ranges from more than one Range finder at one
and the same time
though clearly this was not yet an established method.'2°
In their part of the Pollen Aim Correction System report, the Contracts
Department insisted:
It is...only fair to the Service to state that not until the end of 1912 was automatic range
plotting made reliable (this was accomplished by Messrs. Elliott Bros.) and that even
now in 1913 Mr. Pollen has not yet succeeded in himself producing a reliable
instrument for automatic range plotting.'2'
On both the Original Table and the Mark ifi, automatic plotting (of bearings as well as
ranges) depended on the large step-by-step receiver motors developing sufficient torque to
drive the plotting screws and attachments. The diagram of electrical connections shows
that these motors were similar in operation to the R-type motor supplied by Elliotts with
gyro-compass installations (XVIII- 10), which in turn was a modified version of the
Anschütz design.1V Thus it appears that Elphinstone's firm adapted the gyro-compass
technology to create the large plotting motors, which, perhaps after some problems in
1912, proved more reliable than the clutch-based receivers used by Argo.
As previously, the rate on the range clock was set by following the Dumaresq
indications with the pointer in the transverse slot. The range clock drove the clock-range
screw through a differential; thus the clock-range, as indicated by the clock-range pointer
and pencil, could be corrected with the tuning handle. The Mark ifi also introduced a
second differential gearbox, positioned at the other end of the clock-range screw, with its
output shaft driving the gun-range indicator and transmitter. Hence, with the aid of its
dial and pointers, an operator could apply spotting corrections to the clock-range. The
'Tec1mical Companson, pp.42-4, 46-7 and Fig.V/9.
' 21 Pollen Aim Corrector Sysfrm. General Grounds of Admiralty Policy and Histoncal Record of Business Xegotiation,
February 1913, p.3. P.1024, AL
Technical Companson, Fig. V/9. Hugh Clausen, 'Notes on Step by Step Transmission System' (Evershed
and Vignolles Ltd. 1962), p.11, CLSN 1/7, CC.
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gun-range was then transmitted, in equal steps, to a manually-worked follow-the-pointer
transmitter with interchangeable cams; each cam converted the equal range steps received
from the table into the unequal steps in gun elevation appropriate to one nature of charge
(full, reduced, sub-calibre and aiming-rifle). The introduction of the spotting differential
meant that spotting corrections could be set without disturbing the plot of clock-ranges.
However, there was still a need to be able to adjust the clock-range pencil without altering
the gun-range: for example when switching from the Argo to a turret rangefinder. Instead
of shifting the whole screw bodily, the pointer and pencil were now mounted on a small
carriage which could be moved along the screw by means of a knurled head and dial.
The range-rate disc with parallel wires measured the slopes of the rangefmder
and clock range plots. Any divergence indicated how the Dumaresq range-rate should be
adjusted to improve the accuracy of the cross-cut.123
The rate of the bearing clock was set by hand using the knob and linear scale on
the front of the casing, the scale was calibrated between ± I 5°/min. The clock's output
shaft was coupled through a clutch to the compass ring of the Dumaresq (XIII-8); at any
time, the bearing clock could be disconnected and the predicted target bearing altered by
hand. Observed target compass bearings were transmitted, in 1/40 steps, to the bearing
plot. This could be narrower than the range plot,' 24
 since the bearing scale was engraved
on an endless loop, while the pointer and pencil (which were attached to a split nut) could
be given any starting position. Bearing-rate, in °/min., was measured with a second rate-
measuring disc with parallel wires. This disc was linked to a sliding pointer moving across
a set of curves, of constant speed-across, engraved on a drum (Plate 44); the drum was
rotated by a shaft connected to the clock range screw. The curves were constructed so
that, at all ranges, the drum pointer indicated the speed-across which corresponded to the
bearing-rate indicated by the scale of the bearing-rate disc. Thus a means was provided to
convert between and compare plotted bearing-rate and Dumaresq speed-across, without
calculation.125
' 23 Technical Comparison, pp.41-2, 45-6, 49 and Fig.V/l, 3, 5, 6 and 7.
124 15 compared with 36 inches: Technical Comparison, p.48.
Technical Comparison, pp.42, 44-5, 49-50 and Figs. v/i, 3, 7 and 8. Handbook 1918, p.18, Plates 6 and 23.
Admiralty, Technical History Section, The Technical History and Index, 'Fire Control in H.M. Ships',
December 1919, p.27, AL. For additional technical details of the Mark III and later Dreyer Tables, see





The methods of using the Mark III Table were set out in Dreyer's pamphlet. At
the start of an engagement:
Set the Dumaresq for guessed course and speed of Enemy and bearing of Enemy...as
ordered from aloft [and for own speed from the Forbes log].
Set (the fore-and-aft bar) to True Course of own Ship and clutch in the {gyro-compass
connection).
Turn the {rate handle) ...to keep {the range-rate pointer) opposite to (the enemy bow
pointer) (the Range Rates shown by the Dumaresq are thus put on the Range
Ciock)...'
Using the tuning handle, set the clock-range pencil to indicate the initial target range,
which may be an estimate ordered by the Control Officer aloft. Put on the Spotting
Differential the anticipated difference between True and Gun Range'. On the bearing
cicx±
...set the Bearing Rate for the range in use as deduced from the Dumaresq Deflection...
With both clocks now started and until fire is opened:
...turn the (tuning handle}...as necessary to keep (the clock-range pencil) by inspection
in agreement with the Mean Range Finder Range of the Moment as shown by the Range Dots.
likewise, if the target bearing indicated by the Dumaresq diverged from the mean plotted
bearing:
The movement due to (the bearing clock) can...be overcome and corrected...at any
time by manually turning the milled head [which also disengaged the bearing clock
from the compass ring].
If clock ranges or bearings diverged from the plotted mean values, the table operators
proposed a new value for range-rate or speed-across, also indicating whether the
recommendation was based on a good, fair or indifferent plot. However:
It should be ckary understood that the Range Keeper in the Control Poation in use zs the Master Rate
Operator and therefore no alterations to the Course and Speed of Enemy or any
Rate...can be made without his permission.
The Range Keeper could either order the recommended change or some other value
more in accord with his observations. If (say) the range-rate was altered, the new setting
would be used unchanged until the Range Keeper also ordered a new value for
speed-across; thus a new cross-cut was established (in effect, new settings of enemy course
and speed), after which the clocks were again set with the rates indicated by the
Dumaresq.'27
'	 {} brackets show where descriptions have been substituted for reference letters. The [J brackets, as




Once firing began, there was a danger that range tuning at the table might
conflict with the range changes ordered by the spotter. Thus every tuning alteration was
called up from the table to the Spotting Officer: who could, if he wished, cancel it by
ordering a spotting correction in the opposite sense. Similarly, he did not order a rate
spotting correction without reference to the officer in charge of the table.'28
Dreyer emphasised that:
The Fore and Aft Bar of the Dumaresq being kept Oriented in Space by the connection
to the Gyro Compass, ThE RANGE CAN BE KEPT WHILE OWN SHIP IS TURNING.
During the turn, the bearing clock kept the Dumaresq correctly set for inclination. As
Dreyer made clear, the bearing clock also kept the target bearing, should observations be
interrupted.
Whenever the enemy completely disappears i.e. the moment the bearing operator...ceases to
receive bearings, he reads off the Dumaresq deflection [the speed-across] and sets the
corresponding true Bearing Rate...on the bearing [clock's rate] scale....He must then
watch the Dumaresq for changes in deflection, so that the correspondingly altered
bearing rate may be set on the bearing [rate] scale. The instrument will thus be kept
correctly set for bearing of enemy, although the latter is not visible.
NOTE.—Any alteration in course or speed of enemy while out of sight, or any errors in
estimating enemy's course and speed, previous to his disappearing on a steady course,
will, of course, produce errors in the forecasted range or bearing, or both...
Dreyer also made a virtue of the 'non-positive' connections between the Dumaresq and
the clocks, since they allowed the two parts of the table to be set to different rates. He
did not discuss the possibility of errors arising from the manual transfer of range-rate,
probably because it was not of practical concern. With the rate lines on the Dumaresq
spaced at intervals of 100 yds/min., it would normally have been easy to follow the
changes of rate in steps of 25 yds/min; thus the range error due to stepwise transfer would
have increased by only 12¼ yds/min. (XVIII-1 1). Even when two 25-knot ships passed
beam-to-beam at 8,000 yards, the range-rate changed by 25 yds/min. in no less than 4.2
seconds, still time enough to follow the rate in 25 yds/min. steps. However, if the ship was
also altering course unfavourably, this interval could be reduced to 2.3 seconds (Appendix
" 'Home Fket General Order, 14. fire Conirol Organisation, 5 November 1913 (p.3) with Enclosure No. II,
'Instructions defining the latitude allowed to the transmitting station officer...' in DRAX 1/9, CC. See also
Dreyer, 'Remarks' (1910) pp.6-i.
TecJmical Comparison, pp.41 and 46-7. He even suggested that, by allowing the rate to lag somewhat, the
operator could correct for 'slip': 'Some comparisons made between the Argo Clock arid the Fire Control
table in "Monarch" ',T. 173/91 Part VII; the style and content, and wording cm places almost identical
with Dreyer's technical description), indicate that this was written by Dreyer, probably in late 1912.
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III); this might demand steps of 50 yds/min. but, even so, the total error accumulating
during a turn of two minutes would not much exceed 50 yards.'3°
Setting the bearing-clock for rate was not so easy. Firstly, the speed-across had to
be read from the Dumaresq by eye alone. Secondly, the pointer linked to the bearing-rate
disc had to be positioned against the drum so that it indicated the same speed-across.
Thirdly, the corresponding bearing-rate was read from the scale on the disc and set on the
rate scale of the bearing clock. It might be supposed that the only practicable method was
to alter the dock-rate in steps only when the Dumaresq pointer crossed either a
speed-across line or a mid-point between these lines i.e. each time the speed-across
changed by 2 knots. There was time enough for this when courses were steady; at worst,
when two 25-knot ships were on opposite courses, the speed-across never changed by 2
knots in less than 29 seconds (XVIII-1 1). Even so, as with range-rate, a stepwise transfer
of bearing-rate must have resulted in the clock-bearing lagging the true bearing: although
this bearing lag only 'fed-through' to produce a range-rate error if the speed-across was
high (XVIII-12). In February 1913, a Mark ifi Table was set up in Elliott Brothers'
Westminster office to simulate the case of two ships on opposite courses. The first test
represented two 15-knot ships passing beam-to-beam at 7,000 yards; the target was
assumed to become invisible when the range was still 12,000 yards, after which, for almost
10 minutes, the table kept the range and bearing without operator intervention until the
time of passing beam-to-beam. Yet the range error was then only 70 yards, 3 ' less than the
predicted error from range-rate steps of 25 yards. This suggests that skilled operators,
albeit in ideal surroundings, could transfer both range and bearing rates in very small
steps, in effect, almost continuously.
Despite this impressive performance, it must still be doubted whether at sea, and
especially in battle, bearings could be kept so accurately. The bearing clock was,
nonetheless, a useful feature. While the target was visible, it provided a check on the
deflection component of the cross-cut: while any errors in clock-bearing were readily
correctable from observations.
°When own ship alters course, range is no longer a hyperbolic function of time. However, Appendix
XXI! shows that the same simple approximate relationship between error-rate and rate step size can still be
used, though in extreme conditions the approximation is less exact.
Technical Compariwn, p.61 and Figs.!! and 12. The test was repeated for two 30-knot ships. Until just
before the passing point, the table kept the range as accurately as before, but the range error then increased
to 140 yards in only one minute. However, the bearing rate was then 16.6 °/min. which exceeded the
maximum rate of the bearing clock.
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...it will be necessary from time to time to unclutch the automatic drive and correct the
position of the compass ring. The need for this will be indicated by noticing whether the
bearing of the enemy as shown on the Dumaresq corresponds to the observed bearing
recorded by...the bearing plot.'32
If the target became obscured, firing ceased (blind firing was not possible before the
introduction of the GDT gear). Even so, provided 'the enemy is obliging enough not to
alter course or speed while out of sight',' 33
 the bearing clock could keep the bearing, at
least approximately, even if own ship changed course.' 34
 Thus, when the target
reappeared, the range and rate might not be exact, but they would be near enough to
correct by spotting the first few salvoes.
DREYER Tu M II
As the deliveries of the Mark III tables were commencing:
it became necessary to decide without awaiting the trials in "Orion" what form of
control instrument should be fitted in "King George" class. It was decided to order for
these ships sets consisting of a Pollen dock and a Dreyer Time and Range table. It was
also considered that a Time and Bearing table would not be necessary with the clock
As a result of [the Orion] trials, the clock was favourably reported on but it was shown
necessary to use a Time and Bearing as well as a Time and Range table with it and it
was decided that these should be of the Commander Dreyer type and manufactured by
Elliott Bros.
The Pollen Time and Range and Time and Bearing tables [sic] were not satisfactory...
and, in any case, Pollen's price, even for a time-and-range plotter, had been
uncompetitive. In February 1913, it had already been 'decided to make in Portsmouth
Dockyard the necessary apparatus for connecting [Dreyer's plotting] gear to the Argo
range-finder mountings and clock', and that the Argo clocks would be supplied to Ajax,
Centurion and Audacious (Kzng George V class), Conqueror (Orion class) and Qjieen May.' 35 When
the Dreyer Table Handbook was published in 1918, the combination of Argo clock with
Dreyer rate plotters had been designated the Dreyer Table Mark 11,136 in which: 'the
clock range screw is run by an electric motor controlled by a commutator from clock
range in argo [sic] clock'.' 37
 Unfortunately, apart from an indication that, by early 1914,
'32 Handbook 1918, p.49.
'"Dreyer, 'Some comparisons...' (op. ciL).
'	 large change in bearing-rate induced by a change of own course might force bearing-rate steps of 4
rather than 2 knots: XVIII-11.
"TecJznica1 Companson, p.1 1-12: Record ofBuszness (op. cit.) p.15.
'In 'Ships...Dreyer's fire control...fitted' (1916), the tables with Argo clocks are called Mark 111*. By 1918,
this number had been adopted for a more modem table.
' 31 Handbook 1918, p.15.
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Qyeen Marj was already fitted with standard Elliott-type cam-operated transmitters,' 38 no
further details of the Mark II Table have been found. However, a reasonable conjecture
XV1II-l3) is that the peculiar arrangements for setting spotting corrections and
transmitting gun ranges, which are described in the contemporaneous handbook for the
Argo Clock Mark IV, were replaced by something very like the clock-range plot and
spotting differential of the Dreyer Table Mark ifi.
RANGEF1NDER CONTROL
The ships of the Orion and King George V classes were formed into the Second
Battle Squadron (2BS).' 39
 All these latest battleships were equipped with rate plotters
coupled to either Dreyer or Argo clocks, and, as described in Chapter 3, with multiple
rangefinders. As might be expected, the new system of 'rangefinder control.. .has been
very largely introduced and developed in the 2nd Battle Squadron' which had 'many
more rangefinders than any other'.' 4° The system was promulgated to the Home Fleet in a
General Order from Admiral Callaghan dated 5 November 1913 as 'a method considered
to promise very well', especially though not exclusively for the latest ships.
The readings from as many R.F.s as possible are plotted on moving paper on the
Dreyer table, the Argo R.F. being plotted automatically, and the others by hand. If the
R.F.s are well together, it has been found that there should be a zone of dots proceeding
across the paper, their direction depending on the rate of increase or decrease of the
range, and it is then easy to determine by inspection the mean of these ranges.
...alteration of course and speed of the enemy is quickly made apparent in the different
aspect of the R.F. plots, from which the clock range can be corrected, the correction of the
rate being ofsecondarj importance so long as the range is maintained and hittuzg continued.
It was also claimed that the method reduced the dependence on spotting and that after
'straddling, and not being entirely dependent on rate, the maximum rate of fire may be
developed'. However, these benefits depended on a constant stream of accurate ranges,
which were unlikely to be obtained except:
...under favourable conditions of weather and visibility at ranges below 10,000 yards
[when] the rangefinders are well together. These conditions however can rarel)! be those
of action as, when the visibility is good, fire will probably be opened at much greater
ranges.
E1phinstone, 'Notes' 1916.
Oscar Parkes, Bntish Battleships (London, reprinted 1990) pp.521, 528 and 538: 'Practices of Ships fitted
with Director firing', 15 May 1914 in 'Important Questions dealt with by DNO. Copies, precis, &c. Vol.
III, 1914', AL Sea Heiitage, pp.74-5.
°C.-in-C. Home Fleet G.0360/ 14, 'Practices of Ships fitted with Director Firing', 15 May 1914 and
"Colossus" Report on Rangefinders', 20 May 1914 in IQ/DNO, Vol.111, 1914 (op. ciL).
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Ships adopting R.F. control were warned that they 'must be prepared.. .to revert to the
alternative system i.e. maintaining the Range by means of the Rate'.14'
Rangefinder control was more suited to peacetime practice ranges than the
much greater ranges experienced during the War.
The method...appears most suitable when concentration renders spotting unreliable, or
frequent alterations of course and speed of the enemy makes rate-keeping very hard.
But it should be avoided at very long range, and cannot be used unless the conditions
admit of good range-taking.'42
Nonetheless, it firmly established the advantages of being able to plot as many ranges as
possible from all the rangefinders that could range on the target. Thus, during 1913, there
had been an important change of emphasis, from the automatic plotting of the ranges
from one rangefinder to the need (by whatever means) to plot ranges from a number of
rangefinders at once. In fact, this had already been anticipated by Dreyer in February
1913; for any future supply of Dreyer tables, he expected that:
The Time and Range plot will have arrangements provided to enable the results of
several Range Finders to be plotted.'43
However, he can have had little opportunity to influence subsequent developments once
Amp/zion commissioned on 2 April. By June (in the month when he was promoted to
Captain) his ship came, and remained, top in the Gunlayer's Test and, subsequently, she
was first in her category at Battle Practice. Further advancement soon followed, when, on
27 October, he was appointed Flag Captain to Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot
second-in-conunand of the 2BS;' thus he arrived too late to have had any influence on
the Home Fleet Orde,- of 5 November. His new ship was the Orion; the Navy, while watching
the rapid rise ofJellicoe's protégé, must have derived no little amusement from Dreyer's
appointment to the only ship with a TS entirely equipped by the Argo Company.'45
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Just before he formally assumed command of Amp/zion, Dreyer submitted to the
DNO 'some diagrammatic sketches and a description of some additions which if made to
' 41 Home 17€4 Fire Control, 1913 (op. ciL) p.3 arid Enclosure No. I, 'Remarks on Rangefinder Control'.
' 42 Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Manual of Gunnery (V0LIII)for His Majesty 's Fleet, 1915, pp.17-8, AL.
' 43 Addendum (February 1913) in Tec/znizal Compaiison, pp. 47-8.
Sea Heritage, pp.72-5. Dreyer toJellicoe, l4June 1913 in DRYR 4/3.
' Orion does not appear in the list of 10 February 1916 in the Dreyer Papers, which suggests that it still
relied on the Argo rate plotter. The Handbook 1918 lists Orirn as having a Dreyer Table Mark II;
presumably by then it had been given Dreyer-type range and bearing plots
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my fire control apparatus would make it more automatic than at present' (Plate 45). He
proposed that changes in the Dumaresq range-rate and speed-across should be detected
and transmitted by commutator switches to step-by-step receiver motors. The range-rate
motor was to set the rate of the range-clock directly. The speed-across motor drove the
cone of a cone-and-roller variable speed drive. The roller was somehow positioned by the
range-clock, while its shaft set the rate of the bearing clock by means of a third
commutator and motor.' His scheme resembled the Argo Clock Mark Ill in using two
coupled variable-speed drives to generate bearings, but, by retaining the clock set for
bearing-rate (and, probably, in also striving to avoid infringing the Argo patent), Dreyer
rearranged the elements into a mathematical nonsense (XVffl-14). It must be doubted,
therefore, whether he understood properly how the Argo design worked.
Although the automatic design as finally adopted was entirely different, this
proposal did introduce the principle that the Dumaresq rates could be transferred to the
clocks electrically. However, it is unlikely that any step-by-step motor could have
generated sufficient torque to move the rollers of the range and bearing clocks. Dreyer
himself apparently recognised none of these problems and, in February 1913, declared
that, for future supplies of the tables:
...the following additional parts have been designed and will probably be included.
...Automatic attachments, which...will automatically keep the Dumaresq adjusted for
the Bearing of the Enemy, and also automatically keep the pointer of the roller of the
Range Clock in line with the bows of the enemy ship...
His list of new parts (Xffl-15) ended with the arrangements 'to enable the results of
several Range Finders to be plotted'.' 47
 In reality, it is unlikely that the design of any of
these additions had yet been taken in hand by Elliott Brothers. With the supply for the
Jfuzg Gorge V class and Qyeen May already settled, no more tables were now required until
the completion of the Iron Duke class and 7ger in 1914. Thus priority could be given to the
provision of local control tables for use in turrets. The question had been raised in May
1912 and, in August, Dreyer was instructed to work with Elliott Brothers on a suitable
design.' A prototype was being made at the end of 1912 and, by March 1914, was
installed in a turret of Qyeen Maiy. By that time, the first Mark IV Table, for Iron Duke, was
Dreyer to DNO, 19 December 1912 in T.173/91 Part III.
' 47 Techni€al Comparison, pp. 47-8.
'DNO and ITP, 'Local Control in Turrets', 24 May 1912 and Secretary of the Admiralty to C.-in-C.
Home fleets etc. 7 August 1912 in IQ/DNO, Vol.1, 1912, pp.248-255. See also DNO's minutes of 3OJuly
and 3 August 1914 in IQ/DNO, Vol. III, 1914.
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already under construction, though a letter from Keith Elphinstone dated 14 March gives
the impression that many details remained undecided.' 49 Nonetheless, by 6 July, the new
table had been tested by the DNO's representative and it was decided to order four more
sets; it was expected that the prototype would be placed on board Iron Duke in
mid-August:' 5° though this was no doubt delayed by the flagship's departure for Scapa
Flow. The next three Mark IV tables were fitted in 7ger, Benbow and Emperor of India, all
completed in October and November. The fourth ship of the Iron Duke class, Marlborough,
was completed in June 1914 and never did receive a Mark IV table; the final unit was
supplied instead to Qjteen ElLabeth (commissioned in December, l914).''
The first Mark IV* was already aboard Warspite when she ran her gun trials in
April 1915:152 and thereafter until after the completion of Courageous and Glorious in
January 1917, this was the standard model. The only major difference between the two
marks was in the width of their range plots. As delivered, the Mark IV plotted ranges from
2,000 to 17,000 yards, whereas the maximum range for the Mark IV* was 20,000
yards.'53
 The well-illustrated 1918 Handbook has been used by several authors as the
principal source for design detai1s.' However, it was not promulgated until June 1918,
and incorporates many later improvements. Fortunately, the cyclostyled handbook
delivered in May 1916 with Royal Oak's Mark IV* table survives in the E.celknt Historical
Library; its text and illustrations were in turn based on material first prepared for the
Mark IV Tables) 55
 The following account attempts to deduce from these and the few
other available sources the main features of the automatic Dreyer tables as used at
Jutland, before describing the more important subsequent developments.
49 Technical Comparison, p.47 (1912 Addendum): DofC to Elphinstone, 10 March and Elphinstone to Dof C,
14 March 1914, sheet 3 in 'Fire Control Various Patents'.
°'Dreyer's Fire Control Apparatus', 6 July and "Iron Duke" Gunnery and Torpedo Exercise
Programme' 1 iJuly 1914 in IQ/DNO, Vol.111, 1914, pp.617 and 587.
'' Parkes, Bniish Battleships (op. cit.) pp.545, 551 and 577 for completion dates. 'Ships...Dreyer's Fire
ControL..fitted' (1916). Handbook 1918, p.3.
'"'Report on WaipiJe's Gun Trials', 15 April 1915 in Ships' Cover 294A/58a, Qieen Elizabeth Class,
NMM.
3 Handbook 1918, pp.3 and 22 (the range scale was 400 yards per inch and the speed of paper 2 inches per
minute.) Technical Histoiy, p.27. 'Ships...Dreyer's Fire Control...fitted' (1916). The Handbook 1918 also list
Lion and Princess Royal as having Mark W* Tables; the dates when their Mark Ills were replaced are not
known but were probably in 1917: see XVffl-18.
LL)1V3', pp.218-220 and Plates 7 and 8. Peter Padlield, Guns at Sea (London, 1974) pp.224-7 and 231. Guy
Hartcup, The War ofli'wention (London, 1988) pp.12-3. Schleihauf 'Dumaresq and Dreyer'.
'"Elliott Brothers, London, 'Captain F C Dreyer's Fire Control Apparatus Mark W*. As fitted in HMS
Royal Oak', May 1916, ExceLlent Historical Library. Many of the figures are captioned 'Captain Dreyer's




As originally fitted, the bearing plots of the Mark IV and IV* tables were similar
to those already described for the Mark III (the design shown in the 1918 Handbook was
introduced much later). A second graduated drum was added to convert the bearing-rate
into the component of the Gun Deflection due to speed-across.' 56 The principal change
was in the source of bearings. Beginning with the Iron Duke class and 7ger, all heavy ships
were provided with a squat, armoured Gun Control Tower (GCT) protruding above the
Conning Tower. In the 13.5-inch ships, a revolving armoured hood covered the 9-foot
rangefinder on an Argo mounting. In contrast, all 15-inch ships were completed with a
much 'larger armoured hood accommodating both a director sight and a 15-foot
rangefinder on a Barr and Stroud mounting.' 57 In Iron Duke and later ships, the tables
received target bearings not from the rangefinder but from a special Dumaresq, the Mark
VII*, of which two were installed, one on each side of the GCT (except, it seems, in Tge-).
By 1915, each Dumaresq had been coupled to an Evershed binocular holder; thus the
same sighting device was used both as a target indicator and source of bearings. These
were transmitted by a commutator in the Dumaresq, as bearings relative to ship's head, to
a large step-by-step receiver motor in the Dreyer Table. This motor was coupled to a
differential, the other side of which was connected to the motor relay controlled by the
gyro compass; thus the differential output gave the target compass bearing and could
rotate the screw positioning the pencil of the bearing plot.
Like the Argo mounting, the Mark VIT* Dumaresq transmitted bearings in
relatively coarse steps of 1/40t However, the hunting associated with the relay supplied
with the Anschütz gyro compass appears to have had a more serious impact; Midshipman
Patrick Blackett of Barham found that:
ibüL pp.14-5, 44-9 and Figs. XII and XIII.
'57John Brooks, 'The Mast and Funnel Question' in John Roberts (ed.) Warship 1995.(London, 1995)
pp.50-i. Admiralty to C.-in-C. Home Eleets and Admiral Superintendent, Portsmouth, both 21 October
1913 in Ships' Cover 268A/8, Iron Duke Class, NMM.
'Warspite's Gun Trials' (op. cit.). Elphinstone, 'Dumaresq Instruments Designs & Patents. Notes as to
History', 31 January 1916 in ADM 1/8464/181. Dreyer (who was Captain of Iron Duke) described the
binoculars to the RCAI: T.173/547 Part 17, p.31. 'Dreyer's Apparatus Mark IV*' 1916 (op. cit.), pp. 44-46,
50A-5 1A and Figs. XIII and XIX dated December 1914; despite the date of the figures, liger at Jutland,
'not having the Mark VII [sic] Dumaresq', could not make bearing plots of any value: Gunnery Report, 30
October 1916 in 'Jutland Despatches', ADM 116/1487. For the Dumaresq in Valiant's GCT, see Peter
lAddie, The Saikir's War 1914-1918 (Poole, 1985) p.108.
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The chief disadvantage...lies in the fact that the gear actually operating the bearing plot
is large and heavy - necessitating a powerftil "relay-system" from the Gyro[-receiver] to
eliminate yaw...."hunting" takes place, which tends to render a plot of little value.'59
By 1916, existing Anschütz installations were being replaced,' 6° while Elphinstone was
referring to a new form of relay control switch which 'has the advantage of working with
extreme accuracy'. This switch, which was incorporated in a mechanical differential, is
the only one described in the surviving handbooks;' 6 ' it appears that, when the Sperry
receivers were first introduced, the opportunity was taken to develop a new design with
much less tendency to hunt. However, it is likely that a number of ships, Barham included,
fought atJutland with the older type of compass and relay.'62
Before the battle, some ships may have taken up a suggestion by Qyeen E1iabeth
to increase the movement of the bearing pencil for each degree change in bearing; this
had been prompted by 'the small bearing rates involved by the increase of range at which
actions are likely to be fought'.'63
RANGE PLOTS
In March 1914., it was intended that the Mark IV Table should plot the ranges
from several rangefmders using a pneumatic device invented by Lieutenant Macnamara;
Elphinstone was then working on a scheme to prevent the 'recording points' from
jamming should two records be made simultaneously at the same position.' The whole
device must have been very complex,' 65
 and, in May 1914, the prototype was ordered of a
much simpler, keyboard-operatçd device designed by Commander J Brownrigg. On 6
July, it had been decided to inform Elliotts that no order would be placed for the
' 59 Blackett, 'Rate of Change of Bearing Instrument' (op. cit.). Barham had a Mark fl/* table. For the
proposed instrument, see John Brooks, 'Midshipman Blackett arid the Secret Gadget', Centenary
Conference, 'Patrick Blackett: Lord, Professor and Lieutenant, Royal Navy', Cambridge, 24 September
1998.
°Farining, S€ady As She Goes, p.1 95. Technieal Histoiy, p20.
161 Elphinstone, 'Notes', 1916, p.7 cites 'Dreyer's Apparatus Mark IV*' 1916, Fig.XVII. Handbook 1918,
p.64 and Plate 28.
162 October 1916, Barham had a Sperry gyro compass: Fanning, Steady As She Goes, p.196. Blackett's diary
(op. Cu.) does not mention the change, but there was ample opportunity during the ship's repair at
Devonport afterJutland: entries for SJune and 3July 1916.
'63 TechnicalHistoiy,1919, p.27.
'64 Elphinstone to Dof C, 1914, sheet 6.
'65 Compare with the equivalent unit described in Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Handbookfor Admiralty Fire
Control Tabl€Markl, September 1927, pp.67-76 and plate 7, ADM 186/273-4.
Tim DiYEi. Tis	 198
Macnamara plotter' and, on 7 August (alier favourable reports had been obtained
verbally), that 9 more Brownrigg keyboards should be ordered immediately.
At present the plotting tables in H.M. Ships are provided with no means of plotting a
number of rangefinders and the need for some such instrument is urgently required.'67
Subsequently, the Brownrigg device became the standard fitting until afterJutland. It had
four rows of ten keys, each key representing a step in range of 50 yards. The range-bar
was notched so that the carriage for the keys could be located quickly and accurately in
1000 yard increments. Once positioned, the keys could be used to perforate the paper for
ranges from 1000 yards below the nominal position to 950 yards above it. In 15-inch
ships, the Brownrigg keyboard was the only means of plotting the ranges displayed on the
Barr and Stroud range receivers. Furthermore, drawings dating from 1914 suggest that
the other Mark N tables were not equipped for automatic plotting of the Argo ranges ;168
thus, in the Dreyer Tables, automatic range plotting remained a feature only of the early
Tables Mark II and ifi (XVIII-16).
By early 1915, the Battles of the Falkland Islands and the Dogger Bank had
shown that, in good visibility, firing could commence at the limits of the gun range. In
August, it was decided to fit the range scales of the Mark IV Table with sliding numeral
strips so that, through small windows cut in the scales, they could be read either from
2,000 to 17,000 yards or from 1 0,OQO to 25,000 yards. This required the fitting of a
'pedalling clutch' by which the clock-range pencil could be shifted by 8,000 yards without
changing the gun-range. Similar modifications extended the maximum ranges of the
Marks Ill and IV* to 24,400 yards and 28,000 yards respectively.'69
Ti-us Eiciiuc DIJMARESQ AND CLOCKS
Other than the principle of electrical transfer of rates, Elphinstone's design for
the Electrical Dumaresq and clocks for the Mark N Table owed nothing to Dreyer's
erroneous proposal of December 1912. On the Dumaresq (which was entirely redesigned)
6 'Dreyer Fire Control Apparatus', 6July 1914 in IQ/DNO, Vol.111 1914, p.617	 -
'67 'Tender for Brownrigg Plotters', 7 August 1914 in IQ/DNO, Vol.1111914, p.433. The quantity ordered
was insufficient for the existing 5 Mark II and 5 Mark Ill tables as well as the 4 remaining Mark IVs, but,
in view of the urgency expressed, all were probably fitted eventually.
' 'Dreyer's Apparatus Mark IV*' 1916, p.33 and Figs. I and V. The turret table appears to have been the
first to plot by perforating the paper from below Elphinstone to DofC, 1914, p.3; Handbook 1918, pp.81-2
and Plates 36-7.
' Technical Histoy, 1919, p.27, though this states that the Mark IV's maximum range was 27,000 yards.
The ranges quoted are from the Handbook 1918, pp.17 and 22. Neither source mentions a similar
modification to the Mark 11 tables.
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the enemy bow pointer was replaced by a downward-extending 'contact stem' pressing
upon a circular 'contact plate' (Plate 46). The contacts determined the energising of relays
which controlled a pair of 20-volt motors; their joint action enabled the contact plate to
follow automatically any change in the position of the contact stem (Plate 47); this plate
soon became known as the 'poached egg...which insists on impaling itself on the fork'.'7°
Two pairs of brackets, protruding through slots in the Dumaresq's fixed dial, positioned
the contact plate. One pair was coupled directly to the roller of the range-clock, while the
second pair was linked to the change-of-bearing (C. B.) gear which positioned the roller of
the bearing-clock; thus Elphinstone had devised a novel, dual-axis 'hunter' which enabled
the rates of both clocks to follow the indications of the Dumaresq automatically.'7'
As in the Mark HI, the clocks were of the conventional disc-and-roller pattern,
the cast-iron discs being driven by the main speed-regulated motor (Plate 48). There were
substantial mechanical loads connected to both clock roller shafts: but, since the 20V
motors could supply ample torque to move the rollers against friction with the disc, the
assembly force could be made large enough to minimise slippage. In 1918, the standard
test for the Tables Mark IV and IV* was to simulate two 28-knot ships on opposite
courses passing each other at a minimum range of 7,000 yards; it was expected that, after
a 12-minute run, the range would return to its initial starting value (13,200 yards) without
an appreciable error in range or bearing. Since this test produced a large change of
range-rate, it would have resulted in a substantial range lag if the assembly force had been
insufficient.
Automatic working also depended on the C.B. gear (Plate 48) continuously
dividing speed-across by range to generate bearing-rate. For this purpose, Elphinstone
used a proportional lever; one end was coupled directly to the speed-across motor while
the other end was linked to the bearing-clock roller. The pivot between them was
positioned by a spiral cam which, through a connection to the clock-range screw, was
rotated in proportion to change of range.' 72
 This gear does bear some resemblance to the
' 10 Dreyer before RCAI, T.173/547 Part 16, p.84. See also Tower before RCAI, T.173/547 Part 12,
p.103.
'A certain amount of backlash is necessary to make the hunt dead-beat': 'Pamphlet on the Mark IV*
Dreyer Table 1930', p.14 in 'Guard Book for Pamphlets on Dreyer Tables', AL This was probably
obtained by making the diameter of the plunger contacts slightly less than the dth of the insulating circle
on the contact plate.
72 'Dreyer's Apparatus Mark IV*', 1916, pp.25-8 and 36 and Fig.IV and VII. Handbook 1918, pp.51-5, 61
and 87 and Plates 22 and 24-7.
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corresponding mechanism patented by Argo for their Mark V clock, although their fixed
pivot was at one end of the lever. Hence the spiral cams were cut to different functions of
the range (XIII-16). Furthermore, Elphinstone first proposed 'a system of proportional
levers' in March 1914. This was well before the date of acceptance and earliest
publication of Argo patent 16,373/1913 on 16 July 1914, by which time the prototype
Mark IV Table had already been under test. By 1916, Elphinstone was aware that Argo
were using a device 'on lines somewhat similar to that [used in the] Tables, Mark IV and
IV'; though he described his design (and, by implication, Isherwood's) as 'a special
application of a known mechanical method'.' 73
 While Isherwood was first to use a lever
and cam to generate bearing-rate, the available evidence' 74
 indicates that Elphinstone was
unaware of this when, independently, he decided to use the same well-known principle,
though in a significantly different configuration, for his own change-of-bearing gear.
JUTLAND TO THE ARMISTICE
InJuly 1916 an experimental typewriter was tried for identifying the ranges from each
particular rangefinder....Supply of these to existing tables was made in 1917.
Thus the Brownrigg keyboard was replaced by the typewriter, which was the only means
of plotting described in the 1918 Handbook for all tables, including the Mark III. The new
typewriter provided nine characters (, C, R, •, Y, X, Q B and A), thereby enabling 'the
plotting officer to obtain an idea of the relative reliance to be placed on
each...rangefmder'.' 75 Thus the device was a further, relatively late step in the evolution of
manual plotting-, it had nothing to do with the development of the Original Table, which
plotted automatically.'76
Dreyer returned to the Admiralty as DNO on 1 March 1917. He himself was
mainly preoccupied by the development and supply of new AP shell, but he also 'set up a
Fire Control Staff, which included scientists, and did valuable work'. Despite his duties in
the Grand Fleet (he became flag Captain toJellicoe in Iron Duke on 24 October 1915),
Dreyer had continued to invent and, in 1916, proposed a 'Wind Dumaresq for the Dreyer
Fire Control Table'.'78
' 13 Elphinstone to DofC, 1916 and 'Notes', 1916, p.7.
further details, see XVIII-! 7.
' 75 reclznicalHistoiy, 1919, p.27. Handbook 1918, p.29 and Plate 12.
' 76 d LDMS, pp.218-9.
Sea Hentage, pp.96 and 234-5.
' 18 Undated list (but after 12 December 1923) of 'Rear Admiral Dreyer's Inventions' in DRYR 2/1; see also
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...in the first half of 1917 complete wind Dumaresqs were supplied for use with the
Dreyer table, together with deflection totalisers, by means of which Dumaresq
deflection corrected for range, deflection due to wind, uncorrected drift and spotting
corrections, are superimposed on each other and transmitted mechanically to a position
near the master deflection-transmitter to the guns.'79
These additions were probably designed under Admiralty auspices: but the gunnery
officers of the Grand Fleet were also developing their own ideas.
In August 1917, after various experiments by individual ships, it was determined that a
gun-range pencil must be provided on the range-plot. This pencil shows continuously
the actual gun-range in use, and a comparison between gun-range and clock-range is
valuable in keeping the range.
The screws required to work these pencils are shown in some of the plates for the 1918
Handbook (Plate 49), so any necessary new fittings were probably being supplied by the
Admiralty when the handbook was promulgated on 25 June 1918,180 five days after
Dreyer had been succeeded as DNO by Captain Henry R Crooke; Dreyer himself
became Director of Naval Artillery and Torpedoes with responsibility for the Gunnery
and Torpedo Division of the Naval StafE'8'
In contrast to the evident agreement reached over the gun-range pencil, the
Admiralty's attempts to develop an improved bearing plot were overtaken by much more
radical ideas originated in the Grand Fleet.
...until the Mark V. table for "Ramillies"...bearings were transmitted in '/4 steps. In the
Mark V...these were reduced to 4'-ninute steps....This necessitated a special form of
bearing transmitter which was manufactured by Messrs. Elliott. This table was erected
in "Ramillies" in July 1917. Orders were placed for bearing transmitters and for
improved bearing plotting gear...for all capital ships, but owing to the introduction of
the Gyro Director training gear, which embodied this improvement, but used the gun
director as the bearing transmitter, this order was cancelled.
This 'GDT' gear had been developed initially by a Committee of the Grand Fleet, which,
after the inconclusive action of 17 November 1917, had been established to evolve:
...an instrument, which, by a combination of the gun-director, Gyro compass, and the
bearing clock of the Dreyer table, enabled the Director to be kept on for direction when
the enemy was hidden, provided that he had been effectively engaged before his
disappearance.
....in July 1918 a complete instrument was supplied by H.M.S. Excellent to H.M.S.
theHandbookoftheDrverTac&a1AppIiances 1915 in DRYR 1/3.
' 79 Technical Histoy, 1919, p.27. The 'Wind Dumaresq, when set with own speed and course and true wind
and direction, indicated the components of 'wind-you-feel' along and across the line of bearing
'80 ibia Handbook 1918, p.2. See XVIII-1 6 for possible reuse of the rangefinder screw for gun-range on Mark
Ill tables.
Lists. Sea Henage, p.236. 0 Murray, memorandum 27 June 1918 in 'Re-organisation of Naval Staff
Division 1917-1921',ADM 116/1803.
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Emperor of India for trial. In September, provisional approval was obtained to proceed
with designs for this gear in which certain parts already in service, and other gear which
was previously on order for the improvement of the bearing plot of the Dreyer table,
were to be embodied. Approval to place the order for 24 capital ships with Messrs.
Elliott, who had prepared the designs, were given inJanuary 19 19.182
However, the complete GDT prototype had not yet been built when the 1918 Handbook
was being prepared, which explains why it described the improved bearing plot as a
standard-pattern fitting on all tables. In fact, the cancellation of the improved bearing
plotting gear meant that, apart from the prototype supplied to Ramihies and, perhaps, a
few early production models, t83
 most Dreyer bearing plots ended the War still receiving
bearings in '/4° steps.'
DREYER TABLE MARK I
In February 1916, the Ordnance Coudil awarded Dreyer £5,000 for his
contributions to fire control. The list of the 'Ships in which Dreyer's Fire Control is fitted
or is being fitted', drawn up when Dreyer applied for his award, included the following:















'82 Tec/,jajHjst	 1919, pp.28-9.
units were available to be included in the photographs of the various marks of table included
in the 1918 Handboolç see for example ll)X5', Plates 7 and 8.
After the War, GDT gear was fitted to all Mark IV and Mark IV tables and to the table in RamilJ.ier, all
were then designated Mark IV*. Mark V was reserved for the table in Hood, which was much more
elaborate. 'Pamphlet on the Mark W* Dreyer Table 1930' and 'Pamphlet on the Mark V Dreyer Table
1930' in 'Guard Book for Pamphlets on Dreyer Tables', AL
'With 'Extract from Recommendations of the Admiralty Members of the Ordnance Council at a Meeting
10.2.16 concerning Dreyer's award' in DRYR 2/1. See also Dreyer to Field, 1923.
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This is the first mention of such a table since the Mark I Board of 1911. Notice the
curious order and the gap after the first four ships; also, that three battlecruisers - Inuincibk,
Indomitable and Indefatigable - do not appear, nor were they listed under any other mark of
Dreyer Table. In the equivalent list from the 1918 Handbook, Vanguard (sunk by an internal
explosion) is missing. Agincourt had now received a Mark I table: while a Mark I had also
replaced the Original Table in Hercules. As would be expected, Invincible and Indefatigable
are not listed, but, while Infrcible, Australia and Jvew Zealand remain, Indomitable still does
not appear.'
A handbook for the Mark I was published in 1916187 but, since a copy has not
been found, it is necessary to rely mainly on the description in the 1918 Handbook The
table was built around the Mark VI* Dumaresq, for which the first production order was
placed on 11 October 1914. Like ordinary Dumaresqs, the Mark VI* had a fixed
fore-and-aft bar and a rotating dial; when built into the Mark I Table, a slot, running
most of the length of the target-indicating arrow; contained a small pointer. Since this was
coupled through a flexible shaft to a handle which also set the clock-rate, it was necessary
only to follow the rate indications of the Dumaresq's enemy bow with the pointer.
The range-plot was similar to the other Dreyer tables, except that the paper was
moved only by hand. However, it extended across the full width of the Mark I and, from
the start, was capable of plotting up to 20,000 yards (later extended to 28,000 yards), just
like the Mark IV Table, first fitted in Warspite in the Spring of 1915.189 At first, the Mark
I range-plot probably had a Brownrigg keyboard until that was replaced by the standard
typewriter.'90
 Range was kept by a Vickers clock on the same lines as proposed by Dreyer
for the Mark I Board. Thus the table was entirely mechanical (Plate 50). The 1918
Handbook shows a standard-pattern bearing plot (of the type which was cancelled) and a
deflection totaliser (as supplied in 1917) squeezed in next to the Dumaresq.' 9 ' There could
never have been space for the old style of bearing plot and it is unlikely that the Mark I
'Handbook 1918, p.3.	 -
187 TechrsicalHistmy, 1919, p.28.
E.lphinstone, 'Dumaresq History', 1916 (op. cit.) p.11; this does not mention the Mark I Table. Handbook
1918, pp.13 and 4.'G and Plates 3, 21 and 22.
Because the clock-tuning and spotting differential gearboxes were located together, the Mark I had an
unusually compact arrangement for the pedalling clutch, a feature not introduced on other tables until the
Autumn of 1915. This may indicate that the design was completed in the second half of the year.
'90 Although a gun-range screw is shown in the diagrams of the 1918 Handbook, it cannot be made out in the
photograph. There are no signs that the Mark I was ever equipped to plot Argo ranges automatically.
'91 Handbook 1918, pp.13 and 29 and Plates 3, 21-2 and 39.
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Tables were given any priority in the distribution of the few new-style standard plotters
that may have been completed. Without a bearing plot, the deflection totaliser would
have been much less useful. It must be assumed that, until the War's end, ships with Mark
I Tables plotted bearings (if at all) with Admiralty manual plotters, and calculated
deflection by hand.
All the evidence given here suggests that deliveries of the Mark I Tables began
some time in 1915. This dating is supported by the schedule of deliveries for the Mark
IVs, which shows (XVIII- 18) that only two automatic tables were required for ships
completing between April 1915 and January 1916. It may be conjectured that the list
from February 1916 represents the planned installation schedule for Mark I Tables, and
that only the first four ships had then been fltted.' There is no definite information on
the extent of progress by the time ofJutland, although subsequent reports and memoirs
(quoted in XVIII-19) indicate that Bellerophon had received a Dreyer table, but that
Invincible, Indomitable, Xew Zealand and Enn had not. Thus, it is almost certain that, at the
Falkland Islands and the Dogger Bank, none of the 12-inch battlecruisers present had
Dreyer tables. It is also quite possible that, atJutland, all the ships of both the Second and
Third Battle Cruiser Squadrons had to rely on the pre-War system based on the Mark VI
Dumaresq, Vickers clock and manual plotting.
The Mark I Table was follc3wed by the short-lived Mark 1*, which was very
similar apart from the addition of a coupling between the Mark VI* Dumaresq and a
gyro-compass relay. This in turn led to the Mark 111*, which became the standard table
for use in cruisers. It replaced the Vickers clock with an electric clock similar to that in the
Turret Tables. As described in the 1918 Handbook, it was originally designed to use the
cancelled bearing plot, but the design was subsequently altered to incorporate the GDT
gear (Plate 51). This in turn required a bearing clock, which was set for rate by hand using
values read off a graduated drum.' 93
 Thus, in its use of a gyro-compass connection to the
Dumaresq, bearing plotting (in the straight-line form introduced by the GDT) and
hand-set rates on the bearing clock, the Mark ffl* was also a direct desceident of the
earlier Mark III.
' As would be expected, MarThonugh, the only 13.5-inch ship without a fire-control table, is at the head of
the list. However, there is no apparent reason for the remaining order.
post-War Dreyer tables are described in more detail in Appendix XXIII.
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CONSTRUCTION
Especially in comparison with the enclosed and largely maintenance-free designs
of the Argo Company, the Dreyer tables had a certain Heath-Robinson character.'
Their mechanical construction was much less sophisticated. Gear wheels were held on
their shafts by tapered pins which were hand-made, non-interchangeable and could be
shaken out by prolonged firing. 195
 Chain drives and flexible shafts were liable to wear,
which caused backlash; although not usually serious,' in the change-of-bearing gear the
effects were magnified at low ranges, to the extent that accurate results could not be
obtained below 5,000 yards. Regular lubrication, especially of the parts driven by the
variable speed drives, was essential although, because of the open construction, the oil
attracted dust, so frequent cleaning was also a necessity. In the clock mechanisms, the cast
iron clock discs had to be kept completely free of oil.' 97
 Also, it was vital to move the
hardened steel wheels only when the discs were rotating, otherwise the wheels developed
flats and had to be replaced. The rough surface of the cast iron appears to have been well
chosen to maximise friction: but it may have been more liable than a hardened steel disc
to develop a recess at its centre.
In this event, the recess should be removed by turning up the disc in a lathe.'
Electric relays might stick, but switches were provided to isolate the fault and permit
hand-setting of rates.'
On the other hand, as Dreyer and Usborne emphasised in 1913:
...the whole apparatus is so simple that it can easily be repaired...with the resources of
the ship.20°
Further, during the War, it was also possible for ships' gunnery officers to modif their
tables in the course of developing new techniques, for example in concentration firing and
gyro director training. 20 ' It is very difficult to imagine how the Argo instruments, the
'SchIeihauf, 'Dumaresq and Dreyer' (op. cit.).
'95 Handbook 1918, p.! 0. 311. 'Remarks on the Action of 17th November 1917' in Grand Jleet Gunnery and
Torpedo Orders, p.196,ADM 137/293.
maximum permissible accumulated backlash in the Mark V table from the tuning and spotting
handles to the master transmitter was no more than 75 yards: Schleihauf, 'Dumaresq and Dreyer'.
'97 'Pamphlet on Mark IV* 1930' (op. cit.) pp.47, 50-2 and 55.
' ibid p.14. The clock discs rotated at 15 revolutions per minute.
' 'Dreyer's Apparatus Mark IV*', May 1916, Additions to Book
200 Technical Compañson, p.56.
°"Third Interim Report' in Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Reports of the Grand Fleet Drryer Table Committee
1918-1919, 1919, pp.5-I 1, ADM 186/241.
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true-course plotter in particular, could have been modified to perform even a few of the
functions which had been added to the Dreyer Tables by the end of the War: and, if such
changes had been possible, they could only have implemented at the works of the already
overstretched Thomas Cooke and Sons.
The Dreyer Tables certainly needed careful maintenance and well-trained
operators, which the Royal Navy could normally be expected to provide. They may also
appear somewhat crude to modem eyes, though that is neither here nor there. The vital
question, which can now be addressed in the next chapter, is whether, in the conditions
experienced during the Run to the South, their functional characteristics made them less








30. D1u yER's RAm OF Ca&i' CALCULATOR (DECEMBER 1906)
The narrow paper tape was driven at a constant speed by clockwork across the centre of the
board. The ruler graduated in ranges was held in a slider, which could move along the length of
the tape; the ruler could also slide at right angles to the tape.
When a range was received, the tape was marked by an 'inker' and the ruler set so that the tape
mark indicated the range received. The ruler was kept over the mark until another range was
received. This range on the ruler would correspond with the one of the range rate lines (marked
in knots) radiating from the ink marker thus the rate could be read off without calculation.
Dreyer, 'Change of Range', 10 December 1906 in DRYR 2/1 and T.173/9l Part III.
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31. Ti-rn Dixs' PosmoN Fm.nu. FOR RATE OF CHANGE OF RANGE (1907)
The broad strip of paper moved at constant speed: the strip being as wide as the range scale on
the fixed, upper bridge. Each range was marked on the paper by a pencil in the 'traveller' moving
against this range scale; the traveller and pencil could be actuated electrically from the
rangefinder.
Each range mark was followed by the microscope on the traveller carried by the lower, movable
bridge. As soon as the next range was plotted, the bar linking pencil and follower-microscope
indicated a momentary range-rate on the semi-circular scale.
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32. Di y a VIRTUAL CoulsE INSTIWMENT (1908)
The traveller was propelled by a long screw at a speed proportional to virtual speed. The screw
was coupled to a dual-cone variable-speed drive.
The distance along the range-arm from the pivot to the traveller represented the range. The angle
on the bearing-plate corresponded to that between the virtual course and the line-of-bearing.
The damping-arm was used to set the starting values of range and virtual-course angle.
The note mentioning Pollen's patent was added during the 1925 RCAI hearings.
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33. Joi-nsi DiuxEa's VARIABLE-SPEED DRIVE
The lower cone drove the upper through the moveable contact belt. Both cones were coupled to
a differential gear. When the belt was in the central position (Ii'), the cones rotated at equal speed
and the differential's output shaft was stationary. By displacing the belt, this shaft was made to
turn at different speeds in either direction.
Fig. 2 attarhed toJohn to Fred. Dreyer, I7January 1908 in T.173/91 Part III.
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34. Tn AI'II RANGE TABLE, AS USED IN EXCELLEWr
The rate was measured off the range plot with the celluloid protractor and plotted automatically.
'Fire Control, An Essay by Captain C. Hughes Onslow, RN', Section III, PLLN 1/5.









A lIME 9c R AN	 C HRONOGIfAPH .) -

















35. Dix's LOCAL CoI.rritoL INSTRUMENT, 1910
Rangefinder and gun ranges were plotted automatically. When the instrument was set correctly,
both plots coincided. Range-rate was measured with the engraved glass disc and set on the
rate-of-change clockwork.
The differential gear W corrected the gun-range as transmitted and as indicated by pointer and
pencil U.
Rate-of-change clockwork and gun-range scale, pointer and transmitter were all moved bodily
with handle I by an amount indicated on spotting-scale S by fixed pointer H.















36. UREYER'S PATENTED FIRE CONTROL I ABLE
The clock-rate was set with the wheel on the right side of the Dumaresq by following the bow of
the model enemy ship with the pointer d moving in the transverse slot. The handle and small
scale (both C were used to set gun-range corrections through a differential.
The range plot was that in the centre of the table. Both the rangefinder and gun-range pointers
(to left and right respectively) indicated on a single range-scale A4. Through a rack-and-pinion
mechanism, the knob C2 displaced the gun-range screw and pointer by an amount indicated on
the scale C2 by the spotting pointer C4.







37. Dgy 's Sciii FOR BiurG T1isSMJSS1ON FROM A GYRo CowAss
RECEIVER
Thc gyro-compass kept the receiver card fixed in space irrespective of ship's course. The index
and transmitter rings rotated outside the receiver card with the rangefinder mounting. To
transmit the change of target compass bearing, the transmitter ring was rotated by the transmitter
handle until its graduations were again aligned with those on the receiver card.





































































































40. ELPHINSTONE'S SKETCH FOR 11-i SEVEN-PART RECORDER
The gun-range screw was shifted laterally by a rack, the 'spotting correction' being shown on the
small circular scale 41. The large governor-regulated electric motor 3 drove the clocks and
advanced the plotting paper.
The gyro-compass receiver was mounted on the bridge above the Dumarescj; the motor 83
applied any change in course to the Dumaresq's compass ring. (Motor 84, which received
rangefinder bearings relative to ship's head, was not needed if the rangefinder was on an Argo
mounting with a gyro-compass receiver.)
The discs and rollers of the clocks were beneath the Dumaresq. The range clock was now directly
coupled to the gun-range screw through a tuning gearbox. The bearing clock was connected (by
means unspecified) to the Dumaresq. The pointer 76 and scale 77 indicated the bearing clock's
rate; they were located close to the grid 53 so that the rate from the bearing-plot could be
transferred easily.
Sketch ith Elliott Bros. 'Seven Part Recorder' revised 28 October 1911 in T.173/91 Part Ill.
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41. Dit yiit TABLE Miau 111(1913): ELEVATION AND PLAN
The Mark VI Dumaresq, with the clock mechanisms beneath it, is between the plots, the range
plot to the right. The Dumaresq dial was graduated in steps of 100 yds/min. for range-rate, 4
knots for speed-across. The scale of the range plot was graduated from 2,000 to 16,400 yards.
The rate-scale of the bearing dock was calibrated between ± 15°/mm.
The receivers for the gyro-compass and Forbes log are on front of the panel above the Dumaresq.
The motor-relay on the rear of the panel and its flexible shaft to the Dumaresq can be seen in the
plan, which also shows, at the rear of the table, the main drive motor, hand alternative and
regulating stop-watch.
The spotting differential is to the right. One hand indicated the total spotting correction while the
other was rezeroed after each correction.
Dreyer and Usborne, Technical Histoy and Technical Comparison...(1913), Chapter V, p.48 and Fig. 7.
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42. DREYER TABLE MARK III (1913): PERSPECTIvE SKETCH
The range and bearing receiver motors and their plotting screws are at the front of each plot. The
bearing-receiver also drove the dial 58 indicating target compass bearing.
The rate of the range-clock was set with handle 30A with the aid of pointer 29. The rate of the
bearing-dock was set with the knob 76A; the bearing-rate was read off the scale of the
bearing-grid 52, which could be used either to measure the slope of the bearing-plot, or to
convert Dumaresq speed-across into bearing-rate using the curves on drum 103.
The tuning handle 39 was coupled through shafting to the tuning differential 40. The spotting
handle and differential are just in front of the gun-range indicator 46 and transmitter 47. The
small carriage with dial 41 and wheel 41A allowed the clock-range pointer 45 to be adjusted
without altering the gun-range.
Dreyer and Usborne, Technical His1oy and Technical Comparison...(l 913), Chapter V, Fig. 3.
GYRO COMPS5 RECEIVER	 DRIVE PROM COMPASS
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BEARING SATE HANOWNEEL
i f;.fv, Li.,
The Dumaresq in the Mark Ill Table.
43. Ti-rn DUMARFSQ MAIU VI It THE DREYER TABLE MAIU III
The 'handle and clutch in drive to compass ring' allowed the bearing-clock to be disconnected
from the compass ring so that the Dumaresq could be set by hand.
B)' 1918, the tuning handwheel had been moved to the left side of the range-plot. The 'pedalling
dutch' was fitted when the range scale was given two sets of numerals defining ranges up to
16,400 and 24,000 yards, respectively. When engaged, the clutch allowed the tuning handle to
alter the clock-range by 8,000 yards without changing the gun-range.
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45. Dpy a's AUrO-RANGE RAm Axrus (DECEMBER 1913)
A pin extended downward from the bow of the Dumaresq's enemy bar. It engaged with two
slotted 'sliders' F and M, which were constrained by the 'fixed spur paths' to move at right angles.
As a slider moved, it rotated a transmitting commutator.
The range-rate commutator was wired directly to a step-by-step receiver motor coupled to the
roller-slides of the range-clock.
The motor connected to the speed-across commutator drove the cone of a cone-and-roller
variable speed drive. The range-clock determined the position of the roller. The roller shaft
rotated another commutator, wired to a receiver motor which set the bearing rate.
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The Electrical Dumaresq.
46. DREYER TABLES MARK IV, IV* AND V: Ti-rn ELECTRICAL Du.IsQ
The downwards-extending contact stem replaced the enemy bow pointer. The four contact
plungers pressed on the contact plate, which was positioned by the two rods at right angles. The
ends of the rods were supported by brackets protruding through slots in the Dumaresq dial. The
brackets were positioned by two electric motors, controlled by relays energised through the
electric circuits made between the contact-stem plungers and the conducting areas of the
contact-plate. Their action kept the contact plate directly beneath the contact stem.
The brackets at front and rear of the dial were coupled directly to the roller carriage of the
range-clock. The brackets to left and right were connected to the change-of-bearing gear, which
divided Dumaresq speed-across by range to set the rate of the bearing-clock.
(The bearing tuning handle was fitted only to the Mark V Table.)
Handbook of Captain F. C. Dir's Fire Contn,l Tables 1918, Plate 24.
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Electrical Dumaresq.]
47. THE ELECTRICAL DUMARESQ: Cmcurr Diaw
The pattern of conducting areas on the top of the contact plate is shown shaded. When the plate
and stem were aligned, the four contacts lay in the circular gap between the conductors. Opposite
contacts were connected electrically. If the stem moved out of alignment with the plate, at least
one conducting segment was connected to the central circle, thereby energising one of the relays.
The relay applied 20 volt power to the appropriate motor with the polarity necessary to drive the
contact plate back into alignment with the stem.
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48. CLOCK Discs AND CHANGE OF Blr . G Ga
In the change-of-bearing gear, the displacement of the top end of the link was controlled directly
from the motor positioning the contact plate for speed-across (Dumaresq defleétion). The spiral
cam was coupled to the range clock and determined to position of the link's central pivot. The
cam was cut so that the displacement of the bottom end of the link was proportional to
speed-across divided by range. This displacement was conveyed to the bearing-clock roller by the
two chains.







Mark IV and 1V Tables—diagram.
49. DREYEP. TMis MARK IV AND IV* (1918)
This schematic shows the gun-range screw and deflection totaliser added in 1917, as well as the
pedalling dutch. Note the mechanical link from the table to the Range Master Transmitter. The
representation of the change-of-bearing gear, though mechanically simplified, shows its operation
dearly.
The bearing plot, deflection drums and rate grid were all part of the cancelled standard bearing
plotter.
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50.	 TABLE MAIu 1(1918)
The Rate Handle was coupled through the flexible shafts to the range-dock and the pointer of
the Dumaresq. The movements of the dock's range hand was followed with the arrow by means
of the chasing handle.
The tuning and spotting gearboxes were together at one end of the plot; the pedalling clutch gear
was therefore more compact than in other tables.
Probably only a few tables were fitted with bearing plots, gun-range screws and deflection
totalisers.
Handbook of C4tain F. C Drer's Fire Conivl Tables 1918, Plate 3.
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SI.	 TABLE MARK 111* wim GDT G
This cruiser table was based on the Mark Vit Dumaresq and electrically-powered range and
bearing docks. The bearing-rate was set by making the pointer of the Dumaresq Deflection
Drum indicate the Dumaresq speed-across. 'rhe linkage next to the Deflection Totaliser, when set
by hand for range and speed-across, calculated the component of gun deflection due to
speed-across.
The GDT gear introduced straight-line plotting, in which the difference was plotted (on a narrow
paper strip) between the target bearings as observed from the Director and predicted by the
bearing clock. If the target became obscured, the Director fired on the bearing predicted by the
dock.
Handbook of Qiplain F. C Drewr's Fun Control Tabks 1918, insert.
6WAR AND ITS LESSONS
The engagements fought by British battlecruisers in 1914 and early 1915 soon
demonstrated the realities of gunnery in action. On 28 August 1914, the conditions in the
Heligoland Bight' confirmed per-War apprehensions about visibility in the North Sea.
The enemy first appeared...at about 7,500 [yards] ships being on closing courses.
...when the "Commence" was sounded, no range had been taken, nor was it possible to
take any afterwards.
The range on the sights on opening fire was 6,000 but this was rapidly spotted down to
5,200 and first straddle was obtained at a range of about 5,000....
Lion's Captain Chatfield considered hat 'the gunlayers were probably unduly hurried'
and that 'under short visibility conditions ...slow and deliberate firing with turret guns will
be as effective as rapid and great waste of ammunition will be avoided'. 2 His report
resulted in the Admiralty issuing orders 'to avoid waste of ammunition'; 3
 this emphasis
was to have unfortunate consequences during Lions next major engagement.4
At the Battle of the Faildand Islands (8 December 1914), Admiral Sturdee used
the superior speed of Invincible and Inflexible to force an engagement at ranges long enough
to overwhelm Spec's two armoured cruisers with little damage to the British ships.5
Throughout, the British battlecruisers remained to windward and were severely
Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnought to &apa Flow, VoL II (London, 1965) pp.50-54. tephen Roskill,
Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty (New York, 1981) pp.82-85. Beattys despatch, 30 August 1914 in Brian McL
Ranft (ed.) The Beatty Papers, Volume I(Aldershot, 1989) pp.122-6.
2 
'Remarks on Cruiser Action of 28th August' with Captain Chatfield to VAC First Battle-Cruiser
Squadron, 31 August 1914 in ADM 1/8391/286, PRO. See also Beatty Papers I (op. cit.) pp.127-9.
DNO's minute, 8 September 1914 in ADM 1/8391/286.
For Admiralty concerns about shortages, particularly of cordite, see lain McCallum, 'Achilles Heel?
Propellants and High Explosives, 1880-1916' in War Studies Jounza4 Vol. 4, Iss. 1, Summer 1999, pp.76-8
(author's copy gratefully acknowledged).
' FDSFH (op. cit.) pp.12! -3: Paul Halpern, AYaval Histoy of World War I (London, 1994) pp.98-9.
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handicapped by their own smoke; 6
 at one point, they were forced to turn about to cross
the German wake and, then and later, were on opposite courses to their targets.7
Inuincibk's gunnery report emphasised that, from the foretop (her principal fire control
position):
Range taking was impossible during the greater part of the action, due to funnel smoke,
gun smoke, etc.
Rangefinder was on several occasions covered with spray from shell bursting short.
Similarly, ranging from turrets was most difficult, often impossible: while, without
directors,8
 aiming with the turret gunsights was also badly affected. Furthermore:
Great difficulty [was found] in keeping the shot on the target due to the rate constantly
changing. This appears to have been due to the enemy zigzagging, and at the long
range these alterations of course, in and out, could not be detected by eye or by
rangefinder.
It was often very difficult to see overs, or hits, unless a bright flame accompanied the
hits.9
For most of the action, Invincible's foremast suffered from considerable shaking following
an 8.2-inch hit on the starboard strut: yet the effect on rangetaking from the top with the
Argo rangefinder was not even mentioned explicitly in her reports.'° Nor, indeed, is the
making of range plots. It appears that rangefinding was so difficult, due to smoke and the
long ranges, that few usable ranges were obtained; thus, particularly with the enemy
zig-zagging, most reliance had to be placed on spotting.
The Battle of the Dogger Bank, on 24 January 1915, was a protracted stern
chase to the SE, Hipper (leading in SydliL and followed by Molike, Derfflinger and Blücher)
being pursued by Beatty's five battlecruisers, in order Lion, Tiger, Princess Royal, Xew Zealand
and Indomitable." With a light wind from the NE, Beatty chose the orthodox lee position,
in which the smoke from his own ships would not interfere with gunnery. At 8.52, Lion
6 50. 'Report of action off the Falkiand Islands', 63-and Fket Gunnery and Torpedo &ders (to 15 September
l915)p.l5, ADM 137/293.
Vice-Admiral Sturdee, 'Report of the Action off the Faildand Islands', 8 December 1914 and Inflexible,
'Report on Action...off Falkland Islands...' (with Endosure) 11 December 1914 in ADM 137/304.
John Brooks, 'Percy Scott and the Director' in David McLean and Antony Preston (eds.) Warship 1996
(London, 1996) p.1 68.
'Gunnery Remarks' and 'Damage caused to H.M.S. "Invincible" by Gunfire...', with Invincible to
C.-in-C. S. Atlantic & S. Pacific, 18 December 1914 in ADM 137/304.
°Jon Sumida, In Dfence ofNaval Supremacy (London, 1989) pp.297-8 does not refer to the hit on the mast,
stating only that 'the Argo mounting had been placed at the top of the fore-mast, where vibration from the
high speed...and funnel smoke rendered it useless'.
For general accounts of the battle, see FDSF II, pp.156-174: Roskill, Beatty (op. cit.) pp.108-120: James
Goldrick, The Kwg's Ships Were at Sea (Annapolis, 1984) pp.248-302. Reports are in ADM 137/305, the
majority reproduced in Beally Papers 1, pp.206-248.
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opened on BlQcher with a single shot at the unprecedented range of 20,000 yards; 7ger and
Princess Royal also selected the same target shortly thereafter: but Yew Zealand and
Indomitable were already falling behind. Though Princess Royal also could not keep up, Lion
pressed ahead, accompanied by 7ger. However, 7ger's fire was largely ineffective, which
Beatty attributed to her failure to obtain 'that proportion of short shots which is usually
considered essential for effective control';' 2
 it also appears that other British battlecruisers
made the same mistake.
...it is absolutely misleading to think hits will be seen, at any rate at long range. Shorts
are the only guide, and the great value of them must be impressed on control officers.'3
Furthermore, 7ger also ignored Beatty's order to fire at opposite numbers,
leaving Moli*e free to concentrate with Seydlit on the British flagship. The critical moment
came at about 9.50, when a hit from Lion started a cordite fire which gutted both after
turrets in S ydlit. Unfortunately, as Chatfield admitted:
The mistake made was in not at once going into Rapid Independent and putting forth
our whole volume of fire regardless of ammunition expenditure. Enemy would then
have been overwhelmed and never recovered.
Thus Seydlit. was able to continue firing with her fore and starboard-wing turret and Lion's
shooting was soon severely disrupted.
The enemy's fire was slow at first but got faster, and at the end was a maximum. lion's
fire was fairly quick at first, but got slower, due to the enemy's shorts interfering with
gunlaying, spotting and control, ulEitil eventually it was almost impossible to return the
fire...
After 10 o'clock, Lion continued to bear the brunt of the German fire. From 10.35, she
was struck repeatedly until, at about 10.50, the port engine had to be stopped and she was
forced to quit the line. She was overhauled by TgeT but Beatty's fmal flag signals turned
his other ships NE'wards to concentrate on the Blüchejr,' 5 while Hipper's battlecruisers
escaped, though not before inflicting significant damage on Tiger.
Beatty's ships did not obtain the advantage expected from their lee position. The
wind blew spray from the bows and from enemy shorts onto the instrument glasses, while
12 Beatty to Peily, 11 February 1915 in Beatty Papers I, pp.246-7. Ter also did not use her 'time-of-flight
arrangements'.
Chatfield to Beatty, 'Remarks on the Action, 24th January 1915', 2 February 1915 in Beatty Papers I,
p.232.
H ibid. p.231; despite his own report, Chatfield also regretted 'the general impression there has been since
28th August that ammunition expenditure must not be excessive'. See also Lord Chatfield, The Navy and
Defence (London, 1942) pp.126-7.
' Andrew Gordon, The Rules of'the Game (London, 1996) pp.94-5. Goldrick, King's Ships (op. cii.) pp.272-5.
Moore to Beatty, 7 February 1915 in Bea tty Papers 1, pp.219-220.
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the smoke from the German ships was carried almost directly down-range, causing both
sides severe interference to ranging, aiming and spotting.' 6
 Much of the firing was at
ranges close to the limits marked on the sights; the minimum range recorded in lion's TS
was a momentary 14,825 yards at 10.29'/2. The Argo transmission gear was designed for
a maximum range of 16,000 yards, so the only means of conveying most ranges from the
Argo Tower was by voice-pipe.' 7 Tiger also reported that 'very few ranges were obtained
and no attempt was made either to obtain or keep a rate'.'8
Little use could be made of the rangefinders as few cuts could be obtained, whilst the
range was too great for accurate readings to be taken; time and range plotting was
impracticable.'9
In contrast, a bearing plot was maintained in Lion until about 10 o'clock. This probably
helped her to open with, and then keep, a correct deflection. However, the officer
commanding the Fore TS concluded:
On the whole I do not consider that the Dreyer table has justified its existence and that
until rangefinders have been made more accurate and the difficulties of spray, etc. in
turrets, overcome [more] energy should be devoted to the bearing plot, which if the yaw
can be eliminated, should give accurate results. 20
Since the yaw was taken out in the Argo mounting before transmission to the Mark ifi
table, this comment clearly implies that the gyro stabiisation was only partially effective.
By zig-zagging, Lion threw out her opponents' fire for a short time and both
Beatty and Chatfield recommended alterations of 2 points (1 point at high speed) with
small helm to this end. The former added:
This has often been practised and will in no way interfere with our gunnery.
which indicates confidence in the helm-free operation of the Dreyer Tables Mark ifi and
N (and, indeed, the compensation for course-change incorporated in the Mark VI
Dumares. However, against a zig-zagging target:
Rates and Dumaresqs become almost useless....Rangefinders may help but spotting
must be the primary aid for keeping on the target.2'
After the Dogger Bank action, Chatfield concluded:
16 Hipper's despatch in Hugo von Waldeyer-Hortz, Admiral von Hpper (London, 1933) p.152. Chatfield to
VAC, 1BCS, 27January 1915 and Pelly, 'Gunnery Notes' in BeaUy Papersl, pp.211 and 241.
Lion's gunnery reports with the copy of Chatfield, 'Remarks' in ADM 137/305.
18 Pelly, 'Gunnery Notes' (op. cit.) p.241.
'51. Remarks on Action on 24January 1915' in GFG&TO (op. cit.) p.17.
20 Lion's gunnery reports (op. ci!.).
21 Chatfield to VAC, 27January 1915 in Beaty Papers I, p.212. Chatfield, 'Remarks' (op. cit.) p.232. Beatty,
'Notes re Lessons Learned...' in Beany Papers I, p.224.
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It is certain that Battle Cruisers, and probably Battleships, may have to open fire at
much greater ranges than 15,000 yards, and that rapid fire will be employed by the
enemy at 18,000, which must be answered by rapid fire.
Beatty's emphasis, while showing a surprisingly complacent view of his ships' gunnery,
was quite different.
The Falkiand Is. fight, and 24th January, have proved that hits can be made without
difficulty [sic] at 19 or 20000 yards, but this range is not decisive and the percentage of
hits is too small.
...we ini try and get in closer without delay. Probably 12,000 to 14,000 yards would
suit us well, this being outside the effective range of enemy's torpedoes and 6" guns.
These divergent views would have an important bearing on their next encounter with
Hipper's battlecruisers.
GERMAN Fnu CONTROL24
What is known of the German fire control system, which had shown itself to be
all too effective, even from a disadvantageous position? Their fire was normally directed
from the fore control position, an armoured tower in the rear of the conning tower. This
and the reserve position aft were linked by telephone and voice pipe to the transmitting
stations beneath the armoured deck; gunnery data and orders were thence transmitted
electrically to the turrets by fire control instruments from Siemens and Halske. 25 All the
battlecruisers were fitted with Zeiss -metre stereoscopic rangefinders; these were installed
under turret roofs and above the control towers, particular reliance being placed on the
latter type.26
 As explained in Appendix XXV, straightforward comparisons are difficult,
but it appears that, especially at ranges above 15,000 yards or so, the Zeiss 3-metre was
more accurate than the Barr and Stroud 9-foot FQ2, but no better than the 15-foot FX24.
In addition, stereoscopic rangefinders were sometimes able to obtain ranges when
Chatfield, 'Remarks'.
23 Beatty 'Lessons' (op. cit.).	 -
24 See Appendix XXIV for development history and technical details.
Georg von Hase lCsl and Jutland (London, 1921) pp.77-9. Naval Staff Inteffigence Department, Report on
Interned German Vessels. Gunnery Information, February 1919, pp.8 and 18, ADM 186/240. Guy Hartcup, The
Waroflnventwn (London, 1989) pp.12 and 14.
Interned German VesseLs, 1919 (op. cit.) pp.8,17 and 34-5. Naval Staff, Intelligence Division, Reports on Interned
(Jennan Vessels, Part V Gunnery Material, October 1920 (C.B. 1516E), pp.7-9, ADMI86/243. Seydlit,
'General Experience' in 'Jutland, Later Reports', f.272, ADM 137/1644. Naval Staff, Intelligence
Department, German Gunnery Information De,ü'ed from the Intenvgatwn of P,iconers of War, October 1918
(C.B.01481), pp.18 and 22, Ca 0108, AL von Hase (op. cit.) pp.79 and 148.
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coincidence instruments could not, notably when a target was almost shrouded in
smoke.27
Ranges were transmitted electrically from the rangefinders to the control
positions by the 'Basis Gerät': 2° but mean range and rate were never obtained by any form
of plotting. From 1908, range-rate only was obtained from the EU-Anzeiger, while a
similar but separate instrument indicated deflection; both worked on the same principles
as the British Dumaresq, though neither had any special features to assist in keeping the
rates (albeit approximately) during a turn by own ship. From 1912, range-rate was set on
a range cloclç the more recent model described in wartime inteffigence reports (Plate 52)
was probably the Aw-Geber C. 12 Elevation Telegraph, which automatically converted
clock-range into elevation, the latter then being transmitted directly to follow-the-pointer
gun-sights.3° By the time ofJutland, the German Navy had introduced a training director,
which transmitted corrected bearing angles to all the turrets from the control position.3'
However, gun laying remained the responsibility of the individual layers, who were
accustomed to aim continuously and preferred to fire their own pieces once the fire gong
had sounded; 32
 thus, atJutland, several British observers described the German salvoes as
rapid ripples."
In spite of the rapid motion of the ship the gun-layer must make it his business to see
that the sight of the gun is always kept trained on the enemy...shooting on a rolling ship
was one of the most important feature of our crews' training on the high seas.M
Accurate aiming ensured that salvoes were closely grouped: and that, when straddling,
about 25% of shots could be kept falling short. It also permitted a rather different (and
v For comparative trials held after the War, see Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Pi-ogress in Gunnery Material
1922 and 1923, November 1923, pp.38, 42-9, 51 and 56-7, ADM 186/259.
3° Literally 'base- or pedestal-gear' but frequently used to include the transmitter as well; von Hase, p.79:
Admiralty, German Xaz, Part IVSectwn 4, TargdPracbce, Rang/lnders and ContivlofPire,July 1917 (C.B. 1 182A)
p.16, Ca 0106, AL: Seydlitz, 'Experience' (op. cit.).
3° Peter Padfleld, Guns a: Sea (London, 1974) p.228. Infoimationfrom PoWs, 1918 (op. cit.) pp.16-17.
30 Infonnatwn from PoWs, 1918, p.1 6. Karl Lautenschlager, 'The Dreadnought Revolution Reconsidered' in
Daniel Masterson (ed.) Naval History, The Sirth Snposium of the US. Naval Academy (Wilmington, Delaware:
1987) p.135. von Hase, pp.82-3.
Padfield, Guns at Sea (op. cit.) p.252. Lautenschlager, 'Dreadnought Revolution', (op. cit.) p.135. John
Campbell, Wars/rip Special!. Ba#kcntisers (London, 1978) pp.19, 22, 43 and 49. Sepdlitz, 'Experience', f.271.
von Hase, pp.80-i.
32 Informationfrom PoWs, p.19.
Jellicoe to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 18 June 1916 (Secret Report) f.40 in ADM 137/301.
Midshipman P M S Blackett, 'Naval Diary 1914 - 1918' (transcribed by Dr Nicholas Blackett) 31 May
1916.
von Hase, pp.82-3.
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sometimes more rapid) method of bracketing from that used by the Royal Navy. Attempts
to estimate the distance over were forbidden but:
It is desirable that we should train our assistant observers to such an extent that when
short shots occur they will be able to tell the fire commander with certainty what size of
bracket will suffice.
Between the Dogger Bank and Jutland, the Germans introduced an instrument
which calculated the mean of the ranges received from up to eight rangefinders. The
officer in charge could also switch out any rangefinder ranges which appeared to be
anomalous; he also reported 'the change of range per minute calculated from the
difference of the range-finder readings'. This instrument, called the 'Mittlungs Apparat' in
intelligence reports, provided a mean range to set on the range-clock: 36
 and an alternative
value for range-rate to that obtained from the EU-Anzeiger. AtJutland, Defflinger had also
been supplied with a new instrument which kept both range-rate and deflection. This was
very probably the device called the Z3 1 EU/SV-Anzeiger (Plate 53),37 which (see
Appendix XXIV) may have been capable of keeping range-rate and deflection
approximately through a turn. In any case, when repeatedly altering course, the German
Navy seems to have relied less on its rate instruments and clocks and more on its
stereoscopic rangefinders. AfterJutland, Seydlit reported that:
The electric dock was used only in the first part of the engagement [the Run to the
South]; afterwards the movements_of the ship were so frequent and sudden that regular
shooting by electric clock was impossible. Firing was continued in connection with
the...Basisgerat...in [the] forward gun control tower.
Thus in these conditions the Germans used a form of rangefinder control.
Soon after the War began, the Royal Navy obtained and promulgated full details
of German practices conducted in 1912-13. Between April andJuly 1913, nearly all the
fully worked up battleships and battlecruisers carried out practices that are doubly
noteworthy; the ranges were long: and the targets were three old battleships, moored in
line. 39
 Ranges were from 12,250 to 16,000 yards and rates reached 325 yards per minute.
Some ships made only one hit from 36 rounds fired but, under less demanding conditions,
German Target Practice, pp.5 and 11 (op. ciL).
Irfonnation from PoWs, 1918, p.16 and Plate 3. von Hase, pp.79, 131 and 144. However, 'Mittlungs' has
not been found in German dictionaries.
von Hase, pp.131-3. Padfield, Guns at Sea, pp.228 and 250.
Seyd&z, 'Experience', f.272.
Admiralty War Staff, Intelligence Division, Gennany. Results of Firing Practices, 1912-13 December 1914,
pp.14-15, 24-27, 34-5 and 44-53. ADM1 3 7/4799. Four Nassaus, four Helgolands, lGziser and F,üdrich der
Grosse, Moltke and uon der Tann took part in the practice.
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others obtained over 10%. In addition, the rates of fire per gun equate to salvoes fired
every 27-43 seconds, which suggests that the Germans broke into rapid fire as soon as
they straddled their targets.
In 1921, Derfflinger's gunnery officer wrote that:
Before the war no man in our navy had thought it possible to fight effectively at a range
of over 150 hm. [16,250 yards] I can still remember...war games...in which on principle
all shooting at more than 100 hm. [10,950 yards] was ruled out as ineffective.40
Nevertheless, when hostilities began, the German Navy had given most of their heavy
ships an opportunity for practice at long ranges: and to observe the effects of their fire
falling on and around actual ship targets. No doubt their greater insistence on spotting for
shorts derived from this experience.
BRITISH RANGES AND PRACTICES
The Grand Fleet Battle Orders, first issued shortly after Jellicoe took command,
assumed that:
On a clear day and unless the enemy opens fire earlier, 13.5-inch guns ships will open
deliberate fire at 15,000 yards, 12-inch gun ships at 13,000 yards."
At least it was now possible for the ships of the Grand Fleet to begin practising at such
ranges, firing initially at rocks and, from 1915, at battle-practice targets towed at up to
17,000 yards.42
 Unfortunately, the jncrease in ranges may not have been matched by
widespread improvements in rangefinding. The Grand fleet Order issued after the battle
of the Dogger Bank had declared that, since so few ranges had been taken:
The gun was, in fact, used as its own rangefinder and rate keeper.43
Frederic Dreyer, then still Captain of Orion, feared that, as a result, rangefinding practice
would be neglected and, while he continued to encourage the training of rangetakers, he
did not expect his efforts to have much impact outside his own 2nd Battle Squadron.
He also considered that:
40 von Hase, p. 153.
41 
'Extracts from Grand Fleet Battle Orders', 18 August 1914 in A. Temple Patterson (ed.), The Jellicoe
Papers, Volume I (Navy Records Society, 1966) p.59.
42 Frederic Dreyer, The Sea Henuige (London, 1955) pp.90-91 and 95. 'The Log of Captain F.C. Dreyer
R.N. H.M.S. "Orion". 1914', DRYR 5/1, CC. Blackett, 'Naval Diary' (op. ciL.) for 16 November 1915 and
31 January 1916. Unfortunately, no data have been found either on courses and speeds or the results
obtained during such long-range practices.
H. F. Memorandum, '66. Remarks on Action of 24th January 1915', 5 February 1915, p.18 in ADM
137/1943; there are some differences between this and the GFG&TO, 51 (op. cit.) with the same title.
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The unsupported Spotting of the Battle Cruisers does not seem to have been very
good...
In fact, it is clear that, in general, 'their reputation for gunnery was very very shaky
indeed' and 'that the Battle Cruisers' shooting was rotten'.
An officer posted to Invincible reported back to Ban'zam'c first-lieutenant that "he was
shocked by the standard of efficiency he encountered."45
Undoubtedlly, the battlecruisers, based in the Forth, found practice hard to get.
However, there also seems to have been a feeling in the Grand Fleet that they did not try
hard enough.
Ships from the Forth, visiting Scapa for gunnery drills, found that "the Battle Cruisers'
name up here is mud, owing to the inefficiency of their gunnery and the general
casualness and lack of concentration with which they appear to treat the war."47
In November 1915,Jellicoe wrote to Beatty:
I am afraid you must have been very disappointed at Lion and ligeT's battle practice
results. I can't understand how a control officer of experience could have made such a
blunder as that made by Lion's....I fear the rapidity ideas were carried to excess in one
case ((^seen Mary I think). Also the RF operators were bad. It is most difficult for you to
give them proper practice I know....
Beatty replied, with some complacency:
Yes indeed it was a terrible disappointment the battle practice of Lion and liger....The
other three were not bad but undoubtedly as you say we could do with much more
practice at sea....I do not think you will be let down by the gunnery of the battle-cruisers
	
when our day comes.	 -
on the subject of rapidity of fire [1] feel very strongly...and think we should endeavour
to quicken up our firing...the Germans certainly do fire 5 to our 2...
Jefficoe's response was that:
I...am very glad you think all will be well....
I am all for rapidity of fire, but my only fear is that ships may break into rapid fire too
soon, as Qeen Mary I think did. It's all right even if not hitting fshort but no use
Perhaps some of the battlecruisers improved before Jutland, but, on 7 May 1916, Beatty
wrote toJellicoe:
I am sending you the results of the recent firings. The Tiger's was as usual unsatisfactory.
That is, unsupported by rangefinding. Draft letter from Dreyer to unnamed recipient, 26 March 1915 in
DRYR 1/3.
Interview with Admiral Royer Dick (ax Jutland, a midshipman in Barham) and papers of Rear-Admiral S
Tillard cited in Gordon, Rules of the Game (op. cit.) pp.30 and 51. The second quotation is from 'The Diaries
of Stephen King-Hall' in L King-Hall (ed.) Sea Saga (London, 1935) p.436.
Chatfield Xavy and Defence (op. ciL)p.l38.
S King-Hall quoted by Gordon, Rules of the Game, p.30.
Jellicoe to Beatty, 18 and 23 November 1915 and Beatty toJellicoe, 21 November 1915: in Jellicoe Papers
I(op. cit.) pp. 188-9.
W	 rrs LESSONS	 240
Although Beatty was at last considering a replacement, Captain Pelly was still in
command on 31 May 1916.
Ti-rn BATrLE OF JUTLAND5°
In his secret despatch,Jellicoe wrote of the opening action, the Run to the South:
The disturbing feature of the battle-Cruiser action is...that five German battle-cruisers
engaging six British vessels of this class, supported after the first twenty minutes,
although at great range, by...four battle ships of the QUEEN ELIZABETH class, were
yet able to sink the QUEEN MARY and INL)EFATIGABLE...the result cannot be
other than unpalatable.5'
John Campbell's analysis of the engagement indicates that, for every hit made by Beatty's
ships (the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons), Hipper's battlecruisers made almost four
in return. 52
 The purpose of this chapter is to describe the tactical details of the action and
the conditions under which it was fought. If these external factors can be properly
understood, then, in the fmal chapter, it should be possible to determine whether the fire
control tables in Beatty's battlecruisers contributed significantly to the failure of their
gunnery.
Despite many uncertainties, Fig. 6.1 attempts to chart the courses of the two sides
during both phases of the Run to the South. It differs in many details from the charts in
recent books, which are usually similar to Marder's. 53
 The principal course changes are
described in the text, with substantiating detail in the appendices, especially the notes in
Appendix XXVI.
Beatty toJellicoe, 7 May 1916 in Beatty Papers I, p.308.
5° Two recent accounts of the battle are Gordon, Rules of the Game, which is particularly concerned with
British command and signalling: and V E Tarrant. JutlaiuL The Gennan Perspective (London, 1997), which
relies heavily on the German Official History. ArthurJ. Marder, From the Dreadnouglu to Scapa Flow VoLIJI,
Jutland and After (Oxford, 1978) contains a useful account, valuable judgements and comprehensive charts.
C.-in-C. Home Fleets, Action with the German High Sea Fleet 31st May - 1st June 1916 (Secret
Report), l8June 1916 in ADM 137/301. Also in Jellicoe Papers I, p.286.
52 NJ M Campbell, JutlantL An analysis of the fighthig (London, 1986) pp.78, 94 and 354-5. This work is an
indispensable source for the damage caused by hits on both sides. It also provides the only available
detailed breakdown of when the hits were made and by what ships. Unfortunately, it lacks footnotes and
condusions are often stated without explanations. Thus some of its detailed deductions are questionable:
see Gordon, Rules of the Game p.413 and later in this chapter.
Compare FDSF III, Charts 4 and 5 with Campbell, Analysis, pp.44-5 and 57 and Tarrant, German
Perspective, pp.79, 82, 87 and 95.
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FIG. 6.1: JUTLAND: THE RUN TO THE SOUTH (BATrLECRUISERS)
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THE Rursi TO THE Soum: FIRST PHASE
The opposing battlecruisers forces sighted each other between 3.15 and 3.20.
Beatty's ships were headed NE; Lion led the rest of the 1BCS (in order Princess Royal,
Qyeen May and liger) but Beatty had taken no steps to concentrate his squadrons. The
four battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron were some 7 miles on his port beam, a position
from which they were unable to take part in the first phase of the coming engagement.55
The 2BCS (New Zealand followed by Indefatigable) were about 3 miles off Lion's starboard
bow, closest to Hipper's 1St Scouting Group (LiJtow leading Deffluiger, Seydlit, Moltke and
von der Tann in line astern) steaming NWbyN.56 Between 3.25 and 3.30, the 1SG were
sighted from Lion at a range estimated as 23,000 yards.57
 Thus, at that time, there does not
seem to have been much difference between the best visibility from the two sides.
...the weather was misty in patches, the visibility varying from 12 to 6 miles; wind west,
force 3; sea calm.ss
At 3.30, Beatty turned his squadrons together to E, and only then finally decided
that the 2BCS (his weakest ships) should prolong the line astern; 59
 by means of two rapid
16-point turns, Rear-Admiral Pakenham completed the manoeuvre by about 3.42.60
Meanwhile, with his line of retreat threatened, at 3.34, Hipper had ordered a turn away
in succession of 15 points onto course SE. By 3.39, LüLow had probably steadied on the
new course when he called for a speed of 18 knots, having already ordered a distribution
Tarrant, Geiman Perspective (op. cit.) p.69. Appendix II, 'Record of Messages bearing on the Operation' in
Battle of Jut&znsi Ojicial Despatc/ze$ with Appendices (London, 1920) pp.443-452; the signals of the forces
commanded by Beatty are in Appendix XXVII.
In this account, all courses are given in compass points relative to magnetic North, while times are GMT
post-meridiem
' Gordon, Rules of the Game, especially Chapter 6 and FDSF III (op. cit.) pp.57-62 and Chart 4.
Unless stated otherwise, German courses and times in this account are based on Tarrant, Gennan
Perspective, Appendix 10, 'Summary of the More Important Wireless Messages and Visual Signals Relating
to the Battle of Jutland'; the ISG signals are also given here in Appendix XXVII, where the times have
been advanced by one hour to conform with GM'!'.
'Record of Events during Action of May 31st compiled from Records kept in Control Position and
Transmitting Station. H.M.S. Lion' in BTY 6/6. British 'Record of Messages'.
'Narrative of...the Gunnery Officer of H.M.S. "Tiger" in H W Fawcett and G W W Hooper, The
Fightmgatjutland (London, 1921) p.423. See also Captain, New Zealand to RAC, 2BCS, 'Report of Action of
31st May 1916', 2June 1916 in ADM 137/302.
British 'Record of Messages' (op. cit.). 'Battle of 31st May: Narrative of Events' in 'Action with the
German High Sea Fleet, 31st May - 1st June 1916. VABCFs Personal Records', BTY 6/3, NMM (partly
reproduced in Appendix XXVIII).
60 The British 'Record of Messages' times Pakenham's first order at 3.36 while the chart 'Battle ofJutland.
Battle Cruiser Action First Phase 2 p.m. to 3.40 p.m. May 31st 1916', BTY 24/49 suggests thatNew Zealand





WAR AND rrs LESSONS	 243
of fire from the left (XXVI-2). Between the leading ships, the range was, therefore, now
closing at almost 550 yds/min (XXVI-3). Subsequently, the German battlecruisers made
only one more course alteration, of 2 points together to SSE at 3.44, 'to close the enemy
more rapidly'. When they opened fire at 3.47, their targets and ranges were:
Lütow	 16,800 yards	 Lion






	 17,700 yards	 Indefatigable6'
Thus von der Tann missed out New Zealand (Fig. 6.2); perhaps she had found it difficult to
keep on one target while the 2BCS twice reversed course.
Once the 2BCS had hauled into line, Beatty made his only fire distribution
signal, for the leading pair (lion and Princess Royal) to concentrate (on Lüt.ow). A minute
earlier, a flag signal ordered the formation of a line of bearing NW, but this was followed
Not to scale. 	 der Tann
British courses and relative
positions approximate only. 	
Mole
Royal	 Lion	 -
FIG. 6.2: RuN TO li-IE S0uTI-I: Ir'. mAL FraE DISTRIBUTION
Admiralty, Naval Staff, The Batik ofjutland (The German OffiialAccount), from Der ICn€g zur See, 1914-1918,
North Sea, Volume Vby Captain 0 Groos, trans. Ueut.-Commander W T Bagot, RN, May 1926, pp.57-8,
AL
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(either immediately or at 3.47) by a second signal, to turn together to ESE.62 The first
signal alone would have resulted in all the ships astern of Lion turning to port, further
increasing the rate and ensuring that their after turrets could not bear. Thus both signals
were probably intended to be read and acted upon together by turns to starboard;
however, since the signals were sent separately, perhaps with as much as two minutes
between them, they could well have created confusion in the British line (XXVI-4). Even
if they were correctly interpreted, only the leading ships turned to the course ESE or close
to it,63 alterations which were urgently needed to reduce the rate and open the turret
training angles. And, unfortunately, the move had already been countered by Hipper's
turn to SSE, which kept the range between the flagships closing at 570 yds/min
(XXVI-3).
Lion and P,incess Royal returned the German fire immediately (both ships timed
their first salvoes at 3.47'/2) but Tiger did not open until a minute or so later, with Qjeen
Mary about two minutes later still. 65 .New Zealand opened at 3.51. The targets and initial


















62 Compare the British 'Record of Messages' and Beatty's Personal Narrative (op. cii.). Lion's 'Record of
Events' (op. ci.) states that she altered course to starboard at 3.43 (one point) and 3.46 (unspecified).
63 This interpretation of the signals is largely based on advice concerning fleetwork in general and
line-of-bearing manoeuvres from Captain Peter Grindal, RN, whose comments on the previous draft of this
chapter have been most helpful.
Lion's 'Record of Events'. 'H.M.S. "PRINCESS ROYAL", Fore T.S. Record of Action, 31st May 1916'
inADM 116/1487.
65 H.M.S. "TIGER", Gunnery Records during Action of 31st May 1916 in ADM 116/1487. Captain Pelly
to VAC BCF, 6 June 1916 and Report by MidshipmanJ L Storey of Qyeen Maiy, 3 June 1916, both in
ADM 137/302 (the latter states that QyeenMiny began firing at 3.53).
° H.M.S. "NEW ZEALAND", 'Action with German Fleet 31st May 1916. Record of Ranges, Rates, etc.
Compiled from Transmitting Station & Control Top Records' in ADM 116/1487 times her first salvo at
3.57. However, Appendix I to 'Second Battle Cruiser Squadron. Report on Action of 31st May 1916', 3
June 1916 in ADM 137/302 gives the time for Lion's opening fire as 3.54, so it has been assumed that New
Zealand's times were six minutes fast. See also Campbell, Analysis (op. ci.) pp.39 and 48. Her adjusted times
are shown here in italics.
67 Lion's 'Record of Events'. P,incess Royal, 'Record of Action' Tiger, 'Gunnery Records'. .Nw Zealand,
'Record of Ranges'. Storey, 'Report' (all op. ci.).
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Thus Beatty's ships were disadvantaged fourfold. Since the actual range was about 16,000
yards, at least four opened with ranges that were far too high. They were attempting to
reform their line under fire in accordance with the muddled signals from Lion. The after
turrets of the 2BCS, and probably of 7ger and Qjieen Mwy, could not bear (XXVI-5). And
both Qjseen May and 7igeT were shooting at their opposite numbers, so Derfflinger was not
under fire.
Beatty's despatch appears to be deliberately misleading about his conduct of the
approach; nonetheless, it establishes that smoke interference was a problem during the
approach - and that the general visibility was not.69
At 3.30 p.m. I increased speed to 25 knots and formed the Line of Battle, the 2nd Battle
Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron....I turned to
E.S.E., slightly converging on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000 yards,
and formed the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke....The visibility at this time
was good, the sun behind us and the wind S.E.7°
However, all other sources describe the wind as a light Westerly breeze, though they differ
somewhat in the extent and timing of a shift from NW to SW (XXVI-6). 7 ' This wind
would have piled up the smoke astern while on course E, and carried it onto the engaged
side, especially after the turns to ESE; on either course, the solution was a line of bearing
NW (XXVI-4). Even before it was formed, Lion, at the head of the line, should not have
been troubled by smoke, while her smoke evidently did not affect Princess Royal; the second
British ship had no difficulty in making out '5 Enemy Battle Cruisers in sight' at 3.34.45,
and, at 3.42, she chose the 'Right hand ship ("Lutzow" class)' as her target. 72 Her initial
range was by far the most accurate of Beatty's ships: while her rate of -400 yds/min. was
the most accurate known from either side.73
I think that at this time all the battle cruisers except "P.R." had underestimated the rate;
we had [in Tger].74
Campbell, Anaiysis, p.39.Julian Corbett, History of the Great War based on Official Documents..aual Operations
Volume III (London, 1923) p.334. Chatfield, Nazy and Defence, p.142.
'The visibility was good but not abnormal' although, after opening fire: 'They had the advantage of
light...' Midshipman N G Garnon-Williams, stationed in Lion's conning tower. Papers of Captain N G
Garnon-Wilhiams, 85/26/1, IWM.
° VAC BCFto C.-in-C. Grand Fleet, l2June 1916 in Beatty Papers!, p.326: also in ADM 137/302.
von Haze, pp.153-4. Appendix Ill, 'Report by the Commander-in-Chief of the German High Sea Fleet
on the Battle of Jutland, 4 July 1916' in Jutland, Qificial Despatches (op. cit.). 'Narrative from H.M.S.
"Indomitable" p.243 and liger's Gunnery Officer (op. cit.) p.423 in Fightmg at Jut/and (op. cit.). Admiral Pelly,
300,000 &a Mi/as (London, 1938) p.165. New Zealand to RAC 2BCS (op. cit.).
72 Princess Royal, 'Record of Action').
" 'Narrative from Officers of H.M.S. "Princess Royal" in Fighthzg aejutland, p.18.
' Tiger's Gunnery Officer, p.421. New Zealand, 'Record of Ranges' gives -200 yds/min. Denjlinger's opening
rate was -220 yds/min: von Haze, p.1 45-7.
i'n ns LESSONS	 246
In marked contrast, 7ger's 'Gunnery Record' does not even begin until 3.44
with:




Enemy reported in sight from "Lion".
Sighted enemy B.C.S. apparently 3,






18.500	 4th ship from
right, "Seydlitz"
class
Even after liger opened fire:
Enemy opened fire.
"Lion" opened fire.
Considerable interference from own
T.B.Ds' smoke.
The top reported that the funnel smoke of our battle cruisers ahead made their view
very bad...."
Information about Qyeen Maiy is necessarily scarce. Though next ahead from liger, she
opened fire later, and, although she was regarded as the crack gunnery ship of the B CF,76
her initial range was probably a thousand yards too high. Furthermore, like Tiger, she
fired at her opposite number in the German line. Yet (subject to ensuring that no ship was
left unfired at) Grand Fleet orders emphasised the importance, if numbers permitted, of
concentrating on an enemy's leading ship or ships; 77
 this was the distribution scheme
assumed, without orders, by Princess Royal at 3.42, ordered from Lion at 3.46 and adopted
by the 2BCS. It seems unlikely that Qlseen May and Tiger would have chosen differently:
and, probably, they did not in fact do so. If Qjteen Ma-y, like Tiger, could not at first see
Li2t.ow, SydliL and Molike would have appeared to have been their correct targets.
Evidently, by the time of her first salvo, the mistake was apparent in Tiger, but, with smoke
interference from both battlecruisers and destroyers, there was neither time nor
opportunity for either ship to change target. Thus Beatty's delay in reforming his line 'to
clear the smoke' had particularly bad effects on these two ships. Not only did they select
the wrong targets, but they were able to begin ranging and plotting only a few minutes
(three in the case of Tiger) before their opponents opened fire, while, even then, they were
Ti.ger, 'Gunnery Records' and Tiger's Gunnery Officer, pp.423-4.
76 Midshipman G M Lady, 'Account of Jutland' in 'Life in the Battle Cruiser Fleet 1916' in papers of
Commander GM Lady, 86/58/1, IWM.
Pelly to Beatty, 31 January 1915 (summarised to justify Tiger's firing for a time at the leading enemy ship
during the Battle of the Dogger Bank). See also Beatty memorandum of 17 July 1913. Both in Beatçy Papers
I, pp.75 and 213-4.
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still not free from smoke interference. It is not surprising that their opening ranges and
rates were inaccurate.
Since Xew Zealand's Captain was 'rather impressed by the little smoke
interference there was', 78
 the 2BCS must have come into line on Tiger's port quarter.
However, their violent manoeuvres created conditions of rapidly changing bearings, heel
and vibration which made ranging impossible; it was not until 3.45 that )iew Zealand:
'Commenced ranging on the 4th ship from the right'. 79
 With the IBCS making 24 knots,
the 2BCS also had to recover the speed lost in the turns; when she opened fire, her
engines were making over 300 revolutions per minute, more than she had managed at the
Dogger Bank,8° so all her rangefinders must have been subjected to considerable
vibration. Thus the ranging of the 2BCS was disrupted by the struggle both to join and to
stay in line.8'
Lion's rangetakers had none of the difficulties experienced by those in the four
rear ships, yet they failed conspicuously to match the standard set by Princess RqyaL Lion's
TS record contains only two rangefinder ranges from the period of the approach: 20,000
yards at 3.42 and 18,500 yards at 3.46. From the calculated rates, it can be estimated that
they were too high by, respectively, 900 and 1,600 yards (XXVI-3). Yet her TS did not
even accept the implied rate of -375 yds/min. When fire was opened at 3.47'/2, the rate in
use was only -150 yds/min: while the opening range was still 18,500 yards, as though,
since 3.46, there had been no rate at all. And the other recorded rates suggest that,
throughout the approach, their estimate of enemy course was insufficiently converging by
as much as 4 points.82
 It appears that, despite Beatty's reassurances toJellicoe, the whole
fire control organisation of his flagship was no more efficient than it had been during the
practices of late 1915.
Somehow, Beatty himself seems to have been aware of the German course, since
he reported it by wireless toJellicoe at 3.45 as S 550 E; this was barely 3° different from
their SE'ly course held until a minute before (XXVI-8). However, he may not have been
aware of the serious gunnery implications. Admiral Goodenough, though an admirer,
78 .Mw Zealand to RAC 2BCS.
New zealand, 'Record of Ranges'.
80 Eady, 'With the Battle-Cruiser-Fleet atJutland' in 'Life in the BCF" (op. cit.). Lady claimed 327 rpm. and
29.7 knots but these figures must be exaggerated. On trial, New Zealand managed 26.39 knots at 300 rpm:
John Roberts, Bait. ecniisers (London, 1997) p.80.
81 For the effects of vibration at high speed, see Chatfield, Xaz?y and Defence, p.109.
62 Lion, 'Record of Events'. Note XXVI-7.
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admitted that the pre-eminence of 'that ardent spirit Lord Beatty' did not derive from
'great professional knowledge, certainly not of gun or torpedo'. 83 Unfortunately, at this
critical moment, Beatty was unable to turn to his flag-captain, on whose gunnery expertise
he customarily relied.M Chatfield recalled:
I was on the compass platform...Beatty remained for a time on his own bndge...with
[his staff]. I wanted him to come on the compass platform and sent a message to
Seymour, telling him to advise Beatty that the range was closing rapidly and that we
ought almost at once to be opening fire....But I could get no reply, the Vice-Admiral
was engaged in an important message to the Commander-in-Chief. 18,000 [ic] yards. I
told Longhurst [the gunnery commander] to be ready to open fire immediately.0
Thus Chatfield implies that Beatty was preoccupied with signalling and had not yet
realised that they were already within the range at which they must expect a rapid and
accurate fire from the German ships. Another possibility is that Beatty deliberately chose
to ignore Chatfield's conclusions after the Dogger Bank and to follow his own intention to
press in to 12-14,000 yards: in which case their separation denied Chatfield a final
opportunity to warn against such a dangerous tactic.
Whatever the explanation, Hipper was in no doubt about the consequences of
Beatty's headlong approach.
The fact that the English Battlecruisers, [possibly] on account of bad light conditions or
perhaps forming line of Battle too late, delayed opening fire, allowed us too to withhold
our fire until the enemy was in effective gun range (15,000-16,000 yards). The
possibility of obtaining a rapid gunnery superiority...is principally to be attributed to
this delay in opening fire which compelled the enemy to remain a longer time within
effective gun range.
The light now favoured the Germans, especially for spotting, since they were 'against a
dark grey background, whilst we were silhouetted against the Western sky'. 87
 The effects
of the fire from the 1SG were quickly felt; by 3.52, both Lion and 7iger had been hit
twice.88
 Hipper held his course SSE until 3.53, which brought the range down to less than
13,000 yards; he then probably turned Iiitow away to SE before ordering his ships to
follow in her wake.89 Even before she was hit, at 3.49, Lion began a series of unsignalled
William Goodenough, A Rough Record (London, 1943) p.91.
Roskill,Beally,p.131.
83 Chatfield,jVavy and Defence, pp.141-2.
Hipper to Scheer, 'Lessons from the Skaggerak Battle' in DRYR 6/10 and ADM 137/1644.
87 
'Diaries of Stepen King-Hall' (op. cit.) p.45l. See also Chatfield, Navy and Defence, p.14!.
88 Campbell, Analysis, pp.40-i, 67 and 73-4.
89 German 'Summary of Messages'. von Hase, p.152. 'German Plan IV. Battle Cruiser Action', BTY
24/37. Note XXVI-ll.
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turns away;9° thus there was no possibility of even the 1BCS completing the formation of a
regular line of bearing. By 3.55, lion had steadied on a course SbyE, which she held until
4.00; thus, after 3.55, the range between the leading ships was opening at a rate of 460
yds/min. or even more.9'
Without signals from the flagship, Beatty's other battlecruisers were left as best
they could to follow his movements. Princess Royal also 'gradually altered to southward',
but she seems to have got into lion's smoke, as well as being subjected to Derfflinger's
undisturbed fire; thus she was unable to make anything of her accurate opening range and
rate before her fire was badly disrupted at 3.56 by a hit on her Argo rangefinder tower.92
Qjseen Mazy made the first British hit, on Seydlitz, at 3.55, while her second hit, at 3.57,
burned out the after superfiring turret; 93 she evidently had few problems with smoke from
ahead, which suggests that she made a wider turn than Princess RoyaL Qyeen Mary's
survivors did not recall any hits on their ship until much later, but Tiger was hit
repeatedly by Moltke, after which Q and X turrets were incapable of accurate fire for the
rest of the battle. 95 Also, 7iger's gun ranges continued downwards after 3.55 to reach a
minimum of 10,500 yards just after 4 o'clock, while Moltke's ranges are also surprisingly
low about that time. All this suggests that, until then, 7ger's courses were more Easterly
than those of the rest of the 1BCS (Note XXVI-12).
At the rear of the British line, the 2BCS was still headed E at 25 knots when
firing began and remained on this course until 3.54, when they turned six points to SSE97.
These courses kept them well clear of smoke from the 1BCS to starboard: while the turn
altered the rate from almost -800 yds/min. closing to under +300 yds/min. opening and
allowed the after turrets to bear (XXVI- 13). Their large turn probably disrupted ranging
9° The British 'Record of Messages' contains no course signals from Beatty between 3.45 and 4.40.
'Track of BCF 11.0 P.M. to IX.24 P.M. 31/5/16' (undated but apparently enclosed with BCF reports) in
'Jutland. Plans, Diagrams, Track, Charts, Photographs, &c ADM 137/303; also in ADM 137/2 147.
'Battle ofJutland. Battle Cruiser Action. Second Phase 3.40 to 5 P.M., May 31st 1916', BTY 24/51. Lion,
'Record of Events'. Notes XXVI-9, -10 and -11.
PiincessRoya4 'Record of Action'. Captain Cowan to RAC IBCS and 'Notes on Action' with RAC 1BCS
to VAC in ADM 137/302. British 'Record of Messages' for 3.55. Notes XXVI-10 and -1 1,
Campbell,Analysis, pp. 41 and 80-3.
M W Williams, The Loss of HMS Queen Mary atJutland' in D McLean and A Preston (eds.) Warship
1996 (London, 1996), p.122.
Campbell, Analysis, pp.7 I-5. For the effects of hits on Q and X turrets, see Lt. Cmdr. Macnamara to
Captain Pelly, 4June 1916 in BTY 6/6.
Tger, 'Gunnery Records'. German QffieialAccount (op. cit.) p.62.
91 
'Second BCS Report'. The small 'Tracing of track followed by Second Battle Cruiser Squadron...'
(originally enclosed with this report and now in ADM 137/303) confirms the time but shows a course of
SEbyS.
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and aiming and added to the control problems due to their large opening errors; neither
.Afew Zealand nor Int'Iefatigable made any hits either before or after 3•54•98 However, the
initial high rate reduced the range to a minimum of 13,450 yards, close enough for von deT
Tann to bring her secondary 5.9-inch guns into action.99
At 4.00, the 1 SG was ordered to turn together to SEbyS;'°° if they were already
headed SE, this would have been a turn towards. At the same nominal time, both
flagships found each other's range. Lütow was hit twice while a single hit wrecked Lion's Q
turret. Her TS record of target bearings (XXVI- 10) shows that, at this moment, Lion
turned away rapidly by almost three points so that, at least momentarily, A and B turrets
were not bearing: though, by 4.04, despite three more hits, she had been brought back
onto a new course S.'°' lion's sudden swing to starboard was confirmed by her Captain.
It was at this moment [after Qturret had been knocked out], seeing that the range was
decreasing and not wishing to let it do so, I told Commander Strutt to steer 5 degrees to
starboard. Strutt gave the order. The Chief Quartermaster, however, misheard it as
ordering him to give the ship 5 degrees of port helm. I suddenly saw the ship swinging
off to starboard rapidly and had to bring her back and increase speed to resume our
station. The ships astern, having seen the large flame shooting up, thought we were
steering off because of the damage!
At 4.25, soon after we resumed our position ahead of the "Princess Royal"...the "Queen
Mary"...blew up exactly as had "Indefatigable")02
Meanwhile, at about 4.02, von der Tann succeeded in straddling Indefatigable with two
salvoes in quick succession; at least two 11-inch shells from each were observed to hit and,
shortly after the second salvo, Indefatigable blew up, vanishing entirely under a great pall of
black smoke)°3
As the two lines drew apart at the end of this first phase of the Run to the South:
From the Liitcow it appeared about this time [c.4.05] as if the British flagship hauled out
of line, with a list of 10 degrees to starboard; she seemed to disappear at times behind
the other vessels wrapped in a thick pall of smoke....At times the enemy's fire ceased
Since Moiths was the target of Tiger as well as New 2ea1and, each ship's fall of shot may well have confused
the other's spotting.
Gennan Official AccowzS, p.61.
°° German 'Summary of Messages'.
'°' Campbell, Anaysis, pp.41-2, 64-9 and 78-9. Lion, 'Record of Events'. Beatty's Personal Narrative. 'Track
of BC? (which shows a turn from SbyE to S at 4.00).
'°2 Chatfield, Naty and Dfence, p.143. However, the ranges in Lion's Record of Events were increasing
(XVI-10). In a letter to Keyes datedJanuary 1923 (in KEYES/15, BL), Chatfield gave a different and more
likely explanation of what may have been, at first, a small turn to throw out the enemy fire: 'Lion actually
made one considerable swing to Starboard about 2 Pts. Owing to Comd (N) saying Port 5 and then
forgetting he had done so'. This is a common error (Captain Grindal).
'°3 Campbell, Analysic, pp.60-2. Note XXVI-14.
WAi. ANCI rrs LESSONS	 251
altogether and the tactical cohesion of the British line appeared to be seriously
shaken.'°4
Beatty's ships had made only six hits, whereas they had received at least 22 in return.105
The consequences of Beatty's tactics, aggravated by an unfavourable position for spotting,
are amply sufficient to explain the rapid loss of gunnery superiority. His approach was too
steep to allow enough time: firstly to get the 2nd BCS into line astern: secondly to form
the line-of-bearing necessary to avoid mutual smoke interference: thirdly to allow all ships
to range and plot in favourable circumstances: and fourthly to keep the enemy at the long
ranges which exploited the advantages conferred by the heavier guns of the 1st BCS.
Instead, when they came under fire, the British battlecruisers were already within their
opponents' effective range: they were still trying to reform their line in accordance with
Lion's confusing signals: some ships were still hampered by smoke: not all their turrets
were bearing: only one ship had obtained an accurate opening range and rate: and,
despite their numerical superiority, one of their opponents was not even under fire.
TI-IE Rurr TO fl-is Soum: SEcaNt) PHASE
After the sinking of Ind€fiztigable, Hipper turned his ships together at 4.04 to SbyE
but his leading ships were soon obliged to cease firing as the range continued to increase.
Between 4.07 and 4.10, he again altered together to the slightly converging course of
SbyW. The 1SG increased speed to 23 knots at 4.12, while Lütow probably altered one
point away to South before, at 4.18, Hipper ordered his other ships to follow in his wake.
They then held a steady course until 4.27.106
By 4.10, Beatty's ships were all on course S with Lion (as Chatfield confirms) still
out of line to starboard of Princess Royal and Qyeen Ma?,. 7iger and Xew zealand were further
astern, with, for a time, 7ger nearer to the enemy. Lion and Qjieen Mary (as far as can be
known) were continuing to fire steadily at their opposite numbers, while hew ea1and was
now firing at von thr Tann;'°7
 Ttger was attempting to keep her guns on the Moilke, but, due
to her damaged turrets and a suspect director, she could only fire her shots in ones and
German QificialAccount, pp.61-2.
'°5 Carnpbell, Analysis, Chapter 5. The ricochets which struck Lion and Tiger (the latter 'probably hit in the
first 10 minutes' ) - pp.67 and 75 - have not been included in German total.
German 'Summary of Messages'. German Official Account, p.63. 'German Plan IV. Battle Cruiser Action',
BTY 24/37. The last two time the turn to SbyW at 4.10. The chart shows a course S after 4.18.
'°7 Lion's courses from 'BCF Track Chart' and inferred from target bearings in Lion, 'Record of Events'. New
Zealand, 'Record of Ranges'. Notes XXVI-10 and -15.
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twos, while some of these were probably aimed at Seydlit.'°8 Between 3.55.15 and 4.15.28,
Princess Royals record contains only one range (19,100 yards at 4.06.50) and no indication
that she changed target;'°9 however, von Hase of De'rfflinger implies that she had done so
even before Indefatigable was destroyed, while, even if this was not the case, it is most
unlikely that Princess Royal left her opposite number undisturbed after the British line was
reduced to five ships."°
At about ten past four, the 5BS were at last able to open fire, initially at von der
Tann, which was hit almost immediately at a range of 19,000 yards; they were soon able
to concentrate 'a regular hail of 15-inch projectiles' on Moltke as well." Beatty then
turned Lion to a course SE, which, from 4.12, began to close the range at about -710
yds/min. Although apparently without the aid of signals from the flagship, Admiral Brock
in Princess Royal responded appropriately by altering to SSE; thus, by 4.19-20, Lion had
drawn ahead, when she too turned SSE. By then, Hipper had also altered away to South,
so the calculated rate works out at just over -250 yds/min." 2
 During this new approach
by the British ships, Lütow was hit twice and Seydlit once, the latter by Qyeen Ma?, at
4.17, when the ranges were probably still about 18,000 yards." 3 However, as the range
fell, at 4.15-17 the 1SG were able to reopen fire."4
Once more the "Lion" was covered by the German fire, receiving several hits and, due
partly to a still fiercely burning fire from an earlier hit, she became so enveloped in
smoke and fumes as to be at times invisible from ships astern of the "Lutzow"."5
von Hase confirms that Lion could not be seen from Derfflinger, LQtow's next astern, though
the reason he gives is somewhat different.
At [4.17] I again engaged the second battlecruiser from the left. I was under the
impression that it was the same ship as I had engaged before, the Princess RoyaL Actually,
however, it was the Qyeen Mwy....this was due to the fact that, just as I was finding my
target, Admiral Beatty's flagship, the Lion, was obliged to fall out of the enemy line for a
time, and, owing to the heavy smoke covering the enemy line, could not be seen by us.
'°8 7ger, 'Gunnery Records'. 7ger's Gunnery Officer, pp.424-5.
'°9 Princess Royal, 'Record of Action'.
"°von Haze, p.150. However, Campbell, Analyses, p.79 assumes that Princess Royal was still firing at Liuzow.
lii Captain A W Craig (Barizam), 'Report of Action of 31st May 1916' in ADM 137/302. Beatty's Personal
Narrative and VAC BCF to C.-in-C. (op. cit.) p.326. German OfficialAccount, p.64.
" 2 'Track of BCF'. Beatty's Personal Narrative. Lion, 'Record of Events'. 'Officers of Princess Royal' (op. cit.)
p.19. Note XXVI- 15. For rates, see Chapter 2.
Campbell, Anaiysis, pp.48 and 79-80. As explained above and in XX\TI15, the two hits on Liitow at
about 4.15 were probably by Lion, not Princess RoyaL
U4 von Haze, p.152. Lion, 'Record of Events'.
" German Official Account, p.66.
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von Hase cannot be correct about the time at which Lion fell out of line but, nonetheless,
she had still not regained her proper position at the head of the line and remained hidden
from Defflinger. Unfortunately, Seydlitz did not make the same mistake in identifying her
target, so both German ships concentrated on Qyeen May."6
Beatty's ships remained in the windward position, from which smoke
interference would again be a problem if they did not form a line of bearing inclined
towards the enemy. In addition, they now had the worst of the visibility. In the first
version of his despatch, Beatty wrote that:
The visibility to the North Eastward had become considerably reduced and the outline
of the ships very indistinct. This, no doubt was largely due to the constant use of smoke
balls or charges by the enemy, under cover of which they were continually altering
course or zig-zagging.
The reference to imaginary smoke balls was omitted from the published version of his
despatch, while the only German ships that needed to zig-zag were those under the hot
fire from the 5BS. Nevertheless, there is no reason to doubt the deterioration in visibility,
particularly for the British battlecruisers." 7 Lion's high ranges (she recorded rangefinder
ranges of 23,000 yards at 4.12 and 21,000 yards at 4.16) are explicable, at least to some
extent, by her position out of line and the increased difficulty in rangetaking. Nonetheless,
they fell at an average rate of -525 yds/min., not much less than the calculated value.
Unfortunately, this trend was largely disregarded; the rates in use just before and after the
turn to SSE were still only -200 and -150 yds/min., though the small rate reduction
indicates that Lion's fire controllers were just beginning to recognise their mistake."8
Unlike the first approach, nothing suggests that Beatty had any more accurate
information to guide him: while, from the ranges known for his other ships between 4.15
and 4.20, it appears that no one on the British side realised the extent to which they were
converging on the 1SG." 9
 Perhaps they had been misled by Hipper's change of course
and formation at 4.18. After the three earlier hits on Lutow and Seydlitz, their fire
probably had no further effect, since it is much more likely that the two hits at 4.20 and
4.23 on von der Tann were made by the 5BS rather than Tger.' 2° Thus, although Princess
116 von Hose, pp.154 and 159.
" 7 VAC BCFto C.-in-C. pp.326 and 328. Extract from Beatty's report in 'Jellicoe's Despatch...as published
in...the London Gazette of 4thJuly 1916' in Jel&oe Papers I, p.293. See also 'Diaries of Stephen King-Hall' (op.
cit.) pp.451-5.
'Lion, 'Record of Events'.
U9 Princess Roya1, 'Record of Action'. Tiger, 'Gunnery Records'. Xew 2ea1and, 'Record of Ranges'.
°Campbdll, AnaySiI, pp.89-94 attributes these hits without explanation to Tiger. Since her fire was by then
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Royal was not even under fire, after 4.17 the shooting of the British battlecruisers did
nothing to take the pressure off Qyeen Mary, while lion received two hits from LüLow at
4.24.121 Qj4een Mary had probably already been hit twice by &ydlit before, at 4.21, the
right gun of Q turret was put out of action. von Hase spotted Derfflinger's first straddle at
4.22.40, when his rate was -330 yds/min. After spotting the fall of the next three salvoes,
he ordered rapid fire, which produced six salvoes with an average interval of only 22
seconds; at 4.26, after two further hits, Qyeen Mary was sunk by explosions in her fore and
midships magazines.
At 4.25, Princess Royal's ranges were beginning to converge on Derfflinger's. There
is then an unexplained gap of almost six minutes in Princess Royal's salvo record. Since
Beatty originated a wireless order at 4.25 ordering her to 'Keep clear of smoke', it appears
that, once again, she had failed to keep out of the flagship's smoke. Princess Royal may have
responded to the signal by turning to SE for a time.' 23 She now became the target for
DerfflingeT and Campbell assumes that the British ship received three further hits; however,
they were not well documented and their effects were slight, so only one (on the second
funnel) has been included here in the German total.'24
Only a minute after the destruction of Qyeen Mary, Hipper turned away to SE,'25
so that the range began to increase. Tiger narrowly avoided the wreck by hauling out to
port; she changed target to SeydliL but herself became the target for Seydlitz as well as
Molt/c€ and received three further hits. Her ranges fell to improbably low values but it does
appear that, once again, she got closest to the enemy. 26 After losing sight of von der Tann,
at 4.17 Xew ea1and had shifted her fire to MoiLke, but her ranges did not begin to decrease
decisively until after she had passed the wreck of Qyeen Mary on its starboard side. Her
ranges did not fall as far as those of her consorts, while there are several gaps in her salvo
record;' 27 thus it appears that she remained somewhere on their starboard quarter and
erratic (Note XXVI-! 6), they might have been lucky hits: except thai, when her fire strayed, it was towards
the head of the German line (7iger's Gunnery Officer, pp.424-5). 	 -
I2 Beatty's Personal Narrative. Campbell, Analysis, pp.67-9.
122 Williams, 'Loss of Qyeen Maiy' (op. cii.) pp.122-5 and 132. Campbell, Anaiysis, pp.62-4. Note XXVI-15
concludes that Seyd&z made three hits up to 4.21 and Deifflàiger two at 4.26. von Haze, p.160; for rapid fire,
see also pp.148-9.
' 25 Princess R9ya4 'Record of Action'. British 'Record of Messages'. 'Officers of Princess Royal' p.19.
Haze, pp.! 62-4. Campbell, Analysis, pp.69-71.
German 'Summary of Messages'.
Williams, 'Loss of ()penMarj', p.129. Tiger, 'Gunnery Record'. Campbell, Anaiysis, pp.47-8 and 73-5.
'J'Iew Zeahmd, 'Record of Ranges'.
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that, as would be expected, their smoke interfered at times with her fire. As in the first
phase, she made no hits on either of her targets.
For the second phase of the Run to the South, the 1 SG must be allowed at least
another 12 hits on the British battlecruisers: whereas, if the two hits on von der Tann are
discounted, the British battlecruiser tally was only three.' 28
 These three were all made at
the start, when ranges were long, and hint at what might have been accomplished if the
approach had been less precipitate. Unfortunately, these early successes were not
sustained, though for different reasons. Lion's ranges were again too few, while her
transmitting station ignored their clear downward trend and the rate in use was
insufficiently closing until after her turn from SE to SSE. Princess Rqyal's ranges were
converging on Deriflinger's at 4.25, but, at this critical moment, Princess Rqyal once more got
into lion's smoke. Tiger's previous damage rendered her target selection uncertain and her
fire ragged and ineffective. J'Iew zealand's own gunnery record shows that she was slow in
reducing the range and suggests that she suffered from smoke interference once she did so.
Thus neither of the rear ships supported its consorts effectively.
Beatty's tactics again failed to exploit the advantage of his heavier guns. Lion's
rapid approach without signals left Admiral Brock little time to decide for himself how
best to prevent any risk of collision, allow the flagship to regain the head of the line and
avoid smoke interference. All these things could not be accomplished before the Germans
were able to reopen fire within their effective range and with the visibility in their favour.
Beatty's ships once more found themselves forming their line under fire, while at least two
of them were soon to be hampered by smoke; the 1SG, despite the efforts of the 5BS at
very long range, soon regained gunnery superiority. Most importantly, because Beatty
commenced his approach before reforming his line, Lion was partly obscured so that
DeTfflinger selected the third ship as her target. And, because the fire of the other British
battlecruisers was too ineffective to punish the German mistake, Derfflinger and Seydlit
were able to concentrate undisturbed on Qyeen Mary, with terrible consequences for her
and her crew.
While Beatty's conduct of both approaches disadvantaged his ships even before
fire was opened, the 1 SG were successful in exploiting to the full the advantages handed
to them. Their most rapid rate of fire was so impressive that, after Jutland, the Royal
I28 der Tann made one hit on Barham: while the 5BS scored at least 5, probably 7, on uon der Tann and
Moithe.
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Navy assumed its opponents had fired multiple salvoes in quick succession, even while still
finding the target. This led to adoption, in the new 1916 Spotting Rules, of the ladder
system, under which pairs of salvoes were fired in quick succession, separated by a fixed
distance, both being spotted before firing the next pair.' In fact, no evidence has been
found that the Germans used ladders atJufland. While finding their targets, they and the
British mostly fired at similar rates, with, typically, around 50 seconds between salvoes
(XXVI-16). However, the distinguishing feature of the German firing was their use of
rapid unspotted fire, but only when the target had already been consistently straddled.
LQtow and von deT Tann both fired in this way' 3° but the system is described most clearly by
von Hase of DerfflingeT.
...now I had found the target....the transmitting station was to give the order
"Salvoes-flre!" to the heavy guns once every 20 seconds....While the firing was going on
any observation was out of the question....Naturally such furious rapid fire could only
be maintained for a limited time....It was not long before our salvoes fell over or
short....Each salvo was then directed afresh and this continued until the target was again
straddled. And then the devil's concert began again on the order "Good, Rapid".'3'
The British gunnery records for the Run to the South contain no sequence of repeated
straddles followed by a rapid burst, all at a steady rate, like that which sank Qjieen May.'32
In marked contrast, when J'Iew Zealand opened fire at 3.51, she broke immediately into
rapid salvoes fired mostly at 30 second intervals;' 33 this wild fusillade (undoubtedly
another case of taldng 'the rapidity ideas...to excess') must have made consistent spotting
impossible, and she made not a single hit.
Yet, later in the battle, British battlecruisers and battleships also demonstrated
that the key to effective shooting was to follow up consistent straddles with bursts of rapid
salvoes. After straddling, Barliam 'fired four more salvoes rapid and straddled again'. At
5.44 and 6.19, Lion ordered rapid fire and made hits on Lutzow with salvoes fired at
half-minute intervals.' 35 Just before Invincible was sunk, when she had been hitting Lutow
repeatedly, Admiral Hood was urging her Control Officer to 'keep at it as quickly as you
' 29 Roberts, Battlea'uise,s, p.94. FDSFHI, p.196.
°German OjicialAccount, p.61. Campbell, Analysis, pp.40,43,61 and 364. Note XXVI-16.
131 von Hase, pp.148-9. When ranges were less than 13,000 m. two salvoes from the secondary armament
were fired after each heavy salvo.
'32 ibiiL p.160, reproduced in XXVI-1 6.
'"Xew Zealand, 'Record of Ranges'.
Blackett, 'Naval Diary', 31 May 1916.
" Lion, 'Record of Events'. Campbell, Anaiysis, pp.1 35, 183 and 264. Piincess Rqyal's 'Record of Action' does
not support Campbell's tentative attribution to her of the hit on Lutcow at 5.45. Lützow was hit twice c.6. 19.
Lion also fired 14 rapid salvoes, though with large spotting corrections until the 9th, from 8.22 until 8.28
(one hit on De,ffThger at 8.28).
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can, every shot is telling'.' 36 And Iron Duke (Flag Captain Frederic Dreyer) gave what
Campbell describes as 'a fine display of speedy and accurate firing' against K?Jnig.' 37 The
target was sighted at 6.26 but fire was not opened until 6.30.25, time enough for the
Dreyer Table Mark IV to establish the enemy course as 'slightly converging' and the
range as 11,000 yards. The spread of the range plot of 500 yards determined the size of
the opening bracket. After four salvoes (at intervals of 35, 40 and 50 seconds), the third
and fourth were spotted as hits, after which rapid fire was ordered, the next three salvo
intervals being 30, 25 and 23 seconds. The salvo rate then slowed as ICdng turned away
into the mist:' 38
 but not before she had received at least seven direct hits.'39
After the battle, a Grand Fleet Gunnery & Torpedo Order acknowledged the
usefulness of the Dreyer Tables in difficult conditions.
Notwithstanding the bad light and mist, some ships obtained good ranges which proved
of great value, and it was again proved that every conceivable method should be
employed to gain data with which to feed the fire control table. The difficulties
introduced by enemy and our own alterations of course, speed, etc. make this
imperative. The deflection must also be watched closely.'40
Supporters of Pollen, like Herbert Richmond, took the view that Dreyer, asJellicoe's flag
captain, could and did stifle any criticisms from the Fleet of 'his' tables.I+I However,
Beatty and Chatfield bore no responsibility for the Navy's fire control equipment; if they
believed that the Dreyer Tables had in any way failed them, they would surely have
seized on the excuse. In fact, the Battle Cruiser Fleet's own committee on the lessons
learned concluded:
The action...appears to show that more value was obtained from rangefinders by some
ships than by others, and that at such times as the enemy was on a steady course
undoubted assistance was received from the plot.
It is again strongly emphasised that the enemy system of continuously altering course
Commander H E Dannreuther, Gunnery Officer of Invincible, to Captain F W Kennedy, Indomitable, 2
June 1916 in ADM 137/302. As explained in Appendix XXIX, it appears that, of the 3rd Battle Squadron,
Invincible alone was responsible for the eight damaging hits then made on Lützow).
137 Campbell, Analysis, p.156.
Dreyer, 'Brief Account': Commander (G) Blake, 'Notes made in the. ..Gun Control Tower': Commander
Calvert, 'Notes made ... in "B" Turret" and Lieut. Shelley, 'Notes...on...Transmitting Station' in ADM
137/302.
'Campbell, AnI4YSIS, pp.156 and 187-193 attributes one of the direct hits to Monarch but that ship's 'Notes
taken during the Action off Jutland...' (in 'Jutland Additional Reports', ADM 137/1643) suggest that she
was probably firing at another Knig-dass ship, perhaps Markgraj which was also hit at this time. IConig was
also hit by a ricochet.
'40 GFG&TO, 167. 'Remarks on the action offJutland on 31 May 1916', I7July 1916.
IENS (op. cit.) p.308.
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defeats any system of fire control based on rate-finding, for the reason that by the time
the plot has established a rate it is no longer applicable.'42
Thus the new Spotting Rules included specific provisions for the correction of range and
rate when the enemy altered course.'43
Ti-rn DREYER Tu Coii i i hE
The development of [the] spotting rules and afterwards the solution of the problem of
concentration of fire, constituted the main work of the Fleet during the latter half of
1916, and in 1917 and 1918. The progress has been enormous.'"
Action ranges from 15,000 to 18,000 yards were assumed,' 45
 but practices were conducted
at up to 24,000 yards, while the new technique of 'throw-oft' firing made them much
more realistic.' Although 13.5-inch as well as 15-inch ships had been provided with
15-foot range-finders, 147
 it was accepted that 'small rangefinder spreads were the
exception'.' Nonetheless, the Grand Fleet Gunneiy and Torpedo Orders warned against:
...the neglect of the range plot which on numerous occasions during throw-off firings
provided information which could have been utilised to great advantage.
...many [plots] were excellent and afforded throughout a good indication of the rate
and true range; on the other hand some present large and varying differences between
hitting gun range and mean plotted range.'49
The range plot also had a new importance as a means of recording the ranges in use by
consorts in concentration firing.'50
In contrast, it is doubtful whether the original bearing plot was of more than
marginal utility. An American naval officer with the Grand Fleet found that: 'The bearing
plot instrument is not generally taken seriously':' 5 ' while the post-War Technical History and
' 42 Chatfleld, J%(àvy and Defence, p.153. BCF Gunnery Committee, 'Gunnery lessons learned from Action of
31st May', 22 June and 'Additional remarks', 24 June 1916 in Beazy Papers I, particularly pp.347-50 and
363. Several passages from these reports were quoted verbatim in GFG&TO, 167.
'43 Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Spotthzg Rules 1916, November 1916 in JaO 11, AL For the development of
these rules, see 'Battle Cruiser Force War Records: Volume VI, Miscellaneous', ADM 137/2134 and
'Committees formed to consider experience atJutland, Part II', ADM 137/2028.
'"Admiralty, Technical History Section, The Technical History and Index A Seijal History of Technical Problems
dealt with by Admiralty Departments, Part 23 'Fire Control in H.M. Ships', December 1919, pp.21-2, AL.
on tactical exercises...24 February 1917' and 'Grand Fleet Battle Instructions', 1 January 1918 in
Beatty Papers!, pp.403 and 457.
'Admira1ty, Naval Staff, Gunnery and Torpedo Division, Progress iniVaual Gunnery /914 to 1918,July 1919,
pp.50-i, ADM 186/238.
'47 Enclosure with Admiralty to C.-in-C., 10 October 1916 in ADM 137/2027. PXG 1914-18 (op. cit.) states
that, in August 1917, there were 106 15-foot rangefmders in the Fleet.
GFG&TO, 312. 'Rangefinder Errors', 29 December 1917.
' GFG&TO, 105. 'Full Calibre firings with Main Armament...during second quarter, 1918', 10 September
1918, paras.31-2.
'50 GFG&TO, 91. 'Full Calibre flrings...in first quarter of 1918', 29June 1918, paras.13 and 31.
in William Schleihauf, 'The Durnaresq and the Dreyer' in Wzrslnp International, No. 3, 2000
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Index admitted that: 'Bearing plots have not been an unqualified success...'.' 52 However, in
1918 the Grand Fleet committee was already at work on the Gyro Director Training
(GDT) gear, which plotted bearings transmitted from the Director in steps of 4 minutes. It
also introduced an important new principle, that of the 'straight-line' plot, in which a
straight line up the middle of a narrow strip of moving paper always represented the
target compass bearing predicted by the bearing clock. Each observed compass bearing
was plotted as its thiference from the current predicted value; thus, as well as showing the
deviation of observed and predicted values, the slope of the mean line through the plot of
observed bearings also indicated the error in the clock rate.' 53
 This enhanced version of
Dreyer rate plotting would soon be taken up as the basis for plotting in a new generation
of fire control tables.
In September 1918, Beatty set up the Grand Fleet Dreyer Table Committee.
Their First and Second Interim Reports, which concerned the Mark V table then being
built for HMS Hood, were critical of the excessive number of fittings obscuring the plot,
but, pace Sumida,' concluded only of this plot that: 'A considerable alteration in design is
therefore necessary'. However, they also expressed concern about:
The drive of the Frictional Clock Disc. - Many complaints have been received that this disc is
not sufficiently strong for the work now imposed on it. It is considered that the power of
the motor should be greater, and that the diameter of the shaft carrying the roller
should be increased.'55
In fact, the first clear indication of this problem can be found almost a year earlier:
Overloading the Dreyer Table. Attention is drawn to the necessity of
drcumspection in adding fittings to the Dreyer Table; if driven by the rate disc it is
essential that they should be fitted with great care and thoroughly tested to ensure
against overloading and slipping, as occurred in one ship.'
Even so, the standard tables do not appear to have suffered from excessive slippage, even
when the rate changed rapidly while under helm.
In certain firings [during the first quarter of 1918] the range and deflection were
maintained very successfully during turns of twelve points and upwards.'57
(advanced copy gratefully acknowledged).
"2 TechnicalHistoiy, 1919 (op. cit.) p.30.
' 53 Technical HistO!y, 1919, pp.28-9. Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Handbook on Gyro Director Training Gear
(GDT) 1927, ADM 186/279.
154 LD1'1,S, pp.312-3.
'First and Second Interim Reports' in Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Reports of the Grand Fleet Dryer Table
Q,mmiltee 1918-1919, September 1919, pp.4-5, ADM 186/241.
'GFG&TO. 304. 'Full Calibre Firings...in third quarter, 1917', para.III/23.
'57 GFG8JTO, 91 (op. cit.) para.41.
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In October, the Committee was instructed to consider two much broader
questions. The first, which was addressed in their Third Interim Report of 29 January
1919,t58 concerned 'standardising the alterations which are being made by various ships to
their Dreyer Tables'. The request was repeated for the strengthening of the friction drive,
in the Mark IV as well as Mark V Tables; clearly, this was necessary to accommodate
new fittings on the range plot. Notwithstanding the inadequacies of the old bearing plot,
the report emphasised that:
The measurement of rate of change of bearing is considered of great importance owing
to the accuracy with which bearings can be observed, even when the visibility is poor....
...bearing observations can be obtained continuously and accurately.
It accepted that 'The Gyro Director Training Gear...will standardise the arrangements for
dealing with rate of change of bearing': though it also acknowledged that 'the present
system of correction' of the gyro-compass, with which 'oscillations take place when course
is altered','59 must be improved.'60
The Committee's conclusions concerning the time-and-range plot marked a
radical change in assumptions.
Expeiience has shown, and it must be accepte4 that it will very seldom, f ever, be possible to obtain the
rate of change of range from rangfinders....The frequent alteration of course at high speed
which are now the accepted conditions of action will preclude the rate...being obtained
with sufficient rapidity from a time and range plot.
The setting of the enemy bar must, therefore, be obtained from the rate of change of
bearing and the inclination found by indinometer, observation or outside reports (eg.
aeroplane)....'6'
:::It is considered that the primary object of plotting the rangefinder observations is to
enable them to be "meaned" by inspection for the purpose of checking gun range...and
to allow the value of the rangefinder readings to be assessed....'62
They repeated these axioms in their Final Report, submitted on 1 February 1919, which
addressed the second question of 'the Fleet's requirements for the future development of
Fire Control Tables generally'. However, although true-course plotting was considered, it
was decisively rejected as an alternative to separate plots of ranges, bearings and, now,
inclination.
'Third Interim Report', Drryer Table Committee (op. cii.) pp.5-13. For the date, see 'Monthly Record of
Principal Questions dealt with by Director of Naval Ordnance, Vol.3, January to June 1919, p.1 093, AL.
imperfections of the gyro-compass itself explain why 'the arrangements for applying corrections for
changes in course...were apparently highly unsatisfactory': IILWS, p.313.
°For the introduction of the gyro-compass with mercury ballistic from 1919, see A E Fanning, Steady as She
Goes (London, 1986) pp.218-228.
'6t This cross-cut of inclination and speed-across gave the range-rate as well as the enemy speed.
'62 'Thjrd Interim Report' (op. cit.) p.6.
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When observations and information of the enemy's movements and fall of shot becomes
so good and rapid as to enable a correct track to be plotted, these results can be set
direct on the clock, and the necessity of plotting for gun control purposes vanishes.
While the Committee had no interest in reviving the Argo plotter, they proposed that the
new table should be a 'combination of all the good points of the Dreyer table, Ford
clock,' 63 and Argo clock'; in particular, they accepted that, in the Dreyer Tables:
The drive of the automatic Dumaresq...is not the best available type of variable speed
gear.
They also recommended that the straight-line system should be used for both range and
bearing plots; and that, to deal with the increased amount of range information, two
time-and-range plots should be placed side by side.'64
Ti-rn Aimurn Fuu CONiiWL Tu M I
In most respects, the first of the new generation of fire control tables, the AFCTs
Mark I fitted in Xthon and Rodney, followed the recommendations of the Grand Fleet
Committee. The fmal design had no less than three time-and-range plots and two
time-and bearing plots, all on the straight-line principle (Plate 54). Thus there was no
'adoption of..true-course plotters...after the war'.' Nonetheless, the clock was based on
the Argo-type variable-speed drive, although the linkages which generated the speeds
along and across were more like those in the Ford clock.' 66 However, the Committee's
enthusiasm for the direct measurement of inclination, as a complete replacement for
range-rate plotting, proved premature. The difficulties of designing and using
indinometers became increasingly apparent, and a fully satisfactory instrument did not
enter service until 1927.167 By 1923, it had been accepted that the inclinometer was yet
163	 the American Ford Instrument Company, see LLWS, p.3!4.
6'. 
'Final Report of the Committee. Future Development of Fire Control Tables', Dreyer Table Committee,
pp.l4-l9. For its date, see 'MRJDNO'Jan-June 1919 (op. cii.) p.1114.
'65 LDN, p.33!.
'66 Admiraity, Gunnery Branch, Handbook for Admiralty Fire Control Table Mark I (FLM Shos 'WELSQV" and
"RoDxEr'), September 1927, ADM 186/273-4. Hannibal C. Ford, Range and Bearing lleper, US Patent
1,450,585 filed 19 June 1918. Ford's Range Keeper (US Patent 1,370,204, filed 4 December 1917) used
the same principles but only for generating range-rate.
167 For early optimism about inclinometers, see GFG&TO, 105 (op. cit.) para. 26: GFG&3TO, 123. 'Present
position as regards Inclination and Methods of using Indlinometers', 4 November 1918: IWO 1914-18,
pp.32 arid 42: and Technical History, 1919, p.30.
For later developments and problems, see Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Thgress in Gunnery Materiel 1920,
pp.12-15,ADM 186/244. Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Progress in Guinneiy Material 1922 and 1923 (printed
November 1923) pp.I4-25, ADM 186/259. Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Progress in Naval Gunnery 1923
(p.12), 1924 (pp.3 and 12), 1926 (p.13) and l927(p.lO), ADM 186/261, /263, /271 and /289. The Barr &
Stroud SF7, supplied in 1927, was accurate to 20 if the inclination was less than 700 or greater than 1100.
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one more source of less than precise data. On top of the new clock, the larger dial
indicated enemy course (as inclination) and speed. Above this, two 'suggestion wires', at
right angles, were positioned according to the slopes of the straight-line plots of observed
ranges and bearings (Plate 55). The point of intersection of the wires provided an
indication of how to alter enemy speed and course in order to tune the clock's range and
bearing rates into closer correspondence with observations. However, an alternative
suggestion for enemy course was given by an inclination pointer projected onto the enemy
dial) 68
 Thus the suggestion wires were a physical realisation of the cross-cut of range-rate
and speed-across so long advocated by Dreyer: while the inclination projector extended
the principle by providing for the alternative cross-cut of inclination and speed-across
advocated by the Grand Fleet committee.
In recommending their Final Report to the Admiralty, Beatty had proposed that
the design be undertaken by a committee of experts which should include both Isherwood
and Elphinstone) 69
 As originally formed, the 'Fire Control Tables Development
Committee' had only Service members,' 7° but Isherwood (assisted by H F Landstad, a
senior draughtsman from Argo) joined them in 1920 and 1921 to assist with mechanical
design.' 7 ' The final design, which was not completed until 1925, was later described as 'a
co-operative effort by the F.C. Tables committee, designers on Messrs. Elliott Bros. staff
and the LP. and F.C. section of the D.T.M. Department';' 72 unfortunately, no clear
indications have been found of when Elliotts began to contribute to the design process
nor, therefore, of whether Isherwood and Elphinstone (now Sir Keith) had worked for a
time in collaboration.
The committee's reports were submitted just as Frederic Dreyer left the
Admiralty in February 1919 to serve as Chief of Staff duringJellicoe's Empire Mission.
However, he returned in April 1920 to take up his previous duties (under the title of
FGM1922-3 (compiled in the 'early months' of 1923) pp.9-!2. HandbookforAFCTMarkl (op. cit.).
'Beatty to the Secretary of the Admiralty in Drejer Table Committee, pp.! 8-9.
' 70 'list of Admiralty Committees and Committees in which the Admiralty is interested', September 1919,
ADM 1/8568/259.
Clausen, 'Invention and the Navy - the progress from Ideas to Ironmongery', paper to the
Institute of Patentees and Inventors, 30 January 1970 published in The Inventor, Vol. 10, No. 1, March
1970, CLSN 3/7. Examination of Commander Isherwood in RCAI Minutes of Proceedings, T. 173/547
Part 10, pp.5,100 and 103,: and Pollen to the RCAI Secretary, 28Ju1y 1926, pp.2-3 in T.173/90.
' 12 Capt. E T Wickam and H F Simes, 'Branch 5 of the Electrical Enginnering Department of the
Admiralty. Some Account of its History', September 1953, p.4 in CLSN 5/3, CC. The 'Low Power and
Fire Control Section' of the department of the Director of Torpedoes and Mines became 'Branch 5' of the
E.E. Department after it was transferred in 1939.
W NL ns LESSONS	 263
Director of the Gunnery Division) for two more years.'" Thus he had plenty of
opportunity to influence the Development Committee's conclusions and the start of
detailed design.' 74
 Yet, a year after his return, Dreyer had only one concern about the way
the development was proceeding.
...D. of G.D. was for a long time very anxious as regards the effect of the very complex
proposals for the new Fire Control Table, but eventually arrived at the conviction that
they were necessary in order to face the problems with which we are confronted....'"
After the first trials of the prototype AFCT Mark I at the end of 1925, Dreyer, now a
Rear-Admiral and back at the Admiralty as ACNS, reaffirmed that:
I am quite sure that the Policy pursued and the money expended in connection with
these experimental Tables are fully justified.'76
Sumida suggests that, after Dreyer returned as DofGD, 'the design process was well under
way, but political circumstances [the presence of Beatty as First Sea Lord] were also such
as to limit severely his powers of interference' and that, as ACNS, he 'had good reason to
be circumspect in his remarks' because of the recent exposure by the Royal Commission
on Awards to Inventors of 'the plagiarization [sic} of the Argo Clock that had occurred in
191 j• 177 These interpretations might be justified if the Argo fire control system had been
the basis for the AFCT Mark I. In reality, as a complete system, there is some justification
for Dreyer's claim that the AFCT 'was in fact only a rearrangement of my "Dreyer
Table" ',178 despite the clear Argo influence in the variable speed drives of the clock. Thus
Dreyer had no reason to interfere with the development of the Mark I, or to dissimulate
his enthusiasm over the outcome; not a hint has been found that he did not give the new
table his full support.
Dreyer, 7lze Sea Hentage (London, 1955) pp.236, 239, 261 and 276.
details had been finajised in March 1920: 'Fmal Report' p. 31 with President's Minute of 9 March
1920 in 'Fire Control Requirements Committee... Report, Admiralty remarks &c 1919-1921, p.31, ADM
116/2068.
' Dof GD's minute, 15 April 1921 in 'PQ/DNO', 1921, pp.2275-6.
' 76 ACNS's minute, 4 January 1926 in 'Fire Contol Table. New Design' in 'MRIDNO', Vol. LX, July 1923
-June 1926, pp.3180-8.
' 77 1üNS, pp.315-6.
' 18 Dreyer, Sea Heritage (op. cit.) p.59.
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52. GEiuvir'4 Fm Co1rrtoL INSTRUMENTS.
Naval Staff, Intelligence Department, German Gunnery I,![onnafion Derivedfrom the Interrogation ofPrisoners of War,
October 1918, Plate 3, AL.
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German First World War Fire Control apparatus, Z 31 EU/SV-
Anzeiger (range rate/deflection reporter), a refined Duma.resq.
EU=range rate; SUbearing rate; E =range; SVdeflection;
GFenemy speed; GLenemy position; EFown speed;
ADindicator.
53. Z3IEU/SVANZEJGER.
The instrument indicated range-rate (EU) and gun-deflection (SV) corrected for range (E).
Peter Padfield, Guns at Sea (London: Hugh Evelyn, 1974) pp. 228 and 250.
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54. ADMIRALTY Fn CorsrnwL TABLE MAIU I
To avoid congestion around the main table, the Dummy Plots (BD and DD) plotted all
fall-of-shot observations and consorts' ranges and bearings; all these data were duplicated on the
Gun Range and Bearing Plots (B and D).
The Range Finder Plot C recorded the ranges received from all the rangefinders. A pencil was
tuned to the mean rangefinder range. The Gun Range Plot D plotted this mean rangefinder
range, the gun ranges of own ship and of consorts, corrected for position-in-line.
On the Bearing Plot D, the Director Bearing could be compared with the target bearing
predicted by the dock.
Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, HandbookforAd,nirally Fire Coninil Table Mark I...Diagrarns, Plate I (detail), ADM
186/274.
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FIGURE 4. LtAD OF5HAFTII'IG INTO CLOCK.
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55. AFCT MAaI I: To OF CLOCK WITh MECHANICAL CONNECTIONS
The two 'suggestion wires' intersect above the larger dial, which showed target course and speed.
The wires followed any changes in the speeds along and across but were further displaced by the
values set on the two 'error' dials. Smaller dials indicated OWfl course and speed.
The clock drove the many other mechanisms in the table by means of the electric and air motors,
each with a controlling hunter (H. I - H. II).
Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, HandbookforAdmimky Fm! Control Table Math I...Diagrams, Plate 4, ADM
186/274.
7AN EXCEPTIONAL CASE
It is now possible to address directly the three questions posed in the
Introduction. Firstly, what technical influences shaped the designs of the Pollen and
Dreyer gear and, in particular, were features of the Dreyer Tables plagiarised from Argo?
Secondly, were the Admiralty's choices of technology and supplier justified? And, finally,
what were the consequences of the choice of the Dreyer system; specifically, did it
contribute to the defeat of Beatty's battlecruisers atJutland: and could ships equipped by
Argo have coped better with the conditions?
INFLUENCES
In October 1925, the Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors granted Pollen
the considerable sum of £30,000 for his work on fire control. However, their judgement
was by no means all in his favour. The Commission again rejected his claims for rate
plotting, and came close to accusing him of misrepresentation.
....After 1908 the Admiralty developed a system with another method of plotting, which
Mr. Pollen then regarded we think rightly as something different from the method or
system which he himself advocated. We do not think the view he now presents is
consistent with his earlier view...
The award itself was only for the Argo clock, while the judgement was at pains to 'acquit
all concerned of any intention or desire to copy'.
...we are satisfied that Mr. Pollen and the Argo Co. Ltd. were the first to produce a
mechanical integrator...namely the Argo Clock, and that the clock mechanism of the
Dreyer Tables Mark IV and V works substantially on the same principles though there
are differences of mechanical detail.'
'Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors. Claims of Argo Company and A H Pollen, Rear Admiral
Dreyer and Major Dumaresq. Recommendation', 30 October 1925 in DRYR 2/2, CC. Reproduced in
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It is clear from the hearings that the Commissioners made their award only for what was
referred to as the 'two-rate clock'.
THE CHAIRMAN: ...it is pretty plain that there are two features...in the Dreyer
apparatus Mark IV and V which are not to be found anywhere else; one of those
features is the clock plot, and the other...is the mechanism for moving the fore and aft
bar to accord with the movements of the ship....I do not think there is any dispute about
it that they are novel features and the entire credit...rests with Admiral Dreyer.2
However, the judgement itself made no distinction between the two most important
features of the later Dreyer Tables: that they automatically integrated both range and
bearing rates: and that they automatically adjusted the Dumaresq's fore-and-aft bar for
changes in course. Read alone, the recommendation seems to imply that both features
had been anticipated by Argo: while it also fails to give any indication of how, when and
to what extent the Argo designs had exerted their influence. Nor does the judgement
discuss a question which might have significantly influenced the size of Pollen's award:
that is, the debt which his system owed to his long association with the Royal Navy.
From the very beginning, Pollen's proposals contained features already
anticipated by service developments. Two-observer rangefinders had been tried
unsuccessfully afloat in Arethusa, and were used for target course plotting in one form of
the Watkin Position Fmders in service with the coastal artillery.3
 Thus Arthur Pollen's first
proposal of 1901 combined two well-known ideas with the novel suggestion of plotting
own as well as target course. He also mentioned, vaguely, the possibility of gyroscopic
correction for yaw; this idea was new but, despite Pollen's later claims, there is no
contemporary evidence that it was seriously considered again until the Jupiter trials, or
omitted due to lack of funds from the Admiralty.
In his two papers of 1904, especially 'Fire Control and Long Range Firing',
Pollen developed his ideas for a complete fire control system. It now incorporated a
straight-course plotting table, which moved the plotting paper mechanically but still relied
on manual plotting of simultaneous ranges and bearings from the two-observer
rangefinder. A new element was a clock; in July 1904, it was apparently only for ranges,
an idea partly anticipated by Percy Scott's proposal of late 1903 for an integrating range
clock. However, by December, it had become a 'change of range and bearing machine'.
Pollen's early patents and tactical machines suggest that it was conceived as working on
Anthony Pollen, The Great Gunneiy ScandaL (London, 1980) pp.252-5.
2 RCA! Minutes of Proceedings, T.1731547, Part 18, p.3; see also p.11 and Part 17, pp.89 and 111.$ Dreyer before RCAI, T.173/547 Part 16, pp.91-4.
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the virtual course principle, although, it took another five years to turn the concept into a
working mechanism, the Argo Clock Mark I.
After the Jupiter trials in early 1905, Pollen abandoned the two-observer
rangefinder and, seizing the opportunity presented by the new Barr and Stroud 9-foot
rangefinder, proposed a gyroscopic mounting which was stabilised for yaw and
transmitted both yaw-free bearings and simultaneously-taken ranges. Ranges and
bearings were to be plotted on a fully-automatic straight-course plotting table. He also
proposed transmitting elevation and deflection directly from the (non-existent) clock to the
gun sights, but this was a year later than the trials of the Vyvyan-Newitt sight in the
Channel fleet, when Pollen was being advised by its gunnery officers. While relying on
another supplier for the rangefmder, the rangefinder mounting and plotter were entirely
new, as the Admiralty acknowledged during the contract negotiations in 1905. Despite the
technical obstacles, prototypes of a dual-gyro reference, servo-controlled mounting,
transmission system and automatic plotter were completed for the A7iadne trial in early
1907 and performed well. Even so, the gyro reference and the plotter were redesigned
completely for the Xat.al trials. Prior to these new trials, it was also decided to use standard
Vickers follow-the-pointer sights rather than special Argo designs (which probably were
never built). And, at last, the final essential component of the A.C. system, the
range-and-bearing clock, was completed. This incorporated an early version of the Argo
variable-speed drive (though it was not slipless); also, the discs were driven by a speed-
regulated electric motor, so the clock mechanism was sufficiently powerful to drive range
and deflection transmitters.
As first delivered to Xatal in late 1909 and early 1910, the A.C. system was in no
sense helm-free. The clock could only keep ranges and target bearings while own course
was steady. The rangefmder mounting was yaw-free but its gyro reference had to be reset
if the course was altered by more than one point. The plotter as first completed was
automatic, but only on a steady course. In responding to Ogilvy's urgings to make the
system helm-free, Argo's drastic attempt to modify the plotter for automatic operation
proved disastrous. After the J1atal trials, Argo developed the production version of the
rangefmder mounting, though initially this was still only yaw-free. It only became
helm-free when the Argo air-driven gyroscope was replaced by an Anschütz
gyro-compass receiver. Likewise, the Mark IV plotter depended on a gyro compass input
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and on the Forbes speed log as well. Thus the fmal true-course Argo plotter, which by its
very nature was helm-free, was not complete in itself but depended on technology
acquired by the Royal Navy from other suppliers.
The Argo Clock Mark I had another surprisingly fundamental flaw: its range
(the true or geometric range) and bearing could not be corrected from the plot without
stopping the clock. The design of the Argo Clock Mark II of 1911 was founded on
entirely different principles. It used a Dumaresq-type linkage to obtain a range-rate: and it
set the range-rate on a variable-speed drive, which then integrated the rate to keep the
range. This was no different in principle from the combination of Scott! Vickers clock and
Dumaresq although, unlike the clockwork-driven Vickers clock, the new Argo clock, like
its predecessor, was powered by an electric motor. Further, while the principles were the
same, thanks to Isherwood's new slipless drive, the rate could be altered with minimal
force, so the Argo version of the Dumaresq linkage could set the clock rate directly and
automatically. This led to three more innovations. Argo proposed that, firstly, a second
variable speed drive could act as a bearing clock and, secondly, that the bearing clock
could keep the Dumaresq set for target bearing. Thirdly, after first suggesting that speed
across could be converted into bearing rate by a simple linkage, they developed the Mark
ifi design, in which a pair of variable speed drives in effect integrated speed-across divided
by range to obtain the change in bearing applied to the Dumaresq dial. Once started, the
clock could keep both range and bearing without operator intervention, provided that its
own ship held a steady course i.e. it was automatic but not helm-free. Isherwood's design
was a great advance, both functionally and mechanically, but, even so, the range-rate
integrator and Dumaresq linkage had long been parts of the Service system, with which
Pollen had been familiar since 1904.
Neither the Argo Clocks Mark ifi nor IV were automatic in a turn; a control
lever was set to 'turning' after releasing the 'angle-of-courses' clamp, then the change in
enemy bearing had to be set continually by hand. Also, the Mark ifi held the inclination
coastant in a turn, the same approximation first proposed by Dreyer in 1908 and
embodied from late 1910 in the Mark VI Dumaresq. Automatic, helm-free operation -
that is, range and bearing being kept automatically without operator intervention,
whether own course ship was on a steady, yawing or changing course - was only achieved
with the Argo Clock Mark V of 1913. This depended on a relay-motor connection
AN EXCEPTIONAL cASE	 274
between a gyro-compass receiver and the clock's Dumaresq, on the same principles used
in the Dreyer Table Mark Ill of a year earlier. There is no direct evidence that Pollen
learned of the details of either the Mark VII Dumaresq or the Dreyer table: though, given
his acquaintance with Rear-Admiral Peirse4
 and many other sympathetic officers, it is not
unlikely. However, even if Argo arrived at similar principles independently, they can have
had no claim to priority of invention
To summarise: during its long gestation, there were many points at which the
A.C. system was influenced by or depended on Service developments. The two-observer
rangefinder had land-service antecedents, while the idea of automatic sights was not
original. Had it not been for the new Barr and Stroud 9-foot rangefinder, Pollen would
have had nothing to propose after the Jupiter trials except further development of the
discredited two-observer system. The Argo rangefmder mounting, the true-course plotter
and the Argo Clock Mark V all depended on the Anschütz gyro-compass for helm-free
operation. Most importantly, after the abandonment of the Argo Clock Mark I, the
starting point for the design of the later clocks was the long-familiar integrating
range-clock set with range-rate from a Dumaresq-type linkage.
In 1925, the RCAI rejected Dreyer's own claim for a further award because of
the £5,000 he had received in 1916. Nonetheless, of the Dreyer Table itself (specifically
the Marks IV and V) they concluded:
It has original features of considerable merit, the credit for which is due to Admiral
Dreyer, even if in other respects it owes inspiration to other sources, or is the application
of common knowledge.5
Thus, they had recognised that, while rate plotting owed nothing to Pollen, it was also not
solely inspired by Dreyer. His 'rate calculators' of 1906 and 1907, mainly the latter, led
only indirectly to the time-and-range plotting tried by Wilson in Vengeance. Both the
second calculator and the range-rate plotter with rate grid patented in 1908 were devised
jointly with his brotherJohn. Dreyer's own 'Hints' from 1908 suggest that the principles
of the cross-cut were already understood: while it was Norman of Arrogant who took the
final step of plotting bearings as well as ranges, at about the same time that Dreyer
abandoned his attempts to develop range plotting without bearings. Dreyer did not again
' Pollen remained in dose touch with Rear-Admiral Peirse throughout the second half of 1912, when the
ex-ITP was active on his behalf, while also participating in the trials taking place in Orion. Jon Sumida, In
Defence ofsVaval Supremay (London, 1989) pp.225-32 and 245.
'RCAJ Recommendation' (op. cit.) pp.1-2.
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take up rate plotting wholeheartedly until he joined Vanard, after which his first
improvised system led directly to the patent of September 1910. Even then, he
acknowledged, though only briefly, his debt to Peirse and W W Fisher for the suggestion
of the vital clock range pencil. Also, until the adoption of the Anschütz gyro compass,
dual rate plotting depended on the Argo mounting as the only source of yaw-corrected
target bearings. Yet Dreyer himself must still be credited with the conception of the
complete fire control table as an integrated system, combining connected elements for
plotting, rate-determination, rate-keeping and range integration.
The 1910 patent was realised by Elliott Brothers as the Original Dreyer Table,
which also included a modified Mark VI Dumaresq, the latter embodying the principles
which Dreyer had originated early in 1908. However, the initial vague idea of a
clockwork drive was dropped in favour of a speed-regulated electric motor with plenty of
driving torque (as in the Argo Clock Mark 1). Most probably, Keith Elphinstone alone
chose a conventional disc-and-roller variable speed drive for the range clock; the same
type of mechanism was then used for both the range and bearing clocks of all the
subsequent Dreyer Tables. In July 1911, Dreyer proposed that a gyro-compass
connection and a bearing clock be added to the almost complete Original Table, but
these were not introduced until the next model, the Mark III. Its detailed design was
developed from Elphinstone's proposal of October 1911 for the 'Seven Part Recorder',
which described the two new features. A motorised relay, controlled from a gyro-compass
receiver, applied changes of own course automatically to the Dumaresq. The disc-and-
roller bearing clock was connected to the Dumaresq, although the rate was obtained only
from the slope of the bearing plot. However, the final Mark Ill design as constructed in
1912 added the graduated drum, linked to the range clock, by which speed-across from
the Dumaresq could be converted to bearing-rate; thus the bearing clock rate could be set
from either the Dumaresq or the bearing plot. The dual clock was still not automatic,
since both rates were set by hand. However, it was helm-free, in the sense that no change
in operating procedure was needed, whether own course was steady, yawing-or turning.
In Decenber 1912, Dreyer submitted his proposal for an additional
cone-and-roller drive and step-by-step transmitters and motors, by which he hoped to
make the Mark ifi 'more automatic than at present'. 6
 Unfortunately, his ideas were both
6 Dreyerto DNO, 19 December 1912 in T.173/91 Part III.
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impracticable and wrong in principle. However, in the Mark N Table completed in
1914, Elphinstone did employ electrical means to enable the Dumaresq to set the rates
automatically on the disc-and-roller clocks. He also used a cam and lever to convert
speed-across into bearing-rate but, although the mechanism was similar to that used in the
Argo Clock Mark V, all the surviving evidence indicates that it was designed
independently on well-known mechanical principles.
In their judgement on the award, the RCAI stated explicitly that:
...the prindple and details of the Argo Clock were communicated...and directly
contributed to the evolution of the clock mechanism of the Dreyer Tables Mark IV and
V. The knowledge so acquired made plain the feasibility of converting the clock
mechanism of the earlier types of Dreyer Table into a form which served the same
function and was based upon the same principle as the Argo Clock.7
At the hearings, they were also at pains to establish what had been communicated in May
1911.
THE CHAIRMAN: ...on the 15th. May the Mark II sketches...are communicated; the
description contains a reference to the addition of a linkage...on the 27th. May sketches
of that linkage are sent out.8
This can only refer to Argo's initial proposals for the addition of a bearing clock and a
dividing linkage to the Argo Clock Mark II. However, no such linkage was used in the
Argo Clock Mark ifi completed in early 1912, while there was a gap of two years before
Elphinstone adopted a cam-and-lever in the Dreyer Table Mark N. In any case, the use
of an automatic linkage to set the bearing-rate may have been less important to the RCAI
than the general idea of the bearing clock, whether set manually or automatically. The
main component of their monetary award was calculated on the basis of £200 per ship,
including 24 battleships and no less than 59 cruisers. By 1930, only Hawkins had been
fitted with a Dreyer Table Mark IV. Seventeen modern cruisers (plus two aircraft
carriers) also had Dreyer Tables, but these were of the Mark ffl type, in which the
bearing clocks were set manually for rate, using a graduated drum just like that
introduced for the Mark HI in 1912. It is not possible to say why the RCA! apparently
decided to include all cruisers (even those with turret control tables, which 4id not have a
bearing dock):9
 but their generosity ensured that Pollen was rewarded for every ship with
At this point in his copy of the RCAI Recommendation, Dreyer placed a large X in the margin: DRYR
2/2, CC.
° T.173/547, Part 18, p.11.
° 'Pamphlets on the Dreyer Tables Mark 111* and IV* and the Turret Dreyer Table' in 'Guard Book for
Pamphlets on Dreyer Tables', AL.
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a bearing clock, even if that clock was set manually by means unrelated to that first
proposed byArgo in 1911.
Thus the true intentions behind Pollen's award remain, in some areas, obscure.
Nonetheless, the Commission concluded, correctly, that the May proposal for the Argo
Clock Mark II was the first to communicate the idea of a bearing clock set automatically
for rate. Although the judgement is not specific on this point, there can be little doubt that
Dreyer's request in July 1911 for the addition of a bearing clock to the Original Table
derived from the Argo proposal, even though Dreyer said nothing about automatic rate
setting and suggested the use of an unsuitable cone-and-roller drive. Further, since
Dreyer's spurious proposal of December 1912 concerned 'additions which if added to my
fire control apparatus would make it more automatic than at present', and the RCAI
referred to 'the feasibility of converting the clock mechanism of the earlier types of Dreyer
Table...upon the same principle as the Argo Clock', they had evidently decided that
Dreyer's ideas had been based on the recently completed Argo Clock Mark III for Orion.
But were they also justified in their stated view that 'the principle and details of the Argo
Clock...directly contributed to the evolution of the clock mechanism of the Dreyer Tables
Mark IV and V'?'° And, furthermore, is Sumida correct in his interpretation that,
following frequent visits to York, in 1911 Elphinstone plagiarised the design of the Argo
clock for the Dreyer Table Mark III: that the 'rates.. .were..transmitted automatically via a
mechanical linkage to the clock': and that 'the clock mechanism bore an unmistakable
resemblance to the disc-ball-roller arrangement of the Argo clock'?"
From mid-1911, developments by Argo and Elliott brothers proceeded on very
different lines. In the Argo Clock Mark ifi, the rates were transferred mechanically from
the Dumaresq to the clocks: though, since the bearing clock was based on a pair of
variable-speed drives, there was no need for a special dividing linkage. While this clock
was being designed, Elphinstone made his one known visit to Argo at York, specifically to
discuss the incorporation of the Anschütz gyro-compass receiver in the Argo mounting.
No evidence has been found that he saw any drawings of the clock and he probably did
not learn about its internal design until after it was exhibited by Argo in the Spring of
1912. Yet, in the Autumn of 1911, Elphinstone had already circulated his description of
the 'Seven Part Recorder'; this incorporated the bearing clock already requested by
10 Dreyer to DNO, December 1912 arid 'RCAI Recommendation'. Present author's emphasis.
LDJ'/S (op. cii.) p.219.
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Dreyer but its rate could only be set, manually, from the bearing plot. In the completed
Mark III Dreyer Table, the graduated drum was added as a means to divide speed-across
by range; thus the bearing-rate could be obtained from either the plot or the Dumaresq.
However, the rate of the bearing clock was still set manually, nor was there any automatic
dividing linkage. As in the Original Table, the range-rate was set by following the
Dumaresq pointer, while Elphinstone continued to use conventional disc-and-roller
variable-speed drives for the two clocks. Thus they bore no resemblance at all to the Argo
disc-ball-rollers design. The rival 'Mark ifi' designs were also different functionally. The
Argo transferred rates automatically from Dumaresq to clock: but it was not helm-free,
because it could not keep bearings through a turn. The Dreyer was helm-free, since the
gyro-compass relay adjusted the Dumaresq automatically irrespective of the ship's course:
but, pace Sumida, rates were transferred manually, not automatically, to the clocks.
In December 1912, Dreyer made the novel suggestion of using electrical
methods to transfer Dumaresq rates; however, the RCAI apparently believed that his
other suggestion, to add another variable-speed drive to the Mark ifi Table, derived from
the Argo Clock Mark ifi, which also used two drives in its bearing clock. Yet, in Dreyer's
scheme, the two drives performed different functions, albeit erroneous ones, so it is
impossible to say whether his proposal was a botched attempt to avoid or to adapt the
Argo design. Whichever was the case, only the general idea of electric transfer had any
influence on Elphinstone's design of the automatic Dreyer Table Mark IV, which was not
completed until mid-1914, a year after the Admiralty severed all connections with Argo.
The two clocks were still conventional disc-and-roller drives, but their rates were set by
the Electrical Dumaresq, a device utterly different in principle and detail from anything
made by Argo.
On balance, the RCA! may have reached a just decision in rewarding Pollen but
not Dreyer. Pollen and Isherwood were the first to describe the principle of a two-rate
automatic clock: but one cannot see how the details of their implementation of these
principles contributed to the evolution of Effiott Brothers' designs from Mark ifi onwards.
Nor did the RCA! judgement give sufficient credit to Dreyer and Elphinstone for the
invention of helm-free operation, which, functionally, was at least as important as
automatic, straight-course working. Particularly in view of the dubious method adopted to
estimate the value of Pollen's award, his £30,000 does seem excessive. Even so, the
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Commission provided no grounds in their judgement for Sumida's view that it was
compensation for plagiarism. In any case, to use this highly-charged term betrays a
misunderstanding of the process of engineering design and development, especially in the
circumstances of two rival teams working on the same problem at the same time for the
same customer. Isherwood and Elphinstone both had to depend on other inventions for
the data supplied to their clocks and plotters. Both were constrained by the same
fundamentals, expressible most concisely in the equations introduced in Chapter 2. They
were working within a shared context of contemporary mechanical and electrical
technology. Both were aware of earlier and current developments in fire control, notably
the Dumaresq linkage and the integrator (based on a variable-speed drive) for generating
range from range-rate. Thus, Isherwood (after the false start of the Argo Clock Mark I)
began again with the established principle of the Dumaresq-type linkage supplying rate to
a variable-speed drive. Then, in only a few months, he made important advances, the
perfected slipless drive leading to the conception of the range-and-bearing clock. Dreyer
grasped immediately the importance of this new idea and insisted that it be added to the
next table design. However, without the Argo slipless drive, Elphinstone could only at first
adapt the principle to manual working. He then made the next important advance by
coupling a gyro-compass receiver to a modified Mark VI Dumaresq, thereby creating the
first helm-free clock, on principles which were later used by Isherwood in the Argo Clock
Mark V. Finally, Elphinstone produced his own automatic clock based on the Electrical
Dumaresq, a device having no resemblance to anything devised by Argo.
When he was asked to compare the Pollen and Dreyer systems as they existed at
the beginning of 1913, James Swinburne FRS wrote of the Argo clock: 'It looks as unlike
the Dreyer apparatus as it well could; but it is really on almost the same lines'.' 2
 This
remained true, even after another phase of development of both systems. To plagiarise is
'to take and use another person's...inventions...as one's own' This is not an appropriate
description of the normal process of incremental development followed by both
Isherwood and Elphinstone. Both made important innovations. Both made use of earlier
ideas, but were always obliged to adapt them to their own purposes. Both ended with
automatic, helm-free clocks which solved the fire control equations. Yet, despite the





common principles, their implementations were radically different. Neither were
plagiarists; both were original and talented designers.
CHoIcES
The Admiralty's choices of technologies and suppliers were necessarily
influenced by their technical assessment of the effectiveness and reliability of the devices
on offer. However, their decision also had to take account of commercial factors, not only
acceptable prices and profits but also the financial stability of the chosen firms. In addition
to technical and commercial considerations, there were also personal ones. In the case of
fire control, responsibility lay with a few often overworked and under-resourced
Admiralty officers, who must inevitably have looked favourably upon firms whose
representatives established close and easy relationships with the Director of Naval
Ordnance and his assistants.
Apart from the mountings and clocks purchased from the Argo Company in the
period before the Great War, the Royal Navy acquired the remainder of its fire control
instruments by two well-used means. In the first, a firm developed an instrument using its
own resources and then offered it to the Admiralty in an all-but-final form. Service
involvement was then mainly with trials to verif' suppliers' claims, though the trials might
show the need for improvements, to mutual benefit. Such firms were then free to sell their
products overseas. Barr and Stroud built their business as a supplier of rangefinders and
fire control instruments on this basis. Fire control instruments were also similarly obtained
from Vickers, Siemens and Eversheds: also gyro compasses from Anschütz (through
Effiott Brothers as their UK agent).
Alternatively, a number of fire control instruments originated as the inventions of
naval officers. There were a few unsuccessful attempts to develop such inventions within
the Navy (examples were the Vyvyan-Newitt automatic sight and early directors) but, by
1908, the normal course was to protect the invention by secret patent and then place the
development in the hands of an outside firm. Firms working on this basis were allowed a
reasonable but less substantial level of profits on Admiralty orders, while the Admiralty
retained control over commercial exploitation overseas.' 4
 Thus Keith Elphinstone and
Elliott Brothers were following procedures familiar both to themselves and to the DNO's
Admiralty Circular Letter No.61, 1 Jume 1908, 'Rules and Instructions for the Taking Out of Patents by
Persons in H.M. Naval Service' in 'Regulations as to Patents' in ADM 1/8030.
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department when they undertook the development of the Dreyer Tables on the basis of
Dreyer's 1910 patent.
In contrast, when the Contracts Department produced their historical record of
the Admiralty's relations with Pollen, they began:
...This case has been an exceptional one.
...Usually inventions of importance for naval purposes...are brought to the Admiralty in
a more or less complete state...ready for trial.
...where an inventor brings his invention direct to the Admiralty in an immature state,
and wishes the Admiralty to assist in its development, he obviously cannot expect to
receive so great a reward if he had borne the expense and risk himself.
...Mr. Pollen's case is of the latter class....He brought originally merely ideas worked out
partially on paper but without demonstration in the shape of apparatus.'5
This was true even of Pollen's very first approach to the Admiralty in 1901, which was
also characteristic in two other ways. Firstly, although his ideas were not only unformed
but not even especially original, he represented them as a secret which the Admiralty
should buy. And, secondly, he bypassed the responsible department and went straight to
the First Sea Lord and First Lord. It is hardly surprising that, after a similar approach in
1904, the DNO (Captain Barry) was antagonistic. Pollen was fortunate that, in early
1905, Barry was replaced by Jellicoe who, on Harding's over-enthusiastic advice, was
prepared to fmance the equipment for the Jupiter trials (to the tune of £5,300). Pollen then
proved unable to complete all the instruments which he had promised: while the
rangefmder and plotter which were delivered were almost entirely unsuccessful. As Pollen
later admitted, '...no crazier scheme was ever put forward'.'6
Yet Pollen, with Harding's assistance, continued to impose his ideas on the
DNO. His new proposal for a gyro-controlled rangefinder mounting and automatic
plotter was certainly novel but, despite the fact that they were entirely unproven, he
demanded not only further development funds (and received £6,500) but pressed for an
extraordinary contract. This covered only the mounting and plotter and, while it allowed
the Admiralty the option of choosing whether or not to place a production order, if they
decided to do so they were committed to paying £100,000 to preserve secrecy and
monopoly suppiy. This was an enormous sum, equal to that awarded by a grateful nation
to Lord Roberts for turning the tide of the Boer War.'7
' Admiralty, Contracts Branch, Pollen Aim Correction System General Grounds of Admiralty Polity and H,storzcal
Record ofBusiness Xegtotiatwns, February 1913, p.2 in P.1024, AL
'The Gun in Battle', February 1913 inJon Sumida (ed.) The Pollen Papers (London, 1984) p.309.




The mounting and plotter were completed in time for the Ariadne trials in early
1908; although still experimental, the equipment performed reasonably accurately,
though probably not always reliably. Meanwhile, in mid-1907,Jellicoe had been replaced
by Bacon, who at that time was certainly sceptical of the value of complex fire control
instruments. His attitude could well have been influenced by the recent failure of direct
sight-setting gear and problems with the early Vickers clock. In any case, the DNO's
department faced more immediate and basic problems, particularly the completion of the
hydraulic control gear which, for the first time, enabled turret guns to be aimed
continuously: and the evaluation of Vickers Follow-the-Pointer sights and transmission
gear without which range could not be kept on the sights when the rate was high. Even so,
both the early Navy Estimates for 1908-09 and Wilson's initially cordial relations with
Pollen show that Bacon was not 'determined from the start to prevent the adoption of
Pollen's...system';' 8
 even Dreyer's intention to 'crab' the gear meant only that it would be
rigorously tested. However, Wilson's attitude changed once he had understood the
contractual terms demanded by Pollen and that the system was far from complete; he
conducted the Ariadne trial with the sole purpose of demonstrating that his manual,
virtual-course plot was just as satisfactory. Dreyer no doubt provided all the assistance
required of him, but his time-and-range plotting was not actually tested until after Wilson
had peremptorily terminated the trial itself. Faced with increasing pressures to reduce the
estimates, Bacon would not have opposed the decision (permissible under the contract) to
reject Pollen's system, though he preferred Dreyer's simple time-and-range plotting to
Wilson's over-elaborate scheme. For a Fleet containing but one dreadnought battleship
(the Invincibl€s would join during 1908) and equipped to fire accurately only in tactical
circumstances which limited range-rate and change-of-rate, this was an adequate first step
in the introduction of plotting methods.
More immediate technical priorities and severe financial constraints, Pollen's
unyielding attitude, his all-or-nothing contract and the incomplete and experimental state
of his system, all combined to deny him his £100,000; though the manner in which he
was informed of the decision must be deplored. Yet the Admiralty still chose to pay him
£11,500 to fund further development and maintain secrecy: and there is nothing, other




at first cheerfully acquiesced. Not only had Pollen himself made a surplus of £2,930 on
his dealings with the Admiralty until the end of 1907, but this payment ensured that the
Argo Company, despite development expenses, remained profitable until 1910. At the
beginning of 1909, Pollen announced the availability of the complete A.C. system,
declaring it to be no longer experimental. Yet, as soon as the Admiralty began discussion
on a new trial, it became apparent that some parts were still being developed and others
non-existent. Bacon initially wished to order only the redesigned rangefinder mounting;
however, despite Pollen's provocations and the fact that the system was at that stage no
more than yaw-free, he eventually supported both the purchase of a trial set of equipment
(to the value of a further £6,400) and the placement of a production contract. This policy
was adhered to by Moore when, at the end of 1909, he took over as DNO at the time
when Wilson also became First Sea Lord; the production order for the rangefinder
mounting was placed even though it was not yet reliable in shipboard conditions. The
contract allowed for an advanced payment ofl5,000 and, while the price per mounting
was less than Pollen had asked, it was sufficient to cover manufacturing costs, continuing
development of the rest of the system (at the same rate of expenditure as previously) and
an adequate profit.
The Admiralty placed the order for rangefinder mountings at the beginning of
the financial year 1910-1911, before the Jfatal trial of the complete A.C. system in June,
1910. The Mark I clock worked well enough as a mechanism but, unless it was stopped,
its true range and bearing could not be altered for change of course or with corrections
based on observation; Pollen himself chose to design an entirely new clock beginning with
principles already embodied in Service gear. Further, as Pollen admitted, the attempt to
convert the straight-course plotter into a true-course plotter had failed; thus, following the
Colville report, the only working alternatives for automatically plotting the ranges and
bearings from the Argo mounting were rate plotting or straight-course plotting. However,
the trial had also demonstrated the problem of obtaining an accurate target speed from
either form of course plot: while even Pollen now acknowledged that rate plotting was 'a
good alternative...to straight line plotting'. He also declared that, with both methods, 'you
must have a steady course'.' 9
 This was certainly true of straight-course piotting since the
Argo mounting was then only yaw-free, no useful course plot could be made while own
'The Quest of a Rate Finder', November 1910 in PP(op. cit.) p.269.
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ship was turning. For the same reason, no bearing-rate plot was possible while altering
course, but the range-rate plot gave at least an indication of the change in range-rate, and
it still allowed comparison between clock range and mean rangefinder range; thus Dreyer
had cause for claiming that a Time and Range instrument could cope successfully with
continually altering course.
In Moore's later words to Battenberg: 'after the Natal trials all that was successful
of the Pollen gear was accepted i.e. The gyro-controlled Range Finder'. 20
 At that time, no
further choices were required from the Admiralty. Dreyer's new table promised to make
best use of the ranges and bearings from the Argo mountings, while its Dumaresq and
clock were on proven principles. The Navy could only wait until Argo produced
proposals for their new clock and demonstrated, if they could, that true course plotting
was, after all, feasible.
By the end of 1911, the Original Dreyer Table had been tried successfully in
Prince of Wales. Elphinstone was working on the design of the Dreyer Table Mark Ill,
while Argo were well advanced with both the Argo Clock Mark III and their own rate
plotter. Both Moore and the Controller (Rear-Admiral Briggs) wished to make a
comparative trial of the rival systems, which, in the absence of an Argo true-course
plotter, were both based on rate-plotting. Their intention was to order five sets of
equipment from each supplier but, despite Moore's efforts, no agreement on terms could
be reached with Argo. Probably by June, certainly by August, Moore's patience was at an
end. Pollen's intransigence may have been prompted by Argo's fmancial problems, but
his demands for further large payments only drew attention to what the Admiralty
considered had been Pollen's extravagance and mismanagement of his company's
affairs.2' Faced with Pollen's own request for the early abandonment of secrecy, his
'prohibitive price' and demands for 'Hush money', Moore recommended that secrecy and
monopoly should not be renewed and that, if Argo were to remain an Admiralty supplier,
they must operate under normal commercial terms.
20 Nor was there any lack of commitment in utilising the mounting. From the Lion class to the Iron Duke
class and Tiger, it was placed atop the conning tower under an armoured hood which was the focus of the
ships' fire control: John Brooks, 'The Mast arid Funnel Question' in John Roberts (ed.) Warship 1995
(London, 1995) pp. 4-4-53.
21 There is a marked contrast between Pollen's finances and the prudent policies followed by Barr and





At this moment of crisis in their commercial relationships, Pollen's negotiating
position was also much weaker because, as Moore explained to Battenberg:
If there was no other system achieving equal results with Pollens then there would be no
choice (or very little) for us; but there is another system; it is almost identical, it is
Dreyers.
Plotting was not then the issue; Moore doubted that the new true-course Argo plotter
would be a success, particularly at sea in a fleet, but he was still prepared to give it a trial,
even before the favourable Boys report was received in the Admiralty. Thus the only
immediate technical choice was between the clocks. Moore accepted that both depended
on the data supplied by the Argo rangefinder mounting.
...Both place data thus obtained upon a dock which...transmits the corrected range...&
both clocks keep the rate of clock adjusted as the bearing of enemy alters.
I believe that both Dreyer's & Pollens' [sic] systems will produce about equal results -
Dreyer's is the more developed at present, but Pollen's workmanship is probably
better...22
Moore's own writings go no further is differentiating between the functions embodied in
the rival designs: but the differences are made clear by Dreyer, with his usual
underlinings, in the comparison, written towards the end of 1912, between the Argo and
Monarch (Dreyer Mark 111) clocks.
In the "Monarch" Clock, alterations in own ship's course are made automatically by the
Fore and Aft bar of the Dumaresq being activated by the Gyro Compass.
In the Argo Clock, alterations in own ship's course have to be supplied manually. the
operator having first to remember to raise some clips and then remember to lower these
clips when ship is steady. If own ship is yawing badly or making small alterations in
course for station keeping the manipulation of the Argo Clock will become even more
difficult.
If the case occurs...of the enemy disappearing in smoke, rain or fog, and own ship alters
course, but the enemy is obliging enough not to alter course or speed while Out of sight,
there is a far better chance of having the correct range with the "Monarch" table than
with the Argo Clock when the enemy reappears....
And, as always, Dreyer emphasised that:
The "Monarch" Clock can be "Tuned up" throughout to the "Mean Rangefinder
Range of the moment" BY INSPECTION.25
Pollen to Battenberg, 19 September 1912, MB 1 /T20/ 147, Battenberg Papers, University of
Southampton (Appendix XVI).
23 
'Some comparisons made between the Argo Clock and the Fire Control table in "Monarch", n.d. but




Of course, the criticisms of the Argo clock were hardly disinterested but they were,
nonetheless, justified.
As for the Monarch clock, Dreyer made the most of manual transfer of range-rate
by claiming, none too convincingly, that it permitted an allowance to be made for 'slip'
during a turn. He did not even mention the errors which might arise from the manual,
stepwise transfer of range and bearing rates. However, the tests carried out at Elliott's
offices in February 1913 were soon to demonstrate conclusively that, at least in ideal
operating conditions, manual rate transfer did not result in significant errors, even when
rates were changing rapidly. When in December 1912, Dreyer first proposed making his
table more automatic, he was most probably chiefly concerned with eliminating the
chance of operators' mistakes.
In his report, Dreyer does appear to imply that the bearing rate was transferred
from the Mark III's bearing clock only once, as the enemy disappeared; thus Sumida
concludes that his claim to keep the range until the enemy reappeared was misleading.24
However, as shown by the quotations from the operating pamphlet given in Chapter 5, if
the Dumaresq's speed-across changed, the clock's bearing rate was altered accordingly.
Thus, subject to the limitations of stepwise rate transfer, Dreyer's claim was legitimate.
Dreyer did not draw attention to any other deficiencies of the Argo Clock Mark
III; however, since its trials were delayed in part by alterations suggested by naval officers,
other problems (particularly that the clock could not transmit spotting corrections and
that it always held inclination constant in a turn) must have been well understood in the
Admiralty. Nevertheless, Moore persisted with the policy of purchasing five examples of
each type of clock for comparative trials. In the Autumn of 1912, he clearly took the view
that the pros and cons were finely balanced. But this also meant that there was no longer
the need for a relationship with Argo based on monopoly and secrecy. Many years'
experience had shown, and the recent negotiation had only confirmed, that the existing
contract allowed Pollen to threaten to take abroad not only his own system but what he
had learned of Admiralty methods. The longer secrecy was maintained, the more
knowledge he acquired. It was time, Moore argued, to break the chains.
If any Board members doubted Moore's interpretation, Pollen himself was soon
to provide confirmation by declaring to Churchill that, if his system became public, 'you
24 ILWS, p.232.
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have no secret of any kind left in your naval gunnery': and, for good measure, by claiming
to have invented rate plotting himselfi 25 The Director of Navy Contracts urged that 'the
decision already reached be adhered to....Otherwise all experience goes to show that
exorbitant terms for monopoly will have to be paid to Argo Company'. 26 Yet the
Admiralty continued to discuss the possibility of further orders for the Argo clock on
commercial terms, until, inJanuary 1913, Argo at last quoted a price that might well have
been acceptable. At that critical moment, Pollen made his final attempt to go over the
heads of the responsible departments to the First Lord. This not only exposed his crass
efforts to foment discontent in the Service; it also provided conclusive evidence that, even
after twelve years, he lacked any conception of how to conduct business with the
Admiralty. After this and with the dispute over patents festering, there was little prospect
of establishing a new relationship similar to that enjoyed by other suppliers. Involving the
Press and inciting questions in Parliament only soured relations further. When the final
break was made in the summer of 1913, Argo's name was anathema within the
Admiralty.
But, if this were not enough, by mid-1913, the technical choices had also swung
further in favour of the Dreyer system. The need to make the Dreyer dock automatic had
been recognised, although Elphinstone had not yet begun the new design which would
correct Dreyer's initial, faulty conception. The Admiralty had not yet been informed
about the Argo Clock Mark V, so they had no reason to change their assessment of the
previous Autumn respecting clocks. Argo had indeed completed the prototype Mark IV
true-course plotter, but it was never tried by the Royal Navy. This omission could have
been due entirely to the worsening relationship. However, the requirements for a plotter
had also changed, the developments in rangefinder control making the true-course
principle less and less relevant. The Admiralty's willingness to let Dreyer act as one of the
judges of his own cause must be deplored, but when he and Usborne set out the case for
rate plotting and against true-course plotting in the Technical Historj and Compaiison,
Usborne ended his concluding 'Summary' thus. 	 -
What we require is a method which gives the hitting range in the shortest time, and
which can be relied on to cope with all the difficulties which may arise in action.
As far as can be seen, Commander Dreyer's Fire Control instrument and system fulfils
this requirement completely.
25 Pollen to Churchill, 21 October 1912 in T.173/91 Part II.




If no ranges and no bearings are obtainable, then the instrument is suitable for
employing estimation only.
If ranges are obtained, no matter from what range finder, then the instrument makes
the best possible use of them, combining the information gained from them with
estimation.
If both ranges and bearings are obtained, then the instrument deduces therefrom the
enemy's course and speed with even better accuracy than does the A.C. system.
If spotting proves impracticable, the instrument is ready for working by mean range
finder ranges.
Usborne also pointed out that the Argo system had only 'a continual verbal
communication from the plotting table to the clock' and that it was impossible 'to see at a
glance if the ranges transmitted to the guns are in accord with those coming down from
the range finders'. Furthermore, it had:
...no means of applying "meaned" ranges to the clock...only actual ranges....The
enemy's speed can only be obtained by measuring on the plot the distance between any
two dots or minute circles....one cannot make use of the mean or average position of
such dots'.27
By 1913, target compass bearings could be obtained from the Argo mounting,
which now had a separate trainer to keep it on the target. Thus, in good visibility,
frequent bearings could be taken. However, the accuracy of the individual bearings
received at the plotter was limited not only by the skill of the trainer, but also by any
tendency of the mounting servo to 'hunt', by wander of the gyro-compass induced by
turns and roll, and by the rather coarse '/4° transmission steps. Even so, at least every
bearing observation could be recorded on the time-and-bearing plot. At the same time,
the ranges from the Argo mounting could be plotted automatically by the time-and-range
plot, while ranges from turret and other ranges could be recorded manually. In contrast,
the Argo true-course plotter could plot only the ranges from the Argo mounting and only
the bearings taken simultaneously with these ranges. Consequently, at any moment after
plotting commenced, the Dreyer separate range' and bearing plots would have more,
usually many more, plotted points than an Argo true-course plot. Thus, rate plotting
would be the first to yield initial values of range and rates, before any target course and
speed could be perceived on the true-course plot. Also, as Usborne noted, speed
measurement from the Argo plot had its own additional inaccuracies. Hence, as plotting
proceeded, at any moment the enemy speed and course obtained from a cross-cut of rates
27 Commanders F C Dreyer and C V Usbome, Pollen Azm Conector System Pait L Technical History and





would be more accurate than the values obtainable from a true-course plot. And,
furthermore, only the Dreyer time-and-range plot permitted continuous visual
comparison between the ranges predicted by the clock and the mean rangefinder range.
Nevertheless, Usborne had to concede that the usual criticism of rate plotting 'is,
in its theoretical sense, true, a time and range plot is always a curve, but the curvature is
so slight that in nearly all practical cases it is both negligible and imperceptible'. He also
argued that 'the observer always has the knowledge of which way the curve must be
bending theoretically to help him': 28
 though it would have been more honest to admit
that, in the rare circumstances when the range between two ships on opposite courses was
at the minimum, the rate could only be determined approximately and would require
correction by clock tuning. Also, he did not address explicitly the other causes of
curvature in rate plots, alterations of course by own or enemy ship. However, even then,
much the same arguments for rate-plotting still applied. If the enemy altered course, the
consequent change in range-rate would be perceptible more quickly on the
time-and-range plot; clock range and rate could then be tuned as normal. If own ship
altered course, the clock rate was adjusted automatically; if the Dumaresq was not already
set correctly for enemy course (or even if the enemy altered course at the same moment)
clock tuning with the guidance of the range plot kept the clock and rangefinder ranges
close together until after the turn was completed, when a new range-rate could be
measured and used to adjust the Dumaresq. On the other hand, the disturbances to the
gyro-compass and bearing observations caused by any substantial course alteration would
have increased the scatter of plotted bearings; thus it must be doubted whether any
reliable bearing-rate could be obtained until after the turn had been completed.
Although the functional analysis was restricted to the steady-course case, the
technical advice available to the Admiralty in mid-1913 provided sound arguments for
the view that, in action, the Dreyer tables, which integrated the rate-plotting and
predicting functions in a single, closed-loop system, would be supenor to Argo's separate
true-course plotter and clock. Furthermore, only the Dreyer was suited to the technique of
rangefinder control, then being developed in the 2BS, and to its alternative, rate-control.
Its functional principles had worked satisfactorily in the Mark ifi table, and, although the
Technical Comparison (op. cii.) p.61.
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Mark IV was still being developed, when the time came Elphinstone justified the
Admiralty's faith that he could produce a fully automatic, helm free clock.
'The Quest for Reach' has proposed that the Admiralty's decision was also
motivated by their expectation of close-range battle against the High Seas Fleet. This
suggestion is doubly mistaken. Firstly, two of the main advantages claimed for the Argo
system were that rates were transferred automatically and continuously to the clocks: and
that true-course plotting produced a straight line even if the rates were changing. Since
the shorter the range, the more rapid the change of rates, the Admiralty should have
looked more, not less, favourably on Pollen's system if they had really expected to fight
only close-range engagements. Secondly, the Royal Navy actually hoped to play at long
bowls: though, of course, this would only be possible in good visibility. The rangefinders
would then be rather inaccurate: but nonetheless the Dreyer Table would still be able to
obtain a mean range, and then a mean range and enemy course and speed, more quickly
than an Argo plotter. In poor visibility, fire had to be opened almost immediately the
enemy was sighted, using a gun range based on an estimated range or, at best, the mean
of a few rangefmder ranges; only the Dreyer Table could cope with such conditions. The
Admiralty's decision in its favour did not mark an end to the quest for reach, but a
recognition that, unlike the Argo system, the Dreyer was 'a practical instrument designed
to meet the real requirements of Naval action', at long range if possible but also at short
range if necessary.
Thus, in mid-1913, the Admiralty had compelling reasons for their final choice
of Elliott Brothers as their supplier of fire control tables. Under Keith Elphinstone, the
firm had built up a close and non-problematic relationship with the Admiralty, beginning
with simple instruments like the Dumaresq and progressing to much more complex
devices like the Anschütz gyro compass and the Dreyer Tables themselves. They were
prepared to develop ideas originated by naval officers and to charge prices with a level of
profit acceptable to the Department of Naval Contracts. In return, they were assured of
the production contracts and the recovery of their development costs. Whi1e Elliott
Brothers were in many ways a typical Admiralty supplier, Pollen and his Argo Company
were indeed exceptional. This is strongly indicated in the minutes of the Board of
Admiralty. These hardly ever mention suppliers, even those as vital to the Navy as
Technical Companson, p.62.
Ars EXCEPTIONAL CASE 	 291
Vickers and EOC. Yet, between 1906 and 1910, Pollen and the Argo Company appear in
the minutes of no less than eight meetings of the Board. 3° Pollen's prominence was no
doubt partly due to his habit of bypassing the responsible departments and taking his case
direct to the First Lord and, indeed, to other politicians, including those in opposition.
This behaviour did nothing to develop harmonious relationships with successive Directors
of Naval Ordnance. However, most were remarkably tolerant of Pollen's foibles and he
received a succession of development contracts as well as the order for rangefinder
mountings.
Sumida has proposed that 'the co-operative relationship of Pollen and the
Admiralty can be regarded as an early attempt to create the kind of state and private
partnership in defence procurement that would later become characteristic of the
post-World War H military-industrial complex'. 3 ' On the contrary, the period before
World War I provides many examples of successful co-operation between the Admiralty
and private firms,32 including that with Elliott Brothers who, after World War I, went on
to construct the first of the next generation of Admiralty Fire Control Tables. The
contrast between Elliott Brothers and Argo is marked. In 1913, the Director of Naval
Contracts concluded: 'With regard to...giving encouragement to inventors in the early
states of their work [the] Admiralty does adopt that policy in some cases', but in the case
of the Argo Company:
...the policy was the reverse of successful. Experience shows that there are very
considerable advantages in insisting on inventors...getting all the experimental work
done themselves and bringing before the Mmiralty a finished and prepared piece of
practical mechanism instead of a theory worked out on paper only...It may in some
cases mean paying a higher price for a good and successful invention.33
Likewise, after the War, the experience with Argo was remembered as 'not at all
satisfactory and encouraging' and as an indicator of how not to conduct co-operative
relations. 34 From Jellicoe onwards, Pollen had convinced successive DNOs and
3° From 1905 to 1913, Elswick and Vickers appear once (31 July 1905) among other firms invited to tender
for the I,wzzzcibles. Pollen or the Argo company are named in minutes for 7 August and 18 September 1906,
31 March and 16 April 1908, 17 and 18 February and 4 March 1909 arid 27 April 1910. ADM 167/39,
40, 42, 43 and 44.
Jon Sumida, 'The Quest for Reach: the Development of Long Range Gunnery in the Royal Navy,
1901-1912' in Lt Col Stephen D Chiabotti, ed., Tooliszg for War Militaiy Transfonnation in the Industnal Age
(Chicago, 1995) p.81.
32 For the Admiralty's reliance on the research of private firms, see Nicholas Lambert, Sir John Fisher's Xaval
Revolution (Columbia, SC, 1999) pp.1 52-3.
Report by the Director of Navy Contracts (concerning the Submarine Sound Signalling system invented
byJ Gardiner) 2June 1913 in 'Important Questions dealt with by DNO', Vol.11, p.159, AL
Minute by DNO, 21 March 1919 in 'Ford Fire Control System', p.6 in 'Monthly Record of Principal
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Controllers that he should be paid for secrecy and for the development of his system, yet
had continued to declare that he possessed unrestricted rights not only to his own initial
concepts but to the serviceable instruments developed at Admiralty expense. Towards the
end, he even laid claim to Service ideas which he had initially ridiculed. It is a remarkable
tribute to Pollen's powers of persuasion that his relationship with the Admiralty, so full of
tensions and contradictions, lasted as long as it did. When it eventually ended, the final
rupture was largely provoked by Pollen himself
CONSEQUENCES
The early engagements of the Great War soon established that, in a variety of
action conditions, it was difficult to obtain sufficient, accurate ranges before firing began.
In the Heligoland Bight, Lion opened with an estimated range and relied entirely on
spotting to fmd her targets. At the Falkiand Islands, Sturdee's tactics held the enemy at
long range but resulted in considerable smoke interference. Rangefinding was difficult and
at times impossible and spotting was the main method of range keeping. No plotting was
possible in either engagement.
When the opposing battlecruisers met at the Dogger Bank, firing began at
unprecedented ranges. An opening deflection was obtained from the bearing plot of Lion's
Dreyer Table Mark ifi, even though one of her reports commented adversely on the
incomplete elimination of yaw by the Argo mounting. Beatty chose the orthodox lee
position but the enemy's smoke and spray, carried by the wind, made ranging difficult,
while, for much of the time, the ranges were too high for automatic transmission and the
range scales of the plotters. Some improvised manual time-and-range plotting was
attempted but proved impracticable.
At Jutland, during both phases of the Run to the South, Hipper's smaller force
quickly established gunnery superiority, sank two of Beatty's ships and, most importantly
for this study, made at least three times more hits. Yet this decisive result was
accomplished with a fire control system which was neither automatic nor helm-free:
which used mechanical rather than plotting methods to mean rangefinder ranges: and
which relied on rate control when courses were steady, and on rangefinder control when
they were changing frequently. The 1 SG undoubtedly had an advantage in rangetaking,
partly because their stereoscopic rangefinders were inherently rather more accurate
Questions dealt with by DNO', Vol.11I,Jan. toJun. 1919, AL
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(particularly at ranges over 16,000 yards or when targets were shrouded in smoke): and
partly because their carefully selected rangetakers were better trained than their British
counterparts. However, in other respects, the German system was no more elaborate than
the Dreyer Table Mark I (which may perhaps have been installed in the two ships of the
2BCS): and considerably less complex than the Dreyer Tables Mark II, Ill and IV of the
1 BCS. Yet, although the Germans were singularly successful without the help of elaborate
plotters or range-and-bearing clocks, many historians now consider that the British failed
because all but one ship lacked the Argo Clock and none had been fitted with the Argo
true course plotter. As Captain Roskill acknowledged, such conclusions are largely
conjectural;35
 they are also difficult to counter without further conjecture. Nonetheless, it
is hoped that valid historical insights can obtained by addressing three related questions.
Firstly, did the actual fire control systems in Beatty's ships add to the difficulties imposed
by his tactics? Secondly, did the Argo Clock Mark IV in Qieen May confer an advantage
which explains her rather better hitting (3 hits to Lion's 2) during the first phase? And,
thirdly and more speculatively, might the other ships have been more successful if they
had received Argo docks or the whole Argo system of clock and true-course plotter?
Having sighted the 1SG, at 3.30 Beatty chose to turn E towards their wake,
thereby forcing Hipper to turn about; thus by 3.40, the 1SG and the 1BCS were closing at
a rate of almost -550 yds/min.36
 Meanwhile, the 2BCS had been ordered to prolong the
line astern, but the heel, vibration and large, rapid changes of target bearing induced by
their two 16-point turns prevented any ranging until 3.45; even then, they were still
forcing their engines at maximum revolutions to make up lost speed, so the rangefinders
continued to suffer from severe vibration. As the 2BCS formed up astern, the 1BCS began
the starboard turns to form the line of bearing NW; this was intended to dear the smoke
which still obscured the view of the enemy from liger and, probably, Qjieen Maiy. At
almost the same time, the 1SG turned together to SSE; they opened fire at 3.47, when
7iger she was not yet free of smoke; only Lion and Princess Royal were able to return fire
immediately.
During the approach, the courses of the 1BCS and 1SG until 3.45 had been
steady and the change of range-rate negligible; also, because both sides then altered
course together, the range-rate changed by no more than -70 yds/min. These were
Stephen Roskill, Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beaqy (New York, 1981) p.1 92.
As the 1 SG worked up to 18 knots, this may have reduced to just over -500 yds/min.
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favourable conditions for rate plotting. Princess Royal, which had an uninterrupted view of
her chosen target, obtained an accurate opening range. Her opening rate (-400 yds/min.)
was close to the -340 yds/min. that would have resulted if, after her turn to ESE, the 1 SG
had still been headed SE. Thus it appears that, before the turn, the Dumaresq of her
Dreyer Table Mark III had been set quite accurately for enemy speed and course: in
which case the rate would have been reduced automatically by the gyro-compass
connection. However, because the 1 SG altered course at the same time, the plot of
rangefinder ranges remained almost straight and, therefore, would have begun to diverge
from the plot of clock ranges. This divergence may already have been detected and the
rate made more rapidly c1osing, however, if so, this initial adjustment was not yet
sufficient to correct fully for the enemy's turn.
Had Princess Royal been equipped with the original Argo Plotter Mark IV, it
would have been useless during the approach, since it could only plot ranges to a
maximum of 16,000 yards. However, at the cost of a proportionate loss in accuracy, the
gear ratio between the range receiver and the plotting pen carriage could have been
altered to allow plotting up to (say) 20,000 yards. Thus modified, it could perhaps have
made a true-course plot during the first part of the approach and even continued to plot
through the turn to ESE. However, as explained in the preceding section, the initial
enemy speed and course would not have been as accurate as that obtained from the rate
plots: while, in the turn, the plotted points would have been even fewer and more
scattered than before. Even after the turn, it would have been necessary to wait for the
new course to become percepti11e; then, having measured the new speed (not easy,
especially if the target was still regaining the speed lost in the turn), the clock could be
reset. In comparison, the points on the time-and-range plot were more numerous and
were unaffected by the various bearing errors. A divergence between rangefmder and
clock ranges could be detected much sooner than a new course could be perceived on a
true-course plot: perhaps even before the target had completed its turn. The difference in
slopes indicated immediately whether the rate needed to be increased or decreased;
although the full extent of the change was probably not at first apparent, initial changes in
range and rate could be applied immediately, in the manner of spotting corrections. Thus
range and rate could be tuned progressively until the two plots again converged. In
practice, a Dreyer range-rate plot was unaffected by bearing errors and could pick up a
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change in enemy course more quickly than a true-course plot; in addition, by stepwise
adjustment of range and rate, the Dreyer table could keep the clock range and rate in
close agreement with the observed ranges.
Princess Royal was the only British battlecruiser to obtain accurate ranges. Lion's
TS record contains only two rangefinder ranges before fire was opened. Though for
different reasons, the four rear ships of Beatty's line were only able to start ranging late in
the approach; if any of these ships had taken a few reasonably accurate ranges, its
time-and-range plot could have given first a mean opening range and then, a little later,
an opening rate. In the short time available as they emerged from the smoke, it is most
unlikely that either Qyeen Mary or Tiger could have made a useful true-course plot. It might
be argued that, since in principle true-course plotting was helm-free, the 2BCS (which was
not much troubled by smoke) could have plotted courses as they hauled into line. In
reality, their violent manoeuvres prevented the taking of ranges and bearings and must
have seriously disturbed the gyro compass, on which the true-course table depended.
Furthermore, these older ships were probably supplied from the initial batch of Argo
mountings with the air-driven gyro which could only stabilise the mounting against small
yaws.
Thus, during the approach, when the purpose of plotting was to obtain first a
mean range and then an estimate of enemy course and speed (or the equivalent range-rate
and bearing-rate) none of Beatty's ships would have derived any advantage from an Argo
true-course plotter. With the exception of Princess Royal, their opening ranges were much
too high and the rates insufficiently closing: but the errors were due not to the fire control
tables but to a dearth of accurate rangefmder ranges.
The 1 SG, with much smaller opening range errors, soon began to straddle their
targets, forcing Lion to lead away in a series of small turns, from ESE to SbyE, which
progressively reduced the closing rate. However, the speed-across and its rate-of-change
remained low throughout. lion's target bearings shows that her maximum rate of turn was
just over 1 8°/mm: 37
 from which the maximum rate of change of range-rate can be
calculated, using equation ffl:6, as 256 yds/min/min. Thus, assuming that the rate of her
Mark ifi Dreyer range-clock was altered each time the Dumaresq rate changed by 50
yds/min., the minimum time between rate settings was just under 12 seconds. A
'Record of Events during action of May 31st compiled from records kept in Control Position and
Transmitting Station. H.M.S. Uon' in BTY 6/6, NMM.
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well-trained operator would have had no difficulty in following with the range-rate
pointer. At the maximum rate of turn, equation 111:10 shows that the speed-across was
changing at -1.65 knots/mm. If the rate of the bearing clock was adjusted each time the
speed-across changed by 2 knots, the minimum time between adjustments was 1.2 minutes;
there was plenty of time to convert speed-across to bearing-rate and set the clock
accordingly. Thus, in Lion and Piincess Royal, the manual transfer of range-rate and
bearing-rate in their Mark III Dreyer Tables should not have introduced significant
additional errors. Lion's problem was that she opened fire with excessive errors of range
and rate on her clock, while her attempts to correct these by large spotting corrections
were unsuccessful until 4 o'clock. In contrast, Princess Royal began with more accurate
clock settings. She then got into Lion's smoke but, while this must have interfered with her
aiming and spotting, her Dreyer Mark III Table could keep the range and rate when her
target, on the beam, was obscured. Unfortunately, before she could make any hits, her fire
was also disrupted firstly by shorts and then seriously by hits, especially that which
damaged her Argo tower.
Next astern, Qjieen May probably made a similar but wider turn to avoid smoke
interference. However, she was obliged to respond to each unsignalled turn by the
flagship, so it would have been difficult for Qyeen Mary's bridge to give any advanced
warning of course changes to the operators of her Argo Clock Mark IV. They were
therefore faced with the problem of whether to attempt to manipulate the
STEADY-TURNING lever and course clamp as the gyro-compass receiver swung or
steadied: or to leave the clock set permanently to TURNING. Probably, the latter was the
only practicable method. However, the clock was then only automatic for ranges. The
target bearings had to be adjusted continually by hand: either by following the indications
of the bearing receiver from the Argo Mounting, or by applying equal but opposite
changes to those registered by the gyro-compass receiver. 38
 Without the assistance of
pointers to follow, these bearing changes were not easily transferred; thus, when faced
with a succession of small turns, the Argo Clock Mark IV had no 'obvious superiority'39
even over the Dreyer Tables Mark III, let alone the automatic, helm-free Dreyer Mark
IV in 7ger.
The latter was a valid approximation when the speed-across was low.




Tiger appears to have held longer to EbyS or ESE before also turning further to
starboard. Had her Mark IV table been supplied with accurate data, it would have been
able to keep range and rates automatically through the subsequent turns, even if the target
had been obscured by splashes from enemy shorts. In fact, she too overestimated the
range and underestimated the range-rate. Worse, she was soon badly damaged, after
which two of her turrets were incapable of firing accurately. Tiger was reduced to firing
shots raggedly, mostly in ones and twos, thereby making spotting even more difficult and
interfering with any attempts to range between shots or salvoes. She also lacked an
Evershed installation to take over target designation when the Director appeared to be
damaged. These handicaps are more than sufficient to explain her poor shooting for the
rest of the battle.
The 2BCS never turned to ESE on the line of bearing, but continued E'wards at
full power before making a sharp turn to SSE at 3.54. Until this turn, the calculated
range-rate had been almost -800 yds/min. closing. Sumida appears to imply (see Chapter
1) that none of the Dreyer Tables were designed to generate ranges accurately even at half
this rate. In fact, the tables with electric drive were constructed for rates up to ±2,000
yds/min. while even the earliest Service model of Vickers clock had a maximum rate of
just over ± 1,300 yds/min. Xew Zealand and Indefatigable both relied on Vickers clocks for
range keeping, but no evidence has been found that these instruments were inaccurate
once the initial problems had been sorted out by 1909. In any case, .)Vew Zealand's opening
rate was only -200 yds/min. and, while it was progressively increased, it did not exceed
-500 yds/min. before the turn. However, high rates undoubtedly caused other problems.
Ranging on such a rapidly approaching target must have been difficult, while there would
have been a significant delay between making a 'cut' and plotting the range. Unavoidable
variations in these delays must also have increased the scatter of the plotted points and the
time required to perceive the underlying mean range line. This line was also liable to lag
behind the true range, though the error, perhaps 100-200 yards, 4° was small compared
with fiew Zealand's opening error of over 2,000 yards. However, because the range-rate
was constant, the plotting delays did not result in a rate error, other than that arising from
the increased scatter. Clearly, these effects somewhat reduced the advantage of
rate-plotting with multiple rangefinders over true-course plotting from a single
° If it took 10 seconds to read off a range from a range receiver and plot it, the true range would have
fallen meanwhile by 133 yards.
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rangefmder. On the other hand, the Argo true-course plotter lacked any provision to read
off a mean range, a notable disadvantage when the range was changing rapidly.
When the 2BCS altered course by six points (67'/2°) to SSE at 3.54, the
component of their own speed along the line-of-bearing altered by 1007 yds/min. 4' The
turn may have been completed in as little as two minutes which, if the rate was to be
transferred in steps of 100 yds/min. required a rate transfer roughly every 12 seconds.
This was slow enough to be practicable even if both ships still had standard Mark VIE
Dumaresqs, from which the rates had to be transferred manually to the clock: yet it only
resulted in a range error of about 100 yards in total. This already negligible error would
have been halved if these ships already had the Dreyer Table Mark I with
follow-the-pointer transfer of rates from the Dumaresq Mark VI* to the clock. Thus
manual rate transfers through the turn did not add appreciably to the larger range and
rate errors that had been present as it began.42
For the reasons given in Chapter 5, even if the 2BCS had received Dreyer
Tables Mark I, these would not have had automatic bearing plots: while Eady's account
from Xew Zealand TS does not mention a manual bearing plot (XVffl-19). Given the
conditions of low and slowly-changing bearing rate, it would have been sufficient to open
with an estimated deflection based on the Dumaresq speed-across, and then to rely on
spotting to keep the salvoes correct for line. Furthermore, whatever the equipment in their
TSs, these ships had neither bearing clock nor connection from the gyro-compass to the
Dumaresq. However, they had little need of automatic bearing-keeping while the course
was steady; while, during turns, the Dumaresq was adjusted by the same methods used
with the Argo Clock Mark N!
After 3.53, all the ships of the 1 SG appear to have altered to SE in LüLow's wake,
causing the rate to change in a few minutes from rapidly closing to opening at about +430
yds/min. (the 1BCS) and +290 yds/min. (2BCS). In the din of action, would Dreyer
tables or the Argo system have been better in detecting this change in the enemy's course?
Most reliance had to be put on spotting, the Dumaresqs of both the Dreyer Tables and
Argo Clocks then being adjusted, on identical principles, according to the spotting
' Calculated from the data in Note XXVI-14.
42 J!few Zealand's 'Record of Ranges, Rates, etc...', 8 June 1916 (in ADM 116/1487, PRO) is contradictory
in that a hand-written addition for 3.55'% gives the rate as '350 Cl.' but the gun range reached its
minimum (10,800 yards) at 3.56 i.e. its rate was then momentarily zero. The next recorded rate was 'Nil' at
3.58'/.
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corrections for range-rate and deflection. While deliberate, spotted salvoes were being
fired, it was also possible to range in the gaps and so continue plotting although, with the
enemy firing back, the rate and accuracy of ranging was likely to be reduced. Thus, as in
other circumstances, the Dreyer rate plot, by comparing clock and rangefinder ranges,
could detect a change of course more quickly than a true-course plot. This comparison
assumes, of course, that, while firing, bearings could be taken with sufficient accuracy to
make a useful true-course plot: which is by no means certain. Furthermore, true-course
plotting was always dependent on one, stabilised mounting and, as shown by Pthwess
Royal's experience, could be stopped entirely by a single hit or breakdown.
The second phase of the Run to the South began when the 5BS opened fire on
the rear German ships. At about the same time (approximately 4.10) Hipper turned to
SbyW. Until 4.27, the only subsequent disturbance for Lütow, Derfflinger and Seydlitz was
the change in formation to line ahead S at 4.18: but MoltJc€ and von deT Tann were also
forced to zig-zag to avoid the accurate, long-range fire of the British battleships. After the
hit on Qturret, Lion had veered out of line to starboard but she then recovered to a course
due S, with the rest of Beatty's force to port. In this second phase, the British ships were
almost certainly at a disadvantage in terms of general visibility and the conditions for
rangetaking; they also remained to windward of their opponents and would again suffer
from interference due to their own smoke if they did not maintain the appropriate line of
bearing.
Once BaTham had commenced firing, Beatty turned Lion, still without signals, to
course SE, which induced a rapid closing rate a little over -710 yds/min; thus the 1 SG
were soon able to resume firing. Then at 4.20, Lion altered away to SSE, thereby halving
the rate; however, the speed-across remained low (see figures in Chapter 2). Piincess Royal
and Qyeen Mary turned directly to SSE; 7ger and Xew Zealand, which were initially rather
closer to the enemy, appear to have turned later to follow their consorts. Despite three
early hits by the British, the 1 SG soon found the range and rate and regained gunnery
superiority. The concentration by Derfflinger with Seydlitz produced a weight of accurate
fire on Qjteen Mazy which no British battlecruiser could long withstand. It is hardly
surprising that, after she blew up, the British line was thrown into confusion but, almost
immediately, Hipper turned sharply away, though his withdrawal was not detected by
most British ships for some time.
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For this second phase, it is necessary to focus mainly on Lion. She was already
under fire before she turned to SSE. Thus she needed to have formed a reasonably
accurate estimate of Lütow's course and speed during the SE'ly leg in order to keep the
range and rate through the turn. The calculated changes in range-rate and speed-across
during this turn, which lasted about 2 minutes, were some 450 yds/min. and 2½. knots,
respectively. Thus transfer of range-rate in steps of 50 or at worst 100 yds/min. was
practicable: while the bearing-rate required at most two 2-knot adjustment. Consequently,
the clock and Dumaresq of her Mark ifi Table could keep the range and rates
satisfactorily through the turn; the problem was determining the initial enemy speed and
course. lion's TS record contains only two ranges while her course was SE, though both
were misleadingly high;43
 nonetheless, had they been used to plot (or even to calculate) a
rate, a value of -500 yds/min. would have been obtained. Despite the difficulties of
making a useful bearing-rate plot, it could at least record every bearing taken and provide
an approximate mean rate. Then by setting the Dumaresq by a cross-cut, the resulting
enemy speed and course would not have been too far from the correct values.
Alternatively, the same two ranges, with simultaneously-taken bearings, might have been
used on a true-course plot, prouided both ranges had been taken with the Argo rangefinder. However,
there was then no averaging out of bearing errors over many observations; thus, typically,
any enemy course and speed from a true-course plot must have been less accurate than
the values obtained with a cross-cut of plotted rates.
Unfortunately, despite the indication from the rangefinder ranges and the need
for repeated large DOWN spotting corrections, Lion's TS was still using a rate of only
-200 yds/min. as the turn commenced. Thus the enemy course on the Dumaresq was
insufficiently converging, an error which was then maintained through the turn.
However, this was a failure to make use of the available data, not of the Dreyer Table.
Since ranging in all Beatty's ships was now handicapped by worsening visibility,
the same considerations suggest that none would have benefited from true-course plotting.
Princess Royal's Dreyer Table Mark ifi could adjust automatically as she. attempted to
follow her flagship's turns to SE and SSE. However, her gun ranges (which are only an
approximate guide) indicate that she did not adopt a sufficiently rapid closing rate until
well after the second turn. Her Argo rangefinder remained Out of action, while her
Lion, 'Record of Events' (op. cit.).
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ranging certainly suffered interference at times from lion's smoke; probably, Princess Royal
was forced to rely mostly on spotting and could do little if any plotting.
Qyeen Mary also had to respond as best she could to the course alterations of those
ahead, so the operators of her Argo Clock Mark IV may or may not have received
advanced warning of her own turns. Whether the clock's control lever was set to
STEADY or TURNING, there was a risk that they would not realise quickly enough that
a change registered by their gyro-compass receiver actually signified the start of a turn
rather than a brief yaw. If the lever was at STEADY, there would have been a further
delay while the angle-between-courses was unclamped and the lever thrown over. Once
again, given these operational dilemmas, the Argo Clock Mark 1V was at a disadvantage
compared with the helm-free Dreyer Tables Mark ifi and IV.
The courses of 7iger and New Zealand cannot be determined with any accuracy
but, until Qjieen Mary blew up, they appear to have been steadier than those of the leading
ships. Thus the changes in rate were smaller and could have been easily accommodated,
not only by Tiger's automatic, helm-free Mark N table, but also by New Zealand's fire
control installation, even if it still depended on manual rate transfer from Dumaresq to
Vickers clock. Tiger continued to be handicapped by the damage to her turrets, while New
Zealand probably suffered from smoke interference, as would be expected from her
windward position. In both ships, the ranges were too high before Qjieen Mary was lost but,
especially in Tiger's case, too low afterwards. Without accurate ranges, no fire control
table, from the simplest to the most automatic, could achieve very much.
This analysis of the two phases of the Run to the South provides clear answers to
the three questions posed earlier. Firstly, the functional characteristics of the Dreyer
Tables did not add appreciably to the difficulties experienced by Beatty's ships. The root
cause of their problems was that, with the single exception of Princess Royal during the first
approach, they were unable to obtain sufficient, accurate ranges. In both phases of firing,
the speed-across remained low. Especially in such conditions, rate plotting could make the
best use of the few available ranges; while the errors introduced by the manual transfer of
rates were insignificant. Only two provisos are necessary. Firstly, if the 2BCS had not
already been supplied with Dreyer Tables Mark I, they would have found range-plotting,
by manual means, rather more difficult than the other British battlecruisers. And,
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secondly, the errors due to manual rate transfer were minimal only while the operators
did not make mistakes.
Secondly, Qjseen Mary derived no special advantage from her Argo Clock Mark
IV. In fact, Beatty's unsignalled turns, which were especially frequent in the first phase,
made it difficult to use the clock except in the TURNING mode, which required the
continual unaided transfer of target bearings from Argo or gyro-compass receivers.
Except that range-rate was transferred automatically, in other respects this mode of
working was no different from that used with the Dreyer Table Mark I. During the first
phase, Qyeen Mary actually made only one more hit than Lion, whose TS record suggests
that her fire control personnel were unable to establish enemy range and rate with any
certainty. Qyeen Mary's shooting, which was unremarkable by German standards, did not
need to achieve much to improve on the flagship's score; the additional hit can be
explained by the better ranging and spotting that would be expected of the BCF's crack
gunnery ship: and because, if her survivors remembered correctly, she was not badly hit
until later.
In addressing the third question, the first conclusion must be that none of
Beatty's other ships would have been more successful if, like Qyeen Mary, they had been
given Argo Clocks Mark N. Even if they had been equipped with the Argo Clock Mark
V (which was both automatic and helm-free) in conjunction which a Dreyer rate plotter,
they would have been no better off than 7ger, which had the functionally similar Dreyer
Table Mark N. Thus the only installation that might have demonstrated a decisive
superiority was the final, complete Argo system of Mark V clock and Mark N plotter,
although any improvement would have to be attributable to the plotter alone. However,
this analysis has not found any moment in the Run to the South when an Argo
true-course plotter would have given results as satisfactory as those actually obtained from
the Dreyer rate plotters. If the Royal Navy had adopted the full Pollen system, Beatty's
ships would probably have made their first hits even later than was actually the case: and
it would certainly not have enabled them to hit before they were hit in return.
The shooting of other British ships at Jutland was much more satisfactory and
can be explained by their adherence to the same basic method. Before opening fire, it was
necessary to obtain some reliable ranges, preferably sufficient to plot and to obtain a mean
range and rate; exceptionally, Iron Duke was even able to obtain a spread of ranges to
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indicate the size of her opening bracket. On opening fire with deliberate salvoes, the
remaining range errors (and, if possible, rate errors) were corrected by spotting while, as
soon as the target was straddled, rapid fire was essential before the target was lost, usually
because it disappeared into the murk. This simple system (which, apart from the different
method of meaning ranges, was the same as that used by the 1 SG) could be followed by
all the British capital ships, irrespective of their fire control gear. While Iron Duke
demonstrated that range plotting could yield valuable data, no battleship is known to have
obtained useful results from the bearing plot. Of course, this also meant that, in the poor
visibility which set in soon after the Run to the South, true course plotting would have
been impossible.
As might be expected from the preceding conclusions, after the Battle ofJutland
no blame was attached to the Dreyer Tables for the defeat of the BCF or the inconclusive
result of the brief clashes of the battlefleets. By the end of the War, it was accepted that the
original Dreyer bearing plot had rarely proved useful, but the GDT gear gave a new
importance to the plotting of bearings (now from the Director itself) and to the bearing
clock. The Dreyer Table Committee had every opportunity to be critical. They did,
indeed, record their concerns about slippage in the range clock: although this problem
was recent and confined to tables with additional experimental fittings. They confirmed
the value of the range plot as a source of meaned ranges, but considered that, in action
conditions, it could hardly ever be used to obtain a rate. Instead, they recommended a
cross-cut of bearing rate with inclination, as measured by the then new and largely
untried inclinometer.
In their recommendations for a new generation of fire control tables, the
Committee discussed true-course plotting, but decided that the enemy's track could be
plotted accurately only in such favourable conditions that plotting would be unnecessary.
However, they acknowledged the superior design of the Argo slipless drive, which was
incorporated in the clock of the new Admiralty Fire Control Table. By the Spring of
1923, the limitations of the inclinometer were better understood and it had been accepted
that inclination was not an alternative, but complementary, to range-rate. The completed
AFCTs were, compared with the older Dreyer Tables, instruments of extraordinary
sophistication, in which, as far as possible, gun range and deflection were generated
automatically. Yet they still embodied the same principles of an integrated system which
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plotted ranges and bearings separately against time. The observed rates were used, now
with inclination as well, to set or adjust the estimates of enemy speed and course: while the
plots allowed the predicted ranges and bearings, as generated by the clocks, to be
compared graphically with observed values. Their clocks were based on mechanical
designs originated by Argo and Ford: but, as fire control systems, they were highly
developed Dreyer Tables.
CONCLUSIONS
With good reason, Professor Sumida has placed his accounts of Arthur Pollen's
dealings with the Royal Navy among the 'new model monographs', which are 'based on
the use of a wide range of previously unexploited sources' and directed towards 'the
integrated examination of the technical, personnel, economic, administrative, and
financial factors in order to reinterpret the course of policy-making and its consequences
in operations'. Even so, events and technical assessments are described largely from
Pollen's viewpoint, that of a struggling inventor battling to overcome the Admiralty's
parsimony and technical conservatism and the opposition of the responsible officers,
Bacon and Moore in particular.
The present thesis has tried to show that the Admiralty's perspective was very
different, of a repeatedly over-optimistic promoter who often delivered late or not at all,
regularly demanded large sums for his inventions, and threatened to take his (and, later,
the Admiralty's) secrets abroad if he did not get his way. Extensive use has been made of
an important source which has not been cited in earlier works: the RCAI files in the
Public Record Office.45
 They include, amongst the evidence for Pollen's first, unsuccessful
appearance in October 1923 (which has not been described previously), Argo's own
financial statement; this establishes that Pollen himself, unlike his shareholders, was well
rewarded over many years for his work on fire control, even before he received the
overgenerous award from the RCAI in 1925. Further, despite a considerable overlap with
the Pollen Papers, these RCAI files also contain many essential Admiralty documents,
including those relating to the development of the Dreyer Tables. This study has also
J T Sumida and D A Rosenberg, 'Machines, Men, Manufacturing, Management and Money...' in John
B Hattendorf (ed.)D JVzva1 History, Essays towardc Impnwemenz (Newport, RI, 1995) p.30.
The evidence bundles for the RCAI hearings in 1923 and 1925 are in T.173/91, with additional
material in T.173/88-90. The Minutes of Proceedings are in T.173/547; Parts I to 3 cover the hearings
from 9 to 11 October 1923.
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drawn on surviving technical documents (e.g. handbooks, reports, patents British and
American) and on the Admiralty records which chronicle the development of long range
gunnery in the Royal Navy after 1900.
These sources have been invaluable in clarifying the relative chronologies for the
development of the three British fire control systems and in attempting objective
comparisons of their technical characteristics. Firstly, there was the initial Service system
which, although far from automatic, introduced many of the essential instruments. Their
capabilities, and the different ways in which they were invented and procured, establish
the technical and administrative context against which the rivalry between Pollen and
Dreyer, Isherwood and Elphinstone, and Argo and Elliott Brothers, was played out. The
second system is Pollen's AC. The designs of the various clocks and plotters have been
considered in sufficient detail to establish their actual functional characteristics and
limitations, as opposed to Pollen's sometimes misleading claims. Also, the Admiralty's
long and frequently stormy commercial relationship with Pollen has been contrasted with
their generally easy and informal dealings with other supplier companies, including Elliott
Brothers. Thirdly, the chronological development of the Dreyer tables, the principal
characteristics of the different marks, and the inventions contributed by Dreyer himself,
Elphinstone and others, have been described in more detail than previously, though
some aspects unfortunately remain obscure (particularly the installation dates for the
Mark I tables).
With the aid of this technical chronology, quite different conclusions have been
reached from those of previous authors quoted in Chapter 1. In certain respects, the AC
system was developed from, or at very least was anticipated by, Service ideas. Even so,
Argo were certainly first to propose the idea of a bearing clock. Yet there was no
similarity, either mechanically or in the manner of use, between the methods they and
Elliott Brothers devised to transfer the Dumaresq speed-across and convert it into
bearing-rate: nor was there at any time a resemblance between the Argo and Elliott
variable speed drives. Thus there are no grounds for accusing Elphinstone of plagiarising
Isherwood's design: not least because, almost certainly, he had no opportunity to do so. As
for the choices made by the Admiralty, for many years, despite Pollen's many
provocations, they continued to fund his developments and to purchase equipment. The
For a recent account of the Dreyer Tables, though only as described in the 1918 handbook and 1930
pamphlets, see William Scheihauf, 'The Dumaresq and the Dreyer' in Warship lntematwnal, No. 3, 2000.
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crisis of 1912 followed Pollen's refusal, when faced with a financial crisis of his own
making, to accept orders for clocks to participate in competitive trials. By that time, the
Argo design (the Mark III Clock) was no longer decisively superior to the clock in the
Dreyer Table Mark HI; the Argo was automatic only on steady courses, while the Dreyer
was helm-free even if its rate transfers were manual. Moore persisted with his intention to
hold trials, but recommended that Argo be treated in future like other suppliers. This
might still have been possible, until Pollen himself provoked the final rupture by
demonstrating conclusively that a new relationship on commercial terms was
unsustainable.
Wherever possible, the comparisons between the technical and functional
characteristics of the competing clocks and plotters have been supported here by
quantitative analysis. It has been possible to show that the errors inherent in the
mechanism of the Vickers clock were unimportant: that the stepwise, manual transfer of
range-rate from the Dumaresqs to the clocks of the Dreyer Tables Mark I and III did not
introduce significant errors: and that there was time enough for the two-stage manual
process for setting the rate of the Mark ifi's bearing clock. This quantitative approach has
also been extended to the Run to the South, although it has also been necessary to go
back to the primary sources for the battle in order to understand properly the impact of
Beatty's tactics. It has been concluded that the rates were not too high nor were they
changing too rapidly for any of the Dreyer Tables: that, because Qyeen Maiy, like all those
astern of Lion, had to follow the flagship's unsignalled changes of course under fire, she
obtained no special advantage from her Argo Clock Mark IV: and that the shooting of
Beatty's battlecruisers would not have been better if they had been equipped with the
Argo system. They twice lost gunnery superiority because, except for Princess Rya1 during
the initial approach, they lacked sufficient, accurate ranges. This was mainly due to
Beatty's headlong tactics and to the worsening visibility from the British ships in the
second phase; however, Lion's record, in particular, suggests that inadequate training of
rangetakers and fire control personnel was also a deciding factor.
By the end of the Great War, it was clear that real actions placed far greater
demands on fire control than had been anticipated before the conflict: either by the
British or German navies, or, indeed, by Dreyer or Pollen. In good visibility, firing began
while ranges were still too long for accurate rangetaking and bearings could not be
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measured precisely. In bad conditions, it was necessary to open fire almost as soon as the
enemy was sighted, with at best a few snap ranges as a guide. As soon as salvoes fell close
to a ship, it would invariably take evasive action; thus, while the fire control system must
be helm-free to correct automatically for changes in own course, it must also be able to
detect quickly any alteration by the target. For the new generation of fire control tables,
the Royal Navy accepted the superiority of the Argo-pattern variable speed drive as the
basis for the range-and-bearing clock: but they remained convinced that the clock must be
part of an integrated table which plotted ranges and bearings separately and permitted the
predicted ranges and bearings to be compared continuously with observations. Thus the
clock could be tuned to give better predictions while courses were steady and it could be
adjusted in response to alterations by the enemy. This 'closed-loop' principle, first
introduced (though for range only) in the Original Dreyer Table, was much better suited
to action conditions than the 'open-loop' Argo system, in which the true-course plotter
and clock remained separate, unconnected units. Before opening fire, rate plotting was
able to use every observation of range or bearing, however imperfect. After firing began,
only rate plotting could complement spotting in determining the best step-by-step
adjustments to range, deflection and range-rate which would first find and then hold the
target, even as it attempted to evade the straddles and hits.
The Admiralty's choice of the Dreyer Tables, as manufactured for them by
Elliott Brothers, was amply justified by wartime experience. The tables (of different marks,
automatic and manual) were able to cope with the rates and change of rates encountered
atJutland: and, while the gunnery of the battlecruisers was disappointing, it was not made
worse by the Dreyer tables, nor would it have been improved if the ships had been fitted
with the Argo system. Later in the War, the Dreyer Tables proved adaptable, in ways
inconceivable for the Argo designs, to the new fittings demanded by the lessons of action.
And, although the next generation of fire control table used Isherwood's variable speed
drive, their system principles were the same as their direct predecessors, the Dreyer
Tables.
ADMIRALTY AND INDUSTRY
The history of the Royal Navy's gunnery in the early years of the twentieth
century has been unduly dominated by two individuals, Percy Scott and Arthur Pollen
who, though for different reasons, detested the Admiralty and left images of an
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organisation profoundly hostile to technical innovation. The present author has shown
elsewhere that Scott's account of the history of the Director is seriously distorted and that
its development was not, as is usually represented, a case of too little, too late: but of
successful innovation against considerable technical obstacles. 47
 This study has shown that
the Admiralty was prepared to support Pollen over many years and to treat him and his
company as a quite exceptional case. The final breech with Argo did not follow the
perverse rejection of a technically superior fire control system; it was the result of reasoned
choices between two systems offering distinct functionality: and between two suppliers
with very different commercial relationships with the Admiralty.
The revolution in gunnery from 1899 to 1914 required the development of many
new instruments, like the Director, and, indeed, the Dreyer Tables, these were produced
by industrial firms working closely with the surprisingly few members of the Department
of the Director of Naval Ordnance who were responsible for the procurement of new fire
control instruments. The relationship between the DNO's department and British
instrument makers and weapons suppliers was, in general, close and relatively informal. It
depended on much of the research and development being carried out by the firms, the
Admiralty itself having neither the organisation, personnel nor funds for these activities.
Its ideal was to encourage suppliers to compete on both technology and price: though the
danger of reliance on a monopoly supplier was always present. On the whole, British
industry was able to meet the Admiralty's requirements, though occasionally by bringing
in technology from abroad (some early fire control instruments and gyrocompasses).
Nonetheless, at the outbreak of the War, the Royal Navy led the world in directors, while,
as far as is known, no other navy had fire control plotters and predictors as sophisticated
as the Dreyer Tables Mark IV. Once the United States entered the War, Admiral
William S Sims found:
...a number of things...in the Grand Fleet in which we are very distinctly inferior. This
indudes such fundamentally important things as fire control, concentration and so
forth....the British are very distinctly in advance of us in their application of electricity to
fire control.
Thus, the fire control instruments developed in the pre-War years were not examples of
the 'defective technology, reflecting the scientific and technical backwardness of British
John Brooks, 'Percy Scott and the Director' in David McLean and Antony Preston (eds.) Warship 1996
(London, 1996) pp.'50-170.
Michael Simpson (ed.) Ang10-Am€iican Xaval RelationS 1917-1919 (Aldershot, 1991) p.330 (reference
courtesy of the editor).
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industry': nor were they an 'ingredient in the British failure to annihilate atJutland'. 49
 On
the contrary, the achievements of the Admiralty's suppliers only add to the case against
declinist theories of British industry.50
Of course, the co-operation of Admiralty and British industry was not always
successful. The most notable failure, which is outside the scope of this study and
complicated by the divided responsibility between the Admiralty and the Ordnance
Board, was in the provision of armour-piercing shell. 5 ' In fire control, the worst failing
was the delay in adopting the more accurate 15-foot rangefinder. However this was not
the fault of the supplier (Barr and Stroud) but of the Admiralty, which did not order the
latest models soon enough. This lapse was probably due principally to the flawed
structure of the pre-War Admiralty. There was no part of the organisation responsible for
representing the interests of users of weapons and instruments against those of the supplier
departments reporting to the Controller. The user role was performed, though in no
systematic way, by the Inspector of Target Practice and by the fleet Commanders-in-
Chief. Their criticisms and demands sometimes stimulated improvements or the adoption
of new instruments. However, until the creation of a proper naval staff, the Controller's
departments had, as best they could, to identi1' requirements, procure the equipment and,
with the assistance of Gunnery and Torpedo Schools, assess its performance. It is
interesting, in view of his involvement (in several ways) on the supplier side, to find
Frederic Dreyer as the first holder of the staff post of Director of Naval Artillery and
Torpedoes: and to observe the opposition of Beatty to the reduction of his prerogatives, as
Commander-in Chief, Grand fleet, to represent the gunnery user afloat.
The self-interested accounts by Scott and Pollen have served to obscure much of
the Admiralty's encouragement of innovation and its normal and productive relationship
with British industry. Without their distorting influence, it may now be possible to develop
a better understanding of this relationship in the pre-War period, how it changed during
and after the Great War, and to explore and explain its successes and failures in the
period leading up to the next World War.
Correlli Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely (New York, 1991) P.7. See also IDJ'IS, p.337.
5° For a comprehensive study and the sources for an anti-declinist account, see David Edgerton, Science,
technology and the British industnal 'decline', 1870-1970 (Cambridge, 1996).
Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnought to &apa Thw, Volume IH (Oxford, 1978) pp.204-7. Guy Hartcup, The
War ofInvention (London, 1988) pp.49. lain McCallum. The Riddle of the SIze/h 1914-1918 (unpublished study)
and 'Achilles Heel? Propellants and High Explosives, 1880-1916' in War Studies Journal, Vol.4, Issue 1,





APPENDICES TO CI-IAPTER. 2
APPENDIX I
TIME-AND-RANGE HYPERBOLA
1. From the viewpoint of observers in the firing ship, the enemy appears to be
following an apparent or virtual course which can be found by a vector
subtraction (with a triangle of velocities) of the firing ship's velocity from the
enemy's velocity: see Fig. 2.6. The virtual speed v is found from:
v2 =e2+s2-2escos0
	 (1:1)
where 0 is the angle between courses,
and e and s are the speeds of the enemy and own ships.
2. Thus v is small when the angle between courses is small and rises to a maximum
when courses are opposite.
v = e - s when 0=00
v=e+swhenG= 1800
3. With reference to Fig. 2.6, from the right triangle SPE:
R2 =Ro2+(vt)2	 (1:2)
where t =0 when R = R 0, the minimum range between the two ships.
4. Equation 1:2 can be rearranged into the standard hyperbolic form:
2	 2
a 2 - b2 -
R0
where a = R0 and	 b -
Since the slopes of the asymptotes of the hyperbola (when drawn as in Fig. 2.7) are
± the slopes of the asymptotes to the time-and-range hyperbola aie ±v.
5. Thus, for given values of e and s, when courses are opposite the slopes are a
maximum; and, when courses are parallel, the slopes are at a minimum. If courses
E A Maxwell, Eknentaiy Coordinate Gomrny (London, 1954) pp.163 and 166.
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and speeds are identical, the asymptotes and the hyperbola itself are all horizontal
lines.
6. If courses converge towards or diverge from a common point, R 0 is zero. Thus the
hyperbola coincides with the asymptotes. In practice, the ranges in action are all
well before or well after the minimum range point. Thus, provided that courses
remain steady, the time-and-range curve is a straight line i.e. the range-rate equals







1.	 If the range-rate was correct, the range on the range-clock changed at the same
rate as the correct target range. Thus a bracket could be worked as if the range
were constant and the target would be straddled by one of the salvoes of the
bracket.
•_____	 ___ __200 yards
0:00	 1:00	 2:00	 3:00
FIG. 11.1: BItAc1r MISSING DUE TO RATE ERRORS
2.	 The figure is a graph of range against time. The vertical axis represents the actual
range on the range-clock minus the change of range due to the constant clock rate.
Thus only the spotting corrections are shown and the diagram appears identical




vertical bars represent the spreads of salvoes fired in a typical bracketting pattern
at intervals of 45 seconds. The salvo spread is 300 yards.
3. Line A represents a target with a range-rate equal to that set on the range clock;
thus the line is horizontal. If the centre of the first salvo falls over by 150-250
yards, the target is not straddled until the fourth salvo.
4. Line B represents a target with a range-rate 100 yds/min. greater than that of the
clock. Despite the small difference, the bracket fails to straddle the target. B is
representative of a set of parallel lines; for each line, the first salvo must fall over
and the fourth short. Thus the band containing these lines is only 125 yards wide.'
5. Similarly, lines C and D are representative of targets with rate differences relative
to the clock of 200 and 400 yds/min. Their respective bands, at 350 and 700
yards, are considerably wider.2 This shows that, as the difference between the
clock and target rates increases, there is an increase in the spread of target
positions which:
a) are consistent with this pattern of salvoes and
b) result in the bracket failing to fmd the target.
6. If a bracket, although worked to completion with a final correction of UP or
DOWN 200, failed to straddle, the clock rate must have been wrong. Thus
subsequent spotting corrections for range had to be accompanied by corrections
for rate. However, the Manual of Gunnery 1915 in force when Jutland was fought)
only made specific recommendations on rate corrections after the target was
successfully straddled:
The size of the rate correction to be used before straddling must be
pre-determined on the knowledge of the probable error of the rate under the
circumstances obtaining at the time of opening fire.
After straddling, a simple rule of thumb for keeping the rate is to accompany
every spotting order required by a similar rate correction of half the amount of
the range order.3
7. Was there an equivalent rule of thumb to fmd the target even if a bracket failed to
straddle? The following case study is based on the problems facing the BCF when
fire was opened at the start of the Run to the South: namely, that most ships were
The band width is measured along the vertical line for time = 0:00.
2 For each D line, the first salvo must fall over and the third, short.
Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Manual of Gunnny (VàL Ill) for His Majesty's Fleet 1915, p.1 5,Ja 254, AL
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using ranges that were too high and a closing rate that was too slow i.e.
insufficiently negative. If the range was too high, the initial salvoes would be
OVER; normal procedure was then to fire successive salvoes with corrections of
DOWN 800 until a salvo fell short, that is, the target was crossed. The next salvo
was then UP 400; if it fell OVER (as was likely with a closing rate), the bracket
was completed with a salvo DOWN 200.
8. However, as shown in Fig. H.2, if the target's rate was more negative than the
clock's, even by as little as 100 yds/min., the bracket could be completed without
straddling the target. As in the previous figure, representative lines have been
drawn for rate differences of -100, -200 and -400 yards per minute. Is there a
single rule which, for all these rate errors, can find the target and correct the rate
reasonably quickly?
9. Initially, it was assumed that, if the final two salvoes of the bracket were both
OVER, subsequent corrections should by DOWN 200, CLOSE 100 (reduce the
clock range by 200 yards and the clock rate by 100 yds/min.). It was found that
this procedure was too slow at correcting the larger rate differences. If the rate
difference was -400 yds/min., the target was not straddled until six more salvoes
had been fired after the final salvo of the bracket i.e. six minutes after crossing the
target.
10. The effects of a repeated correction by DOWN 400, CLOSE 200 were than
calculated. This was found to be too drastic for rate, which tended to be already
too rapid by the time of the first straddle.
11. DOWN 400, CLOSE 100 was then tried. The results are illustrated in Fig. 11.2
and the range sequences for the three initial rate differences are also tabulated
overleaf.
12. When the rate difference was -200 yds/min., the target was straddled by the first
salvo after the bracket. However, one subsequent normal correction (of DOWN
200, CLOSE 100) was also needed before the rate was fully corrected.
13. If the rate difference was -400 yds/min., the third salvo after the bracket straddled
but, again, the rate was not fully correct until the next-but-one salvo went over,




Salvo Range Spotted Spotting	 Total	 Range Remarks
time	 relative as
	 corrections	 change	 change
to	 Range Rate	 in rate	 due to
crossing	 yards yds/min yds'mn rate
salvo	 .	 yards
______ yards	 ________ _______ ________ _________ ________ ____________________
0:00 +800
	 Over	 -800	 May be preceded by
earlier salvoes at
____ _____ _____ _____ ______ ______ _____ +1600, +2400...
0:45 0
	 Short	 +400 _______ ________ _______ Target crossed.
1:30	 +400	 Over	 -200
2:15	 +200	 Over	 -400	 -100	 -100	 0	 Final salvo of bracket.




Short	 +200	 -100	 -75	 Special correction of
_____ _______ _______ ______ _______ ________ _______ range but not rate.
3:45	 -75	 Straddle	 -100	 -75	 Straddling with
correct rate.
_____ _______	 Rate difference -200 yds/min.
	 _________________
3:00	 -200	 Straddle	 -100	 -75
3:45	 -275	 Straddle	 -100	 -75
4:30 -350
	 Over	 -200 -100	 -200	 -75	 Normal correction
5:15 -625
	 Straddle	 -200	 -150	 Straddling with
correct rate.
_____ _______ _______ Rate difference -400 yds/min.
	 _________________
3:00 -200
	 Over	 -400	 -100	 -200	 -75
3:45	 -675	 Over	 -400	 -100	 -300	 -150
4:30 -1225	 Straddle ______ ________ -300
	 -225
5:15	 -1450	 Straddle	 -300	 -225
6:00 -1675	 Over	 -200	 -100	 -400	 -225	 Normal correction
6:45 -2100	 Straddle	 -44)0	 -300	 Straddling with
correct rate.
14. When the rate difference was -100 yds/min., the final salvo of the bracket was
OVER, while the rule resulted in the next salvo after the bracket being SHORT.
This had to be recognised as a special case; the optimum correction was UP 200
(the normal range correction) but without an accompanying change of rate.
15. When the rate difference was large, the crossing salvo was more likely to straddle
than to fall short. If it straddled, the bracket was terminated and the next salvo
fired without range or rate correction: but this would fall OVER. A normal









0:00	 1:00	 2:00	 3:00	 4:00	 5:00	 600	 7:00
D yds/min.
FIG. 11.2: RAm SPOTrING CoIcrIoNs AFTER A FAnr) BRACKET
again. It was better to recognise another special case and apply the correction for a
failed bracket (DOWN 400, CLOSE 100).
16.	 To summarise; if, after crossing the target with a SHORT (OVER) salvo, the
remaining salvoes of a bracket all fall OVER (SHORT):
a) correct range and rate by DOWN 400, CLOSE 100 (UP 400, OPEN 100)
until the target is straddled
b) if, subsequently, the target is lost again, apply normal corrections of
DOWN 200, CLOSE 100 (UP 200, OPEN 100)
c)	 if the salvo immediately following the fmal salvo of the bracket is SHORT




If the target is crossed by a straddling salvo, and the next salvo falls OVER
(SHORTE), use corrections of DOWN 400, CLOSE 100 (UP 400, OPEN 100)
until the target is straddled again.
17. Thus a few fairly simple rules of thumb could be used to correct even large rate
errors by systematic spotting. Unfortunately, their omission from the Manual of
Gunnerj meant that some control officers may have had no clear idea how to
recover if their opening brackets made no hits.
APPENDIX 111
Friu CormoL EQUATIONS
Owr'q Si-u p ALThRS Couisi
1. Angles, courses and speeds are as shown in Fig. 2.11. Own ship S is turning with
angular speed 4 (the appendices use conventional calculus notation). Assume
own speed s remains constant. Enemy course 2 and speed e are constant.
2. Obtain virtual course and speed of E relative to S by the vector subtraction shown
in Fig. 2.3.
3. Resolve the the virtual speed into components along and across the line of
bearing. The speed-along equals the range-rate.
dR = a = ecosi—scosfl 	 (111:1)
4. One knot = one sea-mile per hour i.e. 6080 feet per hour or 33.78 yds/min. Thus,
if a, e and s are in knots and	 is required in yds/min.:
=33.78a	 as in 2:2
5. The speed-across x rotates the line of bearing SE relative to the fixed North-





where x, e and s are in yds/min., R is in yards and
	 is in radians/mm.




= 1935.f	 as in 2:9
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7. Sincefl=x—,c:
d18 dX dK
dt - dt - dt
and when own course is steady i.e.	 =0:
dfl 1935 Xdt	 •R
8. Differentiating equation I: 1:













dt2 - R _SS1flP.th
wherex and s are in yds/min., R is in yards,
	 is in radians/mm.
and dt2 is in yds/min/nun.
If x and s are in knots and
	 is in degrees/mm.
d 2R - (33.78 x)2	
.	
ir cii^
- 33.78 . ssmp.-j-j. dtdt 2	
= 1141.--0.5895 . ssrnp.






11. The second of the right hand terms in ffl:6 is a measure of the curvature of the
range-time graph due to the change of course. Halfway through Lion's turn at
4.18-19, s remained 24 knots, fi was 970 and - +20°/mm;' thus this term
evaluates to 281 yds/min/min. Notice how much bigger this term is compared
with the values calculated for the first term in Chapter 2. In fact, eveh when x is at
its maximum, the second term is still important. Take the case of the two 25-knot
ships 16,000 yards abeam on opposite courses: but now with the firing ship also
'Record of events during action of May 31st compiled from records kept in Control Position and
Transmitting Station. H.M.S. Lion' in BTY 6/6, NMM.
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altering course at 20°/mm., both inwards and outwards. Then:
d2R
dt2 = 178 T 295 yds/min/min.
Even if the range is halved to 8,000 yards, which doubles the first term, the second
term remains significant.
From ranges of values for p and i inserted in the fire control equations, ffl:6
establishes that a turn by the firing ship caused a rapid change in range-rate in all
tactical circumstances except those in which the enemy was almost dead ahead or
astern (/3 close to 0° or 180°). Even then, gunnery remained difficult because the
rate of change of deflection due to course alterations was at a maximum (see III: 10
below). Thus in all tactical situations, course changes induced rapid change in
range-rate, deflection or, usually, both. In contrast, rapid changes due to high
speed-across occurred only in limited (and rather uncommon) circumstances.
d212.	 To obtain	 substitute as above after differentiating:
R.4U = e sinz + s sinfl
R	 +	 = e cos z.f + s cosfl.4dt2	dtdt
dX	 dX
= —e cos i.- ^ s cos p. -- - s cos p. 4
d 2X	 2ax scosfl dic
dt2	 R2 - R •dt (111:7)
where R is in yards, a, x and s are in yds/min.,
	 is in radians/mm.
d2
and -- is in radians/mm/mm. When speeds are in knots and angles in degrees:
d 2
	180( 2.33.782 .ax 33.78.scosfl dic it
	
= ( -i- c	 R2	 -	 R
130759.ax 33.78.scosfl&




Differentiating the expression for speed-across x (implicit in 1:2) by analogy with
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To obtain	 in knots/mm. when a, x and s are in knots and 	 is in
degrees/mm.:
________	 r dicdx	 33.78
= -
	
ax - 33.78 . s cos
.- 33.78ax_SC0SP	 (111:10)dt -- R	 57.30dt
14.	 When own course is steady, equations ffl:l0 and 111:8 reduce to equations 2:7 and
2:8, respectively.
ENEMY ALTERS COURSE
1. If own course remains steady but enemy alters course, turning at 4, similar
equations for the rate of change of rate can be derived using the same methods.
2. The equations analogous to 1:5 and 1:7 are:
d 2R x2	. d2dt2 =---es1ni.--j-
d 2X	 2ax ecosi
dt2	R2 + R dt
APPENDIX IV
STRAIGHT-COURSE PLOT
1. This appendix chiefly concerns the type of straight-course plot which uses a
directional reference (in practice a gyroscope) which maintains its direction even
after a turn by own ship.
2. Normally, the directional reference is set at first to point along the initial mean
course line. The plot of enemy course and speed will then show the true course
and speed until own ship alters course. After the turn, the plotted enemy course
and speed is no longer true, but it can still be used to obtain a correct virtual
course (and hence range-rate and deflection): see Chapter 2.
3. After the turn, enemy bearings are measured relative to the directional reference,
not to the mean new course. It will be sufficient to prove that, if a straight-course
plot is made relative to any arbitrarily-set directional reference, a correct virtual
course can be obtained.
4. ST represents a portion of the true course of own ship; its length is proportional to
the distance travelled by own ship. EF represents the corresponding portion of the
enemy course. Thus SE and TF are lines of bearing and their lengths are
proportional to range.
5. Angles TSE and UTF are equal to the target bearing angles, fi.
6. ST' lies in the direction indicated by the gyroscopic reference. When making the
straight-course plot, own ship's course is drawn as a straight line, the length being








while angle TST' is the difference between own course and the directional
reference, a.
7. In making the straight-line plot, the enemy course is plotted relative to own-course
line ST'; the ranges are the same as those used for the true-course plot, while





Since LU'T'F' is also equal to fi', TF and T'F' are parallel. In vector notation:
(IV:!)
8. SE represents the line-of-bearing for both the true-course and straight-line plots.
9. EV represents the true virtual course of the target. It is found by the triangle of
velocities EFV which subtracts own speed from enemy speed. Thus FV is parallel
to TS, FVST is a parallelogram and:
SVTF
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10. EV' is the virtual course obtainable from the straight-course plot by the
vector-subtraction of the plotted own-course ST' from enemy-course EF'. As






Thus both the true-course and the straight-course plots give the same virtual
course and speed.
11. N.B. This result is obtained without relying on the initial assumption that:
ST = ST'
Thus the correct virtual speed is obtained even if the straight-course plot is made
with an apparent speed different from the true value of own speed. The limiting
case is that of the virtual course plot, on which own apparent speed is zero.
These principles were fully understood by Pollen and Isherwood at the time of the
Ariadne trial. Pollen wrote of one day's plotting:
We started the record th the paper at 20 knots, and subsequently, to open out
the course, reduced the speed of the paper to 10 knots. With our present
experience, under similar conditions, we should probably prefer to keep the
paper altogether stationary, so as to put the whole of our speed on to the target,
and make the record clearer.'
'Notes on charts, made before Christmas sent to Admiral Wilson' p.2 in .,M'tes, Correspondence, Etc. on the
Pollen A. C System installed and bid in H.M& A,iadne, December 1907- januay 1908 in DRAX 3/I, CC.
APPENDIX V
Eiuois IN ENEMY SPEED
As explained in Chapter 2, a single rangefinder range could have a random error
of up to ±400 yards at long ranges. In rough conditions or after a change of
course, bearing errors could amount to several degrees, making the speed errors
much too high. However, assume a course plot made in favourable conditions on
a steady course. Thus the main causes of bearing errors were bearing transmission
(±1/80), observational errors, gyro-compass wander and hunting, either by the
gyro-stabilised Argo rangefmder mounting or by the servo which followed the
gyro-compass receiver and corrected keel-line bearings for yaw (see Chapter 4 for
the Argo Plotter Mark IV). Apart from transmission errors, no reliable numbers
are available; however, it is very unlikely that, in total, the random bearing errors
were smaller than ±½0 and this figure is
	
E2'	 used in the following analysis.
	
-	 2.	 Fig. V.1 shows a portion of a true or straight
S2	 SI
FiaV.I
course plot. Si S2 represents own course
and El E2 represents the enemy course that
would be plotted if there were no range and
bearing errors. These errors result in plotted
points El', E2' which are displaced from
the correct position. Range errors result in
displacements along the line-of-bearing,
bearing errors in displacements perpendi-
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3.	 The displacements drawn in Fig. V.1 result in the maximum positive error in the
apparent enemy speed for the courses and bearings shown.
The worst possible error in enemy speed
is obtained if the displacements El El'
and E2 E2' both lie along the enemy's
true course El E2, as shown in Fig.V.2.
The range displacement is a maximum of
400 yards.
If the bearing error is the resultant
lateral displacement when the range is
16,000 yards is 140 yards. Therefore the
total displacement of each plotted point along the true course line is 424 yards.
If the enemy is making 25 knots, the true distance covered in 2 minutes is 1689
yards. Thus the worst case speed error obtained from two points separated in time
2 x 424 x 25 knots i.e. 12.6 knots too high.by2minutesis	 1689
Large speed errors (approximately 10-12 knots) result when the displacements of
the two points due to the dominant range errors, are:
a) close to the maximum error value and
b) in opposite directions; on average, this second condition arises with 50% of
selected pairs of points.
In reality, the errors of range or bearing are distributed symmetrically about zero
according to a statistical distribution, probably a normal distribution.
10.	 Since errors are equally likely to be positive or negative, if sufficient pairs of points
are measured:
a) the speed errors will be distributed symmetrically about zero
b) the errors will average out and a good approximation to the enemy speed
will be obtained.
However, due to the spread of speed values, this averaging effect will only be
obtained after measurements on many pairs of points. Little confidence can be
placed in the first few speeds obtained. It is necessary to wait until the mean is
clearly converging towards a steady value.
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11. Even after plotting for 2 minutes, the worst case speed error is still very high.
Since about 3 to 4 ranges could be taken with a single rangefinder, a mean course
line might begin to be perceptible after this time, while a first speed value could be
calculated from the first and last ranges obtained. However, it would then be
necessary to continue plotting for at least another 2 minutes. This would allow 6-8
speeds to be measured from pairs of points each separated by about 2 minutes.
After 4 minutes, there might be some hope that the mean speed was converging,
while a better estimate of enemy course could also be made.
12. Alternatively, it might be better to wait longer before first measuring the speed; by
waiting for 3 rather than 2 minutes, the worst case speed error would be reduced
to about 8 knots. However, it would still be necessary to measure further values to
obtain a converging mean speed. Probably, the error after 4 minutes would not be
much different from the preceding case.





assumed a constant bearing angle,
which resulted in the total
displacement, due to both range and
bearing errors, falling along the enemy
course line. In practice, this course line
could be at any angle to the lines of
bearing. The worst case error is at a
minimum when the enemy course is at
right angles to the lines of bearings. If El E2 is 1689 yards:
El'E2'= 1(1689^280)2 ^8002
 =2l25yards.
Thus the speed error is almost halved, to 2l25689 x 50 = 6.45 knots.
< > l689yards














1. The maximum speed-across is found when two ships pass on opposite courses,
beam-to-beam.
2. Consider the case of two 25-knot ships passing at 16,000 yards. Rate plotting
begins one minute before they pass (when the ships are at SO, EO) and the first
attempt to measure a range-rate is made one minute after they pass (ships at S2,
E2).
3. Fig. VI.! shows a true-course and a virtual-course representation of the positions
of the two ships. In the two minutes, each ship travels 1689 (2 x 25 x 33.78) yards,
while the target bearing increases by 12.05°.
FIG. V1.I
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4. From the right triangle E0 El S, the actual range when plotting begins is 16,089
yards; it then falls to a minimum of 16,000 yards.
5. Due to the rapid change in range-rate, the real slope of the underlying curve of the
range-plot changes from negative to positive, being momentarily zero as the ships
pass. Assume, however, that the scatter of ranges entirely obscures the curvature.
Thus, after plotting for two minutes, the mean line through the range plot will
appear, on average, to have a slope of 0 yds/min., whereas:
Actual range-rate at E2 =50 x 33.78 x sin(tan_i io)
= 177 ydslmin.
In other words, the range-rate error due to the failure to recognise the curvature is
-177 yds/min.
6. After 2 minutes' plotting, assume that the average apparent range on the plot is
half way between the actual minimum and maximum ranges i.e. the apparent
mean range S E2' is 16,044 yards. Thus the range error after 2 minutes plotting is
-45 yards.
7. Assume that, after 2 minutes, a Dumaresq is set by a cross-cut with the rates from
the plot. The virtual course must be at right angles to the line-of-bearing S E2' E2
to give a speed-along of zero; the virtual speed must be such as to give a change in
bearing of 6.026° in the previous minute. Assume also that the Dumaresq is part
of a range-and-bearing clock which is started after 2 minutes. Then, after one
more minute, the bearing will change by a further 6.026°. Thus, from right
triangle SE2' E3', the travel along the apparent virtual course is 1693.6 yards and
the predicted range is 16,133 yards. However, from right triangle S El E3, the true
range is 16,353 yards; thus the range error increases to -220 yards.
8. Similarly, true and predicted ranges can be calculated for 4 and 5 minutes after
plotting began. The errors in ranges, and average errors in range-rate in each
minute, are tabulated below.
Time True Range Clock Range Range Error Rate Error
	
(mins.)	 (yards)	 (yards)	 (yards)	 (yds/min.)
	
2	 16,089	 16,044	 -45	 -177
	
3	 16,353	 16,133	 -220	 -175
	
4	 16,783	 16,398	 -385	 -165
	
5	 17,368	 16,829	 -539	 -154
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9.	 Thus the range error increases at a rate which is close to the initial rate error;
though the rate actually reduces somewhat. Probably after 4 minutes, certainly
after 5, the divergence between the observed and predicted ranges would have
been apparent, despite the uncertainty in the ranges of ±300-400 yards (see
Chapter 2). Range and rate could then be corrected as when spotting for rate; for
example, two corrections of TiP 200, OPEN 100 would eliminate the errors
accumulated after 4 minutes.
334
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APPENDIX VII
TFm DUMARESQ MARK VI
1. The scales of the Mark VI Dumaresq are illustrated in Fig. VII. 1 overleaf. The
angular settings on the instrument correspond to the courses and angles shown in
the lower diagram.
2. The instrument had two compass rings, graduated in degrees of bearing from 0° to
3600. The two rings were connected by gears so that they rotated together. When
correctly set, the zeros of the scales pointed North.
3. The 'own compass ring' rotated outside the circumference of the dial (the dial
carried the large arrow which was kept pointing at the target). The 'enemy
compass ring' was centred on the sliding pivot of the enemy bar (the enemy bar
being represented by the smaller arrow).'
4. To set the enemy course, the enemy bar could be turned relative to the enemy
compass ring. Once so set, the enemy bar rotated with the enemy compass ring.
5. The two compass rings could be rotated rapidly by pushing on the own compass
ring. For fmer, but slower, adjustment, a small hand-wheel, driving the rings
through a worm, could be engaged.
6. As the rings rotated, the dial rotated with them. However, the dial could also be
rotated independently.2
7. The outer edge of the dial was graduated in degrees of target bearing between 0°
and 180° to port and to starboard.3
For the names of the two compass rings, see G K B Elphinstone, 'Dumaresq Instruments Designs and
Patents. Notes as to History' 31 January 1916 in 'Fire Control Apparatus. Various Patents', ADM
1/8464/181.
2 Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Manual of Gwmeiy	 me III) for His Majesty's Fleet 1915, pp. 172-3, AL.
F C Dreyer and C V Usborne, Pollen Aim Conector System. Part L Technical Hisory and Technical Compañson
wish Commander F. C.Drever's Fire Control System, 1913, Fig. 6, P.1024, AL
Is
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8. Against the pointer located at the fore end of the fore-and-aft bar:
the dial bearing scale indicated target bearing angle, /1
the own compass ring indicated own course, K
9. To set the instrument initially, the compass rings were rotated until the own
compass ring indicated own ship's compass course. The enemy bar was set for
own and enemy speeds and for enemy course. Finally, the dial plate alone was
rotated until the arrow pointed at the target. The range-rate and deflection could
then be read off the dial plate as indicated by the enemy bar. Provided the arrow
was kept pointing at the target, the enemy bar would continue to indicate
range-rate and deflection even as they changed as the target bearing changed.
10. If own ship altered course, the operator used the hand-wheel to rotate the two
compass rings and, with them, the dial and the enemy bar thereby keeping the
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arrow on the dial plate pointing at the target. At the end of the turn, the target
bearing fi was therefore still correct but, as will be shown below, own course K and
the angle between courses 0 were only maintained approximately.
11. Ii a gyro-compass repeater was adjacent to the Mark VI Dumaresq, the compass
courses indicated by the two instruments could have been compared and the
hand-wheel used to correct the Dumaresq's course readings. This would also
correct the angle between courses. It would also move the dial-arrow off the target
but the dial plate could then be immediately rotated on its own to point the arrow
once more at the target. However, this technique was not mentioned in the Manual
of Gunnery 1915.
12. Let the actual change in own compass course through the turn be iSx: and let the
change indicated by the Dumaresq be Lx'. Let the actual and indicated change in
target bearing be \/3: and let MI and MI' be the true and indicated change in the
angle between courses.
13. When the two rings, the dial and the enemy bar were rotated such that fi is
increased, 9 was increased and ic was decreased by the same amount i.e.
LtfiL0'—LK'
14. From equation ffl:2, the change in target compass bearing A is:
t x = S	 dt
But,since XK+fl
from VII:1
Thus the error in own compass course indicated after the turn:
(VII:1)
(VII:2)
In other words, the error is equal in magnitude but opposite in sign to the change
in target compass bearing. As equation VII:2 shows, this error is most significant
when the speed-across x is high and the range R low.
15. Since 0^ K =1, where 2 is the enemy compass course, which is assumed to be
constant:
so the error in enemy course is:
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16. The error in C can also be explained by the fact that, through the turn, the angLe
between the enemy bar and the bearing arrow does not change i.e. that the
inclination angle set on the Dumaresq does not change. In fact, because:
Like the Mark VI Dumaresq, the Argo Clock Mark III also kept the angle
between the enemy bar and the line of bearing constant through a turn, and
therefore relied on the same approximation.
RJ41?PEIVDIX VIII
RATE TRANSFER ERROR
1. The true target range R
Range 
follows a smooth hyperbolic
curve; the tangent to the
curve has a slope equal to the
range-rate R
2. The rate is transferred in steps
to the range clock each time
the pointer of the Dumaresq
crosses a rate-line on the dial;
the lines are spaced at
intervals of 100 yds/min.
3. Between rate alterations, the
range clock runs at a constant
rate. Thus a graph of the
clock range r consists of a
series of straight-line
segments. The slope of each
segment equals the range-rate at the time of transfer, t.
4. Let the time of the next rate transfer be r + or. At that time, let the true-range be
R + AR and the clock-range r + Or. Let the errors in the clock-range due to its lag
behind the true-range be e at t and e ^O at r +Or. Then:
(VllJ:1)
where Or = Or	 (VIll:2)
Differentiating:
2R.4 = 2v2t •	 •	 v2ti.e. R
	 R (VIII:4)
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5.	 Using the form of the hyperbolic equation given in Fig. 2.6:
R2 =R02+v2t2
	 ('1II:3)
Note that R = R0 and =0 when t =0.
6.	 Let the size of the rate-steps be p. In order to calculate how the clock-error e
increases with time, assume that:
a) the clock is started at t = 0 with zero rate and zero error
b) the first rate is transferred when 
= p
c) the nth rate is transferred when = np at time t =
7. Thus, from VIII:4
v2t.
= -r
Squaring and substituting for R from VIII:3
2 2....	 v4r2
'p	 R02+v2r2
n 2p2Ro 2 + n 2p2v2 r 2 = v4r2
2
22	 '	 0V-	 22V2 - fl p
Substituting back into VIII:3
R2=R02I1^ "P 1=Ro(_v2








	 Equations VIII:2, 6 and 7 are in convenient forms to calculate R, r and e. The
following table is for the case of high curvature and lag, with:
Ro=8,000yards
p = 100 yds/min.
v = 1,689 yds/min. i.e. two 25 knot ships passing on opposite courses.
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n	 R	 r	 cär	 when	 jôr	 r	 k
	
yards	 mins.	 mins.	 t = r	 yards	 ya	 yds/m.
________ _______ _______ yds/min. _______ ________ _______ ________
0	 8,000	 0 0.2809	 0	 0	 8,000	 0
1	 8,014.06 0.2809 0.2839
	 100	 28.39	 8,000	 -14.06	 -50
2 8,056.68 0.5648 0.2901
	 200	 58.02 8,028.39	 -28.29	 -50
3 8,129.26 0.8549 0.2997
	 300	 89.91 8,086.41	 -42.85	 -50
4 8,234.25	 1.1546	 0.3134	 400	 125.36 8,176.32	 -57.93	 -50
5	 8,375.4	 1.468	 0.332	 500	 166 8,301.68	 -73.72	 -50
6	 8,558.2	 1.8	 0.357	 600	 214.2 8,467.68	 -90.52	 -51
7	 8,790.49	 2.157	 0.3903	 700 273.21 8,681.88 -108.61
	 -51
8 9,083.56 2.5473 0.4353
	 800 348.24 8,955.09 -128.47
	 -51
9 9,453.99 2.9826 0.4972
	 900 447.48 9,303.33 -150.66
	 -51
10 9,926.92 3.4798 _______ _________ ______ 9,750.81 -176.11
	 -51
10. The last column suggests that the clock error i.e. the difference between the clock
and true ranges, increases in magnitude by a rate which is essentially constant.
The following sections develop an expression for
11. From VIll:7
r+or=4(n+1)(R+AR)
Subtract VIII:7 to obtain:
= 4 [R + (n + 1 )AR]
12. From VIll:3
(R+R) 2 =R0 2 +v2(t+ôr)2
R 2
 +2R AR+AR 2 = R0 2 +v2 r2 +2v24r+v2c5r2
Subtracting VllI:3
2R R+AR2 = 2v2Tör+v2ör2
AR(2R + iR) = v2ör(2r + or)
Substituting for r from VIII:7 and Or from VIII:8
iR(2R ^ R) = v2or[24nR + 4R + 4(n + I)LRJ
=Or[(2n+ 1)pR+(n+ 1)p AR]





ôr	 2 (VI1I:l I)
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Multiply through by (i -
.AR( 1 AR2	 (n+)pzR (n+1)pAR (n+l)pAR2
4R2) (n+-)p_	 2R	 +	 2R	 -	 4R2
' n pAR (n+1)pAR2
4R - 4R2
From the table of calculated values, when n = 9, R = 9,454 yards and AR = 473
yards; thus

















When n = 9, the calculated values from the table give a value for the
	 term of
0.025; thus the expression gives the same value for
	 as that obtained by
calculation. However, for most purposes, to a good approximation:
i.e. the clock-range lags behind the true-range by an amount which increases in
magnitude at a steady rate equal to half the size of the rate steps.
14. This analysis applies mainly to the curved part of the range-time hyperbola. As the
curve approaches the asymptotes, the times between the rate steps become longer.
The value of n for the final rate step is determined from V.111:6, since:
np <1
Thus, for the values of p and v assumed earlier, n 16
If equation VIll:6 is used to calculate R for n = 15 and 16, - = 0.22. Thus the
approximation for holds reasonably well even out to these theoretical limits. In
practice, of course, the true rate would have been essentially constant: other
sources of range and rate errors would have been predominant: and both would
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have been corrected together using the rate spotting procedures described in
Chapter 2.
15. The preceding equations have been derived by considering the part of the
range-time hyperbola where the range is increasing i.e. n, and AR are all positive.
All these variables are negative when the range is decreasing. However, equations
VIII: 10 and 1II: 11 still hold: although, if numeric values for AR are inserted in
VIII: 10, they will be negative. Thus, when the rate is negative, the error increases
in magnitude by slightly less than half the size of the rate steps. This can be verified
by recalculating the figures in the table. If the clock is started 3.4798 minutes
before the ships pass beam-to-beam, by the time they do so the accumulated error
will be 171.87 yards. As the table shows, a further 176.11 yards will accumulate by
the time the range returns to its starting value after almost 7 minutes.
16. A total error of almost 350 yards may seem serious, but it could only accumulate if
the clock remained uncorrected by rangefincling or spotting. This circumstance
would only arise if the target became and remained invisible as soon as the clock





By mid-1907, two or more Vickers clocks had been supplied to ships with
electrical fire control 'according to the description of guns on board', a policy reiterated
by Bacon in 1909.' In 1908, the addition of a second, outer gun range dial for the Vickers
clock was being considered, but this was not adopted. 2 However, for use in local turret
control, the clock was later fitted with a second red gun-range pointer mounted
frictionally on the same axis as the original black pointer, the latter then indicating
rangefinder range (this dual-pointer clock had already been introduced by 191 3).3
Apart from the red pointer, the Vickers clock had by 1909 reached its final form.
From the start, the production model differed from Percy Scott's proposal of late 1903 in
providing a much greater span of ranges. The graduated rim 'is divided into 4,000 yards
but the graduations are numbered through windows in the face so that 3 ranges are
available, 2,000-6,000 6,000-10,000 and 10,000 to 14,000 yards'. The numbers were in
100 yard steps while the divisions on the graduation ring were separated by 25 yards.4
Originally, the rim was revolved by hand but in 1908 a handle was added to make it
easier to set spotting corrections, one turn of the handle being equivalent to 100 yards.5
Paper prpared y the Director ofXaval Ordnance and Torpedoes for the Information of his Successor, Ju'y 1907, p.20
and November 1909, p.16.
2 Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Fire Conirol 1908, pp. 50-52 in ADM 1/8010 and T.173/91 Part I, PRO.
Home Fleet General Onlerr, '39. Local Control', 15 September 1913, p.S in DRAX 1/9, CC.
' Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Addenda (1909) to Gunnery Manual Volc. I (Part ) and Part III, November
1909, p.54 and Plate XXVII, AL. The plate shows the clock with figures running from 2,000 to 6,000
yards inclusive: in which case the rim was divided into 4,100 yards. The clock could still have indicated the
range continuously if the numbers behind the first window, for example, were 2,000, 6,100 and 10,200
yards. Alternatively, the illustrator may have drawn one too many windows: in which the ranges would
have been 2,000 to 5,900, 6,000 to 9,900, etc..
Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Half Tearly Summary ofProgress in Gunnery, July 1908, p.8,Ja238, AL
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In the first models, the rate drum was calibrated in knots but also, like the
contemporary Dumaresq, in seconds-per-50 yards 'so that, in case of breakdown of the
clock a stop-watch can be used'. 6
 In 1909, after the introduction of rate-plotting, it was
decided to change the rate graduations of Dumaresqs, clocks and rate instruments to
yards-per-minute. 7
 The abolition of the old rate units, which were only appropriate when
keeping the range with a stop-watch, may also have marked an increasing confidence in
the reliability of the Vickers clock as the principal range keeper. However, the initial
caution about the reliability of the Vickers dock does seem to have been justified.
Extensive design changes were needed to make it run accurately and it remained a
delicate instrument which required careful handling and a shock-absorbing india-rubber
base. To understand the difficulties experienced, it is necessary to look at its internal
mechanisms.
When Scott and Vickers proposed and patented the clock in 1 9O304,8
variable-speed drives of many different forms were known and used in a variety of
mechanical applications. 9
 Such a drive was therefore a natural choice as the basis for a
device which, when set with range rate, was required to indicate range. Although a
double-cone drive is mentioned in the patent, a basic variable-speed drive of the
disc-and-roller pattern was actually used, with the large disc making one rotation in
approximately two minutes. The small roller was arranged to slide on a slotted shaft
mounted across the diameter of the disc, its position being determined by a carriage
moving on two threaded rods; these rods were geared to the rate drum. Thus by rotating
the rate handle, the wheel could be positioned anywhere on the diameter of the disc.
Springs held the wheel in firm frictional contact with the disc; a pinion at one end of the
wheel shaft engaged with a large crown gear which pivoted at the centre of the clock face
and carried the range pointer itself
6 SPG(op. ciL)July 1906, pp.24.	 -
Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Information regarding Fire Contni4 Range Finding and Plotting, 1909, pp.17 and 31
in JaOlO, AL
8 Patent 9461 of 1904, applied for (by Trevor Dawson and James Home of Vickers Sons & Maxim) 25
April 1914, complete specification 24 February 1905.
A survey of Patents for Inventions, Abñdgementr of Specticatwns for the periods 1901-4, 1905-8 and 1909-15
shows that patents were taken out every year for 'variable-speed gearing of the friction disc type'; for
example, in 1905 there were 10 patents for disc-and-roller designs: seeJohn Brooks, 'Fire Control in British
Dreadnoughts: A Technical History' in 'New Researchers in Maritime History, Papers Presented at the
Third Annual Conference, 18 March 1995', Royal Naval Museum, Portsmouth, p.1.
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The accuracy of the predicted range depended on the disc rotating at constant
speed. The driving power was provided initially by a single spring but, by mid-1908, a
second spring case had been added, geared to the first. No details of the disc drive were
given in the patent, though it appears that a conventional clock mechanism, regulated by
an escapement, was envisaged. This was subsequently dropped in favour of driving the
'rotating disc at a constant speed controlled by a governor'. However, the constant speed
was not obtained without a struggle against the effects of mechanical friction. Ball
bearings were added for the pointer and the disc but not, it seems, for the roller shaft. At
the same time, the contact roller spring (which controlled the 'assembly-force' holding the
disc and wheel in firm contact) 'has been made adjustable so as to permit of the tension
being increased if required'. These modifications from 1908 were not enough. By 1909:
In order to maintain the load on the dock as far as possible constant at all speeds of the
pointer, a compensating brake...is fitted to bear on the rotating disc; the brake is free
when the pointer is travelling at its highest speed and bears with increasing load...as the
speed of the pointer is reduced.'°
The disc-and-roller acted as a variable-ratio gear between the spring drive and the
frictional loads associated with the roller shaft and range pointer. Thus, as the roller was
moved inwards to reduce the rate, the effective load on the drive was reduced as well.
Evidently, the governor was unable to prevent the disc-speed increasing as a result,
though unfortunately, since no description of this part of the mechanism has come to
light, it is not possible to explain why. No subsequent reports of further problems have
been found, so it appears that the brake compensated successfully for the inadequacies of
the governor. However, the modification was no more than a paffiative for excessive
friction, probably mainly in the bearings of the roller shaft. These plain bearings were
loaded with the full assembly-force, and it is surprising that they too were not replaced
with ball-bearings.
It should be recognised that the Vickers designers were faced with a difficult
problem in smoothly regulating the limited power available from a spring drive so that the
disc rotated at a precise, constant speed regardless of the position of the roller. Even so,
the development history of the clock suggests that the full extent of the difficulties were not
to The modifications to the Vickers clock are listed in SPG July 1908, pp. 8-9: see also Fire Conhvl 1908 (op.
ciL) p.5; only the Addenda (1909) '0 Gunne?y Manual (op. ciL) mention the governor and the compensating
brake.
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at first fully appreciated: and that piecemeal modifications were introduced after the clock
entered service until, eventually, the desired performance was obtained.
Speed regulation was a question of static performance; that is, whatever the static
setting of the rate (as determined by the position of the roller) the disc had to rotate at the
same speed. However, the mechanism also contained two potential sources of dynamic
errors i.e. errors induced in the course of changing the rate. While the rate was constant,
the roller rolled in a circle on the surface of the disc. To change the rate, the roller had to
be dragged sideways. To start it moving, sufficient sideways force had to be applied to
make the transition from rolling to sliding, with a corresponding change in the nature of
the friction between disc and roller. Then, while the rate continued to change, a
somewhat lesser force had to be maintained on the roller to overcome the sliding friction
between it and the disc. These forces were exerted against one side of the roller by
moving the carriage using the rate-setting handle. They had the unavoidable effects: firstly
of increasing the frictional load on the roller shaft: and secondly, by pushing the disc
sideways, of inducing additional friction in the upper disc bearing which was not present
when the rate was static. Thus, when the rate-setting handle was first turned, the load on
the spring drive suddenly increased to a peak value as the roller was first forced sideways;
and it then remained at a higher level until the change in rate was completed. Accurate
operation depended on the governor - which could not even correct properly for changes
in static load - responding rapidly to the initial peak load and correcting for the
subsequent sustained load increase.
Once sliding began at the small area of contact between disc and roller, the
frictional load on the roller shaft (enhanced by the effects just described) resulted in
rotational slippage i.e. sliding at the area of contact so that the edge of the roller moved
less quickly than the disc surface beneath it. Thus, even if the governor worked perfectly,
the actual clock range would lag to some extent behind the correct range that would be
expected from the (changing) clock rate. This would continue until the clock operator
stopped turning the rate-setting handle.
Evidence given to the Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors in 1925
establishes that the Vickers clock did indeed 'check' when the rate was altered.
...the little stoppage which you notice when you change a variable speed drive of the
roller and disc type [such] as you saw on the Vickers clock.
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...on the Vickers clock the thing you notice is any sudden change, any sudden
displacement, and that little roller makes the thing stop altogether, it pauses in a sudden
movement.11
Thus it appears that a sudden movement of the rate-handle momentarily stopped the
rotation of the range pointer. These 'little stoppages' raise two questions. Firstly, what
would have been the effect of altering the rate continuously rather than in steps? And,
secondly, is it possible to determine whether the check was due mainly to the imperfect
response of the governor to the increased frictional load, to rotational slippage between
disc and roller, or to both?
ANALYSTS OF SLIPPAGE
Introduction
In the Spring of 1994, while corresponding with Professor Sumida, the present
author wrote an initial (and, as it turned out, too simplistic) description of slippage errors
in range clocks. In response, Professor Sumida very kindly provided a copy of the M.Sc.
thesis written in 1946 by Mr A B (Ben) Clymer, who was an engineer with the Ford
Instrument Company; this discussed the operation and accuracy of many different forms
of mechanical integrator, including those of the disc-and-roller type, and it was of great
assistance to the author in the preparation of a second paper. He is most grateful to
Professor Sumida not only for commenting on this himsell but also for obtaining the
helpful criticisms of Mr William Newell (formerly Chief Designer and later President of
the Ford Instrument Company), Mr Clymer and other colleagues working on the history
of American fire control instruments. The descriptions in this Appendix of the physics of
friction and slippage in the Vickers clock owe a great deal to the information received
during this correspondence: though, as will be explained shortly, the mathematical
equations given here are different from those in the Clymer thesis.
Disc-and-Roller Integrators
1.	 Fig. LX. 1 shows the disc with the roller positioned at a distance r along the
diametric shaft. If:
a) r is static Le. the roller is stationary
b) the roller is not in or very near to the centre of the disc (this case will be
discussed later)
" Examination of Mr RH Ballantyne before the RCAI, T.173/547 Part 12, Pp. 54-5 and 92-3, PRO.
2.
3
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c)	 the torque load T on the roller shaft is small enough relative to the
assembly force P pressing the disc and roller together such that:
cc,P	 (IX:l)
where w is the radius of the roller (also
referred to as a wheel) and a is the
coefficient of static friction between
roller and disc:
then the roller rolls on the surface of






where c50 is the angular rotation in the
roller shaft caused by a rotation ÔØ of the disc.
If the roller is moving sideways (as would be the case if the rate of a Vickers clock
was being changed), there must be sliding contact between roller and disc at the
very small area of contact. Thus the magnitude of the frictional force F must be:
F=pP	 (IX:3)
where u is the coefficient of sliding friction between disc and roller.
Fig. IX.2 illustrates the forces and movement at the area of contact; it is almost the
same as Clymer's Fig. 1-10. The
F	 method of analysis assumes that all
a -
	 a	 > är	 velocities are constant i.e. that there
are no unbalanced forces. Thus the
5s





balances the force required to
overcome the torque load T on the roller. Thus:
-Fsina=
and, from equation IX:3
sina=
Although p <a, the two frictional coefficients are of the same magnitude. Thus,






= tana a jtPw (IX:6)
dO'	 dO	 T dr
	
W dt _Wdt	 uPwdt (IX:7).
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4.	 The sliding frictional force F is induced by relative motion of disc and roller at the
area of contact. With no other forces present, the movement of the roller on the
disc must be in exactly the opposite direction to F. This movement consists of two
components along and at right angles to the roller shaft. In a small time ôt, let
these two components be or and 5s, as shown in Fig. 1X2. Thus, from [X:5
5.	 Let 0 represent the position of the roller shaft if there had been no slippage: and let
6' represent the actual position of the roller shaft. The slippage will result in 0'
lagging behind 0. Thus:
w 00= r t5çb
wOO' =rOS—Os
and so
Assume that, at time ti, 0' = 6: and that, by t2, these have increased to 0 and
02 while the roller has moved outwards from ri to r2. Integrating IX:7 after
dividing by w:
(0—Ol)—(02-6l)=—,2(r2—rI)
6-02 =- 12 (r2—r1)	 IX:8)'2
Thus the error due to slippage is simply proportional to the distance moved by the
wheel: provided, as already stated, that the speed of movement is slow enough so
that there are no appreciable accelerations in the mechanism.
6.	 Fig. IX.2 assumes that the roller is positioned for a positive rate and that r2 > r i.
However, the slippage is identical if r2 <r j. Thus the error e 2 in the position of the
12 Clymer's thesis used R for the diameter of the roller. This unfortunately led to the equation for tan a
being formulated as
	
instead of . , where represented the rate of change of error in 9. Thus the
equation on p.14 equivalent to IX 7 was in error.
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roller shaft at time t2 can generalised as:
- Tfor+ver 1 andr2,	 e2_—UPW2 1r2 — rlI	 (IX:9)
7. Notice that, while r remains positive, even if the roller reverses direction, the total
error is the sum of two negative errors.
8. If r is negative (the roller is on the other side of the disc) the roller shaft is turning
in the opposite direction. Thus 9 is falling in value and the error is positive; hence:
for-ver 1 andr2 ,	 1r2—rlI
	
(IX:10)
9. If the roller passes through the centre of the disc, the shaft changes direction. Thus
the errors also change sign. For example, consider the familiar case of a range
clock representing two ships passing on opposite courses. Before they pass
beam-to-beam, the range-rate is negative: as they pass it is momentarily zero: and
subsequently it is positive. Thus, if the clock is started when the target is well
before the beam, slippage will result in the clock-range falling less rapidly than the
true-range; thus, as the ships pass, the clock will have a positive error. After
passing, the clock-range will increase less rapidly than the true-range; thus this
negative error will start to cancel out the positive error accumulated as the range
fell. When the range returns to its starting value, the error will have been
eliminated.
10. As pointed out by Clyrner, 'as the roller gets closer to the centre of the disc, the
curvature of the arc gets tighter and tighter, and to the degree that the roller is not
a point [i.e. the area of contact between disc and roller is not a point] this means
you get increased scuffing and higher amounts of friction. This resulted in
significant wear and exacerbated the slip problem'.' 3
 Clearly, when the roller was
stationary exactly in the centre of the disc, there could be no rolling and the
scuffing and wear were as described; however, there was no rate, so no error could
result. If the roller moved slightly outwards to a new static position, it then rotated
slowly; looking at the area of contact in plan view, each of the roller microscopic
surface features followed a straight path. In contrast, the surface features of the
disc followed curved paths, although these paths were tangential to the paths of the
roller features in the centre of the contact area. Thus, especially near the outer
Sumidato Brooks, 23 May 1994.
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edges of the contact area, where contact was first made and finally broken, there
was some sliding between the microscopic surface features of the roller and disc.
However, this contact area was formed by slight distortion of the flat disc surface
and the curved edge of the roller; consequently, the contact pressure was greatest
in its centre, where there was little or none of the microscopic sliding. Thus the
transition to rolling contact would take place as soon as the distance of the roller
from the centre was sufficient to allow an area without sliding to develop in the
centre of the contact area. It is probable that this distance was little more than the
size of the contact area itself, which, with hard metal surfaces, would have been a
fraction of a millimetre. Any slipping when the roller was inside this distance
would have been at rates too small to produce significant errors.
Thus scufFmg and wear at the very centre of the disc, though undesirable, are not
themselves indications of significant slippage when the roller was stationary.
Equation IX:8 and its derivatives, which predict a zero error when the roller is
stationary, appears to be valid in all circumstances.
Vzckers Clock
1. In the Vickers clock, the first component of the torque load T on the roller shaft is
due to the friction induced in the plain shaft bearings by the assembly force P. If,
as shown in Fig. IX.!, the radius of the shaft journal is b and the coefficient of
friction in this lubricated bearing is ,%, the torque from both bearings is ZPb.'4
2. The second component results from the sideways force exerted on one side of the
roller to overcome the component of the sliding friction acting diametrically.'5
From Fig. IX.2, this can be seen to be F cos a F. The arrangements for exerting
this force through the moveable carriage are not clear. Make the worst-case
assumption that all the friction is generated near the circumference of the roller.
Thus the friction force is 2F and:
T = 1Pb+L4uP.w
= ).P(b+uw)
Substituting in a composite version of equations IX:9 and IX: 10
1C21 = i(+1)Ir2_rII
	 (IX:ll)
' P is distributed between the two bearings, the ratio depending on the position of the roller.
" Remarks by William Newell on John Brooks. 'Slippage in Wheel and Disc Integrators' with Sumida to
Brooks, 19 April 1994.
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3. At one end of the roller shaft, a small pinion drove a large crown gear. The range
pointer was attached to the axle of the crown gear, which turned in a ball bearing.
Because of the low gear ration, the friction in this bearing can be safely neglected.
By measuring off an enlarged version of the cross-sectional drawing of the clock, it
can be established that one rotation of the range pointer (the equivalent to a
change in range of 4,100 yards) was produced by 8.02 rotations of the roller.'6
4. In equation IX:!!, replace each r by prm, where rm is the maximum distance of
the roller from the centre and p gives the position of the roller as a fraction of r.
The measured ratio between rm and the radius w of the roller is 114.5 : 22.0.
Likewise, the ratio of b to w is 3.5: 22.0.
5. Some relevant coefficients of friction are:
Metal to metal, dry	 0.15-0.20
Smooth surfaces, occasionally greased	 0.07 - 0.08
Smooth surfaces, best results 	 0.03 - O.036'
Even though the roller-shaft and wheel-thrust bearings should have been
lubricated regularly, assume a high value for ,% (0.08); also use a low value for u
(0.15).




+1Ip2—p1I0.15 x22.0	 ) 22.0
= 0.858Jp2—p, I
(IX:12)
7. e is in radians. Convert to rotations of the range pointer by dividing by 2r x 8.02
and then obtain the equivalent range error E by multiplying by 4,100. Thus:
lEt = 0.858x4, 100 
1P2P1l2irx8.02
=7O 1P2 —p JI yards
	 VI: 13
8. Consider a basic Vickers clock with a maximum rate of 1304 yds/min. Assume
that the rate was altered in steps of 100 yds/min. Assume a perfect-governor and
that the rate change was not too rapid to produce significant unbalanced forces.
Then the slippage error arising with each rate step would be only 5.4 yards.
16 The actual ratio was probably 8 but the measured value will be used.
RB Lindsey, Physical Mechanics (Princeton, 1961) p.132.
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9. Now imagine a Vickers clock keeping the range of two ships passing on opposite
courses. Suppose that the clock rate was adjusted continuously and that the
governor was perfect i.e. that slippage errors predominate. Assume also that the
initial rate was the maximum that could be set. By the time the two ships passed
beam-to-beam, the clock error would only have been +70 yards. As noted earlier,
this error would then begin to reduce as the range began to increase. Thus, even
in this worst case for pure slippage, the maximum error is less than the normal
margin of range error.
CoNcLusIoNs
The preceding analysis shows that the slippage due to what may be called
steady-state sliding is always small and usually negligible; it cannot have been a significant
cause of the check observed when the rate on the Vickers clock was altered. Now
compare the relative numeric values for the two frictional components in equation IX: 12;
they show that the torque load on the disc's spring drive when the roller was sliding was
about double that when it was stationary. Thus the change in load was the same as would
have been experienced, before the addition of the compensating brake, if the distance of
the roller from the centre of the disc had been doubled. The necessity for the
compensating brake shows that the governor alone could not fully correct for this change
in load, so the disc would have turned more slowly while the roller was moving.
As already mentioned, the sideways force on the disc also imposed a sideways
thrust on the top bearing of the disc, which further increased the frictional load on the
spring drive. However, it was probably not significant once the original plain bearing had
been replaced by a ball bearing.
When the rate setting handle was first turned, the initial drive load was even
greater because the roller had to be forced from rolling to sliding on the disc; the force
required would be determined by the coefficient of static rather than sliding friction. In
addition, no mechanical governor could have reacted instantaneously when the load
suddenly more than doubled. The action of the governor depended on detecting an actual
drop in speed, in order that the drive power could be increased to restore the speed to a
value close to its previous value.' 8
 Thus the principal causes of the observed check were
most probably the initial peak in the load: the delayed response of the governor to this
18 R L Maxwell, Kinematics and Dynamics ofMachizeiy (Englewood Cliffs, 1960) pp.463-7.
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initial maximum load: and the inability of the governor to correct fully for the steady-state
load imposed by sliding.
Both the initial drop in speed, as well as the sustained reduction while static
sliding continued, increased with the magnitude of the rate. They would also have been
most apparent when the rate was high. However, when used with a Dumaresq, the
normal method of altering the rate of the Vickers clock was in steps, not continuously. In
fact, there was a distinct advantage in making each step change quickly. This did not
increase or decrease the initial check as the roller started to slide. Nor, at least
approximately,'9
 did it affect the already small slippage due to sliding (which remained
proportional to the size of the rate step). However, a rapid change of rate reduced the
time during which the roller was sliding, and therefore the time during which the disc was
turning at reduced speed.
Particularly when the rate was high, it must be supposed that the clock stopped
completely while the rate was changed. Assuming that the rate handle was moved from
one rate to the next in no more than a second, the 'little stoppage' would have resulted in
a range error of one sixtieth of the new rate e.g. of 17 yards if the new rate was 1,000
yds/min. Compare this with the errors arising from approximating the true, smooth range
curve by a series of straight-line segments of constant rate. The figures in Appendix VIII
for this 'stepwise-error' were calculated for the usual worst case of two ships passing on
opposite courses. They show that, when the rate was high (about 1000 yds/min.), if the
rate was changed in steps of 100 yds/min:
a) the rate was changed about every /2 minute
b) the stepwise-error increased by about 25 yards between each rate change.
Thus, at high rates, the magnitude of the two distinct sources of error were comparable,
though the 'stoppage-error' was still less.
While the magnitudes were similar, the signs were sometimes different. When the
rate was positive, both errors were negative. When the rate was negative, the rate steps
caused the clock-range to decrease faster than the true-range, whereas the stoppage-error
resulted in the clock-range decreasing less quickly; i.e. the stepwise-error was still negative
but the stoppage-error was positive. The figures in Appendix Vifi indicate that, as the
rate changed from -1000 yds/min. to zero during the approach, the total stepwise-error
If the rate changed rapidly, the assumption that there were no unbalanced forces no longer holds.
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was -172 yards. Using the 'one-sixtieth' rule, the total of the stoppage-errors from the ten
changes of rate work out at +92 yards. However, at low rates (when the changes in load
on the spring drive were also least) the stoppage errors are less than the pure slippage
errors of 5.4 yards per rate step. Thus, using this value for the last three rate steps, the
total error is +98 yards. Thus, fortuitously, during the critical period when the two ships
were approaching, these errors due to the clock mechanism cancel out more than half of
the stepwise error.
While too much should not be made of this result, it does add emphasis to some
final conclusions about the Vickers clock. There was little slippage in its variable speed
drive, despite its use of plain bearings: but its governor provided inadequate static and
dynamic correction for the load fluctuations caused by changes of rate. Yet the normal
method of working the clock, by changing the rate in steps, minimised the errors due to
poor speed regulation. The clock checked noticeably during a rate step, particularly, it
may be supposed, when the rate was high. However, even in the worst case of rapidly
changing rate induced by opposite courses, the stoppage-errors were less than those
arising from the stepwise change of rate. Even in these most unfavourable conditions,
both errors were correctable by one spotting correction. In all other tactical
circumstances, the clock errors were negligible. The Vickers clock may have been less
than perfect as a mechanism: but its accuracy was quite sufficient for its purpose.
APPENDIX X
BATTLE Picncis
In 1899, HMS Caesar of the Mediterranean Fleet 'carried out the first long range
firing under weigh at a moored target at ranges up to 6,000 yards'.' Canopus
(Mediterranean) and Majestic and Mars (Channel) all carried out long range firing in 19002
and, from 1901:
Long-range firing...practice is to be carried out once a year...by those ships...whose
displacement exceeds 4,000 tons....Each ship is to make three runs [at 12 knots] on a
straight course, opening fire at 6,000 yards.
Initial target bearings on and off the bow resulted in rates between 239 and 405
yds/min.,3
 which were not undemanding for ships with little more than a coarsely
graduated 4'/2-foot rangefinder.
The courses followed by Venerable at Prasa Island in 1904 were similar for the full
charge firings at 8,000 yards; speed was 12-15 knots and target was kept about one point
on the bow. However, the conditions when firing half charges at 3-4,000 yards were
much more taxing, in one case causing the rate to swing from 287 yds/min. closing to 395
yds/min. opening.4
 Of course, an island target presented no problem of determining
enemy course and speed. On the other hand, the rates were typical of many likely battle
conditions i.e. courses initially converging followed by one or more turns onto roughly
parallel courses. Later in 1904, battle firings were held in the different fleets but,
according to Percy Scott:
It is impossible to make a comparison between the squadrons, as they all did it in
different ways, at different ranges and at different sized targets.
Admiralty, Naval Staff; Gunnery Division, Extract of Gunney Fractzce in Grand Fket 1914-18. Battleships and
Battlecruisers, March 1922, p.2, ADM 137/4822, PRO.
2 Schemes of Communications', f. 11 in 'Communication and Control of Gunfire in Action' in ADM
1/7756.
Manual of Gunne7yforHisMajesy's Fleet 1901 (London, 1901) p.382,Ja254, AL.
Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Intenm Repon ofthe Mediten-anean Committee on Control ofFire, &c, forwarded 18
February 1904, pp. 17-18 in ADM 1/7756.
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For example, ships of the Atlantic Fleet, steaming at 14 knots and altering course 4 points
after 4 minutes firing, made 10.1% hits on a 2,700 sq. ft. target at 5,500-6,000 yards.5
Uniform rules for Battle Practice were laid down for the following year, using a
moored target 90 feet long by 30 feet high. Each firing ship was to be led, at 15 knots, by
a ship carrying the Chief Umpire, who would draw a course from a number of prepared
schemes; each scheme included a change of course after about five minutes' firing. 6
 In
Scott's opinion: 'The general result...was very bad, 6,252 rounds were fired and only
1,078 hits made': 7
 although, at I 7.2%, it was an improvement on the previous year and it
is probable that many of the ships taking part had not yet calibrated their guns. In 1906,
the firing ship was again to be led by the Umpire, the former 'should be furnished
beforehand only with the knowledge contained in the general rules of battle practice'.
After an approach with the target almost ahead, the firing ship turned by 51° to 56° to
bring the full broadside to bear at a range of 6,050 yards. After firing for five minutes
with the range falling to about 5,000 yards, a 2-2V2 point turn caused the rate to swing
from about 200 yds/min. closing to 225 yds/min. opening, so that the range had
increased again to almost 6,000 yards when firing ceased after a further 4 minutes. The
allowance for the 12-inch guns was four rounds per gun: while each 6-inch on the
bearing side was allowed 16 rounds, sufficient for sixteen full 6-inch salvoes at half-minute
intervals throughout the firing.8
The 1907 Battle Practice was noteworthy as the first in which an all-big-gun ship
participated (Dreadnought came top): and the last in which the target was moored. The
conditions were officially described as 'more severe' than in 1906; while the range was
still about 6,000 yards, the rate, up to 400 yards per minute, was increased. On average,
the 12-inch guns made 29.1% of hits from rounds fired, although Biitannia, 'the only ship
at present fitted with improved 12-inch turret training gear and the latest 12-inch sights',
achieved 43.8%.
In the battle practice of 1907, there was generally a noticeable improvement in the
organisation of the control arrangements over those of the previous year...weaknesses
Percy Scott, 'Gunnery Lecture No. IV', 28 February 1905 in Guimery (privately printed, June 1905) pp.
55-6, Craig-Wailer Papers (courtesy Commander Michael Craig Wailer).
6 
'Revised Rules for carrying out Battle Practice', 6 May 1905 in Principal Qjiestions dealt with by Director of
Xaval Ordnance,Januaiy to December 1905, p.476, PQI6, HRO.
Percy Scott, 'Gunnery Lecture No. 5', 24 February 1905, p.78, Excel/tnt Historical Library.
8 Rules of 1 February 1906 in 'Revised Rules for Battle Practice 1906' in ADM 1/7896.
Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, RsulIs ofB kPractwenHcMajesyFleet 1907 inJaI56, AL
'°Jeilicoe to Fisher, 17 November 1907 in FISR 8/27 (F.P. 4849) CC.
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still exist in the faulty corrections of fire....Too high a percentage of hits is aimed at,
with the result that a large proportion of shots go "over".11
Arthur Pollen took a much more critical view of what he called 'the kindergarten
conditions of battle practice" 2
 though he also acknowledged 'the astounding variation that
the present tests...exhibit'.' 3
 Were his criticisms justified? Firstly, it must be remembered
that the 1907 practice was also the first in which the 9-foot ran gefinder was widely
available to supply accurate ranges and (by timing) rates. Secondly, the elaborate
arrangements to keep secret the firing ship's course and speed have already been
described; these ensured that the rate had to be obtained during the actual firing. Thirdly,
the following quotation suggests that rate finding, even with a moored target, was made as
difficult as in action.
Fire was opened at ranges between 7,000 and 8,500 yards, with the target bearing 45
degrees to 60 degrees before the beam, the minimum range being about 6,000 yards.
The speed was 8 to 11 knots, the exact amowt being wzknown at the control position [author's
italics] and a turn of two to three points was made during the run.14
These speeds and target bearings equate to a rate between 190 and 330 yds/min. and
emphasise that, when the target was moored 'change of range is far more rapid than in
many cases where the target will be moving'.' 5
 Furthermore, because the control
personnel were kept in ignorance of their own speed, they were obliged to obtain the rate
(from timed ranges), then to set the Dumaresq and use it to keep the rate as the target
bearing altered. Assuming that the same problem was posed to all ships in Battle Practice,
it may be concluded that, even in the last year of moored targets, the exercise was not as
childishly simple as Pollen alleged.
Nonetheless, at the close of 1907, the DNO, Jellicoe, accepted that 'having the
target moored is the one practical blot on our practice', particularly since it precluded
estimation 'of change of range due to alteration in course and speed of enemy'.'6
Unfortunately, after 1907, information on the purpose, conditions and results of Battle
Practice with towed targets is even more incomplete than for the earlier years. Although
II Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Fue Coniwl, May 1908, p.47 in ADM 1/8010 and T. 173/91, Part I, PRO.
12 
'Jupiter Letter II',January 1906 inJon Sumida (ed.) The Poll€n Paperr (London, 1984) p.77.
" Pollen to Admiral Wilson, 17 December 1907, T. 173/91 Part VII.
" 'Instructions to Officers in Battle Practice in HMS "Revenge" 'in Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Half
Tearlp Summary of Progress in Gunnery, January 1907, p.48, AL. The best run produced 50 per cent of
13.5-inch hits and 44 per cent of 6-inch hits, a remarkable result with guns which first saw service in 1892.
Revenge was the gunnery ship attached to Excellent.
Arthur Pollen, 'An Apology for the AC. Battle System', 1907 in PP(op. cit.) p.151.
16 
'Memorandum by Director of Naval Ordnance on Towing Targets' in Navy Estimates Committee,
Report upon Xauy Estimatesfir 1908-9, FISR 8/11 (F.P.4724).
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the results of Battle Practice were published each year, listing ships in order of merit, their
scores were expressed in points. The method of converting actual hits and ricochets on
the target (as well as estimated hits on an imaginary ship) into points was, however, not
revealed either to the public or even to senior officers afloat. While the conditions of the
practice also varied from year to year, the publication of the results demanded that there
was no apparent falling-off in performance, and it was admitted that the points were
adjusted to avoid this.' 7
 Furthermore, the conditions each year were kept secret from the
participants until the last moment; perhaps as a result, there are no clear sources for how
the conditions changed after 1907, although the following account presents what evidence
has been found.
In the system of practices established byJefficoe as DNO and Scott as IT?:
The spirit of emulation...is fostered by making all the practices competitive...and the
rules...provide...for the competition being fair whilst making the [battle] practice at the
same time resemble actual conditions of battle as far as can be done under peace
circumstances.'8
The competition was between all the major ships of the fleet, battleships and cruisers,
some modern, some with old guns on obsolete mountings; as the table (based on the Battle














Thus, until 1911, Battle Practice was dominated by the older types of ship with their
simple fire control, mixed armament and many 6-inch guns; the limited effective range of
' Vice Admiral Jellicoe to the Secretary of the Admiralty 18 December 1911 and Minute by Captain
Moore, DNO, l2January 1912 in 'Gunnery in the Royal Navy, Conference at the Admiralty Dec., 1911/
Jan. 1912. Report and action' in ADM 1/8328.
18 Paper prepami by the Director ofXaual Ordnance and Torpedoed for the ifonnation of his Successor, July 1907, pp.
30-31, AL.
Results ofBattle Practwe 1907 to 1913 are bound together inJa 156, AL (. cii.).
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their secondary armament was certainly one factor working against any proposals to
increase the range. 2° Furthermore, the emphasis on fair competition may have precluded
conditions which gave undue advantage to ships with the latest equipment. Thus,
especially after the introduction of the additional special firings in 191 0,21 Battle Practice
should not be seen as an engine forcing the pace of progress: but as a test that equipment
was effective in general service. It followed, rather than led, innovation.
A manageable towed target, 90 feet by 30 feet, already under development as a
matter of 'supreme importance' in 1907, was ready for the 1908 Battle Practice.V
According to Pollen, the maximum rate was reduced to 175-200 yds/min., while the
average hitting rate fell to 1 720%.2S However, these numbers give little indication of the
actual conditions. The practice introduced two major new difficulties.
For this competition, the firing has [hitherto] been carried out from one broadside only;
it is proposed to let both broadsides fire; this will call for more skill on the part of
officers and men, since the turn of the ship will considerably alter both the range and
also her speed.
....Arrangements will also be made to test the secondary fire control arrangements of
ships in the event of the primary system failing.
After joining the Home Fleet in October 1908, Indomitable carried out her first Battle
Practice on l6January 1909; however, this was part of the 1908 series, in which she came
first. Her remarkable firing, described in a letter to Fisher, confirms that a large turn was
made halfway through.
...of the 15 rounds fired on the first run of 4 minutes, 13 were direct hits on the
target....a "record" under present Battle Practice conditions (with speed of target 8
knots, course and speed unknown to firing ship, "Indomitable" steaming 15 knots and
distance of target 8,300 to 9,600 yards). In the second run of 4 minutes after turning 18
points, 5 hits were scored out of 16 rounds. This less good result was due to a small
error in spotting...
In one run, almost certainly the second, the firing ship and the target must have been on
nearly opposite courses, thereby inducing the rapid change of range-rate to which Pollen
20 In 1911, Jdllicoe was concerned lest increasing range and a reduction in the points awarded for 6-inch
hits 'discourage the training of the Officers and Men concerned with the secondary armament if it
considered that they will be of value in Action'.Jellicoe to Secretary, 18 December 1911 (op.cit.).
See Chaper 3.
DXO for Successor, July 1907 (op. cit.) p.31 and November 1909 p.20. Pollen himself acknowledged the
difficulties of handling targets, especially when towed, except in good weather: FP, 'Reflections on an Error
of the Day', 1908, p.182.
23 PP, pp. 239, 280 and 329.
24 
'Memorandum by Director of Naval Ordnance on Gunnery of the Fleet' in Navy Estimates 1908-9 (op. cit.)
pp.11 1-2. For the intention to test an alternative system, see also Fve Contn,1 1908 (op. cii.) p4.
Results of Battle Practice 1908; Dreadnought was fourth. Rear Admiral Iriglefield to Admiral Fisher, 18
January 1909 quoted in Jon Sumida, In Defence ofNaval Supremacy (London, 1989) p.160.
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attached so much importance. Inflexible, after delays in commissioning to repair damage
from her gun trials, made her first Battle Practice off Malta in March 1909.
A long swell the ship being somewhat light, made her distinctly lively, and '/2 ° to 1 V2°
roll and 10 to 2° pitch, with considerable scend at times, made laying and training
difficult.
She made only 4 hits from 29 rounds. 26
 The contrast with Indomitable was no doubt in
part due to rougher conditions, but was probably made worse by Inflexible's less efficient
turret training gear.
Ranges, courses and speeds differed little in 1909. The target was still towed at 8
knots at a range of 'about 8,000 yards'. The firing ship worked up from 8 to 15 knots
during the eight-minute initial approach, when the rate was at most 300 yds/min. Firing
was limited to two bursts of four minutes each, separated by the 1 8-point turn.
Transmitters were disabled to test alternative methods of communication. 27
 In his
memoirs, C V Usborne, then gunnery lieutenant in Bellerophon, gave a vivid description of
Battle Practice, which establishes that effects of casualties were also simulated.
One of the umpires was with me in the control position. His duty, as I well knew, would
be at some critical juncture of the proceedings to inform me that I was 'dead',
whereupon I must cease to function, and some other must take my place.
...our leader led us round so as to bring the target on the other side....when I was
ordered officially to die we had already expended all the ammunition allowed.
...18 hits on the target. Out of 40 rounds that was a very high percentage for long range
firing...we tied with the freadnoughL
Unlike the dreadnoughts, some older ships for the first time did their practice in rough
weather, which exposed problems with ranging, plotting, aiming and spotting.29
In November 1909, Admiral May (C.-in-C, Home fleet) proposed that, since 'at
about 8000 yards...the "DREADNOUGHT" class firing overwhelmed the target', a new
long range battle practice at 10,000 to 12,000 yards should be introduced for 12-inch and
John Roberts, Baitlecrzisen (London, 1997) p.122. Staff of 1TP, 'Battle Practice, 1909', Lecture 1, f.2, MS
19, Excellent Historical Library, copy courtesy Professor Sumida. Inflexible does not appear in the results of
Battle Practice for 1908 or 1909.
27 Results of Batik Practice 1909. Letters from Vice-Admiral Berkeley Milne 28 October 1909 and Admiral
May 31 October 1909: minute by Rear-Admiral Peirse (ITT') 23 November 1909 all in 'Revised
Instructions for the Expenditure of Heavy and Light Gun Ammunition' in ADM 1/8065. TTP, 'Battle
Practice, 1909' (op. cit.) f. 18.
Vice-Admiral C V Usborne, Blast and Counterblast (London, 1935) pp.8-12. Usborne states that this
practice was held 'a year or two before the War' under Captain Hugh Evan-Thomas, but everything points
to the 1909 practice; see also Results of Batik Prac&e 1909 and Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game(London, 1996) pp.372-4.
ITP, 'Battle Practice, 1909', Lecture 1, ff.2-5.
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9.2-inch guns only. This would be additional to the existing medium range practice,
which should be retained for all ships but made more difficult by exercising the effects of
damage, casualties, and changes of target course. 3° Rear-Admiral Peirse, the ITP, did not
concur with the introduction of longer ranges, in part because they would result in fewer
hits and so make the detection of errors more difficult. However, he did confirm that his
proposals for 1910 included most of the tests suggested by May to simulate the effects of
enemy fire.3'
It is regrettable that little information has been found on the Battle Practice
conditions for 1910, since 'the conditions...differed considerably from those of former
years'.32 Vanguard fired at ranges 'far longer' than 7,500 yards (during the first run) and in
all made 10 hits from 21 rounds, which placed her third. The points scored suggest that
the best ships were still making over 40% hits: which result appears to justif' Admiral
May's renewed warning that 'too much stress should not be laid on deductions drawn
solely from Target Practice under easy conditions in peacetime'.33
The conditions in 1911 were again different from the year before. The range was
increased significantly, to an average 9,300 yards, while the effects of failures were still
being simulated. 35
 Only average figures for the percentage of hits are available, but they
suggest a considerable reduction from previous years.
Battle Practice. 12" guns fired nearly 800 rounds. On Run I they got about 100/0 hits, &
on Run II (short range) about 17%.
Ranges. Dreadnoughts open at 9200.
Squad" firing has been opened at l2,000.
The Return of Battle Practice for 1911 shows that, on the First Run the 12" guns missed
the target 87 times, and the 6" guns 94 times, out of every 100 rounds fired.37
° Letter from Admiral May, 31 October 1909 (op. cit.).
Minute by IT?, 23 November 1909 (op. cit.).
32 Results of Battle Practice 1910. The first three ships were Agamemnon (316.3 points), Invincible (286.0) and
Vanguard (196.6).
'Remarks on Local Control by Commander F.C. Dreyer RN of HMS "Vanguard"', 5 September 1910
and Minute by Admiral May 1 October 1910 in 'Local Control of Turret Guns. SpeciaLFiring by HMS
"Vanguard"... 'in ADM 1/8 147.
Results of Battle Pracewe 1911. Admiralty, Naval Staff, Gunnery Division, Progress in Naval Gunneiy 1926,
Plate l,ADM 186/271.
' During her Battle Practice, P,incc of Wales switched from her fore to aft rangefinder. Captain Hopwood
to VAC Atlantic Fleet, 20 November 1911 in T. 173/91 Part III.
Manuscript notes 'Recent gunnery practises [szc]. (Capt. C Fuller 6.6.12)' in DRAX 1/9, CC. The
ranges and date indicate that these concerned the 1911 rather than 1912 practices.
Vice Admiral Percy Scott, Rear Admiral R H Peirse and Lieutenant A Gilbert, 'Final Report of the
Committee on Director Fn-ing', 15 November 1912, MBI /T22/ 161, Battenburg Papers, University of
X: BATFLE PRACTICES
	 365
There is clear evidence in the surviving documents of serious disquiet. Jellicoe (now VAC
Atlantic fleet) commented that:
There has been a distinct reduction in the number of hits made on Battle Practice
Targets during the last two or three years. This is due to two causes:-
(1)The conditions have been made more difficult year by year, and
(2)There have been innovations in training which have not been altogether beneficial in
producing hits on the Target.
The increase in range has, in my opinion, gone too far, especially as regards ships
armed with 6" guns.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to reconcile the last two quotations with the official results, in
which the predreadnoughts, with many 6-inch guns, obtained 16 of the top 20 places.
Perhaps they made many more than 6% hits in the second, short-range run; or, in
converting hits into points, too much allowance was made for the initial long range. Only
the following comment by the DNO, Captain Moore, provides any explanations for the
poor results obtained by the dreadnoughts:
...it is true the actual score figures are lower, but can largely be accounted for by the
reduced value of the ricochet hit, the increased difficulty of the competition accounting
for the remainder.
The concern over the Battle Practice results prompted the setting up of a Conference on
Gunnery at the end of 1911, chaired by Rear Admiral Sir George Warrender; among the
members was Frederic Dreyer (then Commander of Vanguard) representing Jellicoe.
While the report by the conference made many recommendations concerning training,
towing of targets, etc., it does not shed any further light on other reasons for the marked
reduction of hits, nor does it contain any specific criticisms of fire control gear.4°
In 1912, there was a modest reduction in the average range (from 9,300 to 8,600
yards) while the number of hits per gun per minute recovered decisively from .08 in 1911
to .19 in 1912 (the top ship attaining .24 at 8,500 yards).4' A record kept by Captain
Craig of Orion's battle practice shows that she plotted the 8-knot target for 12 minutes as
the range fell from 11,000 to 8,000 yards. Steaming at 15 knots, she then followed the
Southampton.
Letters to the Secretary of the Admiralty from the C.-in-C. Home fleet 18 October 1911 and VAC
Atlantic Fleet 18 December 1911: Minute from Captain Moore, DNO, 24 October 1911: in 'Gunnery
Conference 1911-1912' (op. ciL).
DNO's minute, 1 2 January 1912 (op.cit.)
4° 
'Conference on Gunnery', report n.d. but early 1912, in 'Gunnery Conference 1911-1912'.
PXG 1926 (op. cit.). Plate 1 is a graph of 'Hits per gun per minute on a ship of "Queen Elizabeth" class at
60 indination' against range and was drawn to compare the results of single ship practices pre-and
post-War. While showing the results for 1911-1913 in terms of this standard target, the actual rates of
hitting on the smaller pre-War targets must have been lower.
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leading ship's turn of 22° outwards and fired her practice allowance of 40 rounds in eight
salvoes in 6 mins. 45 secs., the average, near-constant rate being only -125 yds/min. She
made 10 hits plus 3 ricochets, which equates to 25% of hits to rounds fired (27.3% if
ricochets are valued at 0.3 as in the Gunlayer's Test). Other ships probably had to
contend with higher rates, though the limit was still only 350 yds/min. Captain Craig's
notes include a table of results from 22 ships which is ordered very similarly to the final
published result in which O,ion was placed second to Colossus.42 Assuming the 15
dreadnoughts in the table all fired their full allowances, the average result is 17.7% (hits
only) or 20.6% (hits plus ricochets at 0.3). This was an improvement on the previous year,
although the target length had been increased from 90 to 127 feet 'so as to ensure better
spotting results by obtaining many hits now lost for direction'. 43
 However, it was worse
than achieved earlier at very similar ranges with much more drastic alterations of course;
in 1908, Indomitable made 58% of hits, while in 1909, both Dreadnought and Bellerophon got
45%. Unfortunately, no other explanations have been found for this apparent decline in
gunnery standards, other than the disruption caused by exercises simulating the effects of
damage and casualties.
Information remains sparse for 1913, the final full Battle Practices of the
pre-War years, although it was supposed to introduce 'new elements of actuality'. The
average range remained at 8,600 yards, but the average hits per gun per minute increased
to .23, while the top ship, ICIng George V, made .36. By simple proportion from the previous
year's average results, these figures give an average of 21% and a maximum of 30% direct
hits on the target. However, The Tunes credited the Oiion, which was eventually ranked
fifth, with 40-45% hits, 45
 so perhaps results were again comparable with 1908-9. In 1914,
Battle Practice had probably not even begun before it was interrupted by the real thing.
After hostilities had ended,Jellicoe recalled that:
The effective range of the gun and the torpedo was quickly shown to be much greater
than had been considered before the War.
adding, in a footnote:
42 Battle Practice Chart, HMS Orion 1912 and Table 'Class 1 Ships', Craig Wailer Papers. DNO's minute
24 October 1911 (op. cit.). fl)1v3' (op. cit.) p.226. Resultc ofBattle Practice 19/2. Ciilossus made 8 direct hits but 8
ricochets.
DNO's minute, l2January 1912.
' The Thnes, 27June 1913, p.77.
PXG 1926 (op. cit.). Rculzs ofBattle Practice 1913. The 7iznes (op. cit.)
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In pre-War days our Battle Practice had been carried out at a range of 9500 yard...
This probably refers to the 1911 practice, but even if it alludes to the intentions for 1914,
it confirms that the gunnery part of Battle Practice always remained a test at 'effective'
rather than long range.




Captain Bacon, DNO, on battle ranges, 1908:
Bacon...argued that sophisticated fire control methods were unnecessary because poor
visibility in the North Sea, where he anticipated that the next naval war would be
fought, would restrict battle ranges. "Our guns", he maintained, "are enormously
over-ranged already".'
Captain Hughes-Onslow on visibility:
...in the North Sea...on 7 or 8 days out of every 10, the visibility does not exceed 8,000
yards.2
Admiral May on engaging in thick weather, 1910:
When fleets meet in weather which is such that visibility is less than the effective range
of guns, there is no approach, there is no time to plot, and if the course of one fleet
happens to be so favourable that it may be maintained, there is yet no justification for
that fleet to withhold its fire for one instant longer than it takes to get the guns to bear
and a range on the sights, for it must be remembered that six broadsides are set aside
for every three minutes calculations.3
Admiral May on the 1909 Battle Practice and engaging in clear weather:
In the recent Battle Practice at about 8000 yards...the "DREADNOUGHT" class firing
overwhelmed the target. There can be no doubt that the opening range in action would
be not less than 12,000 yards with the 12" and 9.2" in clear weather.
Rangefinding, plotting and so forth are calmly carried on at a range which for
"DREADNOUGHTS" is not merely decisive but annihilating.4
Jon Sumida, In Defence ofXaval Supremacj (London, 1989) pp.1 51-2.
2 
'Fire Control. An Essay by Captain C. Hughes-Onslow, R.N.', 'General Remarks and Conclusions on
Plotting', p.!, 1909, PLLN 1/5, CC.
$ Admiral W H May to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 25 April 1910 in 'Gunnery: Effects
on...plotting...&c of new developments in Fleet Tactics', ff.51-2 in ADM 1/8051, PRO.
Admiral May to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 31 October 1909 in 'Revised Instructions for the




Admiral May following the 1910 Tactical Exercises:
...whatever system of keeping the gun sights correctly set be adopted, the necessity of a
Range Finder capable of accurate employment during the Approach remains....
reasonable accuracy at 15,000 yards is required.5
Captain Moore, DM0, on the lessons of the Tactical Exercises:
It is interesting to note how small was the error in estimating the enemy's course by
eye...Jt was remarkable also that the error was generally smallest between 8,000 and
10,000 yards, the accepted battle range of today....6
Admiral May in 1911 on assumptions concerning effective range for Tactical Exercises:
In clear weather...no gunfire has been allowed outside 10,000 yards.7
Vice-Admiral Jellicoe's War Orders when commanding 2nd Division, Home Fleet,
1911-12:
RANGE FOR ENGAGING
A slow fire will be opened by guns of 9.2" and above at 15,000 yards providing weather
conditions and the motion of the ships permit. The fire will be quickened as the range
and rate of change are found and decrease, and at 13,000 yards to 12,000 yards the
maximum rate of fire should be established if hits are being obtained. In view of the
torpedo menace, it is not intended to close to less than 7,000 yards under ordinary
circumstances...8
Admiral Callaghan's supplement to Admiralty Instructions, October, 1913:
For ships of the all big gun type in fine dear weather, deliberate fire may well be
opened at about 16,000 yards; 8,000 to 10,000 yards should suffice for effective range
at which superiority of fire may be established; ranges below 8,000 yards are to be
expected towards the later stages of the action in order to press home advantage and
obtain decisive results.9
Home fleet Order on Fire Control, November 1913:
...it has been suggested that under favourable conditions of weather and visibility at
ranges below 10,000 yards a bracket of 200 yards may be sufficient, jf a good plot has
been obtained and the rangefinders are well together. These conditions ho'ever can
May to Secretary 25 April 1910 (op. cit.), f.60.
6 Minute by Captain A C H W Moore received 4May 1910 in 'Effects...of new developments' (op. cit.)
Admiral W H May,J'fotes on Tactzcal Exercises, Home Fleet, 1909-1911, p.3, Eb 012, AL.
8 A Temple Patterson (ed.), Tlzejellicoe Papers, Volume I (Navy Records Society, 1966) p.24.
Memorandum 'Conduct of a Fleet in Action. Commander in Chief's Instructions (Supplementary to the
Instruction issued by the Admiralty...October 1913)' attached to Captain H G Thursfield, 'Development of
Tactics in the Grand fleet', Lecture 1,2 February 1922, THU 107, NMM.
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rarely be those of action, as, when the visibility is good, fire will probably be opened at
much greater ranges.'°
Captain F C T Tudor, DNO, November 1913:
I am very strongly of the opinion that the probability that the modern battleships and
battlecruisers can knock themselves out...at say 9,000 yards will merely leacL.to ships
opening at much greater range than 9,000 yards.t'
Vice-AdmiralJellicoe's Grand fleet Battle Orders, 1914:
OPENING Fu - Tim; BATFLEFLEET
...On a clear day and unless the enemy opens earlier, 13.5-inch gun ships will open
deliberate fire at 15,000 yards, 12-inch gun ships at 13,000 yards.
If the enemy opens fire at greater ranges...flre is to be opened at once in reply....
CONDUCT OF A FLEET IN ACTION...
...In clear weather we hope that deployment at long range may give us the initial
advantage in gunfire it is so important to obtain, but there can be no doubt that we
must gradually close the range to obtain decisive results....
...BATFLE TACTICS...
...Generally speaking, so long as the action is being fought on approximately parallel
courses, the whole fleet should form one line of battle, and the range should be between
12,000 and 9000 yards.
INTENTIONS AS REGARDS DEPLoYMEi'fr
...Assuming good visibility and favourable weather, and non-deployment earlier on the
part of the enemy, I shall probably deploy at a range of about 16,000 yards so as to be
in a favourable position to open fire in good time, whilst, if the enemy delays his
deployment, our fleet will be able to concentrate its whole force on the leading ships of
his columns.
I attach the greatest importance to making full use of the fire of our heaviest guns in the
early stages at long range. Close action is to the German advantage, if they intend to
use large numbers of auxiliary craft to strengthen the attack on our fleet....'2
'° Home Fleet General &der, '14. Fire Control Organization', 5 November 1913, p.3 in DRAX 1/9, CC.
" DNO's minute, 18 November 1913 in 'Important Questions dealt with by DNO...Vol. II', 1913, AL.
12 Jel&oePapersl(op. cit.) pp.59 and 61-3.
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APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 4
APPENDIX XII
A C AND ARGO: TECHNICAL Noms
I. TWO-POSITION RANGEFINDER: SYNCHRONISATION
At a bearing instrument, the observer, by pressing one of the seven transmitter
keys, could indicate that the selected target feature lay somewhere in a band 15" of arc in
width. If the target was moving across the telescopes' fields of view, it was necessary for
both observers to press their keys almost simultaneously, otherwise additional angular
errors would be introduced equal to the angular movement in the times between the two
keystrokes. Assume that the target for synchronisation accuracy was also 15".
Consider first the case when the ship has no yaw. The following calculations are
based on Pollen's own example in his 1904 pamphlet 'Fire Control and Long Range
Firing' of two ships on roughly opposite courses.t When in positions A2
 and B2, the values
to be inserted in equations 2:3 and 2:4 are:
e=l2knots	 z=125°
s=l7knots
R = 8,490 yards
giving
= 6.0 °/min. or 6.0 '/sec.
If the target was moving across the field of view of the telescopes at this speed, it would
traverse 15" in 6.0x60 = .042 secs. or 42 msecs.
In practice, movement due to yaw was much greater than this; in Jupiter, yaws of
2°/sec. or greater were experienced. This would require a synchronisation accuracy of
15x 10002x3600 =2.lmsecs.
Arthur Pollen, 'Fire Control and Long Range Firing...', December 1904 in Jon Sumida (ed.) The Pollen
Papers 1901 - 1916 (London, 1984) Fig.4, p.48.
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2. A C DUAL GYRoscOPES
Plate 13 (which is taken from the 1906 patent) gives a plan view of the A C dual
gyroscope directional reference.2
The whole mechanism was mounted on a chassis 5 which was fixed in the ship.
The action of the gyroscopes kept the arm 44 pointing in the same direction, even as the
ship yawed beneath it. In the Ariadrze gear, this arm was itself a contact arm working over a
divided contact arc connected by gearing to the training drive of the rangefinder
mounting. 3
 The divided arc had a narrow gap in its centre. if the rangefmder was bearing
correctly, the tip of the arm lay in the gap. If the ship yawed, the arc rotated beneath the
arm; thus the arm made contact with one segment of the arc. This closed an electric
circuit which energised one of the two clutches in the rangefmder training gear, thereby
training the rangefinder in the direction necessary to return it to its correct bearing.
Initially, both gyroscopes were clamped with their rotational axes parallel to the
keel. Then each in turn was released to run freely, the free gyro providing the directional
reference. While still clamped, each gyro was driven up to speed by an air blast. As each
gyroscope was unclamped, it was coupled through a light clutch and coupling rod to the
contact ann. Once connected, frictional torque (due mainly to the contact pressure of the
arm on the divided arc but to a lesser extent to friction in the various gyro bearings) would
tend to make the gyro precess so that its axis of rotation was no longer horizontal. Before
this inclination could affect directional accuracy, at fixed intervals of four minutes the
other gyroscope was connected in its turn. The disconnected gyro was then reclamped so
that its axis was once more parallel to the keel; and then again driven up to speed.
The direction of the contact arm was determined by that of the first gyro to be
unclamped i.e. by the direction of the ship's head at that moment. When making a
straight-course plot, it was desirable that this direction should coincide with the
mean-course line. Subsequently, as each gyro was connected alternatively, the ship's head
might or might not have been in the same direction. Even so, differences in the directions
of the gyros as each was unclamped in turn did not induce any change in direction of the
control arm.
Patent 23,846/1906 applied for 26 October, complete specification 25 May 1907.
1'he Pollen Aim Corrector' in JIotes, Correspondence, Etc. on the Pollen A. C. System installed and hid m HMS.
A,iadne December 1907 -Janutny 1908, pp.15-19 and Figs. 12-14, DRAX 3/1, CC.
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3. HUNTING BY THE A C RANGEFINDER MOUNTING
The general arrangement of all the A C rangefinder mountings was similar
(Plates 18 and 19). Its foundation was a pedestal screwed to the deck. Within this rotated a
vertical, inner tube, the position of which was controlled by the gyroscope so that it
remained fixed in space even while the ship yawed beneath it. On this tube was a second,
outer tube which carried both the rangefinder itself and a seat for its operator; the latter
could train himself and the rangefinder with the power-training gear, which rotated the
outer tube relative to the inner.
In Ariadne (and the Jfata1 mounting must have been very similar), the inner tube
was trained by means of a shaft carrying an armature plate placed between two
counter-rotating electromagnetic clutches. If the inner tube was correctly aligned with the
gyro-controlled contact arm, neither dutch was energised and the armature plate
remained stationary. If the inner tube and the contact arm were not in alignment, the arm
made contact with one segment of the divided arc described in Note 2; current therefore
flowed in a relay switch which energised one of the clutches. The selected clutch then
drove the armature plate in the correct direction to realign the narrow gap in the divided
arc with the contact arm controlled by the gyros.4
The operation of this basic type of 'bang-bang' servo has two disadvantages.
Firstly, it is inherently jerky. The clutches rotate at constant speed, which must be fast
enough to keep up with the most rapid yaw. However, if the yaw is slower, the clutches
must be energised intermittently, in order to produce the required rate of training by a
series of short steps. The frequency and duration of the steps depend on the inertia of the
mounting, the amount of slip at the clutch faces and on the relative dimensions of the gap
in the divided arc and the width of the contact at the end of the contact arm. Note also
that these effective contact gaps are likely to vary with the state of wear and cleanliness of
the contacts.
The second disadvantage is also related to the inertia of the load on the training
drive: which, since it consisted of a 9-foot rangefmder and its operator, wai considerable.
If the mounting slewed off the correct bearing, it had to be driven back by the action of
one of the clutches. Although the clutch would disconnect once the correct bearing was
reached, the inertia of the mounting tended to carry it past this position. Thus the contact
'Pollen Aim Corrector' (op. ciL).
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arm would make contact with the opposite segment of the arc, thereby energising the
other clutch. This would reverse the direction of rotation and drive the inner tube back
towards the correct position. However, there was a danger that the clutches would
continue to be energised alternatively, resulting in the inner tube 'hunting' to and fro
about the correct bearing.
The Ariadne design used two means to counter these effects. Firstly, a rotation of
30° by the armature plate produced a change of only 1 /400 in the training of the
rangefmder i.e. the reduction gear ratio was 1,200:1. Secondly, a spring coupling was
inserted between the armature-plate shaft and the drive shaft to the mounting; 5
 the latter
shaft was also fitted with a pair of fly-wheels, one connected rigidly, the other through a
friction coupling. The whole assembly was intended to smooth out the jerky movement of
the armature. However, the resilience of the spring connected to the load inertias created
a coupling with a natural frequency of mechanical oscillation: though any oscillations
would have been damped by friction in the high-ratio gearing and, possibly, in the
fly-wheel coupling.
Either hunting by the 'bang-bang' servo, or oscillations in the flexible coupling,
or a combination of the two, would explain the 'rhythmical motion' which had to be
countered by the rangefi.nder operator.
4. BEARINGS TRANSMITTED FROM THE RANGEFINDERS
In the mountings fitted with the air-driven dual or single gyros, the gyro
reference had to be clamped parallel to the keel while the ship turned. The servo which
controlled the training of the inner tube of the mounting then held its bearing on the
keel-line.
Once the ship had settled on a new course, the gyro reference was released at the
moment when the keel lay on the mean-course line. The servo action then held the inner
tube of the mounting on the mean-course line, even though the ship might be yawing.
Thus, if the rangefinder was trained on the target by rotating the outer tube relative to the
inner, the angle between the two tubes equalled fi, the target bearing relative to mean
course. Hence the rotation of the bearing transmitter was controlled by the rotation of the
outer tube relative to the inner.
The divided arc was connected directly to the armature shaft, the best configuration for an intermittent
drive: P L Taylor, Seivomechanisins (London, 1960) pp.' 98-9.
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If the ship altered course, the gyro reference was again clamped parallel to the
keel. Once a new mean course was established and the rangefinder trained on the target,
the transmitted angle was again the target angle relative to mean-course.
When the Xatal table was modified in the attempt to plot true course, it was fitted
with its own gyro reference so that it could plot own course correctly relative to True
North. To plot enemy course, the enemy plotting arm had to be positioned according to
the angle between own instantaneous course and target bearing. 6 Thus the bearing
transmitter must have been reconnected so that it transmitted the angle between the outer
tube and the pedestal. The inner tube was otherwise unaltered; the gyro reference in the
mounting could then still be used to assist the rangefinder operator in training, though
only while on a steady course.
In the final production Argo mountings, the Argo gyro was replaced by an
Anschütz gyro compass receiver. This provided a directional reference to True North
irrespective of course changes. Thus, by the action of the training servo, the inner tube
could be held at all times in alignment with True North. For true-course plotting, the
mounting was still required to transmit the angle between the outer tube and the pedestal.
In contrast, for dual-rate plotting, the mounting had to transmit target compass bearing.
This meant reverting to the arrangement whereby the transmitter transmitted the angle
between the inner and outer tubes. This could also be used for dual-rate plotting with the
older Argo air-driven gyro. While own course was steady, it did not matter whether the
transmitted bearing angle was relative to True North or to mean-course; the slope of the
bearing plot equalled the rate of change of compass bearing in both cases.
5. THE X4TAL STRAIGHT-COURSE PLOTTER
Patent 5,031 of 2 March 1909 described a manual plotter, which was probably
the same as the plotters in the second batch supplied by Pollen in 1909 to naval
acquaintances (Plate 11). Its basis was a large board, to which the plotting paper was
pinned, with a bar mounted across the centre. A carriage was moved along the bar by a
threaded rod rotating at one of a selection of fixed speeds determined by interchangeable
discs.7 The carriage carried both the pen plotting own ship's course: and the range bar
6 Patent 1,111 applied for 1 5 January 1910, complete specification 12 August 1910.
A constant speed of rotation was maintained by reference to the seconds hand of a stop-watch: patent
25,654/1908, applied for 27 November by Isherwood. This unimportant patent is unique in not being
taken out jointly with Pollen.
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used to plot the enemy course. The bar was provided with angular scales so that it would
be set at the correct angle relative to own ship's mean course, which was parallel to the
bar and threaded rod. The patent also described manual procedures for plotting through
a turn, but these are of doubtful practicality and accuracy; they depended on unpinning
the paper from the board, inserting a pin a distance from the course line equal to the
radius of turn, and then rotating the paper through the angle of turn, meanwhile
manipulating the target range-and-bearing bar as the target bearing changed.8
This patent is the best guide to the general layout and principles of operation of
the automatic straight-course table which was delivered to the J'Iatal in September 1909.
Unfortunately, no detailed description has survived, although Pollen himself confirmed
that 'the paper on which the chart was made was pinned upon the plotting table, and the
plotting pen traversed over it'. 9
 However, some of its features can be inferred from
Pollen's and Isherwood's next plotter patent, 1,111 of 1910.
The provisional specification applied for on 15 January, describes, but only in
outline, several different designs for a true-course plotter; its purpose was clearly to claim
as broadly as possible while an actual design was still being worked out. One design was in
effect an automatic version of the manual scheme described in 5,031 / 1909: but it was not
used to modify the Xatal table for true-course plotting. Instead of traversing the pen which
plotted own ship's course, it was held stationary in the middle of the table; the plotting
paper was pinned to a wooden board, which was moved (linearly and in rotation) by the
action of the two pricker wheels located beneath the pen. This method of driving the
paper proved wholly impractical. However, the same principle was retained for the
complete specification of 12 August 1910; the wheels below the paper now drove it
directly through rubber rims, firm contact pressure being maintained by a matching pair
of pressure wheels mounted above the paper.
Unusually, the complete patent specification is quite different from the
provisional, both in text and drawings (Plate 14). Nonetheless, the new design retained
features which suggest that it was derived from an earlier table in which the carriage
carrying the plotting pens moved. Like the earlier manual plotter, the carriage is mounted
on transverse bars (though two rather than one): while its original direction of movement
is still shown as small arrows on the top! Similarly, the arrangement of drive shafts to
8 Patent 5,031 / 1909 applied for 2 March, complete specification 13 September.
PP, 'The Quest for a Rate Finder', November 1910, p. 264.
XII: A C AND A1Go: TECHNICAL Noms	 379
operate the target range-and-bearing arm would have worked equally well with a moving
as with a fixed carriage. Thus it seems probable that these later drawings give a good
indication of the general layout of the earlier straight-course table.
6. Aio CLocI MARK I
The first Argo clock generated a 'simulacrum' of virtual course. Its general
arrangement is shown in Plate 15, which is taken from patent 360 applied for on 5
January 1911. The instrument was approximately two feet square,'° with the target range
and bearing hands pivoted at its centre. This centre represented own ship, while the target
was represented by a moving cross-piece P. Two long rods at right angles ran through the
cross-piece, so that it was constrained always to lie at their intersection. The horizontal
rod was attached to a split nut around a vertical screw: while the vertical rod was similarly
connected to a horizontal screw. As a result of the vertical and horizontal displacements
caused by the rotation of the two screws, P moved relative to the centre of the clock at a
speed and in a direction corresponding to virtual speed.
The design depended on the assumption that own course was parallel to the
horizontal screw. Thus the vertical screw had to move P at a speed proportional to the
component of the virtual speed perpendicular to own course (v). This component
derived solely from the perpendicular component of enemy speed i.e.
v = e sin 0
The horizontal component of virtual speed (vi) was derived from own speed subtracted
from the horizontal component of enemy speed:
v=e cosO—s
In the mechanisms shown at the bottom of the diagram, a rotating disc was set
by the right-hand knob to the angle between courses, 0. The disc carried two pins
separated by a right angle; the pins displaced two sliding links by amounts proportional to
cos 0 and sin 0. Two proportional levers multiplied these two displacements by the enemy
speed e set on the adjacent knob. The resultant displacement proportional o e sin 0 was
used directly to control the position of the ball in one of two variable-speed drives; this
tO Argo Company, 'The A.C. Range and Bearing Clock, Mark II' p.2 with I E Brown, Secretary, Argo
Company to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 15 May 1911 in RCA! Claims Files for Argo Co. and A H
Pollen, T.1 73/91 Part III, PRO. In the Mark I clock, one thousand yards was represented by 6 inches.
The variable speed drives were driven by a clock-regulated constant speed electric motor as patented in
9,223/1909.
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drive then rotated the vertical screw at a speed proportional to The ball of the second
drive, which was connected to the horizontal screw, was positioned by subtracting a
displacement proportional to own-speed s (set on the left-hand knob) from the
displacement proportional to e cos (1.
The cross-piece P was coupled to a frame G pivoted at the centre of the clock;
the angle of the frame directly indicated the bearing angle from own course; an endless
chain within the frame, which was coupled to a sprocket wheel connected to the range
hand, ensured that the indicated range was proportional to the distance from the centre to
the cross-piece. The J%[atal clock also had a second frame, likewise coupled to the cross
piece, but its other end could be displaced from the centre of the clock by vertical and
horizontal distances proportional to the two components of virtual speed multiplied by the
time of flight.' 2
 Thus two additional hands operated through this frame indicated gun
range and gun bearing.' 3
 Although the details have not been found, the clock was able to
transmit gun range and deflection (so there must have been a differential of some sort to
derive deflection by subtracting the two bearings indicated on the clock). It was also
possible to apply spotting corrections to the transmitted ranges and deflections.'4
As in Hughes-Onslow's essay, the patent claimed that the settings of the control
knobs could be altered while the clock was running;' 5
 however, in practice it was found
that the variable speed drives were 'not capable of driving while the speed was being
altered'.' 6
 The patent also described how, before starting, the target range and bearing
were set by releasing the split nuts on the vertical and horizontal screws; it also stated that
if 'the ranges indicated by the clock begin to differ from those observed at the
rangefinder...corrections should be made in the positions of the range and bearing hands'.
However, the only method described for making such corrections was to disengage the
split nuts on the driving screws i.e. in effect to stop the clock.'7
As Hughes-Onslow recognised, if own ship altered course (and assuming that the
enemy did not), this produced an equal and opposite effect on the angle between courses,
which could be set on the right-hand knob i.e. from Fig. 2.11:
12 Time of flight was set on the second knob from the left.
This feature 'did affect the accuracy of the clock', though the extent was not stated: 'A.C. Clock Mark
II' (op. cii.) p.14.
' Report by Lieutenant R Plunkett, Natal, 4July 1910 in DRAX 3/3.
Patent 360/1911 applied for 5January (identical complete specification 28June), p.2.
16 Argo Company, 'Memorandum', 6 May 1913 in T.173/91 Part II.
Patent 360 /1911 (op. ciL); see also PP, Pollen to Admiral Colville, iJuly 1910, p.249.
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2=0+ic




ô/3 = - &
There was no means of applying the large change in /3 due to the change in course &
except by stopping the clock and releasing the split nuts on the vertical and horizontal
screws. Thus the Mark I clock was fundamentally incapable of keeping the bearing during
a turn by own ship; it was not helm-free.
The Argo Clock Mark I could not...compute ranges and bearings accurately while the
firing ship was turning, because its mechanism was incapable of integrating the turning
motion of the firing ship with the straight motion of the target to produce the virtual
replication of relative motion that was required.'8
More precisely, the mechanism was incapable of integrating during a turn because the
variable-speed drives stopped driving the mechanism if their speeds were altered. Even if
this had not been the case, the clock could not have computed ranges and bearings
because the target bearing could not be altered in accordance with the change of course.
Furthermore, the schematic diagram on p.209 of In Defence of J1aval Supremaçv seems to
imply that the clock contained a mechanism analogous to a Dumaresq. In fact, there was
no 'trigonometric calculating mechanism' which, when set with a range-rate and a
bearing-rate, firing ship speed and target bearing, generated target course and speed.
Indeed, there were no displacements anywhere in the clock which, in the general case,
were proportional to the range and bearing rates.
The idea that the clock had separate means for setting rates probably arose from
correspondence after the Xatal trials.' 9 The Admiralty had insisted that any future clock
must 'be capable of being set for rate alone in addition to the existing means of setting';
this would have allowed it to be used like a Vickers clock with a range-rate obtained from
a rate-plot or a Dumaresq. Pollen replied that: 	 -
The clock in its present form is not only "capable of being set by rate alone in addition
to other means of setting", but what seemed adequate instructions for so setting it are in
fact engraved on the dial provided for the purpose.2°
'8 Jon Sumida, In Defence ofXaval Supremacy (London, 1989) p.208.
The letters are cited in ILWS (ibid.) p.205.
20 Secretary of the Admiralty to Argo, 19 August 1910 and Pollen to Secretary 25 August 1910 in
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This rate dial was mentioned during the second of the RCAI hearings.
MR. ISHERWOOD: There is a small dial...which says rate of change in yards per
minute and by setting these dials to zero I can now set on here any rate....
MR. MORITZ: It becomes a Vickers clock?
MR. ISHERWOOD: Yes, exactly.2'
Isherwood also confirmed that one of the dials set to zero was target course. Thus the
most likely procedure was that subsequently described in the provisional patent
specification for a quite different clock mechanism, the Argo Clock Mark II; however, the
fundamentals were no different.
...it is possible to set up the rate of change of range directly in the machine by setting
bearing, target course, and target speed to zero, and setting up rate of change of range
by the ship's speed handle...
The Mark I clock may have had a separate range-rate dial coupled to the own-speed
handle: or perhaps the own-speed dial may have been calibrated in both knots and yards
per minute. Note that the settings described in the last quote correspond to own ship
steaming directly towards a stationary target, so they would only have worked
satisfactorily if the rate was negative. If a positive rate was required, the enemy bearing
could have been set to 1800.
Thus the Mark I clock could be set for rate alone if all that was required was to
work it like a Vickers clock. However, it could not be set for range and bearing rates like
the later Argo clocks.
7. ARGO STEP BY STEP TiIvHSSION Gii.
The patent for the Argo step-by-step transmitting gear was applied for on 24
March 1911; the provisional specification stated that it was intended 'for use in operating
charting tables', though this was omitted form the complete specification. As in other
step-by-step systems, the transmitter was very simple (see Plate 17); in the Argo design, the
transmitter shaft revolved a wiper arm over three stud contacts; thus only four wires were
needed to coimect transmitter and receiver. Just like the first rangefincler mountings
(though presumably on a smaller scale), each receiver used a pair of magnetic clutches to
drive its part of the plotter, so there was plenty of driving torque available. The clutch
T.173/9lPartVII.	 -	 _____________
21 RCAI Minutes of Proceedings, T. 173/547 Part 11. Moritz was Counsel for the Crown
Provisional Specification for patent 19,627, 4 September 1911, p.10 in T.173/9l Part III.
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windings were connected through slip rings to a revolving drum; the drum was geared to
the output shaft driven by the armature plate 3 mounted between the clutches. Three
sprung contacts were disposed around the drum, each drum contact being connected to a
corresponding stud contact at the transmitter. The pattern of the two conducting sectors
(6 and 7 in the figures) on the surface of the insulating drum were such that each drum
contact touched at most one sector; if the corresponding transmitter contact was at the
same time under the wiper arm, electric current was conveyed through both contacts and
the slip rings to a clutch. While the clutch was energised, the armature plate was attracted
to its surface and the output shaft revolved.
The conducting sectors on the drum were configured so that, around the circle
traced by the contacts, there was one wide and one narrow gap. Assume, as in the figures,
that the wiper arm lay on transmitter contact A'. If the wide gap was not already under
drum contact A, A would make a connection through one of the drum sectors to a clutch
winding; the wiring was arranged so that the clutch rotated the drum in the direction
necessary to bring the gap under contact A. The power would then be disconnected from
the clutch and the drive shaft would stop turning. If the transmitter arm then moved on to
(say) contact B', the appropriate clutch would be energised through sector 7 so that the
drum would rotate clockwise until the gap lay under drum contact B.23
The clutches were driven continuously at one speed. When a clutch was first
energised, the armature plate was attracted to its friction disc; due mainly to the inertias of
the plate and the mechanical load, the plate would slip on the clutch disc while it
accelerated towards the speed of the clutch. When the clutch released, the same inertia
would keep the plate and load rotating until brought to a halt by friction. If the inertia was
high and friction low, the gap on the receiver drum could overshoot the contact, resulting
in the other clutch being energised. This would reverse the direction of rotation of the
armature plate and bring the gap back towards the contact; if the ratio of inertia to
friction was unfavourable, the cycle could repeat several times, the output shaft hunting
back and forth before eventually settling. A simple plotting pen driven by a long screw, as
used in the Argo rate plotter, should not have had this characteristic, but the inertial loads
imposed by the complex carriage and large chart of the true-course plotter could have
been significant.
23 Patent 7,383/1911, applied for 24 March, complete 25 September.
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If the transmitter turned slowly, the receiver moved in a series of jerks, each of
one third of a turn. At the other extreme, the receiver could never rotate faster than the
clutches: so a rapid movement of the transmitter could result in the receiver getting out of
step by one or more whole revolutions. The Orion trials found that:
The transmission of ranges is on the Step-by-Step principle...If the working head [of the
rangefinder] is moved too fast...the receiver will, get Out of step. To prevent this the
working head is geared down [but] this is...very inconvenient for the range taker who
likes to move the working head quickly to and fro before obtaining the "cut".
Clearly, the first essential was tO ensure that the clutches rotated faster than the equivalent
maximum speed of the transmitter; however, increasing the clutch speed would prolong
the slipping when the clutch engaged and increase the tendency for overshoot and
hunting when the clutch released. Another possible improvement might have been to
increase the angular size of the transmitter contacts; with the small contact studs shown in
the patent, the clutches would have been energised for less than a quarter of the interval
between steps (assuming the transmitter was rotating at uniform speed). The behaviour of
this transmission system at all transmitter speeds was dependent on complex interrelations
between load inertia and friction, the inertias of armature plate and clutches, the
characteristics of the clutch friction disc, the rotational speed of the clutches and the
widths of the contact gaps at transmitter and receiver. Further, some of these factors were
difficult to control and keep constant over time, notably the clutch friction and contact
gaps. It is not surprising that, in service, the Argo step-by-step transmission system was
troublesome at times.
8. Ti-rE SUPLESS Diuw
The Argo variable-speed drive should be regarded as Isherwood's engineering
masterpiece. Earlier designs employed in the Xatal plotter and the Mark I clock had used
a disc, ball and two fixed rollers, but the ball had to be dragged sideways against the
friction at its points of contact with the disc and both rollers. Isherwood now mounted the
rollers in a carriage, which was arranged to slide (on ball bearings) parallel to the roller
axes and a diameter of the disc (see Plate 20).2+ As before, the ball moved along the
diameter, its distance from the centre determining the rate of rotation of the rollers and of
the output shaft from the drive. But now the ball could be rolled along the diameter by the
24 The essential features of the variable speed drive were first described in 'A.C. Range and Bearing Clock
Mark II', pp.10-11 and 15-6, in May 1911.
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rollers sliding in their carriage. Two decisive benefits were obtained. Firstly, the rate could
be changed with minimal force; only rolling friction (of the ball itself and the ball-bearings
supporting the carriage) had to be overcome at the surfaces subjected to the assembly
force between disc and ball. Secondly, even when the ball was moving diametrically (the
output rate of rotation was changing), it remained in rolling contact with the disc. Unlike
a simple disc-and-roller variable speed drive, the ball did not slide on the disc when the
rate was changed, so no errors (proportional to the torque load on the output and the
distance moved by the wheel) resulted.
...owing to the changes in the ball's position being produced by a rolling action, the ball
does not slip or fail to drive the rollers at the moment when its position is being
changed.
Two minor qualifications are necessary. Firstly, imagine the ball in the very
centre of the disc i.e. the rate at zero, so the rollers do not rotate. The ball cannot rotate
about a vertical axis because it is prevented from doing so by the friction between itself
and the rollers. Thus, as the disc rotates beneath it, there must be rotary sliding in the
minute area of contact between ball and disc. This sliding did not result in any
slip-induced errors when the ball was exactly in the centre of the disc. However, when the
ball moved slightly off centre and began to rotate slowly, the constraining effect of the
rollers forced the microscopic surface features of the ball in the area of contact to follow
straight (tangential) lines: whereas the surface features on the disc were moving in circular
paths of small radius. Thus, while the ball was very close to the centre, there was still
microscopic sliding in the area of contact. As the ball moved further from the centre, the
curvature of the circular paths followed by the disc's surface features was reduced, until
pure rolling contact was established.
Any slippage between ball and disc due to this effect only occurred when the ball
was very close to the centre; since the rate was small, so too were any resulting errors.
Later experience with disc and ball drives showed that the main disadvantage of this effect
was that, at the centre, the sliding induced significant wear of the disc surface. Where
possible in inter-War British fire control tables, the Argo-type drives wer arranged to
reduce the probability of the ball working in the centre of the disc. 26 In American Ford
Provisional specification for the Argo clock, patent 19,627 applied for 4 September 1911, p.2, T. 173/91
Part HI. The same words are used in the patent for the Argo variable-speed drive, 17,441 applied for 12
April 1912.
See for example the 'disc-and-ball generators' in the Speed Across Plotter Unit of the AFCT Mark IV:
Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Addendum ..Mi. 2, Handbook for Admiraliy Fire Conin,! Tabks, Marks IV and IV',
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fire control tables (which used a variable-speed drive with two balls and a single roller),
the higher-power 5-inch variable speed drive was designed to allow the ball in contact
with the disc to rotate about the vertical as well as the normal horizontal axis: even
though this design appears to have required a greater force to move the balls as the rate
changed.27
Secondly, although a change of rate induced only rolling at the ball and ball-
bearings, sliding friction had to be overcome between the moving rollers and their
stationary shafts. The contact surfaces were not subjected to any assembly forces.
However, a significant load on the output shaft would increase the sliding friction between
the slot and key conveying the drive from the roller to the shaft. The Ford-type variable
speed drive had the (probably small) advantage that its roller was stationary and the force
required to move the balls was independent of the output load. The Ford design was also
more compact, since the whole drive was little larger than the disc.28
9. RATE GENERATION IN THE Aio CLOCKS
Dumaresqs
The fore-and-aft bar of the standard Dumaresq (see Chapter 3) was fixed parallel
to the ship's keel, while the graduated bearing plate was rotated until its arrow pointed at
the target. The angular scale around the circumference indicated target bearing against a
pointer at the bow end of the fore-and-aft bar. The fore-and-aft bar was slotted from the
centre half way to the after edge of the dial; in the slot, a sliding block was positioned at a
distance from the centre of the dial proportional to own ship's speed. Beneath the first
block, a second rotated on a pivot. The second block engaged with the slotted bar
representing the target ship. A pointer on the bow of the target bar indicated the rates on
the bearing dial graduations; the distance from this pointer to the pivot was set to be
proportional to target speed.
1933, Book I - Text, pp.10-i2 (ADM 186/275) and Book II - Plates, Plate 37A (ADM 186/276), PRO.
' Ford Instrument Co. for the Bureau of Ordnance, U S Navy, Ordnance Pamphlet 1140, Basic Fire Control
Mechantsms, September 1944, pp.1 28-9. The author is especially grateful to Professor Sumida for a copy of
this invaluable reference of over 400 pages.
These considerations may explain why Ford-type variable-speed drives were preferred for the Admiralty
Fire Control Clocks (AFCCs) and the Admiralty Fire Control Tables (AFCTs) Mark V and VI. For a
technical study of these devices, see Allan Bromley, BriJüh Mecharncal Gunnery Computers of World War LI
(Sydney, Australia, 1984).
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The Turret Dumaresq differed in that the bearing dial was fixed in the turret
with its arrow parallel to the guns. The fore-and-aft bar was rotated to lie parallel with the
keelY This form of the instrument was the most Convenient for use in automatic clocks;
because the bearing dial was fixed, the displacements of the target bow (or its equivalent)
along and at right angles to the line-of-bearing could be taken off by links constrained to
slide in fixed ways.
Argo Clock Mark II
The Mark II clock was riot built but its description dating from May 1911
contains Argo's first intentions for a rate-generating mechanism. The figures are no longer
attached to the copy in the PRO, but the essential elements are described clearly in the
surviving text.3°
The bearing dial and fore-and-aft bar were combined in a single, large, rotating
disc. A scale for target bearings was engraved round the circumference of the disc; the
target bearing was indicated by a pointer on the fixed body of the clock A 'radial slot' cut
in the disc extended from the centre half way to the circumference. A 'sliding piece' was
positioned in the slot at a distance from the centre proportional to own speed. This piece
carried a pivot for a second, smaller disc, the circumference of which was marked with a
scale of target course. This smaller disc was also slotted and, in the slot, an 'adjustable
piece' was located at a distance from the pivot proportional to target speed. From this
adjustable piece, a stud engaged with a slot in a T-shaped link connected directly to the
slide which determined the rate of the variable-speed drive generating the range.
As in subsequent designs, rack-and-pinion mechanisms were used to position the
two sliding pieces.
Prothional Clock Patent Specfiation
The patent was applied for on 4 September 1911. It was accompanied by only a
schematic diagram of the mechanism for generating range-rate. Although described as
'purely diagrammatic', this figure (Plate 21) and the text show that the design was still
evolving.
The mechanism was still based on a large, slotted bearing dial, the slot
containing a sliding piece. A square plate was carried (but did not rotate) on this sliding
Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Manual of Gunnery (l7olwne 111) for I-lw: Majesçy': Fleet 1915, p.174, AL.
' 'A C. Clock Mark II'.
St 19,627/1911, Provisional Specification (op. cit.).
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piece. The sliding piece also provided the pivot for a smaller dial, now called the 'target
course dial', beneath which was fixed a bar 'or equivalent'. A piece sliding on the bar was
positioned from the pivot at a distance proportional to target speed; this sliding piece
carried a pin engaging with the slotted, T-shaped link to the variable-speed drive. The
target dial rotated above the square plate; the main purpose of the latter appears to have
been to carry the pointer which indicated the target course on small dial.
Compkte Clock Patent Specification
The complete specification of 4 April 1912 was accompanied by detailed
mechanical design drawings.32 These were used unchanged in the American patents, from
which Plate 23 is taken;33 however, the drawings do not show the rate mechanisms clearly
and the following description is based on the text.
In the final design, the rotating and sliding pieces are all placed underneath the
main bearing dial. This dial was still calibrated to indicate target bearing, it also carried
the additional knobs and dials for setting and indicating target course and own and target
speed.
Beneath the bearing dial, a 'rotating slide or way' turned about its centre. In the
slide, a block was positioned at a distance from the centre proportional to own speed. The
block carried a 'vertical tubular member', about which rotated a second slide, in which a
second block was positioned at a distance from the pivot proportional to target speed. The
angle of the second slide was set according to target course. The second block carried a
pin which determined the position of the slides of the variable-speed drives which
integrated the speeds along and across.
Thus, the initial attempts to use slotted dials were abandoned. In the final clock
design, the own-ship slide was like a shortened version of the Dumaresq's fore-and-aft bar.
In both clock and Dumaresq, the first sliding block provided a centre of rotation for the
member representing target course. In the clock, this was the target slide, while the enemy
bow was represented by the second sliding block with its pin. In a Dumaresq, the second
block pivoted on the first; this enabled the target bar to both rotate arid slide, so that its
bow pointer corresponded functionally to the clock pin.
32 Complete Specification of patent 19,627/1911, 4 April 1912 in T.173/91 Part III.
' U S Patent 1,162,510, 30 November 1915 (application 788,266 filed 5 September 1913).
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JO. ARGO CLOCK MARK ffi
The mechanism of the Argo Clock Mark III (the design as patented) was housed
within a rectangular enclosure with dials arranged on top, the Dumaresq to the right and
the large, spiral range scale to the left. The fixed axis in the clock representing the
line-of-bearing lay along the diameter of the Dumaresq dial which ran through the
bearing pointer (Plate 22) . The clock contained four Argo-pattern variable-speed drives,
labelled I-IV in the drawings, enabling the clock to generate both the range and bearing
of the target (Plate 23 and Fig. 4.2).
Drive I integrated speed-along to give change of range; it was located beneath
the Dumaresq, with its rollers parallel to the line-of-bearing. The target bow pin (see the
previous note) engaged directly with a slotted plate fixed on top of the roller carriage,
thereby setting the range-rate.
Target bearings were generated by Drives H and ifi, which were mounted to the
left of Drive I, with their roller axes perpendicular to the line-of-bearing-, this allowed one
roller in each drive to be coupled together by a short straight shaft. The carriage of Drive
II bore a plate with a slot which also engaged with the target bow pin protruding
downwards from the Dumaresq linkage. Thus the rollers of this drive rotated at a speed
proportional to speed across. Drive HI worked 'in reverse'; instead of the disc being the
driven member, one of its rollers was driven by the shaft from Drive II. The carriage of
Drive ifi was positioned by a screw driven from the output of Drive I. The mechanical
design was such that the distance of the ball of Drive ifi from the centre of its disc was
proportional to the range generated by Drive I. Let (9 represent the angular position of the
shaft joining the rollers of Drives II and ilL Then, from the equations given for a
variable-speed drive in Fig. 3.1 and for speed-across x in 2:4:
dO	 dfl
-- x R--	 assuming a steady course.
Because the ball of Drive ifi is positioned such that r R
dO	 dqS	 dfl
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Thus, by coupling the disc of Drive ifi to the bearing dial of the Dumaresq, the slides
representing own and target course were rotated at the correct speed relative to the
line-of-bearing. Hence the speeds along and across were correctly maintained. In the
opinion of Professor C V Boys:
Perfect as the integrators are as an element in the design of the "Clock" the manner in
which they are cross connected so as to provide a constant mechanical solution of the
ever varying triangle of velocity is equally so, and the conception and execution of the
"Clock" as a whole represents in my opinion the high water mark of invention in this
field.
With justification, he acknowledged Isherwood's 'genius'.3'
The Mark ifi clock was provided with two scales for displaying the current rates
of range and bearing, and with two knurled knobs for setting the rates.35
 Thus the
Dumaresq was reversible. It could be set for target course and speed and indicate the
resultant rates: or it could be set with rates (or the rates could be corrected from rate plots
or by spotting for range rate and deflection) and the target speed and course would be set
or adjusted automatically. Note that, since the clock had no scale showing deflection in
knots, any deflection corrections had to be converted by some means into bearing rate at
the range in use. 36
 At the front of the clock, two handles were used to set or correct the
indicated true range and the target bearing relative to own course. These handles
operated clutches which disconnected the variable speed drives while the clock readings
were being altered manually.
The control lever below and to the right of the Dumaresq dial was left in the
'STEADY' position until the course was altered, when it had to be moved to
'TURNING'. When the lever was in this position, the bearing dial was disconnected from
Drive III and the target bearing was set by hand, using the right-hand handle. During the
turn, the target course dial was clamped relative to the line-of-bearing i.e. the inclination
was held constant, so it was only approximately correct after the turn.
Boys to Pollen, n.d. but 1912 in T.173/91 Part II.
Fig. 5 of the complete specification shows an additional scale surrounding the range-rate knob; its
purpose appears to have been to indicate the latest change in range-rate, in which case its pointer (while
disconnected from the rest of the mechanism) would have been returned to zero between one change and
the next. However, the scale and pointer are neither shown on the other drawings nor mentioned in the
text; they appear to have been late additions to the patent and, since they were not present in the Mark N,
were probably not fitted to the Orion clock.
It is not known how this correction was made. To avoid having to make calculations under the stress of
battle, some form of graphical or tabular method was probably used.
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The range scale of the Argo clocks was a spiral, so that the range indicated by
the pointers could be read easily to the nearest 50 yards up to 20,000 yards. 37 The first
pointer, labelled RANGE FINDER, was coupled through the clutch to Drive I; the clock
was correctly set when this pointer followed the mean of the ranges received from the
rangefmder. The second pointer showed GUN RANGE; it was connected to and moved
with the first, but could be offset by an amount equal to the total spotting correction. The
patent indicates that spotting corrections were set using a knob in the centre of the range
dial. Two spotting scales are shown on the plan view in the patent, but only one in the
elevation, while neither scale is mentioned in the text. Sumida cites a letter from Pollen to
the DNO, dated 17 April, indicating a four to six weeks delay in availability of the clock if
it were to be fitted with a spotting pointer; 38
 thus it appears that the arrangements for
setting spotting corrections were added to the patent's Complete Specification at the last
moment.
The GUN RANGE pointer indicated the range which had to be transmitted to
the follow-the-pointer sights. This aspect of the design, which had previously been
dismissed as a mere engineering detail, was actually a major difficulty which, the surviving
documents suggest, was never entirely resolved. The designers were faced with three
problems. Firstly, the follow-the-pointer transmitters and receivers were step-by-step: that
is, irrespective of gun range or elevation, one step always produced a constant angular
movement at the receiver. However, the range scales of the gun-sights, which determined
the gun elevation, were non-uniform: which is to say that, at different ranges, the same
change in range required different angular movements of the range pointer. This meant
that, at different ranges, the same rate of change of range required that the transmitters be
driven at different rotational rates. Secondly, the gun sights had several different range
scales to allow for firings with full and three-quarter charges as well as 6-pr. rounds. 39
 The
third problem was that, if the clock was to transmit automatically, it had to develop
sufficient torque to rotate a number of transmitters without interfering with its operation
as a range and bearing integrator.
	 -
The Argo Clock Mark Ill tackled the third problem by driving the transmitters
with a fourth variable speed drive (numbered IV). The position of the carriage of this
As the pointers revolved, their length changed automatically in order to follow the spiral.
LLWS, p222.
In turrets, these were fired from aiming tubes fitted inside the bores of the guns: Viscount Hythe (ed.)
The XavalAnnual 1913 (Newton Abbott, reprinted 1970), p.328.
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drive (and hence the rate at which it turned the range transmitters) was controlled by a
lever with a moveable pivot. The other end of the lever was connected directly to the
carriage of Drive I, while the position of the pivot was controlled by a spiral cam which
was connected through shafts and gears to the RANGE FINDER pointer. The effect of
this mechanism was that, at any particular range, the transmitter rate was proportional to
the range rate: while the action of the cam ensured that, as required, the ratio of range
rate to transmitter rate could alter as the range changed. However, there were three
objections to the design. The first was that nothing in the description of the Mark III clock
(or, indeed, of the later marks) suggests that the cam could be changed to allow for the
different gun range scales. Secondly, since the transmitting arrangements were concerned
with gun range, the spiral cam which altered the transmitter rate should have been
connected to the GUN RANGE pointer, not the RANGE FINDER pointer. However,
the third objection was fundamental. The output from Drive IV was entirely unaffected
by range corrections, whether spotting corrections (which moved only the GUN RANGE
pointer) or range corrections set using the handle (which moved both pointers together).
As explained in Note 12, these design errors were corrected in the Mark IV
clock, though the solution was not automatic and required an additional operator to
follow a pointer. It is uncertain how far the Orion clock had been modified by the time of
the trial held in November 1912. Afterwards, two functions 'which might be automatic
and are not so' were described as 'watching the transmission dial to the sights' and
'putting spotting corrections on transmission dial'. 4° These operations were still necessary
with the Mark IV clock, so the Orion clock may already have been fully altered.
Alternatively, it is possible that only part of the full Mark N solution was adopted for the
Mark III, such that Drive IV drove a follow-the-pointer step-by-step transmitter through a
slip coupling.4' Spotting corrections would then have been put only on the transmitted
range, not on the clock; however, if it became necessary to tune the clock's
rangefmder-range, the change would not have been transmitted unless the same
correction was also applied as a spotting correction.
4° F C Dreyer and C V Usborne, Pollen Aim Correction System Pan L Technical History and Technical Companson
naSh Commander F. C. Dryer's Fu Coninil System, February 1913, p.38, AL
" A differential would have been better mechanically, but the Mark N used a slip coupling.




The Mark III clock was installed aboard Orion, probably in early September
1912. Pollen had visited the ship just before 20 September, while Argo engineers were
then allowed on board for the pre-trial experiments, which took place from 23 to 25
September and 30 September to 2 October. In one of these trials, the ship followed a
course around a large rectangle while the clock was required to keep the range and
bearing of a fixed mark. The range varied between 1,000 and 10,000 yards yet Orion's
Captain recalled that, at the end of the circuit, the range was 'correct...within a small
amount as far as I can remember' (Pollen claimed it was within 25 yards of the correct
value)."2 This was clearly an excellent performance. Even so, it is not inconsistent with the
approximations inherent in the Mark III design; because the target was stationary, it
made no contributions to the speeds along and across, so it did not matter if the
inclination was incorrect.
Further range-keeping exercises took place on 9 and 19 October, after which.
Orion was involved in the director trials which culminated in the firing with Thunderer on
13 November. Then, on 19 and 20 November, Orion conducted two trial runs with the
Argo clock, one with full charges, the other with three quarter charges. 43 In both,
conditions were taxing. Each began after a large turn to bring the target dead ahead. The
target altered course while ranges and bearings were still being taken. Then, after the
clock had ceased to receive ranges and bearings, Orion herself turned away y 30° in the
full charge run, by 60° with 3/4 changes) and only then opened fire. In the full charge run,
the opening range was 9,600 yards while the initial rate error was 150 yds/min; two
spotting corrections of 'Down 400' were needed before commencing the bracket. Further
complication was introduced after two minutes' firing by reducing from 15 to 10 knots
and commencing a long, slow turn of 67° in the next three minutes. The bracket was
completed and the target found while still turning, during which 3 hits were made.
When the ship was steadied the rate on the clock although not absolutely correct was
sufficiently accurate to enable hits to be obtained...continuously throughout the rest of
the run.
42 IDJ'/S, p.228. Rear Admiral Craig Wailer before RCAI in T.173/547 Part 12, p.13.
ILWS, p.231 and O,ion's log in ADM 53/243 12. The author is most grateful to Professor Sumida for a
copy of his transcription of the log.
XII: A C AND ARGo: TECHNICAL Noms	 394
After steadying, hitting was aided by ranges and bearings again being made available at
the clock and by a low rate (less than 200 yds/min). The rate of fire was slowed by two
turret breakdowns but in all 14 hits were made from 40 rounds.
The run with 5/4 charges was less successful, partly because the opening range
(9,600 yards) was much greater than planned (8,050 yards). Also, during the approach on
opposite courses, the towing ship had obscured the target. No hits were made in the first
period of firing. Then further ranges and bearings were made available for three minutes,
after which both Orion and her target altered course outwards (by 90° and 30°
respectively). Remarkably, when fire commenced after the turn,
...the second salvo straddled the target. The rate on the dock was approximately correct
and hitting therefore continued for the remainder of the run...22 rounds were fired in
3'42" by the 3 after turrets...8 hits were obtained."
Thus, in both runs the clock had proved capable of keeping range and rates through large
turns. However, except during the approach to the full-charge run, the courses were
either convergent or divergent and did not induce a high speed across; thus the true
inclination changed little as (Mon turned and the constant inclination maintained by the
clock would not have introduced significant errors. The descriptions of the two runs both
state that the clock received neither ranges nor bearings while Orion was turning. In that
case, while the control lever was at 'TURNING', the change in target bearing can only
have been set on the clock by using the change in own course as indicated by a gyro
compass receiver. Again, because of the low speed-across, this would have been a good
approximation to the change in target bearing.
I2.Aio CLOCK MARK IV
The Argo clock which finally saw service in the Royal Navy was known as the
Mark IV; it was fully described in a handbook promulgated in January 19l4. This
production model (Plate 24) differed significantly from the patented Mark III design. The
most conspicuous external change was the addition of an extension on the right-hand side
of the clock; this carried a Vickers follow-the-pointer range receiver (thoughwith an extra
red pointer as well as the usual black pointer), range transmitters and a range setting
handle H4 (Plate 25). The range spotting scales and controls had been improved. Spotting
' 
'Full Charge Run' and '3/4 Charge Run' in the Craig Wailer Papers, courtesy Commander Michael
Craig Wailer (copies of transcriptions by Professor Sumida gratefully acknowledged).
Gunnery Branch, 77zeA,o Range and Beanng ClockMarklV,January 1914, AL
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corrections were set using a handle Hi on the front of the clock; the total spotting
correction (the difference between RANGE FINDER and GUN RANGE) was shown on
a scale in the centre of the range dial. However, each spotting correction was set
independently (with the handle Hi) on the small SPOTTING scale at the top left of the
clock: after which the scale could be reset to zero (using the button D) ready for the next
correction. When Hi was turned, the GUN RANGE pointer was moved (through the
action of a differential) to increase or decrease the total spotting correction by the amount
set on the spotting scale. Thus spotting corrections could be set while the clock was
running and the range rate was being applied to both range pointers. Like the Mark III,
the handles H2 and H3, which altered RANGE FINDER range and target bearing
respectively, worked through clutches which disconnected the variable speed drives.
Another addition to the dials on top of the clock was a small dial with a
ship-shaped pointer indicating inclination. Hence the clock now gave a birds-eye view of
own and enemy course relative to the line of target bearing. This dial and the new range
spotting features were probably among the improvements added at the suggestion of naval
gunnery experts. The Mark IV clock, like the Mark ifi, had scales and setting-knobs for
range-rate and bearing-rate; but there was no sign of the additional scale for indicating
change of range-rate. Respecting bearing rate, Usborne complained that the clock did not
generate deflection; of course it did (as speed across) but it did not display the value
generated. Thus, as with the Mark HI, it was necessary to convert spotting deflection
corrections from knots into the equivalent degrees per minute before putting them on the
clock.
Like the Mark III, the Mark IV clock retained the 'STEADY/TURNING'
lever; thus, like its predecessor, while own ship turned, the clock was set by hand to target
bearing, the easiest and most accurate method was to use the bearings received (on the
digital receivers) from the Argo rangefinder mounting. However, due to a major internal
redesign, the clock now correctly generated the change in inclination during a turn. Even
when own course was changing, Drives II and ifi continued to integrate speed-across
divided by range. Thus, if, as in the previous note, çb represents the angular position of the
disc of Drive ifi and x the target compass bearing, it follows from equation 2:9 that:
dt	 dt
Technical Comparison (op. cit.) p.61.





and, since A (target compass course) is constant
di	 dØ
dt - - dt
In the Mark 1V, the effect of moving the course lever to TURNING was, as in the Mark
III, to disconnect the bearing drive from the bearing dial so that the latter could be set by
hand. However, the lever no longer clamped the target course dial stationary; instead, it
caused the target course dial to be connected (in the correct rotational sense) to the disc of
Drive ifi; thus the target inclination i was correctly maintained through the turn. As its
handbook now declared: 'The mechanical accuracy of the clock is practically perfect':
provided, of course, that the target bearing and own speed were correctly set by hand
throughout the turn.
Despite the mechanical accuracy of the clock, the arrangements for driving the
electrical gun range transmitters were still imperfect. Drive W and its spiral cam were
retained, while the rollers of this variable speed drive were connected, through a slip
coupling, to the step-by-step transmitter switches; the black N pointer of the sight dial on
the side of the clock was driven by a step-by-step receiver wired to one of these
transmitters. Thanks to the addition of a new differential to the Mark IV, the spiral cam
now followed gun range rather than rangefinder range: but, as with the Mark HI, the
drive to the transmitters still could not register automatically any alterations to range set
using Hi (spotting) or H2 (rangefinder range). The deficiency was overcome by
introducing an additional operator to work handle H4. The shaft turning the spiral cam
(which was coupled to the GUN RANGE pointer) was extended through the right hand
side of the clock to a pair of specially-cut cams linked by steel bands. These cams
converted the uniform rotation of the gun range shaft into a non-uniform rotation which
corresponded to gun elevation. Through an intermediate gear-box, the cams drove the
second, red M pointer on the range receiver dial. 47
 This dial was graduated in the same
non-uniform way as the gun-sights. Thus M indicated the correct gun-range on the
receiver dial. If (say) a spotting correction was applied to the clock proper using Hi, the
M pointer would move by the correct amount: but the N pointer would not move at all.
The gearbox ratios were selected by a lever with only two positions 'FULL & REDUCED' and '6 PDR'.
This implies that war-service rounds fired with full charges had the same trajectories as practice rounds
with reduced charges. The same assumption (which is not what might be expected) was not made in the
transmitters fitted to the Dreyer tables, which had separate cams for full and reduced charges and
sub-calibre firing: Handbook of Captain F. C. Dryer's Fu Control Tables, 1918, p.72, AL
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At this point, the additional operator used the handle H4 to rotate the range transmitters,
thus forcing a slippage in the coupling between the transmitters and Drive IV. The
operator stopped turning H4 when the black N pointer (showing the range transmitted to
the guns) coincided with the red M pointer, which showed clock-generated gun range.
The net result was that, when the clock was correctly predicting gun range, the red and
black pointers moved as one and no manual intervention was necessary: but that, if one or
both clock range pointers were altered by the first operator using Hi or H2, the second
operator had to work H4 to force the black pointer to follow the red. The design also had
the advantage that, if there was slippage in Drive IV as it attempted to rotate the
transmitter switches, the operator of H4 could make a correction.
Although inelegant, these transmission arrangements appear workable enough,
although there were some problems in service. An undated memorandum from 1914
refers to 'slipping of the friction drive for the Red pointer viz, the pointer which indicates
the gun range to be set on the sights'. The red (M) pointer, which was not enclosed, was
carried on a hinged arm which would be rotated sideways out of the way of the range
dial; the drive shaft within the arm incorporated a frictional coupling to prevent damage
if any pressure was placed on the pointer. The memorandum also refers to 'back lash in
the gearing': though it not stated what part of the clock was affected and, in any case, the
problem had been rectified by Elliott Brothers.4'
13. DATA FROM ThE MARK IV TRUE COURSE PLOT
The true course plotter was constructed so that both pens drew small circles at
time intervals of one minute along the plotted tracks of own and target ships. The plot of
own course could be drawn as a continuous line, with the minute circles at intervals along
it.49
Because the Argo power cut did not prove satisfactory when used with a
coincidence rangefinder, the target course could only be plotted as a sequence of distinct
points. To obtain accurate ranges, the operator first threw off his cut after taking a range;
then he 'likes to move the working head quickly to and fro before obtaining a [new}
'Difficulties Experienced with "Argo" Range Clocks' in 'Important Questions dealt with by DNO', Vol.
III, 1914, AL
For detailed descriptions of the mechanism of the Argo Plotter Mark IV, see patent 23,349 of 1912
(applied for 12 October, complete specification 11 April 1913). The description in the Technwal Historj and
Comparison pp.28-30 is very similar.
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"cut" '50 Having made his cut, the rangetaker depressed a foot pedal, which caused the
plotter to draw a new point on the plot of target course using the range and bearing
transmitted simultaneously from the Argo mounting. Once the mounting had been
provided with a separate trainer, it should have been possible to keep it bearing on the
target almost continuously. Thus, at each minute, when the target pencil drew another
minute circle in the vicinity of the target course, its bearing relative to the corresponding
point on own ship's course would usually have been correct. However, the range could be
seriously in error, especially if the rangetaker had just thrown off the cut. Thus, after
plotting for a few minutes, the enemy course would have been appeared as an irregular
line of course points intermixed with some more widely scattered minute circles.
To set the Argo clock, it was necessary to obtain from this plot:
the mean range of the moment
the target course
the target speed.
However, measuring off the plot was not easy, since it was moving continuously as the
distance between the two pens fluctuated with the range transmitted from the Argo
mounting. To assist with measurements, the plotter had a small straight scale revolving
around the target pencil. This could be rotated to lie parallel with the mean target course,
an operation which was possible even if the plot was moving to and fro along the line of
bearing. Thus the process of measuring the target course would not have added much to
the errors inherent in estimating the direction of the mean course line. Having set the
scale, if the target course was more or less perpendicular to the line-of-bearing, a mean
range of the moment could be obtained by waiting for the lateral movement of the plot to
bring the mean course line directly under the scale line and immediately reading off the
range from the Argo receiver. However, this method could not have been used if the
target course was close to the line-of-bearing. The best estimate of the mean range would
then have been the last plotted range: but, since this was not easily measured on the chart,
it would have been necessary to keep a record of the ranges received.
To obtain the target speed, the distance travelled by the target in a known time
interval was required. The minute marks were intended for this purpose; however,
because of their wide scatter, no accurate value could be obtained simply by measuring
5° Technical Companson, p.34.
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the distance between them. What was needed was not each minute-mark itself, but the
point of intersection with the mean target course line of the instantaneous line-of-bearing
at the moment that the minute-mark was drawn. In principle, if the plot was stopped,
these points could be established by joining corresponding minute marks along the own
and target courses. In practice, it was vital to keep plotting during the approach. This left
only the alternative of trying to estimate the points of intersection by eye. This might not
have been too imprecise if both ships were on similar courses: but when courses were in
roughly opposite directions (the conditions of high bearing rate for which Pollen claimed
his system was uniquely suited) such estimates would have been approximate at best. It
would have been much easier and more accurate to ignore the minute circles and instead
keep a record of the times of every plotted point on the enemy course. Then the distance
between a selected pair of points could be taken off the plot with dividers and the speed
calculated from the distance travelled in the interval between the two points.
No evidence has been found that the Argo system had an automatic method of
recording the time and range of each plotted point: nor, indeed, that Pollen ever admitted
that the minute circles were of little use. If they remained the only recommended method,
Usborne was justified in stating
The A.C. cannot measure the enemy's speed accurately...51
14. Aio CLOCK MARK V
The final Argo clock, the Mark V, was truly helm-free, incorporating a 'motor
connected to the Gyro compass which automatically eliminates yaw and applies
alterations of own ship's course'. 52 This part of the new design was described in outline in
a provisional specification applied for on 9 May 1913: while full details, with drawings of
the new Dumaresq, were left in the complete specification of 8 December (Plate 28). The
prototype was probably complete by mid-October; though the Admiralty declined an
offer for a demonstration. The principal external change, compared with the Mark IV,
was the introduction of the compass scale which rotated as a ring outside the main
bearing dial. As in the Mark IV, the fixed pointer (which established the fixed line in the
Tec/zniazl Comparison, p.61.
" Phillpotts Committee, 'Report of inspection at York of Pollen Fire Control System', n.d. but 1918, p.2 in
DRYR 3/1, CC.
British Patent 11,009/1913; also US Patent 1,162,511 30 November 1915 (filed 14 April 1914).
LLWS', p.247.
XII: A C ANt) ARGo: TECHNICAL Noms	 400
clock representing the line-of-bearing to the target) indicated on the bearing dial scale
(now the inner scale) the target bearing relative to the keel-line. However, on the outer
compass scale, it indicated target compass bearing. Consequently, the large arrow on the
bearing dial (which represented own ship's keel) indicated own compass course on the
compass scale.
Internally, the clock mechanism was still arranged to rotate a shaft at a speed
proportional to the speed-across divided by the range. The equations in Note 12
demonstrate that this rotational rate is proportional to the rates of change in both
inclination (z) and target compass bearing (i). Thus the shaft was coupled directly both to
the compass scale and to the small dial which showed enemy course. Since, as illustrated
in Fig. 2.11:
fi=x—'c
the main bearing dial was driven from a differential; one side was connected to the shaft
already described; while the other was coupled in the appropriate sense to a motor
controlled by the gyro compass receiver. The clock still depended on own ship's speed
being set manually but, subject to the accuracy and reliability of the gyro compass and the
Forbes speed log, the clock maintained the range and bearings irrespective of whether
own ship held a steady course, yawed, or made a small course correction or a large course
change.
The introduction of a 'helm-free' Dumaresq was not the only innovation in the
Mark V clock. In July 1913, Pollen and Isherwood applied for another patent which
radically altered the part of the clock which generated change of bearings. This
provisional patent was accompanied by a drawing illustrating the principle, if not the
actual mechanical detail (Plate 29); in August 1914, the Admiralty believed that this
patent 'describes the mechanism of the latest type of Argo clock...already...on the open
market'. In the new design, one of the slipless drives was replaced by a dividing
mechanism comprising a pair of linkages and a spiral cam (driven by the range clock) cut
to generate a reciprocal function. The effect of the mechanism, which determined the
position of the roller carriage of an Argo variable speed drive, was to displace the ball of
" British Patent 16,373/1913, date of application 16 July 1913, Complete Specification 16 January 1914,
accepted I6July 1914: US Patent 1,232,968 lOjuly 1917 (flIed lIjuly 1914).
DNO's minute of 18 August 1914 quoted in Admiralty to C.-in-C. Home Fleets, March 1916 in 'Fire
Control Apparatus: Various Patents', ADM 1/8464/181.
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the drive by an amount proportional to bearing rate; thus the output shaft of the drive
could be coupled directly to the bearing dials of the Dumaresq.
Why was this part of the clock changed, particularly since, at first sight, the new
design seems less elegant than the old? The Dumaresq with its dials and linkages
presented a not inconsiderable mechanical torque load; let this be represented by T. In
both the Marks IV and V, this torque had to be generated by the static friction between
the ball and disc of the variable-speed drive coupled to the Dumaresq. In the Mark V, the
torque T equalled the frictional force f multiplied by the radius of the ball b:
T=f.b	 or
Thus, f was approximately constant at all ranges, varying only if T varied with the
positions of the Dumaresq elements. If the assembly force pressing together the disc and
ball was set correctly so that f was less than the limit for static friction, there would be no
danger of slipping, at any bearing-rate (except the very smallest - see Note 8).
In the Mark fflhIV design, T was generated by the frictional force F acting at a
distance r from the centre of the disc of Drive III i.e.
F
where r varies in proportion to the range R. If the maximum range shown by the clock is




F is at a maximum when R is at the minimum value which the clock can display. Thus:
Fmaxb Rmax
f
From the range scale of the Mark IV clock:
= 20,000 yards and R = 1,000 yards
while measuring off the drawing of the variable-speed drive in patent 17,441/1912 gives a
value for of 4.3. Thus:
max
f
In the Marks III and IV, the rollers of Drives II and III were directly coupled; thus the
same frictional force F had to be generated in Drive II. Hence at very low ranges, if
slipping was to be avoided, Drives II and III needed four to five times the assembly force
required in the Mark V. Quite apart from increasing mechanical wear, a large assembly
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force increased the force required to move the ball and rollers. This effect would have
been particularly unfortunate in the case of Drive II; since its roller carriage was
positioned directly by the Dumaresq, the increase in assembly force would have added to
T, demanding a further increase. Thus, in practice, there was a limit to the permissible
increase in assembly force, and slipping in the Mark IV was probably experienced at low
ranges.
This limitation in the design appears to explain why the Mark V design was
developed: though Isherwood may also have been concerned about the extra loads of the
compass scale and the permanently-connected target course dial. However, even if the
Marks ifi and IV suffered from some slipping, it should have occurred only at much
lower ranges than would be expected in battle: and there are no indications that it was of




The following notes are transcribed from JVotes, Correspondence, Etc. on the Pollen A.0 System
installed and tried in H.M.S. Aiiadne December 1907 
-Jaaua?y 1908, 1908, DR.AX 3/1, CC.
NOTES ON THE TORBAY TRIALS
OF THE A.C. SYSTEM
The gear was not designed for any other purpose but to show that in all weathers
in which guns could be kept trained, the data for the geometric range, speed, and course
of a moving target could be ascertained. It was no part of the plan of the designers to
consider chiefly facilities for getting the data off the chart with rapidity; it appeared that
this was a matter in which only experience could indicate the best method. Consequently
in considering either the time within which—after the close of the two-minutes' run—the
change of range for the next three minutes was given—or its exact accuracy, regard
should be had to this fact.
As it happened, in Run I., no forecast was made at all, and in Run H., owing to
mis-reading of the chart, the error in the forecast was several hundreds of yards. In Run
IV. the chart was mis-read by 220 yards. But in Run I. the chart agreed with the
hydrographer's measurements within 31 yards—i.e., 2 per cent. of the change, Run II.
within 120 yards, Run IV. within 70 yards. Runs III. and V. the forecasts were each right
within 70 yards, and agreed practically with chart.
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The failures to read correctly were partly due to the fact that laymen are not
trained to do a piece of drill with quickness and accuracy. During the earlier runs, Mr.
Isherwood and I were attempting to look after the chart, get the forecast, and give
instructions for running the Service gear at the same time. When Lieut. Gipps took on the
table, and the Service gear was stopped, the time taken in getting off the forecast was
reduced from minutes to a few seconds. The forecasts in Runs ifi. and V. were actually
given in less than 20 seconds after the expiration of the two minute run.
It should be remarked that in each case when a forecast was made, it was on one
minute's data after the run—consequently the forecast was made for 4 minutes, not 3.
Several important improvements can obviously be made so that data shall be
available as fast as they are given—it is not necessary to specil' them.
A. H. POLLEN.
APPENDiX XIV
A C AND ARGO: COMMERCIAL Noms
I. TACTICAL MACHINES
The term 'Rate of Change machine' used for the final item in the order for the
Jupiter gear proved conveniently ambiguous. On 18 June 1906, Pollen declared:
I have also completed designs for an improved tactical change of range machine similar
in principle, but very different in design to that already supplied to the Admiralty in
fulfilment of my contract of May 1905.1
The key word here is 'tactical'. Pollen was describing machines which could solve the
triangle of velocities and show the virtual course; however, they were not range clocks like
the 'change of range machine' described in 'Fire Control and Long Range Firing'; nor,
indeed, could they show or be set with 'Rate of Change' of range. Nonetheless, the
Admiralty seem to have accepted this contractual sleight-of-hand, since no attempt was
made to reclaim any part of the payment for the Jupiter gear.2
2. CoNTRAcT NEGOTIATIONS: 1906 - 1907
At the Board of Admiralty on 7 August 1906:
Desirability of carrying out further trials [of the Pollen Aim-correcting apparatus]
discussed. Controller, Director of Naval Ordnance and Director of Contracts to see Mr.
Pollen and ascertain his views as to terms, on basis of 50001. [JJ5,000] down to cover
everything irrespective of Dockyard work &c. and to arrange as to future terms in the
event of success.3
Pollen to the Secretary of the Admiralty, l8June 1906 in RCA! Claims Files, TJ73/91 Part II. The
machine was delivered on 14 May 1906:Jon Sumida, In Defence ofXaval Supremay (London, 1989) pp.88-9.
Sumida seems to imply that the machine was a form of clock, since 'computed ranges and bearings',
corrected for baffistic factors and time-of-flight, are mentioned; however, he clearly describes the first
tactical machine, called the 'crab machine', on pp.Bl-2.
2 The machine supplied 'is not a machine for shooting': Pollen's counsel before the RCAI, Minutes of
Proceedings, T. 193/547 Part 7, p.27. The tactical machines were patented as 13,082 and 14,305 of 1906,
applied for 6 and 22 June respectively.
Admiraltj Board Minutes, 7August 1906 in ADM 167/40.
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This meeting took place in the Admiralty Board Room on 9 August, Jellicoe being
accompanied by Harding. Pollen asked for JJ8,000 for the trial system, although this
figure included £3,600 towards his earlier development costs.
It was represented to him that the Admiralty ought not to be expected to make good his
losses on a trial that was unsuccessful, but he replied to the effect that he was not in a
position to finance the working out of the invention, and that, if the Admiralty would
not do so, others were ready to undertake it. His view was that if the invention was
considered by the Admiralty to be worth trying at all, its possibilities were so great that
the expense of the trial ought not to stand in the way.
After some haggling, he was offered, but refused, £4,500 and it was left that he would
think the matter over.
Pollen also submitted the terms under which he would be prepared, after a
successful trial, to grant the Admiralty permanent and exclusive use of the invention.
It was explained to him that a guarantee to equip 12 ships a year for 5 years...was out of
the question...
(It was roughly calculated that the minimum payments he asks would amount to the
equivalent of JJ300,000 spread over 15 years....he considered that the Admiralty should
pay them in consideration of his giving up all his foreign markets....)
Mr. Pollen was told that the proposed terms, both for trial and for permanent
monopoly, were out of the question.
was pointed Out to Mr. Pollen that inventors usually have to perfect their inventions
at their own expense....He said his terms...would have been very much higher [for] a
perfected and proved system, also he was understood to say that he had had offers from
a Foreign Government and from large firms to take it up.
It was also explained to him that if the trial took place, he could not fail to acquire
further knowledge of range-finding in general and of British Naval methods in
particular, in addition to that which he already owes to us, and that it might be serious
to us if we then dedded to let him go abroad with that knowledge; we might in fact be
almost obliged to accept his terms so as to keep the knowledge from others. This being
so, he ought to be prepared to offer terms, both for trial and for acquisition, which the
Admiralty could accept.
The last sentence suggests that the Admiralty officials were at a loss how to negotiate with
Pollen: but the whole paragraph explains why the conditions for the trial insisted that
Pollen was 'to attend preliminary trials to see any necessary adjustments carried out so as
to ensure proper working and to demonstrate the utility of his invention...but not to be
present at the fmal trials'.4
'Pollen Aim Correcting Apparatus. Notes of a meeting held at the Admiralty in the Board Room on 9th
August 1906', T.173/91 Part II. LDiVS (op. cit.) p.92.
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On the following day, Pollen informed the Admiralty that 'The smallest sum
which would enable me to carry on is £6,500'. He also requested that
...the agreement should include an undertaking...that, as it is not disputed that I am the
sole inventor and originator of the system for obtaining the data for gunnery by the use
of ranges and bearings taken simultaneously and used in conjunction with a chart
gyroscopically corrected that the Admiralty will undertake not to employ any such
systern...except subject to agreement with me.
He also proposed a clause stating:
The Admiralty to decide, after two months working of the instruments...whether or not
they wish to acquire a monopoly of my system.5
The reason for this final stipulation was not given; it was probably intended to prevent
any undue prevarication by the Admiralty in concluding a monopoly agreement after
trials had proved successful.
The Admiralty responded on 21 August agreeing £6,500 for the development of
the trial instruments. Nonetheless, at some point, Pollen was also paid an additional
£802! 10/- towards 'expenses which he had not anticipated' for the Jupiter trials, so he
received more than 90% of the sum which he had first demanded. In the same letter, the
Admiralty refused to entertain more than £90,000 for monopoly, although, by this time, a
clock no longer figured in the negotiations; these very large sums related only to the
supply of the rangefinder and plotting table. 6
 Pollen replied on 24 August proposing
royalties of £120,000, to be paid in three instalments, plus a fair commercial profit.7
Then, on 27 August, Pollen wrote directly to the First Lord. He explained that he had
'come to the end of the resources that I can devote to the project' but that he was
reluctant to seek further capital elsewhere because 'the admission of partners would rob
me of control'. However, while expecting the Admiralty to pay for the trial instruments,
he still sought a total of255,000 over some sixteen years on the grounds that:
...what I have to sell is not instruments but a system, the embodiment of certain laws of
gunnery which I was the first to codify....The monopoly of instruments is only
incidental.
Pollen was clearly aware that his position was exceptional; 'perhaps the fact that there is
no parallel to the present negotiation may explain some of the difficulties that have arisen
in dealing with it'. Tweedmouth replied that 'potential values are hard things to
Pollen to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 10 August 1906 in T.173/91 Part VII.
6 Secretary of the Admiralty to Pollen, 21 August 1906 in T.173/91 Part II. Pollen Aim Correction System.
General Gnnrnds of Admiralty Policy and Histoncal Record of Bu nessegotiations, Admiralty, February 1913, p.7,
P.1024, AL
LDM.,p.93.
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assess...though it does seem to me that our offer was a liberal one'. 8 In his response of 7
September, Pollen complained that:
...the real difficulty of the position is that everybody at the Admiralty is so much
overworked that no one in authority can give attention to the whole negotiation;
and...every one dreads having to make out a case to the Treasury for a very unusual
transaction.... I never have had...the slightest doubt...that...the business arrangements
that I have proposed will be understood to be just as moderate and reasonable as the
technical proposals...
On 4 September, Harding completed his 'Memorandum on the Professional and
Financial Value of the A.C. System' which very probably helped to persuade Fisher that a
monopoly of Pollen's gear must be obtained. 9 Thus, on 21 September, the Admiralty
renewed their offer of £6,500. As Pollen had requested on 10 August:
My Lords will agree...to decide after 2 month's working of the instruments...whether or
not they wish to acquire the monopoly of your system.
If the trials were a complete success, the Admiralty would pay £100,000 for the rights to
the system, including installation in 40 ships: £1,000 for each additional ship up to 80
ships: after which no further payment was to be made. In addition:
The instruments required by the Admiralty from you to be supplied at a cost of 25%
above that paid by you to the manufacturers.'°
Yet Pollen still continued the negotiations. On 25 September, he proposed additional
conditions for payment even if the trials were not successful; the Admiralty's response was
that payments would then be subject to the provisions for arbitration in the contract.
Then on 17 October, Pollen asked for changes in the contract terms relating to profit
margins and to the conditions which defined success in the trials. These were agreed by
both parties on 29 October: which enabled the Admiralty to pay Pollen the advance of
£6,500 for the trial instruments on 8 November.t'
With the immediate urgency removed, the Admiralty did not send Pollen a draft
contract until 11 March 1907, but this only initiated another round of negotiations about
the terms of monopoly. Points included were: when Pollen's exclusive rights to
manufacture should cease (not unreasonably, the Admiralty thought this should coincide
with the expiry of his patents): the Admiralty's insistence that he should maintain a
permanent design stafl whether there was an obligation to pay if complete success was
Jon Sumida (ed.) The Pollen Papers (London, 1984), Pollen to Tweedmouth, 27 August and Tweedmouth
to Pollen, 3 September 1906, pp.218 and 220-1. Also in T.173/91 Part VII.
LlNS, pp.95 and 98-9.
Secretary of the Admiralty to Pollen, 21st September 1906 in T.173/91 Parts II and VII.
ILWSpp.115-6.
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not achieved until after the first trial: and who was liable if other parties' patents were
infringed by Pollen's gear. Tempers became short and Pollen at one point seems to have
been accused of sharp practice. In pursuing the question of patent infringements, Pollen
declared, in a letter to the Director of Contracts dated 31 July, that:
the whole purpose and object of the Admiralty has been to take over the commercial
position themselves, and to leave us in the position of an expropriated patentee.
After this, the Admiralty seems to have been reduced to (a perhaps exasperated) silence,
until Pollen was sent a further draft contract on 26 November. A further round of
correspondence was concluded by 23 December but the contract itself was not signed
until 6 February 1908.12 However, by that time, the Ariadne trials had already been held
and Pollen's situation had changed entirely.
3. HARDING'S MEMORANDUM
Synthetic andAnalytical Methods
In Defence ofXaval Supremacy states that, in his Memorandum, Harding:
,..rejected the separate range and bearing plots approach as "obviously unsatisfactory,"
choosing instead the "more correct method" of a plot of simultaneously observed ranges
and bearings from which the target's course and speed could be measured.....
It is true that, almost twenty years later in his testimony to the RCAI, Harding claimed
that dual-rate plotting was considered as an alternative to course plotting but, under
cross-examination, he admitted that, in his Memorandum: 'The double rate is not
represented at all'.' 4
 This is born out by the document itself, which states:.
THERE are two principal methods of determining the rate of change.
(a) THE SYNTHETIC METHOD
BY dividing the difference between successive readings at definite periods of time by a
convenient multiple of the time taken, or by [noting] the time taken to alter a definite
amount.
This method is obviously unsatisfactory.
(b) THE ANALYTICAL METHOD
Determining the value of the separate elements which produce the rate of change viz.
the speeds and courses of the opposing ships and their bearings to one anothei'....
12
LDNS', p.96: see also p.91.
14 T.173/547 Part 14, pp.9, 11-2 and 34.
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He also noted that 'the speed and course of the enemy are merely estimated': and that
both methods were part of the 'present system' which 'gives results which though they are
not good are not very bad'.'5
Plotthig by the CocstalArtilkry
Pollen was later accused by Dreyer of making a rechauffé (warming up) of the
Watldn system used in British coastal defences and tried unsuccessfully in Arethusa.'6
The idea of maintaining the range by plotting ranges and bearings of enemy and
drawing a meaning line through them was first used by Colonel Watkins [sic] of the
R.A. and is the system which the R.A. have used in the Watkins [sic] position finders for
25 years.'7
In 1909, Pollen himself claimed that he had never heard of the Watkin 'inventions...until
1 906....and could not now give an intelligent account of his system" 8
 yet the depression
rangefinders used in one version of the Watkin system' 9
 are mentioned in the
Memorandum sent by Lawrence to Selborne in May, 1 9Ø4•20
As a member of the Royal Marine Artillery, Harding was well acquainted with
the Watkin gear.2' He would have recognised that the originality in Pollen's proposals lay
not in course plotting pei- Se, but in his conviction that this type of plot could be made from
a ship at sea.
4. BACON AND MECHANISED GUNNERY
Bacon responded to Pollen's letter of 27 February 1908 (which the inventor
printed for circulation in the Admiralty) in the following terms:
The flexibility of the powers of a man either cerebral or mechanical has to be balanced
against the rapidity of operation of a machine. The liability to error of both from
different causes is a variation of the problem and the available spare men must be
balanced against the available spare machines. It is as I have previously pointed out the
knowledge of the adaptability of men & matter at sea which draws the only distinctive
line between sea & land experience.
13 Harding, 'Memorandum upon the Professional and Financial Value of the A.C. System' with Harding
toJellicoe, 4 September 1906 in T.173/91 Part VII.
16 Frederic Dreyer, 'Summary' n.d. but after 1923 and probably 1925, p.15 in DRYR 2/1, CC.
Dreyer to Hughes-Onslow, 19 October 1908 in T.173/91 Part VII.
' PP, 'Notes, Etc. on the Ariadne Trials', April 1909, p.214-S.
Anita McConnell, Insinunent Makers to the WorkL A Fksto,y of Cooke, Troughon & Simms (York, 1992) p.65.
° 'Memorandum' with Lawrence to Selborne, both 9 May 1904 in 'The Pollen Rangefinder' in ADM
1/7733. See also PP, 'Memorandum on a Proposed System for finding Ranges at Sea...',July 1904, p.1 6.
' Harding before RCAI, T.173/547 Part 14, p.7.
22	 p.133.
XIV: A C AND ARGo: Coimacw. Noms	 412
While there can be no doubt that Bacon was sceptical of the value of complex
mechanisms which could get out of order, he was also willing to introduce new
instruments when their value and reliability were proven, as is shown be the innovations
made while he was DNO (see Chapter 3). Thus his opposition to all fire control
instruments was not as absolute as suggested by Sumida.
'The Quest for Reach' proposes that:
Bacon...was opposed in principle to the mechanization of fire control on the grounds
that it was inherently unreliable....
Bacon's distrust of fire control instruments and faith in spotting probably owed
something to his experience as captain of the Dreadnozght. During gunnery experiments
in this ship in early 1907, Bacon had found the new model Barr and Stroud 9-foot-base
rangefinder to be unsatisfactory, and that because of good loading drill...four-gun
salvoes could be fired at 15-second intervals, which was triple the speed of earlier
battleships. In theory, such rapid fire greatly increased the value of spotting when the
range was changing because the shift in the relative positions of the target and firing
ship between salvos was reduced by a third.23
Firstly, Bacon's criticism of the rangefinders was only that they required target ' "fmders"
of much greater aperture'. Secondly, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the loading interval (36
seconds for A turret and 29 seconds for the remainder) was no guide to the actual, much
slower, firing rate.2
 And, thirdly, these conclusions seem to suppose that Dreadnought
would have fired and spotted without the aid of her Vickers clocks to keep the change of
range between salvoes.
Similary In Defence ofi'Iaval Supremacy states:
Bacon's opposition to mechanized methods of gunnery induded mechanized gunlaying
as well as sight-setting. The Petravic system of automatically discharging guns at a
predetermined point during a ship's roll with the aid of gyroscopes was tried in
September 1908 but rejected as "being not suitable for adoption under sea going
conditions," a decision that appears to have been prompted by the same distrust of
gyroscopes that had operated in the case of the Ariadne trials. The Naval Ordnance
Department even declined to support the work of Percy Scott...23
In fact, such distrust was amply justified by the Petravic trials, during which the gyro was
deranged by the shocks of firing and by changes in course and speed. 26 Further, as the
present author has tried to show elsewhere, at most Bacon did not support further
development of the early elevation-only form of director, and was himself Iesponsible for
23 Jon Sumida, 'The Quest for Reach' in Lt. Col. S D Chiabotti (ed.) Toolingfor War: MiliJarj Transfonnaiwn
in the IndustnalAge (Chicago, 1996) p.64.
24 Captain R H Bacon, Report on Experimental Cruise, 16 March 1907, pp.28, 84-5 and 96-8, ADM
116/1059.
23 I17V3,p.153.
'Trial and Report on Obry (Petravic) Gunfiring Apparatus' in ADM 1/8011.
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placing the order with Vickers which produced the first practicable Director, as fitted in
the battleship Xeptune in December 191 Ø27
5. Col'.mcT NEGOTIATIONS, 1909 - 1910
On 21 June 1909, the Admiralty invited Argo to tender for a production order of
at least 30 rangefinder mountings.28 On 23June, Pollen responded with a price of1,915
(with indicators), though he also proposed a royalty of £250 per ship per annum. 29 After
being ordered ashore from Xatal prior to gunnery exercises, Pollen met with Bacon on 13
November. At the end of the month, the outgoing DNO advised his successor, Captain
Moore:
The really useful portion of Mr. Pollen's apparatus appears to be the gyroscopically
controlled range-finder....but there is no reason why he should be paid any large
royalties on the instrument....If Mr. Pollen can be put on the same basis as all other
Admiralty contractors a difficulty which has existed for the last two years would be
successfully removed.3°
However, at a meeting on 10 December with the ADNO (Captain Craig), the plotter was
still being discussed.
It was explained to Mr. Pollen that the only portion of his apparatus at all likely to be
adopted at present were:-
(a) ...rangefinder mounting [with] indicators
(b)Automatic Plotting Table.
It was suggested that he should state what terms he would accept on the following basis:
Orders ) ...75 sets of(a) 	 )	 to be guaranteed by the Admiralty
)	 )	 within 5 years (no definite
for	 ) ...50 sets of (b)	 )	 minimum within any one year).
Pollen then indicated that he would be prepared to accept a fixed royalty of /J1 ,000 on
each mounting or table. He also proposed that:
...if the Admiralty saw its way to paying 20,000 in advance, it would enable Mr.
Pollen to obtain a Controlling interest in the firm of Cooke & Son of York, where the
apparatus could...be manufactured under Mr. Pollen's direct controL3'
21 John Brooks, 'Percy Scott and the Director' in David McLean and Antony Preston (eds.) Warship 1996
(London, 1996) pp.168-9.
28 LLWS, pp.164-5. Secretary of the Admiralty to Argo, 21 April 1909 in T. 173/91 Part VU. There are no
indications that the observer's correcting mechanisms were ever completed.
IEMS, p.165.Record ofBusiness(1913) (op. cit.) p.10.
Paper prepared ly the D&ector ofNaval Ordnancefor the infonnatwn of1u Successor, 24 November 1909, p.4, AL
'Pollen Aim Correction System. Notes of what took place at the Conference...on... 10th December 1909'
in T.173/91 Part VII. In 1908, the Linotype company had ceased manufacture in Britain: McConnell,
Instrument Makers the World (op. cit.) pp.74.
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Once in office, Moore followed Bacon's advice, further negotiations focusing
solely on the mounting, with transmitters and range and bearing indicators, and on a
single inclusive price for each set. On 22 January 1910, Pollen quoted a price of £1,750
each for 75 sets supplied over five years with monopoly, while offering a 15% reduction
on non-monopoly terms.32
 However, during the December meeting, he had revealed that
the Linotype Company had quoted only £275 for the manufacture of each mounting with
transmitters: although he had also proposed that a cost to him of £380 should be assumed
to allow 'a margin for alterations and improvements...and also a proportion of the cost of
Tools, on which about £1,000 has been spent'. He also stated that the Argo Company
cost about £5,000 to £6,000 a year to run. 33
 Thus his own figures pointed to a profit of at
least 1 24%, which probably explains why, by the beginning of March, he was writing of a
'fraudulent contractor theory' apparently held by some in the Admiralty. In January, the
Admiralty had warned Pollen that no decision could be expected before the start of the
next financial year34
 but their first counter-offer, of 11 April, was for only 15 sets at
£1,000 each, without secrecy. Since Argo would now be able to seek customers abroad,
they were told that:
It is not desired at present to fix any term of supply beyond the first 15, but it is
considered that there should be substantial reduction in price if any further sets are later
on ordered from your company.
Pollen replied temperately, but he insisted, contrary to the earlier indications of
manufacturing cost, that:
...the bare cost of the instruments...would exceed the amount offered....it is a
commercial and industrial impossibility for us to accept.
In a private letter to the First Lord, McKenna, also dated 13 April, Pollen expressed his
'profound regret that the Board do not consider monopoly worth preserving' and implied
that he might be compelled to sell to 'foreign - and perhaps hostile - governments'. He
also argued that the expected savings to the Admiralty were largely illusory, since his
success abroad would oblige the Royal Navy to purchase more installations and, by
promoting more rapid development, would make it impossible to keep a standard pattern
for long. And, in any case, foreign navies would wish to manufacture the gear in their own
32 ILPv, pp.197-8. Minute by Director of Navy Contracts to Controller, 18 April 1910, f. I in MCKN
3/15.
'Conference 10 December 1909' (op. cit.).
3' LDM, pp.197-8.
' SecretaryoftheAdmiraltytoArgoCo. 11 April l9lOinT.173/91 Part VII.
' IDNS, p198. Pollen to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 13 April 1910 in T.173/91 Part VII.
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countries. He then proposed that secrecy should be maintained and an order placed for
45 sets, still at £1,750 each, which, he declared, 'would leave no divisible profit at all'. He
also asked for an advance of £25,000 since:
...owing to my having understood before Xmas, that an order for 75 units was virtually
decided, I entered...into an obligation to acquire a share in an important factory...and
have consequently to find £15,000 beforeJune 15th.37
The request for prices at the meeting of 10 December hardly justified such an optimistic
interpretation.
On 19th, Pollen met with McKenna and Admiralty officials to discuss costs but
not, as he had hoped, the question of monopoly; afterwards, Pollen wrote to McKenna
with a clearly implied threat to make public the abandonment of secrecy: but he also
offered some reduction on price, proposing £1,600 each for the 45 sets. 38
 This concession
was probably welcome to the Controller, Jellicoe, who appears to have become doubtful
about the initial offer to Pollen. On 18 April, as directed byJellicoe, the Director of Navy
Contracts, F W Black, submitted his 'personal opinion as to a fair manufacturing price for
the...Apparatus for which the Admiralty have offered Mr. Pollen £1000 per set for 15
sets'. Using the figures given by Pollen in December, including the contingencies, Black
calculated that the cost to Argo of a mounting with a pair of indicator was £500; he also
added £100 per set for additional tooling. However, after making allowances for a
proportion of the costs of running Argo and for interest charges, Black concluded that,
without secrecy, a price of £1,200 would be necessary to yield a 'substantial and liberal'
profit. 39
 These figures must have influenced the subsequent negotiations. By 27 April, the
parties were close enough for the Admiralty Board to give its general approval:
Details to be arranged by the Control1er.
On the 29th, Argo was sent the Admiralty's offer to purchase 45 sets over the next three
years at £1,350 each, while secrecy was to be maintained until the end of 1912; the first
' Pollen to McKenna, 13 April 1910 in T.173/91 Part VII.
Pollen to Spender, 12 April 1910: Pollen to McKenna, 19 April 1910 with Enclosure, 20 April 1910: in
MCKN 3/15. As an alternative, Pollen also proposed a price of £1,100 with secrecy payments of £540 per
month for three years.
DofC, 18 April 1910 (op. cit.) p.6. On the same day, Moore, the DNO, provided his own similar
estimates (also in MCKN 3/15) in which the corresponding figures were £470 and £85; however, he used
Pollen's estimate without contingencies but assumed, wrongly, that it did not include a manufacturer's
profit of 25%.
° Board A'uinutes, 27 April 1910, ADM 167/44.
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15,000 of the value of the contract was to be paid in advance. The price covered
payment by the Admiralty of all the Argo Company's charges of £6,000 per annum for
the three years. In consequence, any other parts of the A C system would be supplied at
the cost to Argo plus 'a fair commercial rate of profit only'. Argo were also required to
acknowledge that the agreement of 18 February 1908 was 'a dead letter' and that the
Admiralty manual plotting table did not infringe their patents.4'
Although the 'Argo Company accepted the conditions "without qualification" on
the day they were offered', Sumida proposes that:
...Pollen's acceptance of the Admiralty's unfavorable terms of purchase for only a
portion of his fire control system...provided a margin of profit that was too small to
enable the Argo Company to carry on experimental work on the remaining
instruments...42
Yet, when the Contracts Branch reviewed the history of Argo's business with the
Admiralty in 1913, they noted that:
In May 1912, the Argo Company reported that the actual manufacturing cost of the 45
sets of range-finder mountings (including 30 per cent. profit to the manufacturers) had
worked out at just about 29,0001. ...
i.e. £645 per set, not much more than Black's estimate of £500 plus £100 for tooling.
The value of the contract was £60,750. In 1910, the Admiralty's estimate of the
manufacturing costs was £27,000, while Pollen's figure for the cost of running Argo for
three years was £18,000; this left a profit of15,750 i.e. 35%. Black allowed that
...33 per cent. [as] an ordinary trading profit...would be a good percentage, but it may
be regarded as small having regard to pioneer work &c.
However, in this case, the Admiralty was also fmancing all Argo's running costs, including
experiment work, at the present rate of expenditure, while the firm developed the rest of
the A C system. If Pollen's own lower estimate for manufacturing costs - £380 including a
contingency for tooling - is used, the profit would have been 73%. Thus, in 1910, the
terms of the contract cannot have appeared unfavourable to either party.
Secretary of the Admiralty to Argo Co. with enclosures, 29 April 1910 in T. 173/91 Part VII.
42 LD.iVS, p.201.
Record ofBusin#sXegotiatwns, p.17.
DofC, 18Apr11 1910, p.6.
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6. ADMIRAL1Y SALARIES.
The following salaries are taken from hitiaker'sAlmanacic 1914, p. 245.
Director ofXaval Co7lstniction, E. H. Tennyson-d'Eyncourt	 £2,000
Eng neer-in-CJof the Fleet, Eng.-Vice-Adm. Sir H.J. Orain... 	 £1,500
Director ofVava1 Ordnance and Torpedoes, Rear-Adm. F. C. T. Tudor...	 £1,500
AssitantDirectorofXava1 Ordnance, Capt.J. D. Dick...	 £ 800
7. POLLEN'S SALARY
The Argo Profit and Loss Account (Appendix XV) shows a /J1 ,000 increase in
directors' salary for 1909, yet the Notes of the Admiralty meeting on 10 December 1909
state that Pollen's salary was £1,500. Before the RCAI in 1925, Pollen said that the
increase to £2,500 was in 1911 and that payments continues until 'six years ago'.
Reference courtesy of MrJohn Covington.




In preparing their submission to the RCAI in 1923, the Argo Company
submitted their audited accounts to Mr Alan Rae Smith of Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths &
Co. From these, he prepared amended Balance Sheets and Profit and Loss Accounts for
the six years ended 31 December 1913. These accounts were preceded by a report by Rae
Smith; the more important paragraphs are quoted below.'
REPORT
Formation of 2. The Company was registered on 31St December 1907 with a
the Company	 Capital of1,000 divided into 20,000 shares of 1/- each.
On the 9th March 1908 the Company entered into an
agreement with Mr. A. H. Pollen, under which the latter assigned to
the Company his interests and obligations under a contract between
himself and the Admiralty, dated 18th February 1908, with the
exception of the sum of6,500...already paid by the Admiralty to
Mr. Pollen.
Initial Issue of 3. In consideration of the assignment of the above-mentioned
Share and	 agreement, the Company issued 17,992 shares of 1/- each (credited
Debenture	 as fully paid) £899. 12. 0...and £3,500 5% First Mortgage
Capital.	 Debentures fully paid (part of a total Authorised of10,000)...
The foregoing consideration of4,399. 12. 0 appears under the
heading of Goodwill in the Balance Sheets...
The remaining 2,008 Shares of the total Authorised Issue were
issued and paid for in Cash (L100. 8. 0).
Further Issue of 4. In 1911 the Authorised Capital was increased to £3,600 by the
Share Capital	 creation of 250 6% Cumulative Preference Shares of £100 each, of
Report and Accounts in RCAJ Claims Files for Argo Company and A H Pollen, T. 173/91 Part I, PRO.
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which 234 were issued for Cash. £50 was called up on each share,
making £1 1,700.
Further Issue of 5. The £3,500 Debentures which were issued in 1908 were
Debentures	 redeemed in 1909. In 1913 a further issue of £10,650 Debentures
was made for cash at par.
Receipts from	 6. ...it would appear that from the inception of the Company up to
sources other
	 the end of 1913 the Company transacted business practically solely
than the	 with the British Admiralty....the total...from sources other than the
Admiralty	 Admiralty amounted in the six years...to...154....
Period prior to 8.....Previous to the Company becoming interested in the matter
incorporation Mr. Pollen had been personally concerned, in a private capacity, with
of the	 the inventions and the development thereof, and no separate records
Company	 or accounts were kept by him in relation thereto.
Mr. Pollen has furnished me with a list of the payments made by
him between 1905 and the incorporation of the Company, and
representing the expenditure incurred by him....These payments...
total £6,870. 2. 2....
During the same period...Mr. Pollen informs me that he received
from the Admiralty sums totalling £11,800, of which £2,000 was to
cover expenditure which he had incurred prior to 1 905....giving a
surplus of receipts over expenditure of...L2,930.
9th October 1923	 [signed] A Rae Smith
Piorrr c Loss Accour.rrs
The 'Amended Trading and Profit and Loss Accounts for the Six Years ended
31st December 1913' were appended to the report as Statement B.
Without changing any of the figures, the original tabulation has been rearranged
on the next page into a summary table showing gross profit and net profit or loss: together
with a detailed table showing expenses, salaries, etc.
BALANCE SHEETS
The 'Amended Balance Sheets for the Six Years ended 31st December 1913'
were appended to the report as Statement A.
The original 'side-by-side' layout has been rearranged with Creditors above
Debtors. The method of incorporating the profits and losses has been slightly simplified,
but the allocations to one 'side' or the other remain unchanged.
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ARGO PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNTS
	1908	 1909	 1910	 1911	 1912	 1913	 Total
1908-
______________________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________	 1913
____________________	 Profit and Loss
Receipts from Admiralty 	 11,500	 6,107	 3,719	 8,180	 60,711	 13,254 103,471
Other sales
	 24	 75	 9	 14	 32	 154
ku Purchases, balance of
	 -2,179	 -2,657	 -2,682	 -5,566 -34,174	 7,165 -54,423
stock, etc. (see Note)	 ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ _________ ________
Gross profit	 9,345	 3,525	 1,046	 2,628	 26,569	 6,089	 49,202
Dividends	 49	 900	 949	 949	 2,847
kss Expenses, salaries, etc. 	 -4,919	 -5,963	 -8,651	 -11,050 -12,437
	 -12,807 -55,827
(as detailed below)
	 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______
Net profit or loss 	 4,426	 -2,438	 -7,556	 -7,522	 15,081	 -5,769	 -3,778
____________________ _______ Details of Expenses
	 _______ _______ _______
Travelling arid directors' 	 972	 583	 257	 480	 780	 638	 3,710
expenses
Staff salaries	 1,081	 581	 2,306	 4,092	 4,545	 2,742	 15,347
Directors' salaries
	 2,373	 3,575	 3,625	 3,658	 3,700	 3,600	 20,531
Patent fees	 229	 52	 136	 343	 608	 2,590	 3,958
Experimental work	 69	 763	 708	 1,075	 2,615






	 141	 30	 282	 453
Bank charges and interest	 300	 454	 648	 537	 1,939
Life insurance (on Pollen) 	 153	 175	 245	 573
General and other	 123	 479	 1,958	 1,107	 1,273	 999	 5,939
expenses________
Total	 4,919	 5,963	 8,651	 11,050	 12,437	 12,807	 55,827
.Mte: These items cover:
purchases
balance between stock at the end and commencement of the year
erection expenses
carriage	 -











Issued Capital	 1,000	 1,000	 1,000	 12,700	 12,700	 12,700
First Mortgage Debentures 	 3,500	 10,650
Receipts on account of 	 15,000	 11,278
Goods not delivered
Loans from Bankers
	 7,500	 13,730	 13,730	 6,730
Sundry Creditors	 1,804	 5,431	 699	 3,179	 8,537	 5,548
Credit balance	 4,426	 -13,590
Profit foryear	 4,426	 15,081
less Loss for year	 -2,438
less Dividend paid	 ________	 -500
_______________________	 10,730	 7,919	 24,199	 40,887	 36,458	 35,628
Debtors
GoodwiU	 4,399	 4,399	 4,399	 4,399	 4,399	 4,399
Plant, furniture, fittings, etc. 	 383	 1,753	 1,233	 1,222
Stock on hand	 200	 1,978	 303	 3,682	 1,069	 4,554
Motor car	 893
Investments (at cost)	 12,650	 15,650	 16,650	 16,650
Cash at Bankers and in Hand
	
124	 131	 388	 530	 5,415	 1,020
Sundry Debtors	 6,007	 518	 8	 1,283	 7,692	 3,505
Debit balance	 -1,488	 6,068	 -1,491
Lossfor year
	 _________ _________ 	 7,556	 7,522 _________	 5,769
________________________	 10,730	 7,919	 24,199	 40,887	 36,458	 35,628
INSPECTION OF ARGO'S BooKs: 1912
In May 1912, Argo requested a payment of an additiQnal £26,000 on the
contract for the supply of rangefmder mountings. This led to an inspection of their books.
After the abandonment of secrecy, in February 1913 the Contracts Branch produced a
record of the business relationship between the Admiralty and Pollen and the Argo
Company entitled Pollen Aim Correction System. GeneTal Grounds ofAdmira4y Polig and Historical
Record of Business J'Iegociation.s. Amongst much else, this records the information supplied in
1912. The following table compares the impressions created then with what can be






133. The first inspection of the books
revealed...that...Argo...had expended much
more than the 60001. [as anticipated in 1910}
on their staff...
The bulk...went on high salaries e.g. to Mr.
Pollen 25001. per year, and to...Mr. Isherwood
10001. a year, and to ex-Naval Officers who
had joined the firm Lieut. Gipps, 10001. a
year, Lieut. Riley 7921. a year; Draughtsmen,
27001. per year.
134. These gentlemen had been employed
partly in perfecting the 45 sets, but also largely
in designing and experimenting with other
Argo A.C. apparatus e.g. range clocks to which
invention alone the Compay attributed an
expenditure on design and development of
137001.
In May 1912 the Argo Company reported that
the actual manufacturing cost of the 45 sets of
range-finder mountings (induding 30 per cent
profit to the manufacturers) had worked out
just about 29000!. but that instead of spending
only the expected 210001. on salaries and
expenses...during the contract period they
were actually spending about 290001....and
90001. for experimental work and increases to
staff to overtake time lost by their originally
designing alterations for the Natal gear which
the Admiralty afterwards refused to accept.
p.17 167. They further stated that the Company
was about 80001. to the bad at the time when
the order for the 45 sets was given.
171.....on Mr. Pollen's own admission the
11500!. paid to him in May 1908 left him
57001. to the good after paying all expenses
incurred on the system up to that date.
1923 Accounts
The accounts show the annual figure for staff
salaries peaking at £4,545 in 1912. This is less
than the total for salaries, Pollen's excluded, of
£5,492 given in the Record ofBusiness.
Either the salaries for draughtsmen had been
exaggerated: or Isherwood was paid as a
director (though, in Pollen's and Isherwood's
many joint patent applications, only Pollen is
named as a Director).
The manufacturing cost of the 6 Argo clocks
supplied to the Admiralty was £971 each
(Record ofBusines.r p.16). The maximum annual
expenditure on experimental work was £763
(1911) and on salaries £8,245 (1912).
Development work on the dock began in early
1911 but detailed design around mid-1911. It
is difficult to understand how £13,700 could
have been spent by May, 1912.
In 1910, Pollen had estimated that the cost of
running Argo (which presumably induded
salaries and expenses) was about £6,000 p.a., a
figure which is consistent with the 1909
accounts. In that case, the £21,000 expected
by the Contracts Branch represented running
costs for 3 '/ years. However, the contract
agreed in April 1910 was for 3 years; since
secrecy expired in December 1912, it appears
probable that the rest of the contract
conditions applied to the same three calendar
years 1910-1912 indusive.
The total expenses for these three years in the
accounts was £32,138, which is not very
different from the estimate of £29,000: but it
should have been compared with £18,000
rather than £21,000.
The total for 'Experimental work' in the
accounts for the three years is only £1,540.
However, an unknown proportion of
'Purchases' probably included experimental
instruments.
The report on the accounts states that Pollen
was £,2,930 in surplus at the tithe that Argo
was incorporated. The Company then made a
profit of4,426 in 1908. If expenses were
uniform throughout the year, at least £2,500
was incurred fromJune to December 1908.
Thus, after the payment of £11,500 in May,
Argo and Pollen (the major shareholder) were
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The Company made losses in 1909 and 1910
of2,438 and £7,556. In 1910, there was a
large increase in staff salaries to £2,306 for the
year, it may be assumed that most of this was
incurred after the contract was placed and
additional draughtsmen were engaged. Assume
that salaries and general expenses from
January to April 1910 did not exceed the bill
for the whole of 1909 i.e. £1,060; also that
only £1,208 of the directors' salaries had been
paid by the end of April. Thus, when the
contract was placed, the loss for the year to
date would not have exceeded £1,935. On this
basis, the Company alone was still just in
profit, to the amount of £53.
In any case, the 1910 accounts gave a very
pessimistic view of profitability, since none of
the £15,000 advance payment was included in
that year's receipts.
As for Pollen himself the redemption of the
debentures in 1909 had added £3,500 to his
earlier surplus of £2,930.
Thus, in 1912, Pollen understated his profit for
1908 and greatly exaggerated the company's
accumulated loss by April 1910.
Arm&ur PAYMENTS TO ARGO
The Record of Business included as Schedule A 'Approximate details of payments
made by Admiralty to Mr. Pollen and Argo Company in connection with Pollen A.C.
System (including sums remaining to be paid on orders not yet complete)'.
The table below compares this schedule with the 1923 accounts. Although the
totals from year to year do not always tally and neither set of figure shows explicitly the
£15,000 paid in advance on the order for 45 rangeflnder mountings, the overall totals
from the two sources agree closely.
The schedule from the Record of Business appears to have been used as the basis
for Table 23 in In Defence ofXaval Supremacy. The only difference is that Sumida assumed
that Argo were paid to install all six Argo clocks. With the rapid deterioration of
relationships between Argo and the Admiralty from the beginning of 1913, it is most
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unlikely that any representatives of the firm would have been allowed on board any Royal
Navy ship by the time the clocks were ready for delivery.2
_____	 Schedule A, Record ofBusmess, 1913	 1923 Accounts
1905 Two observer set obtained for trials in "Jupiter".
	 4,500
_____ Extras	 800
1906 Set purchased for trial in "Ariadne".	 6,500	 11,800
1908 In return for his services, and to secure secrecy up to November
1909 Mr. Pollen was paid	 11,500	 11,500
1909 Set purchased for trial in "Natal" (including accessories and cost
	 7,660	 6,107
of installation, etc.)	 ________ _____________
1910 Trials having extended over the date fixed for secrecy (November
1909) further payments for temporary secrecy were made,
totalling about
	 2,160
45 sets of gear for gyro control of range-finders purchased at
	 3,719
13501. per set (approximate payment, including tools and
accessories afterwards ordered to be supplied with each set and
excluding cost of gyroscopes afterwards cancelled as regards
certain of the 45 sets)	 60,750 ____________
_____ Subsequent purchases:- 	 ________ ____________
1911 AdditionalgearforNatal'sset	 210	 8,180
1912 Spare parts &c. for 45 sets
	 6,975
Rate plotter for "Orion" including cost of fitting 	 580
Drawings, &c
	 200	 60,711
Argo improved clock, six in number for trial, at 21331. each	 12,798
Cost of installing one of above
	 150
	
1913 ____________________________________________________ ________	 13,254
_____ Total
	 114,783	 115,271
G B Cobb, Assistant Director of Contracts, 'Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors. Answer by
Department to Claim 1451 of the Argo Company and Arthur }iungerford Pollen...', 19 December 1922 (in
T. 173/91 Part I) repeats the 1913 schedule and includes the cost of installing only one clock.
APPENDIX XVI
Moor&s RECOMMENDATIONS, 1912
ExmicT FROM Ti-mw SEA LORD'S Mm4UrE, 13 AUGUST 19121
In any case, the Argo Company possesses no knowledge that the Service is lacking,
indeed the whole of the knowledge it has of the Fire Control necessities has been
derived from the exceptionally privileged position in which Mr. Pollen has been placed
by the Admiralty; everything that the Argo Company professes to achieve, can be
equally well performed with the Dreyer instruments: except that the Argo Company still
advocates "True Course and Speed plotting" as an essential, whereas the Service and
Dreyer prefer the "Time and Range" and "Time and Bearing" curve system. (T he True
Course and Speed system has been tried over and over again and always fails). His
[Pollen's] clock may or may not prove better than Dreyer's, under monopoly terms it
will certainly be more expensive. I do not see any reason for continuing the privileged
position of this inventor, he has been handsomely and generously paid for his work in
the past, and in my opinion it is full time that he was placed in the same position as all
other inventors. Apart from the financial disadvantages of Monoply [sic] terms, it
restricts our area of research...and it conveys a false impression in the Service of his
position, enabling him to acquire most confidential information immediately we make
any advance, and such information naturally leaks farther afield. I believe Messrs Barr
and Stroud have a very fair knowledge of our system, and indeed are working very near
it in the matter of instruments. I would again urge the desirability of ending this
unsatisfactory condition of affairs, by releasing Argo Company from its present Secrecy
A G H W Moore, Extract from 3rd Sea Lord's Minute, 13 August 1912 in MB I /T22/ 174, Papers of




dause, warning Mr. Pollen against divulging any Naval Secrets in his dealing with other









I have read the letters you gave me & return them herewith. Mr. Pollen's being a
"personal" letter to Peirse I do not comment on it, although it contains a strong attack
upon me. The general subject matter of his letter has been dealt with over & over again
on the official papers.
But as regards Peirse's letter & Memorandum - It is perfectly true that by placing
Mr. Pollen in the position of a favoured inventor, we have put him in possession of the
most confidential items of our Fire Control System, and we are constantly being pressed
by Mr. Pollen to pay him large sums of money to keep that information for our
exclusive use (His way of putting it is in the form of saying we pay him consideration for
the restriction of his profits by limiting his market). Each time we pay him thus
(monopoly rights) he gains more Confidential knowledge, and [thus] his most valuable
marketable artide rises in proportion, so that Monopoly prices rise, it is a chain round
our necks being forged more and more relentlessly. If there was no other system
achieving equal results with Pollens then there would be no choice (or very little) for us;
but there is another system; it is almost identical, it is Dreyers; the mechanical details
are different but with one exception the principles are the same -
(a) Both depend upon a Range finder which automatically transmits range and gyro
corrected bearings.
2 Moore to Battenberg, hand-written letter of 19 September 1912, Moutbatten Papers, MB I /T20/ 147.
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(b) Both place data thus obtained upon a clock which, set going, transmits the corrected
range by steps to the gun sights (or a follow the pointer transmitter) & both clocks
keep the rate of clock adjusted as the bearing of enemy alters.
(c) The difference lies in the data obtained by (a).
Dreyer gets Rate of Change of range
& ,,	 ,,	 ,,	 ,, bearing
Pollen gets Speed & Course of Enemy
from which rates are automatically put on the Clock, but he can set his clock equally
well with the data that Dreyer gets.
I agree with a great deal Peirse has written in his Memorandum but...so far
Dreyers system has given the most reliable results....
...after the Natal trials all that was successful of the Pollen gear was accepted i.e.
The gyro controlled Range Finder, & a very handsome Monopoly price paid for 45
sets. The Clock was not then completed. The plotting table aiming at finding "True
Course & Speed of Enemy" failed, & until recently Mr. Pollen has not produced a
better table. If he can produce one there would be no objection to trying it in
conjunction with the Clock & Rangefinder, and Mr. Pollen is quite mistaken in thinking
I oppose this. He knows I do not think he has yet, or is ever likely to produce equal
results with True Course & Speed plotting to those obtained by Rate plotting under
Seagoing fleet conditions. What I am opposed to is paying him Monopoly prices when
we have practically the same principles at work in Dreyers system - I am so far from
being opposed to Pollens Clock that I have begged him for his own sake to push on with
it & perfect it, as I knew Dreyer was going ahead, & I believed Argo Company's work
would be more accurately carried out. I have been for nearly a year trying to get
contracts placed for 5 Argo Clocks to compete with Dreyers 5 going to King George V
class - but Pollen has held out always on a prohibitive price based on Monopoly terms.
Mr. Pollen has always made a great parade of his patriotic feelings preventing him from
seeking other markets, but if we propose to accept that kind offer of patriotism without
paying him for it, he threatens to go abroad and trade upon the Confidential
Knowledge he has acquired by reason of his specially favoured treatment -
I believe that both Dreyer's & Pollens' systems will produce about equal results.
Dreyer's is the more developed at present, but Pollen's workmanship is probably better
& less liable to get out of order. If Pollen's table proves better than rate plotting, then it




Pollen hangs up, because of the demand for Monopoly money (it might be called Hush
money).
I don't think Peirse is conversant with the latest details of Dreyers gear, although as
he is an advocate of "True Course & Speed plotting" such knowledge would not
altogether change his opinion.
I agree that it is unfortunate Mr. Pollen should have acquired so much
Confidential information, but I think the time has long since arrived when we should
shake ourselves free, and let Mr. Pollen prove the truth of his contention that he has a
waiting market elsewhere.
On this point I cannot find any argument for altering my opinion, but I should be
the first to welcome any improvement in plotting that would give us a correct forecasted





APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 5
APPENDIX XVII
DREYER'S EARLY CAREER
Frederic Charles Dreyer was born on 8 January 1878 at Parsonstown, King's
County, Ireland, the second son of the Danish-born astronomerJohn Louis Emil Dreyer
(1852-1926).' From the Royal School, Armagh, Dreyer entered Britannia in 1891 and, in
his final examinations, was placed fifth in his term. He continued to obtain Class I
certificates in nearly all his courses for sub-lieutenant and lieutenant (promotedJuly 1898)
and for gunnery lieutenant; in 1900, he was the author of How to get a Irst Class in
Seamanship. In 1901, on the demanding Advanced Course for gunnery and torpedo
lieutenants at Greenwich, he came first, with honours, in his class of three. 2
 In January
1902, he became an instructor at the Naval Gunnery School, Sheerness, where senior
staff officers included Lieutenant Fawcet Wray, the inventor of the first range clock, and
Lieutenant J D Edwards who introduced the Royal Artillery's bracket system into the
Navy.3
From the start, Dreyer showed an enthusiasm for invention, beginning in 1895
when he conceived 'a range-keeper with object glass of varying focal length [although this
was] not sent in as optical difficulties were too great'. ByJuly 1898, he was the lieutenant
in charge of the rear barbette of the Repulse with its pair of 13.5 inch guns and, in the
following August, he did send in a proposal (though it was not taken up) for a 'mechanism
for connecting a medium calibre gun [a 12-pr] to a heavy gun so that the former's
projectiles could be used as a Hitting Gun Range finder for the heavy gun ("Pilot Gun")'.4
In June 1903, Dreyer joined the new battleship HMS Eanouth as Gunnery
Lieutenant. This gave him the opportunity to employ his pilot gun method, now using
LWB, 1922-1930.
2 Examination certificates in DRYR 1/2, CC.
Admiral Sir Frederic Dreyer, The Sea Heritage (London, 1955) pp. 32 and 45.
' 'Rear Admiral Dreyer's Inventions' in DRYR 2/1. Sea Heritage (op. cit.) pp.29-30.
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the ship's secondary 6-inch guns; Dreyer 'ranged on the target with the 6" guns and
when these were hitting, he applied a correction... to allow for the difference in the
external ballistic characteristics for the 6" and 12" guns... and in each year's Battle
Practice scored a hit with the first 12" shot fired'. 5
 In May 1904, his ship recommissioned
as the flagship of the Channel Fleet and Dreyer, while continuing as the ship's gunnery
officer, also acted as fleet gunnery adviser to Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson. Dreyer
distinguished himself by placing the flagship first in Battle Practice and the Gunlayers'
Tests for three years (1904-6) in succession: and his advice became so indispensable that,
half way through his appointment, Wilson asked him to stay in Exinouth even though this
meant declining an appointment (with good prospects of promotion) to the Senior Staff of
Ecelknt. 6 In 1905, he was appointed to represent the C.-in-C. on the Gunnery Calibration
Committee chaired by Rear Admiral Percy Scott. 7
 Dreyer also found time to apply
himself to theoretical gunnery questions, in 1906 contributing a paper on the proportion
of short shots required to optimise the rate of hitting. 8
 He continued to invent, but his
proposals for improvements in telescopic sights (1903) and breech mechanisms (1907)
were not adopted .
Remarks onAdmirally Counter Statement to RearAdmiralDryer's Claim, p.2 in DRYR 2/1.
6 Sea Hentage., pp.32, 45, 47-8, 52-3 and 57.
'Calibration of Guns. Report of Committee, &c in ADM 1/7835, PRO. Dreyer, Sea Herztage,p. 45.
8 Admiralty, Half tearly Summary of Progress in Gunnery, No.?, July 1906 pp.80-84, AL also referred to in
DRYR1/2andl/3.
'Dreyer's Inventions' (op. cit.). Secretary of the Admiralty to C.-in-C., Portsmouth, iJuly 1903 in DRYR
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I. Posmoij FINDER FOR RATE
Clock Smoothing
Since the clock was set by a sequence of discrete rates, a graph of its ranges must
have consisted of a series of straight-line segments. The slope of each segment was
determined by the ranges at the start and end of the preceding segment: the slope (rate)
equalling the difference between these ranges, divided by the segment duration. If the
ranges had been entirely error-free, this might have approximated reasonably well to the
underlying smooth curve. In practice, each range had a random error, while the intervals
between ranges also fluctuated, adding to the uncertainties in the rates; thus the graph of
clock range would normally have been even less smooth than that of the rangefinder
ranges, as illustrated below.
Time
FIG. XVIII.I: PREDIcmD CLocI RANGES FROM PosmoN Fir.n RAms
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While it might have been possible to reset the clock at the beginning of each
segment to the latest range, this would have resulted in a 'sawtooth' graph of clock range
which would have been even less smooth than that shown.
7)pe B Pos-itiDn Thider
In the Type B instrument, 'the moving paper need only be a quite narrow strip'.
The inker was in a fixed position on the fixed bridge, over the strip. Initially, the
moveable bridge was placed against the fixed bridge. When a new range was received, the
inker placed a mark on the strip, while the travellers on both bridges were set to this
range; thus the indicated rate was zero. The moveable bridge then followed the mark on
the strip until another range was received. This was set on the traveller of the fixed bridge,
while a new mark was made on the paper strip. The bar joining the two travellers
indicated the instantaneous range-rate on the semicircular scale. As soon as the rate had
been read off, it was reset to zero while the moveable bridge was returned close to the
starting position so that it could follow the new mark on the paper strip.
The Dreyers recommended Type B when the traveller on the fixed bridge was
not operated electrically from the rangefinder.'
2. VIRTUAL COURSE RANGE KEEPER 1908
John Dreyer described the instrument to Frederic in the hand-written letter





Hope you can understand enclosed. I have had an awful rush to finish it for post.
The black bar in (fig. 1) carrying pivot of range arm can be clamped in any position you
like on table by the clamping gear. The relative bearing (I don't know if this is correct
term; have called it angle between Compass bearing & Virtual Course) is set on
bearing plate & clock drive carries traveller along bar (X) fig. I at relative speed. The
range arm is rove through the traveller & the range at any moment can be read off.
I will think it over & write again tomorrow. I don't think it is really necessary to reverse
movement of traveller along (X); it may however be convenient.
F C and J T Dreyer, 'Position Finder for determining Rate of Change of Range' in RCAJ Claims Files,
T.173/91 Part III.
2 The Dreyers' father, J L E Dreyer, was Director of the Armagh Observatory from 1882 to 1916: EWB
1922-1 930.
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It would be advisable to have a clutch between endless screw (fig 2) & spur wheel (Y) to




John described the action of the mechanism on a separate, undated sheet.
Action
Set contact belt (h fig. 2) to relative speed. Unclamp clamping gear (fig. 1 & 3). Adjust
range arm to range & relative bearing. Turn damping handles thus firmly locking pivot
of range arm. Start clock. The traveller will read the range on the range arm
continually.3
If John Dreyer's Fig. 1 is compared to Fig. 2.6, it should be apparent that the
range arm corresponds to SE, the distance from the pivot to the traveller being
proportional to range R. The black clamping bar allowed the pivot to be positioned
anywhere on the table, according to the initial range and the angle between the
line-of-bearing and the virtual-course.
Someone involved with the RCAI hearings scrawled on the copy of Dreyer's
sketch now in the PRO:
Substantially the same as Pollen's Patent [?] of 1906.
Unfortunately, a copy of this patent has not been found, although Sumida has concluded
that, like the later mechanisms outlined in 2,497/1908, it relied on simulating motion
along a virtual course. However:
Pollen's proposed device [of 1906] solved the problem posed by the non-existence of
any motor whose speed could be varied continuously with precision...in such a way that
a constant speed drive produced a variable speed result.4
Isherwood's testimony to the RCAI confirms that he rejected the use of a variable speed
drive in the early clock designs.
...I was trying to devise some mechanism for running a certain thing at a varying rate. I
found considerable difficulty in devising suitable mechanism for getting this varying
rate, because I did not consider that the ordinary variable speed drive of a roller on a
constant speed disc was suitable for the mechanism in which the rate was continuously
changing.5
In contrast,John Dreyer did propose a variable speed drive, though of a different design
comprising two cones, one driving the other through a friction belt sliding parallel to their
axes. Since this was set to a speed proportional to the virtual speed, it did not vary while
John to Frederic Dreyer, l7January 1908 in T.173/91 Part III.
' Jon Sumida, In Djence ofi'faval Supremacy (London, 1989) p.82.
Isherwood before RCAI, Minutes of Proceedings, T.173/547 Part 15, pp.104-5.
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both ships maintained constant speeds and courses; thus it was not subject to the concerns
expressed by Isherwood. It should also be noted that, unlike the patent specification for
2,497/1908, John Dreyer's description and sketches do not indicate how the virtual
course and speed was obtained. Presumably, the intention was to get it directly from a
virtual course plot or from a Dumaresq.
The note on the sketch is correct only in that all these early range keepers
worked on the general virtual course principles which had been embodied in the
Dumaresq since 1902. To generate virtual speed,John Dreyer proposed a variable speed
drive long before Isherwood accepted their use of such drives, initially in the Argo Clock
Mark I.
3. TACTICAL PLOTTER
James Swinbume's review of the Dreyer and Pollen patents mentions, briefly,
only one aspect of this invention.
20733/09
Describes a cone variable speed gear apparatus. This patent is not of importance in
connection with the present machine.6
Some further information was provided by Keith Elphinstone in his 1914 and 1916
reviews of patents.
Patent 20733/09. Improvements in and relating to Apparatus for
determining the positions of moving objects.
One example of this Apparatus has been constructed by my Firm and was submitted for
triaL...7
Patent 20733/08. [sic]	 Improvements in. and relating to Apparatus for
use in controlling the fire of Guns.
In connection with this Patent, a piece of Apparatus was constructed, consisting of
Variable Speed Device with an Index or Pointer in the shape of a small bead which
could be clipped to a string and caused to travel along a chart at any desired speed, and
according to the relative position of the Instrument on the chart in any desired direction
on the chart.
Claim I. A pointer travelling in a pre-arranged direction at a variable Speed
according to the Speed of a moving object.8
6 The Tune and Range System. Reponofj. Swinbune, F.RS, 5 March 1913, p.3 in P.1024, AL
Elphinstone to Director of Navy Contracts, 18 March 1914, p.2 in 'Fire Control Apparatus: Various
Patents', ADM 1/8464/181.
6 
'Notes' 9 February 1916, p.2 with Elphinstone to Director of Navy Contracts, 14 February 1916 in 'Fire
Control Apparatus: Various Patents' (op. cit.).
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4. HYPERBOUC CLOCK
Swinburne's report has three passages on Dreyer's 1909 clock patent.
21655/09
A form of range-keeper....
...Dreyer arranges two bars...as embodied vectors, speed and direction of target, and
speed and direction of own ship. This gives the speed and direction of target supposing
own ship stopped. A range bar is set so that its length is the instantaneous range, and its
direction that of the line of sight; it swivels at one end, and a screw moves the other grip,
which is sliding, along it, so that this bar continues to gives [sic] instantaneous range as
long as both ships preserve their speeds and courses.
No. 21,655, 22nd September, 1909.— Patent for a range clock which, when set for
course and speed of enemy, range and bearing of enemy, and speed of own ship, and
started, will automatically transmit and continue to transmit the ranges to a receiver.
A direct pinion drive variable speed drive was fitted.9
Elphinstone supplied further details.
Patent 21655/09. Improvements in Range Keepers for use with Ordnance.
One example of this piece of Apparatus has been constructed by my Firm and was
submitted for trial....'0
Patent 21655/09. Improvements in Range Keepers for use with Ordnance.
An example of this Apparatus was constructed by Elliott Brothers and was known as the
T. & R.C.T. Instrument - it consisted of a Range Keeping Device depending upon the
adjustment and relative motions of some elements and bars of which Own Course and
Speed and Enemy's Course and Speed were among the number."
At the 1925 RCAI hearings, Dreyer was cross-examined by Pollen's counsel
about the reports written after the visit to Broadheath in July 1909.
...Then there are certain suggestions about the clock and you [DreyerJ apparently made
a suggestion to them [Pollen and Isherwood] about what you called a hyperbolic clock
of some kind. A. Yes.
Q. I see the D.N.O. makes a suggestion that you should take out a Patent. A. But you
will read, in fairness to me, what I said further down the page.
:::"...an officer spoke to me some months ago of 'Mr. Pollen's hyperbolic clock' ....Mr.
Isherwood stated that the great thing they had impressed on them...was that the
apparatus should be easily capable of being set, or re-set should the data set for be
shown by further plotting to be incorrect and this apparently led him to design his more
complicated mechanism. No difficulty would however occur with the hyperbolic clock
of the type I suggested as resetting it so as to give the new Virtual Course and Speed of
Enemy and the new minimum range and range of the moment would set the Clock
running correctly". That did not come to anything? A. I beg to be excused there; for
the reason I put there [it is not dear what this refers to] nobody took it up.'2
Swinbume, Tune and Range (op. cii.) pp.4 and 8.
'° Elphinstone to DofC, 1914 (op. cii.).
" Elphinstone, 'Notes' 1916 (op. cii.).
12 T.173/547 Part 17, p.61.
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The above quotations give a consistent picture of the nature of the mechanism
envisaged by Dreyer. The basic range-generator resembled John Dreyer's design of
January 1908, though the means of clamping the fixed pivot of the range bar may have
been different. In positioning the pivot, the mechanism was set for 'minimum range' as
well as for 'range of the moment'; these must be, respectively, the R 0 and R shown in Fig.
2.6. The additions to the 1908 design were the two bars, representing own and enemy
speeds and courses, from which the virtual course and speed were obtained; this was the
same vector subtraction embodied in the Dumaresq. The virtual speed propelling the
'sliding grip' was obtained from a 'direct pinion drive'. This is the same term used for the
drive which Dreyer mentioned as 'being made by Messrs. Elliott Bros.' in his 1910
'Remarks on Local Turret Control';' 3 thus it appears that Elphinstone was correct in
stating that one example was actually built. However, no record has been found of any
trials; perhaps this provides further confirmation that the direct pinion drive was a failure,
which in turn explains why this range-keeper did not come to anything.
Unfortunately, these straightforward conclusions are confused by Dreyer's
subsequent answers to questions about the mechanism of the patented clock.
Q. Was the idea...that you had a sort of master hyperbola? A. It is very difficult. I
have forgotten a great deal of mathematics in the last 17 [sic] years; I have had other
matters to attract my attention: but my recollection of it is that the idea one had of a
hyperbola was that it was either a single hyperbola or a solid hyperbola....I cannot tell
you at this period of time.
Q. I am trying to assist your recollection. Mr. Pollen tells me that now that he has seen
this document [the report by Dreyer and Craig] it all comes back clearly how this
conversation arose. He says you suggested to him constructing a clock on the basis of
the range hyperbola, and he pointed out that the slope of the hyperbola was different,
and the difference was a function of the bearing rate; that is to say, in the one case your
hyperbola would be comparatively flat and in another case it would be comparatively
steep. A. Yes
Q. He pointed this out to you, and said it was impossible to construct a clock on the
basis of the time and range hyperbola; you had to have both rates, and he was at work
on a clock to be used with the two rates, but was held up by the slipless drive. A. I can
give you no help in the matter at all. There is my full report.
When Pollen was re-examined, he recalled:
Captain [sic] Dreyer...suggested that if we engraved a plot with a hyperbolic curve...it
should be possible to fix a running roller into this curve...and read off the change of rate
[sic] by propelling those along sideways to follow this curve on the analogy of the snail
'Remarks on Local Turret Control by Commander F.C. Dreyer R.N....', 5 September 1910 in 'Local
Control of Turret Guns. Special Firing carried out by HMS 'Vanguard'...' in ADM 1/8 147.
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cam and other cams of that kind. We had some discussion about it and I could not get it
quite clear between us that it was impossible to make a master hyperbola.
....I told him we had already been working for two years working out a rate clock that is
running both rates, but we could not bring that up to perfection unless we had got rid of
[sic] the slipless drive...and there we rested. 14
It is apparent, firstly, that, in 1925, Pollen had forgotten the properties of the range-time
hyperbola; as shown in Fig. 2.7, the slope (of the asymptotes) is proportional to the virtual
speed (v), not the bearing rate. However, he was quite right that it was impossible to
construct a single master hyperbola; whole families of curves would have been needed, for
different values of v and R0. Secondly, Pollen and his counsel were principally engaged in
attempting to establish that Pollen had anticipated the Service system of plotting rates and
setting them on a two-rate clock; their objective here was to show that, in July 1909,
Dreyer was thinking on different lines. In fact, at that time, the hyperbolic relationship
between range and time (when two ships were on steady courses) appears to have been
comprehended correctly by both men: 15
 and, although their mechanisms were very
different, both Dreyer's patented design and the Argo Clock Mark I generated the full
range of hyperbolic functions. However, it is unlikely that Dreyer would have revealed his
own ideas to Pollen, but he could still have suggested the idea of a clock containing
hyperbolic cams, while discussing possible alternatives to the Argo design. His reluctance
to admit such a subterfuge may have been behind his recollection of a 'single or solid
hyperbola'. If that memory can, for one reason or another, be discounted, the rest of the
evidence indicates that the actual design contained no such element but was an
elaboration ofJohn Dreyer's proposal from early 1908.
5. LOCAL CONTROL INSTRUMENT
The 'Time and Range Chronograph, Range Clock & Transmitter combined"6
brought together in one unit (Plate 35):
a plotter with clockwork paper drive R
• automatic range plotting using an electrical receiver C from the turret rangefinder to
position the range plotting pencil E (actuated by the rangefmder operator) by means of a
long screw
T.173/547 Part 17, pp.64 and 109.
Pollen referred to 'the Dreyer bulk curves we had set out in the end of our "Reflections" pamphlet:
T.173/547 Part 17, p.108.
16 Dreyer, 'Local Control' (op. ciL).
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• a sliding, rotating plate N with engraved parallel lines which could measure the mean
slope (hence range-rate) from the rangefinder plot
• a gun-range scale T to which were attached all of the following:
• a clockwork range clock V with differential W for applying corrections
• a second long screw driving a gun-range pointer U: U carried a red pencil for plotting
clock-generated ranges
• electrical transmission of gun-rangeJ
• a rack-and-pinion worked by handle I by which T and all its attachments could be
moved by an amount shown by the fixed pointer H on the spotting scale S.
While, even for local control, Dreyer held that plotting should be automatic, he also
insisted that manual alternatives (handles X, Y and Z) were essential.
As described by Dreyer:
The method of using the instrument is :-
Start the dockwork R and commence taking ranges, the pencil E making a dot on the
paper each time the Rangefinder Operator presses a key on taking a range. When a
sufficient number of range dots have been made, measure their slope with N and set the
rate read off at M on the clockwork V which should then be started.
Then by means of the differential gear W bring U up in line with E, any spotting
correction being put on at S with the handle I.'
The gun ranges can now be read off the scale T opposite the pointer U and are
transmitted byJ.
The gun ranges can kept tuned up to the Rangefinder ranges by turning W to keep U
opposite E.
EXAMPLE .:-
Suppose the forecasted true range is 8000 yards (see diagram) and the corresponding
gun range 8500 yards, then after an interval, ranges begin to come in again, and the
mean range of these is 8400 yards.
The operator should then turn W until U is in line with the mean position of E, thus
increasing the gun range from 8500 to 8900 yards (This is a correction in range due to
faulty rate and not an ordinary spotting correction due to differences between true and
gun ranges).
The operator immediately reports to the Officer of Quarters "I have upped 400". If the
latter has just previously seen a shot hit, he may order "Down 400" to neutralize the
above, which would be put on at the spotting scale S by turning I (the total correction at
S being thus altered from "Up 500" to "Up 100"). U would then have to be run back
by turning W to a gun range of 8500 to bring U back in line with E.
If, however, the Officer of Quarters has j observed the fail of his last shot or two with
any certainty, there can be no doubt that he should be guided by the new mean
Rangefinder range and accept 8900 as the correct Gun range.'8
This initial 'spotting correction' must actually be the ballistic correction (to convert true-range to
gun-range) put on in the manner of a spotting correction.
18 Dreyer, 'Local Control', pp.18-9.
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Although all circumstances (including the simple case of applying spotting corrections




Set the total ballistic correction (for wind along, cordite temperature, time-of-
flight, etc.) on the spotting scale S with handle I.
With the tuning handle of W, bring the gun-range pointer and pencil U opposite
the mean rangefinder range as plotted by the rangefmder pencil E. Keep the gun-range
pointer coincident with the latest mean rangefinder range.
The best estimate of gun-range is indicated by U and transmitted byJ.
Whikfirbzg.
The spotting scale S indicates the current best estimate of the difference between
the gun-range and the true-range. Each spotting correction is applied by changing the
indication of pointer H on S by the amount of the spotting order e.g. UP 200.
Immediately after putting the spotting correction on S, use the tuning handle of W to
bring the gun-range pointer back into coincidence with the mean rangefinder range; this
transmits the spotting correction to the guns.
if the rate set on the clock is different from the rate of the rangefinder ranges, the
two pointers will diverge. The gun-range pointer can be retuned to the mean rangefinder
range with the W handle. This change will be transmitted to the guns. It must also be
reported to the Officer of Quarters controlling the fire of the turret. if necessary, he can
countermand it by ordering a opposite spotting correction; this is applied as normal, first
on the spotting scale and then with the tuning handle.
6. BEARING TiwrsussIoN IN PRiNCE OF Wiis
The following is an excerpt from the proposal accompanying Dreyer's letter to
the DNO of 2 December 1910 (illustrated by Plate 37).
FIG.I. shows diagramatically a case where ship's head is at 82° and bearing of target is
152°.
Outside the Gyro Compass Receiver Card A, a Transmitter Ring B is mounted (see
FIGII). Between A & B is an Index Pointer C actuated by the Vanes used in connection
with the Compass Receiver Card or if the latter is mounted inside a Rangefinder
mounting, C moves with the rotating portion of the mounting carrying the
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Rangefinder.
In FIG.H is shown the view of A, B & C obtained by an observer looking into the prism
of the Gyro Compass Receiver card.
The observer keeps the readings of B & A at C the same by turning the Transmitter
handle D, which also transmits the bearing to which B has been turned, to a Receiver E
on a Time and Bearing Chronograph.t9
In fact, it was necessary that the Transmitter Ring B as well as the Index Ring C rotated
with the vanes or the rangefinder. Then if, by rotating the transmitter handle, the
graduations on B were brought back into coincidence with those on the Compass Card,
the transmitter would transmit any change in compass bearing.
When bearings were transmitted from the rangefinder, the trainer would have
been fully occupied keeping the target in the centre of the field of view of his telescope; an
additional man would have been needed to work the transmitter handile in order to keep
the scales on A and C in coincidence.
7. SEVEN PART RECORDER
The complete final sentence of the quotation in the main text from Moore's
recommendation reads:
It is therefore submitted that Messrs. Elliott Bros. may be requested to tender for five of
the improved instruments omitting the gyro compass receivers.20
This appears to propose that the five improved tables should not be provided with gyro
compass receivers. However, Elphinstone's description and schedules of the 'Seven Part
Recorder' shows that this was not the intention.
The schedule of parts began with the standard parts I - X required for all
variants of the design: that is, common components like the frame, motor drive (with hand
alternative), range and bearing chronographs, range clock and Dumaresq. Optional parts
included:
XL Gyro Compass Receiver complete with Dials for indicating Ship's Course, contact
and Clutch device for controlling the movement of the Fore and Aft Bar of the
Dumaresq (IX) with reference to the Compass Ring by means of a small Electric Motor
this whole equipment being mounted above the Dumaresq Instrument (IX).
XII. Gear for setting a definite Rate of Change of Bearing on the Dumaresq IX [the
bearing clock]...
Dreyerto DNO, 2 December 1910 in T.173/91 Part III.
20 DNO's Minute, 7 December 1911 in T.173/91 Part III.
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Xffl. Gyro Compass Receiver and attachment for transmitting "Compass Bearing" of
Range Finder line of sight to Bearing Chronograph (IV) the Gyro-Compass Receiver
being fitted in the R. F. mounting itself.
These modular parts were then included in a number of schedules for differently
equipped ships. The five ships eventually provided with the Dreyer Tables Mark III were
covered by:
SCHEDULE "A"
Equipment for a Ship fitted with Gyro Compass and Argo R. F. Mounting with
Automatic Step by Step Transmission of Ranges and Bearings -
Parts Ito Xli inclusive to accomplish automatically the following:-
	





Adjust Fore and Aft Bar of Dumaresq Instrument for own Ship's Course.
Transmit Ranges from Clock to Receiver in Transmitting Station.
- in the case of the Argo R. F. Mounting being controlled in Azimuth by the Gyro
Compass, the Receiver for this part is not included in this Specification, being
considered as a separate supply.2'
Thus Moore was not recommending that the Mark III Tables (as they were to be known
later) should be without gyro compass receivers. He was merely emphasising that only the
receivers XI were to be included in the table order, while the receivers XIII were already
included in the order for the Argo mountings for the five ships.
8. DUMARESQ MARK VI ON ii-i Mi ifi TABLE
In the standard Dumaresq Mark VI (as described in Appendix VII), the
fore-and-aft bar was carried on a fixed outer ring. The compass ring turned between this
outer ring and the instrument's bearing dial.
As modified for the Mark ifi Table, the bearing dial was fixed while the outer
ring carrying the fore-and-aft bar revolved; as before, the compass ring also rotated. The
compass ring was coupled to the bearing clock. If the clock rate was set correctly by
converting Dumaresq speed-across into bearing-rate, it generated change of target
compass bearing (by integrating as expressed by equation 2:9). Thus the compass
ring turned relative to the fixed dial by i\. Since the target bearing arrow indicated x on
21 Elliott Bros. 'Seven Part Recorder' revised 28 October 1911 in T.173/547 Part Ill.
Commanders F C Dreyer and C V Usborne, Pollen Aim Corrector System Part L Technical Histoiy and
Technical Comparison with Commander F.C. Dreyer's Fire Control System, Gunnery Branch 1913, p.42 in P.1024,
AL Handbook of Captain F. C. Dr9er's Fire Control Tables 1918, C.B. 1456, pp.1 7 and 49 and Plate 23, AL
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the compass ring, the bearing clock kept the target compass bearing correctly set as it
changed due to the speed-across: provided that an increase in resulted in an anticloc/cwise
rotation of the compass ring.
The compass ring also carried a circular rack which engaged with gears on the
fore-and-aft bar. These gears were coupled through a flexible shaft to the relay motor
controlled by the gyro compass receiver. The gear ratios were chosen so that the
fore-and-aft bar rotated clockwise relative to the compass ring when own ship's compass
course increased by Aic. Thus the pointer at the fore end of the fore-and-aft bar correctly
registered this change on the scale of the compass ring.
As can be seen in Fig. VII. 1, this pointer also indicated the target bearing relative
to own course, fi, where:
The indicated change in fi (Lfl) was positive when the fore-and-aft bar turned anticlockwise.
Since the total rotation of the fore-and-aft bar was the sum of the rotations of the compass
ring and itself relative to the compass ring:
which is correct.
9 is the angle between the enemy bar and the fore-and-aft bar. Since::
A=9+K
and). (enemy compass course) is assumed to be constant:
A9=—&c
Thus the enemy bar and its compass ring were also geared to the shaft from the gyro
compass relay motor such that it was rotated relative to the fore-and-aft bar by &, in an
anticlockwise direction when x was positive.
9. RELAY FOR ANscHO-r-z G'o CoMPASS RECEIVER
The Dumaresq was driven through a flexible cable by a motor located behind
and controlled by the Anschutz compass receiver. The control was effected by a device,
then called a relay, which today would be described as a servo follower. The stepper
motor in the compass receiver (itself connected to the master Anschütz compass)
developed very little torque, sufficient only to rotate the compass card and a light contact
arm. This arm rotated over an insulating disc carrying two semicircular arcs separated by
two narrow gaps; the disc was rotated by the relay motor. When the gyro receiver and
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compass ring were reading identically, the contact arm lay exactly in the gap between the
contact arcs. However, if the compass receiver then registered a change of course, the
contact arm would rotate, thereby making contact with one or other of the arcs. This
closed an electric circuit which, through an electromagnetic relay, 23
 applied power to the
motor with the polarity necessary to bring the gap once more under the contact arm.
Hence the motor caused the compass ring to follow the receiver.24
This simple type of follower is another example of a 'bang-bang' servo. The
motor is either off: or driving at full power in one direction or the other. Thus, if the
compass was registering a slow turn, the motor would tend to follow in a series of jerks.
Alternatively, a sudden big yaw would produce a large misalignment between contact arm
and gap. In this case the motor ran up to full speed, until the contact arm once again
reached the gap. However, the inertia of the motor and its mechanical load then tended
to continue the motion; the contact arm overshot the gap, causing the motor to be
powered in the opposite direction to overcome the inertia, change direction and once
again return the arm to the gap. This cycle could repeat several times, with oscillations of
decreasing magnitude, until eventually the motor settled down to a new static position.
This characteristic behaviour is called hunting and it was observed in Batham by
Midshipman Patrick Blackett; although his ship was fitted with a later mark of Dreyer
table, it was initially provided with an Anschütz gyro compass installation. The amount of
the hunting was enough to limit the usefulness of the bearing plot, though Blackett did not
state its extent. 25
 However, the accuracy of the plot was also restricted by the accuracy of
the bearing transmitters, which used steps of '/°. Thus the hunt would not have caused
concern unless it was at least as great: i.e. at least ± 1/40 around the nominal value shown
on the receiver.
The errors caused by the fluctuations in the rates indicated by the Dumaresq can
be calculated. For example, consider the error in speed-along, a.
a=e cosl—s cosfl
= e cos(9 - /1) - s cosfi
= e sin(O - 6) + s sin Ii = x	 where x is speed-across
23 Meaning, in the modem sense, a switch operated by an electromagnet.
24 See the Technical Compaiüvn (op. cit.) Fig. V/9 for a schematic and circuit diagram.
'Rate of Change of Bearing Instrument' appended to P M S Blackett, 'Naval Diary 1914-1918',
transcribed by and courtesy of Dr N M Blackett.
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If a is in yds/min., x is in knots and a small change in fi, öfl, is in degrees:
33.78 it
180 .xôjI
Thus, for two 25-knot ships beam-to-beam on opposite courses, a change of /2 in
bearing produces a speed-along (range-rate) error of 14.7 yds/min. Since this maximum
value for the error is only a little more than half the step size for transferring range-rate to
the clock, it is barely significant. In all other tactical circumstances, the error is negligible.
Similar equations can be derived for speed across. However, since,
proportionately, larger steps are assumed for transferring speed-across, the hunt-induced
errors can have had even less impact.
JO. ELLIorr STEP-BY-STEP MoTols
While there is no doubt that the Original Table had three receiver motors, their
supplier is not named explicitly in the sources. The letter from Prince of Wales' Captain
Hopwood confirms that the rangefinder was fitted with the Barr and Stroud mechanism
which ensured that, at all ranges, equal movements of the range adjusting head
transmitted equal changes of range.
Barr and Stroud's Automatic Range transmission.
This mechanism is recommended for general adoption for present and future Barr and
Stroud Rangefinders. It enables ranges to be more rapidly taken and communicated to
the plotting chart and it saves the Range Taker the strain of reading off.
Thus it is possible that Barr and Stroud step-by-step receiver motors were used on the
table, even though they were designed only for driving digital receivers, 27 not plotter
screws, let alone the differential gearbox and transmitting switch on the gun-range screw.
However, the Royal Navy only adopted Barr and Stroud's complete auto-transmission
gear on the introduction of their 1 5-foot rangefinders. Hence, alternatively, for Prince of
Wales the Glasgow firm may have provided only the mechanically complex 'uniform
range scale conversion gear' at the rangefinder: 28 while Effiott Brothers developed special
receiver motors with adequate torque to drive the table screws. Later evidence relating to
the Mark ifi Table indicates that this latter suggestion is the more probable. -
Hopwood to VAC Atlantic Fleet, 20 November 1911 in T. 173/91 Part III.
v Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Handbookfor Fire Control Instruments 1914, p.23,ADM 186/191.
28 
'The Uniform Scale Auto-Transmission Gear' in Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Handbook for aval
Rangefinders 1921. Book 1, pp.101 -7 (ADM 186/253) and Book H, Plates 57 and 57A (ADM 186/254). See
also Michael Moss and lain Russell, Range and .sion (Edinburgh, 1988) p. 88.
















FIG. XVffl.2: ELLIOTr Tir'.sivtrrm. Swrrci-i 1 REcE1WR. MOTOR
MAIU Ill TABLE, 1913.
Fig. XIll.2 is redrawn from the connection diagram in the Technical History and
Technical Comparison, Chapter V, Figure 9. It show that the range and bearing step-by-step
receiver motors had three-phase stators and a wound rotor, apparently with simple slip
rings. Unfortunately, the diagram gives no hints about the details of the transmitter
switch.
In 1962, Hugh Clausen, the inventor of the M-type motor which had been
widely used in British fire control systems between the Wars, wrote an account of this
step-by step system. He also included a brief mention of some earlier designs, including
those of Anschütz and Elliott Brothers.
FIG. XVffl.3: ELuorr R-TYPE MOTOR
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The Anschutz step by step motor is a special case of one of the earlier types. It works on
a 4-wire system , as shown in Fig. 1. [It was] made in a modified form by Elliott
Brothers Limited as the R-type motor when they manufactured the Anschutz gyro
compass in this country.
This motor had a 3 phase stator like an M-type motor but the neutral point was
brought out and used for the negative return, in series with a rotor winding fed through
slip rings. The motor gives six steps per revo1ution....
The main difference between the two schemes is that, in the Dreyer table, the
rotor was connected directly across the supply, so its current did not change depending on
whether one or two stator coils were energised. Although the details of its operation
remain uncertain, there are sufficient similarities to suggest that Elliotts had developed
both the receiver motor in the Original and Mark ifi Tables, and the R-type motors,
from a common Anschütz original.
II. RATES OF CHANGE OF SPEED-ACROSS
1. The transfer and conversion of speed-across into bearing-rate on the Mark III
Table was most difficult when the speed-across (x) was changing most rapidly i.e. when
the rate of change of speed-across () was:
a) at its maximum if , was positive
b) at its minimum if was negative.
It is required to fmd the values of/I and 1 at which these 'turning points' occur.
2.	 In Fig. 2.6, let angle ESP be y (-90° <y < 90 0). Resolve the virtual speed v along
and across the line of bearing SE i.e. into speeds along and across. Thus:
a = v sin y
x = v cos
R0
1 =





 cos ' (cos 2 y — 2 sin2y)
= R
3.	 The two turning points are found where:
H Clausen, 'Notes on Step by Step Transmission System' (Evershed and Vignolles Ltd. 1962), p.1,
CLSN 1/7, CC. Fig. XVIII.3 is based on part of Clausen's Fig. I.
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cos 2 y = 2 sin2y
= ±0.707
Thus:	 y = ±35.26°
4. With two ships on opposite courses, v = e + s and y = 0° when the ships are
beam-to-beam. When the target is ±35.26° before or abaft the beam,, is most rapid. For
25-knot ships that pass at 8,000 yards:
502 x 33.78 x sin 35.26 x cos235.26 = 4.O6 knots/mm.
8000
Thus the minimum time to change by 2 knots is 29.6 seconds.
5. In equation ifi: 10, the second term gives the rate of change of speed-across due to
change of course. This rate is at a maximum when the target is dead ahead or astern; for a
25-knot ship turning at 20°/mm., it evaluates to ±8.73 knots/mm. If both terms had the
same sign i.e. the rates of change were additive, it would probably have been easier to
alter the bearing-rate every time the speed-across changed by 4 knots i.e. every 18.8
seconds.
12. BEARING it RAr-im Eiuois
As shown in Note XVIII-9:
p_X
Thus a small error ep in fi will result in an error in speed-along of:
La X.Lp
To obtain La in yds/min. when x is in knots and ep is in degrees, use:
La 33.78 x.p.1j = 0.5896 x.cp
When courses were similar (see the Jutland examples in Chapter 2), x was less than 10
knots, so a 50 error in bearing would result in a range-rate error of only about 25
yds/min. This would be increased five-fold for two 25-knot ships on opposite courses.
13. T ARGO CLOCK MARK IV n mr DRY Tu MARK II
The handbook for the Argo Clock Mark IV was dated 10 January 1914. Yet it
contains no indication of how it was to be used in conjunction with Dreyer-type rate
plotters.'0 Further, although 'early in 1914', Qyeen Ma?y already had Elliott-designed
3° Gunnery Branch, The Ago Raige and Bearing Clock, Mark IV, lOJanuaryl9l4, AL
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follow-the-pointer transmitters, 3 ' the arrangements for transmitting gun-range described
in the handbook are different. These have already been explained in Note XII-12.
Despite the automatic operation of the clock (when own course was steady), spotting
corrections could not be transmitted to the guns without an operator following a pointer;
thus the transmission arrangements were little better than with the Elliott gear, where all
changes of range were transmitted by following a pointer.
As arranged according to the handbook, neither of the shafts emerging from the
Argo Clock Mark IV were suitable for driving the transmitter-switch to the clock-range
pencil of the Dreyer range-plot. The shaft to the transmitter-switches and the black N
pointer rotated, in effect, according to the change in gun-elevation: and it did not respond
to spotting corrections set with handle Hi. In contrast, the shaft connected through the
cams and gearbox to the red M pointer did make equal turns for equal changes in range:
but it registered gun-range rather than the true-range required by the plot. This shaft was
driven by a differential coupled to both the range-clock (Drive I) and the range-tuning
handle H2. However, the standard Dreyer range plotter already had its own spotting
differential gearbox. Thus the simplest arrangement would have been to connect the
clock-range transmitter-switch to the M-pointer shaft: and leave the spotting correction
always at zero on the Argo clock.
Another flaw in the Argo design was that the clock-range could only be tuned
with handle H2 by disconnecting the variable-speed drive I; especially when the
range-rate was high, a significant change of range could be lost while the handle was
being manipulated. If the spotting corrections were now to be applied at the plot, the
redundant spotting differential in the clock could be used for clock-tuning. The
clock-range (predicted true-range) would then have been indicated by the pointer labelled
GUN RANGE: though it would probably have been easy enough to remove it and
replace it with the RANGE FINDER pointer, which would no longer have been required
in its original position. These simple modifications should have been well within the
capabilities of the dockyards, so they could have been made after the clocks were
delivered from Argo.
An objection to this suggestion is that the main reason for the unsatisfactory
arrangement described in the handbook appears to have been to avoid the additional load
Elphinstone, 'Notes' 1916, p.4.
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of a transmitter-switch on Drive I. If the switch was left connected to Drive IV, it would
have been necessary, in effect, to connect together the roller-carriages of Drives I and N:
but also to add new differentials or clutches so that tuning corrections were applied
equally to the outputs of Drives I and IV. Such extensive modifications are much less
probable.
While the clocks could have been altered to meet the new requirements, these
conjectures still do not explain why the handbook describes the clock as coupled directly
to unequal-step transmitters. By the publication date, the Argo Company were already
selling abroad and needed just such a transmission scheme, without any intervening rate
plotter. Perhaps, therefore, the handbook was largely prepared by the firm. Since they
had been struck from the list of approved suppliers, the Admiralty would certainly have
gone to considerable lengths to keep secret how the Argo clocks were being adapted to
Dreyer-type plotting. On the other hand, the handbook was evidently not revised before
being printed by Eyre and Spottiswoode, apparently as normal. 32 Perhaps, with only five
ships affected, a revision was not thought worthwhile.
Unfortunately, unless new evidence emerges, the fmal form of the Argo Clock
Mark N in the Dreyer Table Mark II must remain conjectural: though the simple
re-arrangement proposed above does seem the most likely. The Argo clocks were
probably modified by the Dockyard, using parts supplied by Effiotts, as they were
delivered from Argo during 1913. Conqueror was commissioned in November 1912, so her
table must have been installed later. Ajax, Centurion and Audacious followed in March, May
and October 1913, respectively, so some could have received their fire control tables
before they were commissioned.33
14. DREYER'S 'AUTO RATE' APPARATUS
As can be seen from Plate 45, the two 'sliders' which moved in response to any
changes in Dumaresq rate were constrained to move orthogonally by the pinions
engaging in the fLxed racks. Each slider carried a transmitter-switch; the commutator
rotated with one of the pinions, while the contacts were held fixed. Thus a switch
transmitted movements of its slider to the connected motor.
32 The printers mark on p.3 reads 'E (33)19331 Pk538 125 2/14 E & S'. The author is grateful to Prof.
Sumida for explaining the significance of these marks.
" Oscar Parkes, British Battkthips (London, reprinted 1990) pp.521, 528 and 538.
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The range-rate motor was coupled directly to the roller of the range-clock. This
arrangement was mathematically correct. However, it is most unlikely that a
stepper-motor could have developed enough torque to drive the roller sideways against
the considerable friction needed to prevent significant slippage in the range-clock.
The bearing-rate (more correctly, the speed-across) switch was wired to a motor
driving the cone of a cone-and-roller variable speed drive. Its roller was positioned
(although the means were not shown) by the range-clock. The roller's shaft worked
another transmitter-switch, while its motor was supposed to set the rate of the
bearing-clock. The cone rotated only when there was a change of speed-across (5x).34





Thus Dreyer's first, elementary mistake was to multiply, not to divide, by R. Perhaps he
had misdrawn the variable-speed drive and really intended to show the cone-and-roller
'in reverse' (as in the Argo Clock Mark Ill) to get:
Ox
However, this would still have been incorrect because, in fact:
g • Ox	 x
VX_R_R2
Elpbinstone saw clearly what was wrong with Dreyer's proposal.
...assuming that a certain...deflection is adjusted on the Dumaresq dial...any subsequent
alteration of the Range would only cause [the] Roller to travel longitudinally on the
shaft...and no alteration to the Rate of Change of Bearing.., would result, which I do
not think is correct.
The Device appears to me to call for a system of proportional levers whereby alteration
to either the deflection the Range alters the Rate of Change of Bearing.
IS. EXPECTED ADDITIONS TO ii-IE DREYER TABLE, FEBRUARY 1913
At the beginning of 1913, Dreyer and Usborne were concerned toemphasise all
the positive features of the Dreyer Tables and, in the Technical History and Technical
Comparison, were none too scrupulous in distinguishing between existing features and those
Dreyer to DNO, 19 December 1912 in T.173/91 Part III.
Elphinstone to DofC, 1914, sheet 4.
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envisaged for the next model, that which became the Mark IV. Nevertheless, in his 1913
Addendum, Dreyer did provide a clear statement of intent.
For all future supplies of these instruments, the following additional parts have been
designed and will probably be included:-
(i) Automatic attachments, which, when clutched in, will automatically keep the
Dumaresq adjusted for the Bearing of the Enemy, and also automatically keep the
pointer of the roller of the Range Clock in line with the bows of the enemy ship, as the
latter moves over the central disc of the Dumaresq.
(ii) A corrector which will automatically allow for the "slip" of own ship when
turning.
(iii) A connection from the Dumaresq of the instrument actuating a repeat dummy
enemy's ship on the Control Officer's Dumaresq, thus showing on the latter the course
and speed of enemy set on the former. Also a Range Rate Receiver alongside the
Control Officer's Dumaresq, operated automatically from the Instrument.
(iv) A "Gun Deflection Drum" added to the "Time and Bearing" Plot.
(v) Automatic Range Transmission from the Instrument to the Gun Positions.
(vi) A "Time of Flight" corrector to allow for change of Range in the Time of Flight.
(vii) The Time and Range plot will have arrangements added to enable the results of
several Range Finders to be plotted.
However, only some of these features were actually incorporated in the Mark IV.
(i) The new Electrical Dumaresq, with the Change-of-Bearing gear, automatically set
the rates on the range and bearing clocks, but it was nothing like Dreyer's proposal of
December 1912.
(ii) A single example of the slip corrector, which introduced a lag of 100, had been
ordered for the first Mark N table, for Iron Duke. In July 1914, it was decided that it
should 'not be introduced without further experiments'. 37
 Thereafter, it disappears from
the record; presumably under wartime pressures, the need for this elaboration never
became sufficiently urgent for the experiments to be renewed.
(iii) Commutator-switches were incorporated in the Electrical Dumaresq to transmit
enemy speed and inclination and the rate to the gun control tower. However, all these
data were displayed on a single Repeater instrument rather than on the control officer's
Dumaresq.38
(iv) The Mark ifi table had a 'Dumaresq Deflection' drum which converted between
bearing rate and speed-across. This was retained in the Mark IV, mainly for converting
Technical Comparison, pp. 47-8.
' DNO's Minute 'Dreyer Fire Control Apparatus', 6 July 1914 in 'Important Qiestions dealt with by
DNO', Volume III, 1914, p.617.
Handbook 1918 (op. cit.) p.76 and Plates 25 and 33
XVIII: DREYER TABLEs: TECHNICAL Noms	 454
the bearing rate measured off the bearing plot. A second drum was also fitted to convert
from bearing rate to Gun Deflection i.e. the units of deflection used on the gun sights.39
(v) Range transmission to the guns was not made fully automatic and continued to
rely on an operator following a pointer.40
(vi) The tables do not seem to have been given their own time-of-flight corrector;
instead, this and other range corrections were obtained from the range-corrector
instrument invented byJ T Dreyer in 1 9O8.'
(vii) The abandonment of the Macnamara automatic plotter in favour of the simple
Brownrigg keyboard is described in the main text.
16. AUTOMATIC AND MANUAL PLOT1ING
Marks II and III
In the Technical History and Technical Comparison, Dreyer described how ranges
from the Argo mounting were plotted automatically on the Mark HI: while, as an
alternative, ranges from another rangefinder (on a Barr and Stroud mounting) could be
plotted manually. As rangefinder control was developed, it became usual to plot ranges
from multiple rangefinders, those from the Argo mounting automatically, those from Barr
and Stroud mountings manually.
Ships with 13.5-inch guns had Barr and Stroud Mark fl* transmitters and
receivers, and buzzers to signal new ranges. 42 As soon as the range-taker made a 'cut', he
called the new range to the transmitter man, who set the new range on the transmitter
and pressed the buzzer key. At the sounding of the buzzer in the TS, the range plotter
quickly drew a short line on the plot using the edge of the range scale. Since the actual
range on the receiver then remained unchanged until the next cut was made, there should
normally have been enough time to read off the range and mark it on the line, as a dot
surrounded by a circle.43
Elliott Brothers, London, 'Captain F.C. Dreyer's Fire Control Apparatus Mark IV*. As fitted in H.M.S.
Royal Oak', May 1916, sheet 44 and Fig.Xll, Excellent Historical library.
4° Handbook 1918, p.72 and Plate 31.
Technical C.ompanson, p.47. The 'Dreyer Calculator' was still used in 1930: see 'Pamphlet on the Dreyer
Tables Mark 111*, 1930' (p.3 and Plate 1) and 'Pamphlet on the Dreyer Tables Mark P1*, 1930' (p.7 and
Plate 2) in 'Guard Book for Pamphlets on Dreyer Tables', AL.
42 Fire Control instruments, 1914 (op. ciL) pp.24-5 and Plate 68.
Technical Comparison, p.44. Perhaps the ranges were written down in the order in which they were
received; it should have then been a simple matter to plot each in turn on the next unused time-line.
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The original plotting arrangements on the Mark II Tables were probably the
same as for the Mark III.
The rangefinder screw used for plotting Argo ranges may have interfered with
the mechanism of the Brownrigg keyboards, in which case the screw and receiver motor
would have been removed when the keyboards were fitted. However, assuming the
keyboards plotted by perforating the paper from below, it may have been possible to
retain automatic plotting when the new method of manual plotting was introduced. The
keyboard (and the later typewriter) should have allowed the ranges to be recorded much
more quickly and accurately than before. However, timing accuracy depended on
positioning the carriage and pressing the right key as quickly as possible after a buzzer
sounded.
If the plan views of the Mark III Table from 1913 and 1918 are compared, it
looks as though the later gun-range screw was in the same position as the earlier
rangefinder screw. If the latter had already been removed, it would have been necessary
to refit a new screw in the old position. If, until then, automatic plotting of Argo ranges
had been retained, the range receiver motor would have been removed when the screw
was reconnected (through a flexible shaft) to the output shaft of the spotting differential.
Thus automatic range plotting definitely ceased once the gun-range screw was introduced.
Mark IV*
In the 1916 pamphlet describing the Mark IV* Table supplied to Royal Oak, the
only means for plotting ranges was the Brownrigg keyboard. The 15-foot rangefinders of
15-inch ships were all on Barr and Stroud mountings and they were equipped with a new
type of Barr and Stroud transmitter and receiver, the Mark III. At the rangefinder, the
rangetaker no longer had to call the ranges; as he adjusted the cut, 'uniform range scale
gear' converted between the reciprocal scale of ranges of the rangefmder and the uniform
(linear) scale of the transmitter dial; thus a pointer on this dial always indicated the actual
rangefinder range. On obtaining a cut, the rangetaker pressed a foot-pedal to actuate a
'Cut' indicator on the transmitter dial. The man at the transmitter immediately worked his
transmitter-handle to bring a follow-up pointer into alignment with the new range. As
soon as the transmitter handle was moved, a shutter closed over the range previously
Technical Comparison, Fig.V/7 (Plate 41) and Handbook 1918, Plate 40.
Fire Control Instroments 1914, p.25 and Plate 69. Annual Reports of the Torpedo &hool 1914, p.74 and 1915,
January 1916, p.228 in 109M9 1/ART 2, HRO.
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indicated at the range receiver; by means of a switch, the transmitter man could open the
shutter to reveal the new range as soon as it had been transmitted. Thus the range
remained unchanged on the receiver from one 'cut' to the next, which provided as much
time as possible to record it on the plot.
When a gun-range screw was added to these tables, a new fitting must have been
required.
Mark IV
There is no reason to suppose that, apart from its width, the range plot on Qyeerz
E1Labeth's Mark IV Table was any different from the later Mark IVs. Further, the only
method of plotting ranges shown in the general view of the table in the 1916 pamphlet is
the Brownrigg keyboard. This figure is captioned:
Captain Dreyer's Fire Control System Mark 1V.
H.M. Ships Iron Duke & Class and Tiger.
Elliott Brothers London. l7.8.14
Thus it appears that, in these ships, ranges received from Argo mountings were plotted
manually, not automatically. However, it is uncertain how long the Argo mountings were
retained in these ships.
In each ship of the earlier Lion and ICing George V classes, the Argo mounting was
placed under an armoured hood revolving on top of the conning tower; the hood and the
armoured partition separating the mounting from the rest of the conning tower was
known as the Argo Tower. The hood was trained by electric motors but the control
switches supplied by Argo, which enabled the hood to follow the rangefmder, were
unreliable. In October 1913, it was decided that, for the Iron Duke class and 7ger, the
rangefinder hood should be trained hydraulically. In these ships, the hood was on top of
the squat Gun Control Tower (GCT), which protruded above the roof of the conning
tower. A memorandum of August 1914 concerning the breakdown of Lion's 'Argo
Revolving Hood' during the action in the Heligoland Bight confirmed that the hoods in
the ' "IRON DUKE" Class are fitted with hydraulic training'. 49 liger's Jitland reports
Handbook of Range-F&zders and Mounthzgs 1921 (op. cit.). In later installations, the shutter was replaced with a
lamp illuminating the word 'cut' at the receivers.
'Dreyer's Apparatus Mark IV*', 1916 (op. cit.) Fig. 1.
Admiralty to C.-in-C. Home Fleets and Admiral Superintendent, Portsmouth, both 21 September 1913
with extracts from reports by Commanding Officers of ruzg George V(2June 1913) and Lion (22 May !913.
Ships' Cover 268A18, Iron Duke Class, NMM. John Brooks, 'The Mast and Funnel Question' in John
Roberts (ed.) WarthipI995 (London, 1995) pp.50-i.
DNO's memorandum, 8 September 1914 in 'Cruiser engagement in Heligoland Bight 28 August
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mention the Argo rangefmder, though they do not explicitly state its location; they also
imply that it was not used as a source of bearings for her Mark IV Dreyer Table.5°
By 1921, the Lion and Ang George V classes still had 9-foot FQ2 rangefinders on
Argo mountings in their 'Argo Towers'. All the ships with revolving hoods also had
1 5-foot F124 rangefinders installed in light housings attached to the rear faces of their
hoods; the supply of rangefinders for this purpose had been approved in October 191 6.'
Yet even the term 'Argo Tower' does not appear in the lists of rangefinders fitted in the
Iron Duke class and 7ge-. Nonetheless, Tiger still had her Argo mounting, though it was
now in the fore-top and carried a 12-foot FQ2 - this was probably the 'long rangefinder'
installed aloft in 191 8;52 a 9-foot FQ2 remained in the GCT, but now on an MP2
mounting. No Argo mounting appears in the list for the Iron Duker, instead, a 9-foot FF8 (a
more modern design than the FQ2) was installed 'inside' the GCT on a turret-type MG3
mounting.
The ships of the Orion class also retained their Argo mountings in the original
position aloft: though, as in Tiger, they had been adapted to the 12-foot FQ2. 53 Clearly,
the Argo mounting, with or without an electrically-trained hood, was still giving good
service. Yet it had been removed from the GCTs of ships with hydraulically-trained
hoods. Perhaps the hydraulic control, which was intended to enable the armoured hood
to follow the training of the Argo rangefinder, proved in service to be unsatisfactory in
some way; if it became necessary to resort to manually-controlled training, the
rangefmder had to follow the hood, for which the Argo mounting was unsuited.
Alternatively, when the 1 5-foot rangefmder was installed on the back of the armoured
hood, it may have been decided to revert to manual training and transfer control to the
operators of what was now the ship's principal rangefinder. In either case (or even both),
the alterations were probably made when the 15-foot instruments were fitted i.e. after
October 1916. The decision to order 12-foot rangefinders for installation in fore-tops was
not taken until November 1917, which is consistent with the date for the alteration to
1914...', ADM 1/8391/286.
° H.M.S. "TIGER", 'Gunnery Records during Action of 31st May 1916' and 'Gunnery Report' 30
October 1916 inADM 116/1487.
" Enclosure with Admiralty to C.-in-C., 10 October 1916 in 'Committees formed to consider experience
atJutland, ADM 137/2027.
52 Parkes, British Battleships (op. cit.) p.554.
" Handbook for Rangfiuzders and Mountings 1921, Book I, Appendix III, p.1 68. The author is grateful for this
reference to Mr.John Roberts.
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Tiger's fore-top; however, the 1 5-foot rangefinder had been fitted before this work was
done,55
 so it is even possible that the Argo mounting was removed and later reinstated
aloft.
While the precise chronology remains obscure, the available evidence suggests
that the Argo mounting was not used as the source of bearings for the Mark IV Dreyer
Tables in the Iron Duke class and Tiger. Until Jutland, the mounting was one source of
manually plotted ranges but, by the end of the War, only one remained, in Tiger's fore-top.
17. CHANGE OF BEARING GEAR
In both the Argo Clock Mark V and the Dreyer Tables Mark IV and later, a
proportional lever and spiral cam were used to convert speed-across into bearing-rate.
The different mechanisms are shown in schematic form in the following figure.
In the diagrams overleaf (see also Plates 29 and 48), y represents the
displacement caused by a spiral cam. To produce the correct displacement, the cams in
the two mechanisms had to be cut to quite different functions of the range, R. Let Y
represent the fixed dimension which determines the size of the mechanism, x represent
the displacement proportional to speed-across and
	 the required displacement
proportional to bearing-rate. If k and k' are constants of proportionality:
Since Argo patent 16,373 claimed only for 'cam-operated means for obtaining...a
displacement proportional to i-', Elphinstone's design did not infringe it. However, could
he have obtained the broad principle from the Argo patent: or even set out to avoid it?
The Argo patent was applied for, with a provisional specification, on 16 July
1913; the complete specification was left on 16 January 1914. In February 1914, the
Admiralty had asked the Patent Office for notice of Argo patents as soon as they were
December 1919, pp.33-4, AL
John Roberts, Batt1ecndsen (London, 1997): compare photographs on pp.39 and 119.
Handbook 1918, pp.61-2 and Plate 27. Argo patent 16,373/1913, Fig.2.
A;,
Dreyer C.B. Gear Argo Clock Mark V
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FIG. )Ull.3: SPEED-ACROSS TO BEARING RATE CONVERSION
submitted. This request had been refused, the Patent Office insisting that patents
remained confidential until they were accepted and published; 57
 however, they did
undertake to supply copies of Argo patents as soon as they were published. 16,373/19 13
was accepted on 16 July 1914. Thus even if it had been published immediately, 59
 it could
not have reached the Admiralty until after the first Mark IV table had been completed.
In March 1914, at the request of the Director of Navy Contracts, Elphmstone
made some suggestions concerning patent cover for the existing and new Dreyer Tables.
Dreyer had already submitted a complete patent specification which included his spurious
For the Patent Office's insistence on preserving the confidentiality of unaccepted patents, even during
the Great War, see T H O'Dell, Inventions and Official &cregi (Oxford, 1994) p.71. The author is most
grateful to Dr Anita McConnell for this reference.
DNO's minute, 'C.P. 11614/13. Pollen Patents; Question of Civil Proceedings Against Argo Co.', 2
February 1914 in 'IQ/DNO, Vol. II, 1913'. Pollen Aim Coneclion System. General Grounds ofAdmthzlsy Po&2y and
Histo,ieaI Record ofBusiness Negotiations, February 1913, Annex p.9, P.1024, AL
° This seems to have been the usual procedure. Two of Pollen's other patents, 23,352 and 25,768 of 1912,
were accepted in December 1913 and marked as printed in the same month. The print date on 16,373 is
just '1914'.
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proposal from the end of 1912,60 but Elphinstone realised that it was not correct and what
was needed in its stead.
The Device appears to me to call for a system of proportional levers whereby alteration
to either the deflection the Range alters the Rate of Change of Bearing.
He described the scheme he then adopted as 'a special application of a Device which has
been used for a long time for a particular purpose'. 6 ' Although Elphinstone mentioned
another Pollen patent in his letter,62
 he did not refer to 16,373/1913. However, a copy
had evidently reached the Admiralty by August, when a minute by the DNO (Captain
Singer) suggested, optimistically, that it had been anticipated by Dreyer's erroneous
21,480 of 1912.63
When the subject of patent cover was raised again in 1916, Elphinstone
specifically drew 'attention to Mr. A.H. Pollen's Patent 16373/13, Claim I, where
Apparatus is mentioned on lines somewhat similar to that [used in the] Tables, Mark IV
and IV*'. He went on to propose that, although the device actually adopted was 'a special
application of a known mechanical method [it] might possibly be worth protecting'.
Dreyer, on the other hand, took the view that it was 'too late to take out a New
Patent...as it would be invalidated by Mr. Pollen's Patent...16373'.65 However, in early
1916 Dreyer was attempting to secure an award from the Ordnance Council for 'his'
tables. On 1 February 1916, he declared:
In the case of each of the inventions described in [my] patents, I took Out a provisional
specification...before communicating with the Firm, so that the prior claims of the
Admiralty should be clearly established.
The actual details of such machines when made are of little importance, and could be
designed by any good Firm of Instrument Makers to whom the invention was
communicated.60
He was awarded £5,000 on 10 February: 67
 but this did not persuade him to give any
more credit to Elphinstone.
60 Secret patent 21,480, applied for 20 September 1912. The provisional specification was mainly
concerned with 'the control of own ship's bar by the gyrostat compass': Swinburne, 7ime and Range, pp.4
and 8 (the number and date on p.8 are incorrect).
6i Elphinstone to DofC, 1914, pp.4 and 6. Unfortunately, there are no clues to what was 'the particular
purpose'.
2,497/1908, published with the other withheld Argo patents on 6 November 1913.
63 DNO's Minute, 18 August 1914 quoted in Admiralty to C.-in-C. Home Fleets, 1 March 1916, ADM
1/8464/181.
' Elphinstone to DofC, 1916 (op. cit.) and Elphinstone, 'Notes', 1916, p.7.
Enclosure (b) with Dreyer to C.-in-C. Home Fleets, 7 March 1916 in 'Fire Control, Various Patents'.
Dreyer to C.-in-C. Home Fleets, 1 February 1916 in 'Fire Control, Various Patents'.
67 
'Extract from Recommendations of the Admiralty Members of the Ordnance Council at a Meeting
10.2.16 concerning Dreyer's award': Dreyer to Vice Admiral Sir Frederick Field, 12 November 1923: both
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The fact, as mentioned by Mr. Elphinstone, that in my Secret Patent No. 21,480 of...
1912, the example quoted...is not quite automatic, is unimportant.°
At the RCAI hearing in 1925, Dreyer was seeking a further award and was only prepared
to acknowledge Elphinstone's 'assistance' in elaborating the plans for the first table:
although he was obliged to admit that he had had no part in devising the 'poached egg'.
The designers chose to suggest another method; but I think that is only a detail.69
Thus, in both 1916 and 1925, Dreyer had ulterior motives for denigrating Elphinstone's
innovations, even if this meant accepting that Elliotts had been anticipated by Argo. In
fact, while Isherwood was certainly the first to use a lever and cam, there is nothing to
suggest any direct influence on Elphinstone. Both engineers made independent and
significantly different use of a long-known mechanical principle.
IS. COMPLETION DATES FOR Si-u ps wim TABLES MARK P1 t .it W
Year Quarter	 Ship	 Completion Date Dreyer
Table
______ ____________________ _________________ _________________ Mark
1914 April -June
	 Marlborough	 June	 I
July - September	 Iron Dule
	 August: see Note. IV
October - December Ben bow	 October	 IV
Tger	 October	 IV
___ ____________ Emperor ofindia	 November	 IV
1915 January - March
	 Qyeen Elizabeth	 January	 IV
_________________ Warspite	 March	 IV
April -June	 _______________ _______________ _______
July - September	 Canada	 September	 IV*
October - December Barham	 October





	 Royal Oak	 May	 IV
_________________ Royal Sovereign	 May	 1V
July - September	 RepuLse	 18 August	 IV
_________________ Renown
	 20 September	 IV'S
October - December Resolution	 December	 IV
1917 January - March	 Courageous	 January	 IV
_____________ Glorious	 January	 IV
April-June	 ______________ ______________ _______
_____ July - September	 RamiL!ies	 September	 _______
in DRYR 2/1.
Dreyer to C.-in-C. 7 March 1916 (op. cit).
Dreyer before RCA!, T.173/547 Part 16, pp.83 and 85. Argo patent 16,373/1913 was not considered
by the Commission.
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Mite. With the exception of Iron Duke (against which is the earliest date for the
installation of the first Mark IV Table), the dates in the table are the ship's completion
dates given by Parkes in British Battleships.
The IL 918 Handbook lists the ships with Mark IV* tables in the following order.
Resolution, Revenge, Royal Oak, Royal Sovereign





Thus, by the last year of the War, lion and Princess Royal had Mark 1V* tables. No
explanation is apparent for the 'R'-class appearing first in this list but, even so, it still
suggests that the two older battlecruisers were not re-equipped until near the end of the
production run for the Mark IV*. This would also be expected from the completion dates,
which show that demand for new ships was beginning to fall off by the end of 1916;
manufacturing capacity was then available for delivery of the replacement tables, perhaps
in the second quarter of 1917.
19. JUTLAND REPORTS
Xew Zealand
Midshipman G M Eady served in the Transmission Station of Xew zealand at
Jutland. The following passage is taken from the second, longer account 'written within a
few months of the event' in a notebook donated to the Imperial War Museum by
Commander G M Eady, RN.
By 4.35 p.m. 7' the enemy's funnels were just visible on the horizon out of range but
closing rapidly; the turrets were ordered to lay and train on the enemy and be ready for
firing in every respect. Ranges now began to come through to us from the rangefinders
in the turrets and foretop. The action, in so far as I and my assistant snotty were
concerned, had begun. Facing us were six range transmitters worked by the men at each
rangefinder. 72 As these flicked round altering the ranges it was our job to mark them
down on a large moving roll of paper spread out on a table in front of us. This was
called the Plotting Table. Two snotties and two A.B's as voice-pipe men completed the
"Plotting Table's Crew". By plotting the ranges we were able to determine at-what rate
the enemy were opening or closing on us. The rates so obtained were passed to the
gunnery lieutenant in the fore-top.73
70 Handbook 1918, p.3.
71 Xew Zealand's times were recorded in British Summer Time.
72 This must refer to the six range receivers in the TS showing the ranges transmitted from the
rangefinders.
" Midshipman G M Eady, 'Life in the Battle Cruiser Fleet 1916. Including an account of the Battle of
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This account refers to a 'Plotting Table' rather than a 'Dreyer Table' and it makes no
mention of the other principal components of the Mark I Dreyer Table, the Dumaresq
and the clock, nor of their operators. The 'large moving roll of paper' could be part of the
Dreyer range plot, but it could also be a description of the time-and-range roller boards
issued in 1908, especially if these had been modified so that a hand drive, regulated with a
stop-watch, advanced the paper at a steady speed. Thus it seems more likely that Xew
Zealand had a manual range plotter rather than a Dreyer Table Mark I.
Bellerophon, Erin
On 24 September 1916, AdmiralJellicoe issued a memorandum requiring that:
All battleships, battle-cruisers, cruisers and light-cruisers, engaged in the action of 31
May 1916, are to forward to the Admiralty their Dreyer table plotting charts and any
other range and bearing records they may have...74
Of the surviving reports in ADM 116/1487, only those from Bellerophon and Erin give any




With reference to H. F. Memorandum...of 24th September, 1916 ordering
Dreyer Table plotting charts of the action of 31St May 1916 to be sent to the Admiralty,
I have the honour to report that very few ranges were obtained and though a small plot




From	 The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "Erin",
3rd October 1916...
Subject: Rangefinding Plot of Action, 31st May 1916.
:::only six ranges were taken altogether, at considerable intervals and no value could be
obtained from them.
The roll containing this information was therefore not kept and has since
been destroyed.
(Signed)	 V. A. Stanley,
Captain.
Jutland, May 31st, 1916', original manuscript (used here) and 1964 typed transcript with corrections,
86/58/1, IWM.
AdmiralJel]icoe, Memorandum, 24 September 1916 in BTY 6/6, NMM.
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The wording of Belkrophon's letter leaves little doubt that she had a Dreyer table. In
contrast, the absence of any mention of a Dreyer table or Dreyer plot by Erin suggests
(though by no means conclusively) that her plotter was probably still a simple
time-and-range board.
Indomitable
After Jutland, the Grand Fleet developed the new system of ranging called ladder firing,
in which the salvoes of brackets were fired in pairs. On 3OJuly, Indomitable reported:
Rapid and early hitting A "Ladder" system of ranging has been introduced and
thoroughly exercised both at the Spotting Table and at Control drill. The system
appears to work well. A special pointer has been designed and made on board to enable
the ranges to easily read off the Range Clock when using the "Ladder"."
In the Dreyer Table Mark I, the scale of the Vickers clock was replaced by a
follower-ring, while the gun-range was read off the counter connected to the spotting
differential. Thus this description is much more applicable to a ship using a standard
Vickers clock, from which the ranges were called to the operators of the cross-connected
range transmitters; it provides a clear indication that, inJuly 1916, Indomitable did not have
a Dreyer Table.
Invincible
The following evidence was given before the Post War Questions Committee by
Commander Hubert Dannreuther, who had been Invincible's gunnery officer at Jutland,
stationed in the fore-top.
Q.	What instruments were used by you?
A. I telephoned direct to each turret direct personal communications with
officers in command of turrets. Otherwise, orders, which were very few, went through
T.S.
Q.	T.S. is not necessary to you?
A.	 I do not mean to imply that we used it to pass on ranges. The clock was
down below.
Q	 And range [i.e. spotting] orders?
A.	 Passed them usually from top of [to?] T.S. by voice pipe.76
Once again, this is not conclusive but the reference only to a clock in 'the TS again
suggests that the Dreyer Table Mark I had not yet been fitted.
Captain M H Hodges, Indomitable to RAC 2nd Batttle Cruiser Squadron, 3OJuly 1916 in 'Battle Cruiser
War Records, Vol.VI, Miscellaneous', f.408, ADM 137/2134.




...ln September 1907, Dreyer met Pollen while the inventor was on his way to
Portsmouth to choose a position for his instruments on the protected cruiser Ariadne,
which had been assigned to him as a trials ship, and Pollen later recalled that Dreyer
"told me he hoped it would be his duty to crab me when the time came."
The selection of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Knyvet Wilson to umpire the official
trials insured that Dreyer's desire to play a major role in the blocking of Pollen wo1d
be fulfilled.'
At the hearing before the RCA! on 1 August 1925, Pollen recalled:
was quite a chance meeting; it was not arranged. Commander Fawcett Ray [ac]2
was the other. We three went down together....He [Dreyer told me he hoped it would
be his duly to crab me when the time came. I said I did not think he would. I should he
the last person in the world to wish the Admiralty to adopt a stumour [sic] 5 thing; I
wanted them to have the best.
Pollen did not have to rely on memory for this encounter, since he had referred to it in a
friendly letter written to Dreyer on 4January 1908 to congratulate him on his promotion
to Commander. Typed copies can be found in the Claims Files for the RCA! hearings






Please forgive me for dictating this, but I am in a rush to get things done before going
down to Portsmouth to join the Ariadne.
Jon Sumida, In D/?ne' ofNaval Suprmaçy (London, 1989) pp.121 -4.2 Fawcet Wray had invented an early form of range dock: Chapter 3.
The Shorter O.'çfordDrtionary (3rd edition) does not contain this word but defines:
Stumer...skng I 890...A worthless cheque; a counterfeit note or coin...also a dud.
RCA! Minutes of Proceedings, T. 173/547 Part 14, p.84, PRO
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I need not tell you how gratified I am by the announcement in the promotion list. Some
junior promotions cause heart burning. Yours is one which I think everyone - senior
and junior - will think is as right as it could be, and absolutely to the good of the
Service.
We have had two talks in the last six months - one when we parted at the Midland
Station after your visit to Manchester, when you assured me of your heartiest good
wishes for the success of the A.0 apparatus.5
 On the occasion of our last meeting, going
down to Portsmouth, you warned me that you hoped it would be your duty to crab it if
you could. I know that in both wishes you were absolutely sincere. I was as grateful as
possible for the first, and I welcome as heartily as I can the second.
Personally, I am strongly convinced that, unless the system is crab proof, and crab proof
from the strongest quarter from which crabbing can come, the Service ought not to go
to any exceptional expense or trouble to acquire it; but I am also confident that, when
you get to the bottom of it, you will find that it is crab proof.
No doubt we shall have an opportunity in the course of the trials for going into all the
different details. It certainly was a stroke of genius on Captain Bacon's part appointing
Wilson to superintend the thing and to report on it. You of course have known him well
for years. To me he is an absolute revelation in this sense - that I have never before met
in any walk of life the combination of practical judgement and theoretical appreciation
that he seems to embody. It is impossible to believe that the age limits are rightly
imposed in instances like this, and, considering how critical the state of the Navy is
today, in the sense that we seem to be working through epochs of technical development
with such appalling rapidity, it looks as if it were a real misfortune that his commanding
influence over naval work should be removed. Needless to say, I take it as far the
greatest compliment that has been paid to my invention so far that he should have
accepted the job of reporting on it, and my admiration for the D.N.O. in having
persuaded him to do so is unbounded, and my gratitude likewise.







The Shorter Oxford Dictionary gives two relevant definitions of 'to crab':
Crab...To go counter to, to cross.... [Scots, latest recorded use] 1605....To criticize
adversely...pull to pieces (colloq.) 1812.
Thus Dreyer's declared intent to 'crab it' (the apparatus) rather than to 'crab me' (Pollen),
and Pollen's acceptance that this was his proper role, establishes that Dreyer was using the
verb in its more recent colloquial sense rather than in the archaic Scots usage.
Dreyer was in the delegation which visited the Linotype works at Broadheath, Manchester on 11 June
1907. ILWS', pp.l2l and 123. Pollen before RCAI, T.173/547 Part 14, p.82.
6 Pollen to Dreyer, 4January 1908 in DRYR 2/1, CC and RCAI Claims Files, T.173/91 Part III.
APPENDIX XX
DiuYiR rm mi 13.5-INcH Gu
When Bacon took over as DNO, Dreyer's responsibilities included
non-transferable (turret) mountings (except electrical).' In his memoirs, Dreyer stated:
In 1908 we were getting excessive spreads in range and accuracy trials from the 50
calibre 12-inch guns...intended for...the SL Vincent class....At this time I came across an
artide...in connection with U.S. coast-defence guns, giving the arguments in favour of
mounting low-muzzle-velocity 14-inch guns instead of high velocity 12-inch ones. I
discussed this with Commander H. G. R. Bevan, R.N., who spedalised in gun design
for the Chief Inspector of Naval Ordnance, and we agreed that this was a good
proposition....I took the matter to the D.N.O., who asked Commander Trevor Dawson
of Vickers what he could do. The latter soon returned with the design of a 13.5-inch
gun [and] the outline design of a twin 13.5-inch turret....The D.N.O., after consulting
the Director of Naval Construction, myself...Commander...Bevan, and Engineer-
Admiral E. F. Ellis about the turret, then put forward the proposal toJellicoe, who had
returned to the Admiralty as Third Sea Lord and Controller, for the adoption of
13.5-inch guns for the projected Oñon class of battleships and the Lion class of
battle-cruisers. This was given Board approval and was a great advance.2
This passage gives a valuable insight into the workings of the DNO's department, both
internally and with other Admiralty departments and industry. However, it also leaves the
impression that Dreyer was a principal instigator of the increase in calibre for British
capital ships. In fact, the idea had been considered as far back as the summer of 1906 for
the 1907-08 programme; for a short time, the alternatives were discussed of either eight
13.5-inch guns (in dual turrets) or twelve 12-inch, 50 cal. guns in triple turrets. 3
 InJanuary
1908 Fisher, inspired by Bacon, was pressing for the adoption of the heavier piece and, as
Sumida suggests, Dreyer may have contributed to a paper on its merits, which was
Paper prepared by Director ofXaval Ordnancefor the Information of his Successor,July 1907, p.49, AL.
2 Frederic Dreyer, The Sea Hentage (London, 1955) pp. 59-60.
Minutes by DNO (2OJune) and DNC (10 August 1906) in Ship's Cover 223 (untitled), ADM 138/251,
NMM. On 20 August, a conference in the First Sea Lord's room recommended 12-inch, 50-cal. guns with
turrets in the Dreadnought layout but with 3 guns in X turret. See furtherJohn Brooks, 'All-Big-Guns: Fire
Control and Capital Ship Design 1903-1909' in War Stiidiesjourna4 Spring 1996, Vol. 1, Issue 2, pp.45-6.
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printed in April 1908 (though this makes no mention of American guns). 4Jellicoe returned
to the Admiralty as Controller in October 1908 but the decision to proceed with even the
first trial gun was not taken until the end of the year.5 Board approval, in principle, for the
new 13.5-inch battleships and battlecruisers was given by the end of May 1 9Ø96
Dreyer's involvement with these events remains unclear. In his outgoing report,
Bacon noted that:
The procedure as regards gun mountings has been improved, and now conferences are
held regularly at the Admiralty to discuss and pass drawings...delay in design is almost
completely obviated.
However, there had also been changes to the responsibilities of the DNO's assistants and
Lieutenant Henley (who had replaced Dreyer) was no longer responsible for hydraulic
mountings. 7
 In view of his considerable workload (and the many innovations with which
he had been involved), it seems probable that, at some time after October 1908, Dreyer
had been relieved of his duties respecting gun mountings and so was probably not
involved in the detailed designs for the 13.5-inch mountings.
Jon Sumida, In Defence of Jvaval Sujrtma€y (London, 1989) p.161. Copies of the memorandum are in
DRYR 2/1 and FISR 8/29, FF4872, CC.
'New Design 13.5 inch B.L Guns. Tender for supply of one to V.S.M. design', ADM 1/8064. The First
Lord gave approval to proceed on 21 December 1908.
6 Admiralty Board Minutes, 12 and 27 May 1909 in ADM 167/43.
DNOforSuccessor(op. cit.) November 1909, pp. 2 and 41.
APPENDIX XXI
HENLEY TO DREYER, 13 AUGUST 1910
Henley's letter exists as a typed transcript in the Dreyer Papers. Its informal style
suggests that it may originally have been hand-written. The transcript was probably made
for the hearings before the Royal Commission for Awards to Inventors.
13th August 1910.
My dear Dreyer
x	 x	 x	 x
Re Plotting.
Your screed on T.&R. & T.&B.' has come in officially and gone on but
everyone so far is opposed to making it automatic.
Since I last wrote Mr. Pollen appeared one day and informed me he was
preparing a scheme for Automatic Time and Ranges Plotting. I said nothing about you
having already got the Secret patent for a Time and Range Board but I am pushing on
the papers submitting that you should take out a Secret Patent for the whole system of
T.&R. & T.&B. plotting whether done manually or automatically and also asking you
for drawings of Auto T.&R. and Auto T.&B. board.
Mr. P. may have been on this T.&R. scheme for some time but so far we
have no information of any patent having been lodged. (Personally I expect he has
heard of your scheme through somebody and this has given him the idea).
There seems no reason why we should not have the patent for the principle
of auto T.&R. even if we have to fall back on Mr. P's Auto Receiver to do it.
Re Pollen R.F. by terms of contract we shall not get the first one until
September 1911 so am afraid it will be towards the end of your commission.
This must be 'Remarks by Commander F.C. Dreyer on the question of how best to obtain and maintain
the gun range in action', 22Ju1y 1910 in RCAI Claims Files, T.173/91 Part Ill (also in ADM 1/8147).
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In view of Mr. P's sudden attack on T.&R. I concur with you re secret
patents and I hope you agree with me that the patent should cover the whole principle
of T.&R. & T.&B. so as to keep him out of it.
I read your letter to Capt. Craig re "your attack on Mr. P." and I certainly
did not read your screed in any way as an uncalled for attack or [sic] that gentleman
entre nous.2
 We have it in writing now that he foregoes all claims to the principle of
plotting so we are now square with him on that point.3
I hope the Sec [Secondary] control may be successful as a good deal in the
way of future supply depends on it.
Best wishes for a magnificent B.P. [Battle Practice]
Yours ever,
J.C.W. Henley4
2 Captain Arthur Craig was Assistant DNO. In his 'Remarks' of 22 July, Dreyer had again asserted that
Pollen's machinery was 'on the system invented by the late Colonel Watkins [sic] R.A. (and employed for
the last twenty years or more years in nearly all our shore forts'. Perhaps Captain Craig took exception to
this: or alternatively Dreyer had been more forthright in another 'screed' which has not come to light.
In the contract for the production order for rangefinder mountings, Argo were required to acknowledge
that the agreement of 18 February 1908 was a 'dead letter' and that the Admiralty-pattern plotter did not
infringe their patents: Secretary of the Admiralty to Argo Co. with enclosures, 29 April 1910 in T.173/91
Part VII, PRO.
Henley to Dreyer, 13 August 1910 in DRYR 2/1, CC.
APPENDIX XXII
Eiuois FROM STEPWISE Cl-lANGE OF RATE
1. Let f(t) be some function of time t, and let its first, second,...nth derivatives be
represented by f', f1', f(n)
2. Consider an interval of time before and after a time t = a such that:
a—r<t<a+r
Assume that, in this interval, the derivatives of f(t) are all finite. Let:
IhI<r	 and	 O<0<1
Then if:	 =	 + Oh)	 tends to zero as n tends to infinity
f(a + h) can be expressed in Taylor's series' as:
f(a + h) = f(a) ^ hf'(a) +	 + j-f"'(a) +	 + ...	 (XXII: 1)
3. Similarly, for the function f'(t) which is the differential of f(t) with respect to time:
f'(a + h) - f'(a) = hf"(a) +	 + -f"(a) + ...	 (XXII:2)
4. Let g(t) be the function of time generated by an integrator set for rate at intervals.
Let the integrator be set with rate f'(a) at time a and let the integrator run at that rate for
the time interval h. Then:
g(a+h)=g(a)+hf'(a)
5. Let e = g - f	 be the difference or error in g with respect to f. Let 6
increase by ce in the interval h. Then:
&=g(a+h)—f(a+h)—g(a)+f(a)
= —f(a + h) + f(a) + hf(a)
and substituting from XXII: 1:
= _{hf"(a) +	 -r'(a) +	
^ ...)	 (XXII:3)
CJ Trainer, Techniques ofMat/zematzcalAnalysis (London, 1957) p.225.
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6. Assume that the rate of the integrator is changed in steps of constant size p i.e.
f(a+h)—f'(a)=p
so, from XXII:2:
p = hf"(a) + -f"(a) + --j-f"(a) + ...
	 (XXII:4)
7. The series in XXII:3 and XXII:4 are converging. Make the further assumption
that they converge rapidly such that:
f'(a)>> -f"(a) + -j-f"(a) +	 (XXII: 5)
Then:	 p hf"(a)	 (XXII:6)
and
	 hp
Since this indicates the change in error in a time h, the rate of change of error is:
de P
dt	 2
8. This is the same result obtained in Appendix VIII specifically for the hyperbolic
range-time function. Does this function satisfy the inequality XXII:5? This can be
investigated using the rate equations from Appendix I for steady courses:
axR =a	 x
= a' =
Therefore:	 R'" = R.2x.x' - x 2 .R' - 3ax2R2
	 2
and	 R" = 3(R2 (a.2x.x' + x 2 .a') - ax2.2R.R')R4







Consider initially the first term of the series on the right-hand side of XXII:5; it is
necessary to verify that:
>>
or, after substituting for h, that:
pR"
2R"2 <<1
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pR"	 P 3ax 2 R2	 3pa
2R" 2	  R2 x4	2x2
Rates have to be transferred to the range-clock in steps when the rate is changing rapidly.
This condition arises when the range is fairly near the minimum of the range-time









x 50 x 33.78
Thus, for the first term of the series, the condition for rapid convergence (XXIL5) is met.
If the virtual speed is lower, the range-time hyperbola is less sharply curved but the ratio
can be held below 0.1 by reducing the maximum value of y i.e. using rate transfer in fixed
steps only when the curvature is near its maximum.
10. To verify that convergence is rapid, the same values can be used to evaluate the
second term of the series:
h 2R'" - p2R'" - p2R 3 12a 2x 2 - 3x4
3!R" - 6R" 3 - 6x 6	 R3
- x4
252 0.0001
2x2 = 2(50 x 33 . 78) 2 =
Thus, the series does converge rapidly.




and, from 111:2 and 111:3:
3ax2	
cosfl.-+s. .2 cosfl	 (XXII:8)
Again, it is necessary to determine whether:
pR"
2R"2 <<
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First consider the conditions in which x 
-+ 0 i.e. curvature of the range-time
graph is due only to change of course. Then:
pR"	 2 p - p cos fi
2R"2 - 2 s2 2 sin 2fl 2 s sin2fl
p = 25 yds/min. and assume s = 25 x 33.78 yds/min. Hence:
_& =0 0152s
and the approximation holds, unless fi -^ 0. However, if own ship is headed along the line
of target bearing and x 
-^ 0, the enemy course must also coincide with the line of bearing.
Thus the speed-along must be nearly constant i.e. the range-time graph must be straight,
so there is no need for the transfer of range-rate in steps.
Now look for a condition which maximises R" and minimises R". With the
target before the beam, the third term for R"' (XXII:8) is positive and a maximum when
fi = 0. The second term is also maximised by /1=0 and can be positive if x and have
opposite signs. The first term will be positive if a is negative and will be large if both a and
x are significant. All these conditions are met if an enemy is crossing own ship's 'T': when
the second term of R" (XXH:7) is zero. Assume a range of 8,000 yards: that s and e, and
hence a and x, are all 25 knots: and that , is 20°/mm. The different terms evaluate to:





+	 =25 x 33.78 x 20 x 
-i- o- L 8000 + 20
134
.2c! - (33.78 X 25)2 89R	 8000
Thus'	 pR" ,25x162 = 0.262R" 2
 - 2x892
Hence, for this worst case condition, the expression is less than, but not much less than,
one. The approximation for error-rate is, therefore, not always exact; however, it still
gives a good order-of-magnitude indication of the errors resulting from stepwise rate
transfer when the rate itself is changing.
APPEJVDIX XXIII
Ti LATER DREYER TABLES
MARK 1*
The Mark I was derived directly from the Mark I and still relied on a Vickers
clock; the major difference was the addition of gyro compass control gear coupled to the
Mark W Dumaresq. In 1918, two of these tables had been allocated to the coast defence
vessels Glatlon and Gorgon (completed between 1915 and mid-1918), while a further five
were destined for the Hawkins class.' These cruisers were ordered in December 1915 but
not completed until after the War; by 1930, Hawkins (the first of the class completed) had
(or was about to have) a Mark IV* table, while the other two surviving members had
already received the more elaborate Mark 1111* table. 2
 Thus it appears that the Mark 1*
had only a short service life before it was superseded or upgraded to Mark 111*.
MARK flJ
The 1918 Handbook shows that, as originally designed, the Mark ffi* was a
further development of the Mark 1*: though it was capable of plotting up to 29,000 yards
(at 600 yards per inch) without shifting the range scale. It also used a Mark VI* Dumaresq
coupled to a gyro compass receiver; however, the Vickers clock was replaced by a range
clock 'similar to that in the turret instrument'. A further novelty was the introduction of a
multiplying linkage which, when set with Dumaresq Deflection and range, automatically
computed the component of gun deflection due to speed across; this was then applied to
the deflection totaliser. However, both range and Dumaresq deflection had to be set on





- Pamphlet on the Mark 111* Dreyer Table, 1930 and Pamphlet on the Mark IV Dreyer Table, 1930
in 'Guard Book for Pamphlets on Dreyer Tables', AL. Jane's (op. cit.) p.56: JJ Colledge, Ships of the Royal
Xavy (London, 1987).
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the linkage by hand, the latter being read off the Dumaresq dial itself. As for all other
tables, the 1918 Handbook shows the Mark JJJ* table with the cancelled new-pattern
bearing plot.3 This was subsequently replaced by CDT gear: which required that the table
be provided with a bearing clock. 4 However, the bearing rate was set by hand with the aid
of a graduated drum, just like that used in the Mark HI table. Thus the approximations
inherent in manual setting were accepted for the ships in which the Mark llI was
installed. By 1930, these were the cruisers Frobisher and Effingham (Hawkins class), Emerald
and Enterprise, eight D-class ships and five Carlisle class. The aircraft carriers Eagle and
Hermes also had Mark 111* tables, though without GDT gear.5
MARK V
The ultimate development of the Dreyer Table was the Mark V. The 1918
Handbook applied this mark number to the tables for both Ramillies and Hood and described
an improved version of the Mark IV*. Like the Mark ffl*, this table also had a linkage for
generating the component of gun deflection due to speed across. However, both
Dumaresq deflection and gun range were set automatically: while an operator only had to
follow a pointer to transfer the deflection from the linkage to the deflection totaliser. This
linkage was first supplied as part of the table for Ramillies, which was otherwise much like
the preceding Mark 1V*s.6 However, after the publication of the 1918 Handbook, the
design of the table for Hood continued and radical alterations were introduced in line with
the recommendation of the Grand Fleet Dreyer Table Committee (see Chapter 6). In
addition to the inclusion of GDT gear, the deflection gear was further elaborated, on the
principles developed by Commander Graham-Brown, so that deflection could be
automatically adjusted for changes in wind-across induced by course alterations! The
range plot and its associated transmitters and receivers were completely redesigned, much
of the additional equipment arising from fittings required for concentration firing. The
plot was now fitted with five screws; to give a clearer view, they were all moved to the
back of the table. Clock range and gun range screws functioned as in previous marks. A
Handbook 1918 (op. cit.) pp. 19 and 42, Plates 7 and 20.
Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Progress in Gunney Material 1921, p.9 and Fig.1, ADM 186/251.
'Pamphlet Mark 111*, 1930' (op. cit.) p.1. and Plate 2.
6 Handbook 1918, pp.23 and 44, Plates 11 and 20
DNO's minute 24 February 1919 in 'Monthly Record of Principal Questions dealt with by director of
Naval Ordnance', Vol.11!, January to June 1919, p.1110, AL. Papers of Commander David T Brown,
EtcelleiU Historical Ubrary.
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typewriter for own rangefmder ranges was now positioned by a third screw and its
electro-pneumatic typing head was controlled remotely; later, screw positioning was
found to be too slow and replaced by a wire loop. A fourth screw with typewriter was used
to plot incoming ranges from one or two consorts, corrected for position-in-line P.I.L.).
Finally, a consort's range pencil, its screw driven by the clock, could be independently
tuned to the mean of the consort ranges (just as the clock range was tuned to own ship's
ranges). To further improve the view of the plot, the circular wire grid was replaced by a
projector mounted above the table, which cast an image of parallel lines onto the plot. As
with the Mark Jfl*, ranges up to 29,000 yards could be plotted (at a scale of 600 yards per
inch) without changing scales.
The many additional loads on the range plot evidently proved too much for the
variable speed drive.
These are the same as fitted to the Mark 1V* tables, but in order to increase the power
of the docks the speed of the friction discs have been doubled...this speed being reduced
in the case of range in the tuning differential box, and in the case of bearing in the
sprockets...driving the inner ring of the Dumaresq.8
Initially this seems to have been sufficient. In 1921, the table was described as 'a great
improvement on all previous Marks of Dreyer Table.' In 1922, Hood opened on the
ex-Gerrnan cruiser Xurn berg (towed by Repulse) at 28,000 yards and: 'Excellent results were
obtained at ranges between 26,500 and 23,000 yards'. In 1923, against the
radio-controlled target ship Agamemnon, 'HM.S. Hood obtained an extraordinarily high
percentage of hits e.g. 40 hits out of 100 rounds fired'.9
Despite these satisfactory results, subsequent developments suggest that (as would
be expected) slip-induced errors in the range clocks had been reduced but not eliminated:
and complaints continued to be received about the overloading of existing Dreyer tables,
though these were also refitted.'° A complete solution depended on the development
during the 1 920s of improved servo followers, initially for the Admiralty Fire Control
Table Mark I. A standard form of sensitive 'hunter' mechanism used differentials to detect
any misalignment between a low-power input shaft and a motor-driven output; the hunter
was then arranged to control either an air-motor or an electric clutch-brake motor. 11
 The
8 Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Pivgress in Gunnery Materiel 1920, pp. 8-12 and Fig. 1, ADM 186/244.
PGM 1921 (oft. ciL) p.9. Admiralty, Naval Stafl, Gunnery Division, Progress uz Naval Gunnery 1922, pp.3
and 25 (ADM 186/258) and Progress in Naval Gunnery 1923, p.12 (ADM 186/261). Agamemnon zig-zagged but
only at 8 knots.
tO PNG 19.22 (op. cit.) p.27.
"Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Handbook for Admiral!] Fire Control Table Mark I, 1927, pp.6-10, 12-14 and
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latter had been adopted for the Mark V table by 1930, so that all the fittings on the range
plot were driven by this motor, which, through the action of the hunter, followed the
range clock output shaft; thus the load on the clock was reduced to nothing more than the
hunter itself.' 2
 The clutch-brake motor was designed to reduce greatly the overshoot and
oscillation previously associated with contact-controlled motorised followers. Its operation
depended on sensitive electric contacts in the hunter; if either contact closed, the motor
drove the output shaft through an electrically-operated clutch in the direction necessary to
realign the output and input shafts. As soon as they were once more aligned, the hunter
contact opened. This not only removed the power to the motor; the clutch was also
released and, instead, an electrically-operated brake on the output shaft was energised.
Thus, at once, the inertia of the motor was disconnected from the output shaft, while a
brake was applied to the shall (and all its connected loads).
The gear should be adjusted to operate in steps of about 10 yards. If the [hunter
contact] gaps are made too small, a continuous oscillating motion will be set up in the
power driven side of the mechanism which will cause unnecessary strain and burn out
the contacts and relays. The contacts require to be cleaned regularly.'3
Thus, with this new servo follower, the load on the range clock was negligible and, when
the contacts were in proper adjustment, overshoot was negligible.'4
MARK IV
The table in Hood remained the only Mark V afloat.
This table is based on a design which is now several years old and may be said to have
reached finality.'5
However, while the future lay with the new Admiralty Fire Control Tables, existing
capital ships had to make do with Dreyer Tables, and by 1930, the standard table for all
other 15-inch ships, the Iron Duke class and liger (as well as Hawkins) was the Mark JV*.
Compared with the original version, the main changes were the replacement of the
Figs. 24-6, ADM 186/273-4.	 -
32 A clutch could disengage the clutch-brake motor and connect the range-clock directly tQ the plot and all
its attachments. The retention of this option suggests that, if the power follow-up gear failed, the clock
could still generate usable ranges, though perhaps with appreciable errors.
'Pamphlet on the Mark V Dreyer Table,1930', p.21 et seq. in 'Guard Book' (tp. cit.)
The hunter and clutch-brake motor still constituted a bang-bang servo system. Thus a slow movement
could not be followed continuous but by a series of small. 10 yard steps. The development of followers
which operated smoothly and accurately was one of the greatest technical challenges facing the designers of
the AFCT Mark I and its successors.
' PUM 1921, p.9. Three other Mark V tables were supplied to Excellent and the Chatham and Devonport
Gunnery Schools: 'Pamphlet Mark V 1930' (op. ciI) p.1.
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bearing plot by GDT gear and the addition of a second gun range plot, on which
concentration information could be plotted. Furthermore, the Mark IV* tables were also
fitted with the power follow-up gear based on the clutch-brake motor.' 6
 Thus, like the
Mark V, the Mark IV* benefited from the advances in servo-followers made during the
development of the early Admiralty Fire Control Tables. Some of the most important
features of these entirely new designs are described briefly in the Chapter 6. However,
after Xelson and Rodney (AFCT Mark 1), the next six marks were allocated to new cruisers.
It was not until the complete reconstruction of Warspite that the AFCT Mark VII (a direct
descendent of the AFCT Mark I) was designed to fit into the new (and presumably
enlarged) transmitting station. The 1939 Addendum to the Handbook for the Mark VII
handbook stated that: '[This] type of table is expected to be supplied to H.M.S.
HOOD...and is also being provided for H.M. Ships QUEEN ELIZABETH, VALIANT,
RENOWN and REPULSE with modifications to suit their new secondary armament of
4.5-inch guns'.' 7
 These intentions were carried out for the three ships then being
reconstructed:' 8
 but the new war prevented any drastic alterations being made to Hood'9
and Repulse and there are no indications that their Dreyer Tables had been replaced
before they were lost. Similarly, neither Barham, Malaya nor any of the 'R' class were
reconstructed and it appears that all these old ships fought in World War II with fire
control tables dating back to the previous conflict.
16 
'Pamphlet Mark IV* 1930', pp.6, 25-7 and Plate 2.
17 Admiralty, Gunnery Branch, Handbookfor the Admiralty Fire Control Table Mark VII 1939, Addendum No.1,
p.7, ADM 186/357 (Ii).
18 Ledger 1.05/2 in the Elliott Brothers Archive (19 October 1942 to 25 March 1944) records work on
Admiralty Fire Control Tables in Renown, Valiant and &een Elizabeth.
Stephen Roskill, Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty (New York, 1981) p.66.
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In some aspects of fire control, the Germans were ahead of the Royal Navy in
the early years of the century. They had been first to adopt fire control instruments' and it
will be recalled that many British pre-dreadnoughts had been equipped by Siemens and
Haiske; for German ships, the firm supplied range, deflection, bearing and order
instruments.2
 In contrast, Zeiss did not introduce a stereoscopic naval rangefmder until
1906, their first model being relatively short at 1.44 m (4.72 feet). However, their 3 m
instrument was accepted by the German Navy as soon as it was introduced in 1909
(though large orders may not have been placed until 191 2). Two versions were in service
during the War. The tube of the turret model was under the roof, with prismatic
objectives protruding through it. On the control towers, the main tube of the rangefinder
rotated above the roof, while extension tubes brought the images down to the rangetaker
in the tower. Because of the errors arising only in the prismatic ends, the turret
rangefinders may have needed continual adjustment4
 and most reliance seems to have
been placed on the control tower rangefinder;
...in the Osfiiesland, it was the practice to station a very skilful observer [at] the
rangefinder in the fore control tower, and to use the ranges taken by him for purposes
Captain Edward Harding, 'Memorandum on the Professional and Financial Value of the A.C. System'
with letter of 4 September 1906 in T.173/91 Part VII, PRO.
2 Naval Stafi Intelligence Department, Report on Interned German Vessels. Gunnery Injinnation, February 1919,
pp.8 and 18, ADM 186/240. Guy Hartcup, The War ofI,wentwn (London, 1989) pp.12 and 14.
' Karl Lautenschlager, 'The Dreadnought Revolution Reconsidered' in Daniel Masterson (ed.) Xaval
History, The Sixth Symposium of the U.S J$IavalAcademy (Wilmington, Delaware. 1987) p.1 25. Michael Moss and
lain Russell, Range and Vision - the First Hundred re€ ofBan- & Sioud (Edinburgh, 1988) pp.65 and 68.
Interned German Vessels, 1919 (op. cii.) pp.8,17 and 34-5. Naval Staff, Intelligence Division, Reports on Interned
Gennan Vessels, Part V Gunnery Matena4 October 1920, (C.B. 151 GE), p.8,ADM 186/243.
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of control, exercising a check over his ranges by an occasional mean taken from the
Mittlungs Apparat [q.u.J .
Longer instruments were not introduced until 8.2-metre rangefinders were installed in the
turrets of Bayern and Baden. 6 The Royal Navy also believed that the JCdnig class had 5 and
8m rangefinders and that other ships may have carried instruments larger than 3-metre:7
but these assumptions were not born out by post-War investigations.
By 1908, the Germans had developed their own version of the Dumaresq, called
the EU-Anzeiger (Plate 52), though the disc of the instrument was only calibrated with
lines of constant range-rate. 8
 The Royal Navy learned from intelligence sources that:
...inJuly 1910...the German Fleet had carried out their exercises with heavy guns at
ranges up to 10,000 yards and that the system of obtaining 25 per cent of short shots
had been adopted.9
However, these firings may have been without the aid of range clocks, since, by 1918,
British intelligence had concluded that clocks had not been introduced until about 1912.
An older model had a spiral range scale on a revolving drum; a later design had both a
circular range scale and a digital indicator which clicked round in steps of 50 metres, as
well as a digital indicator of the rate.'° German reports on the Firing Practices for 1913-14
stated that: 'The ranging was carried out by all ships with the range clock', though the
wording suggests this was still something of a novelty." Initially, the clock ranges were
probably transmitted to the guns using the existing Siemens instruments (which were
retained until the end of the War)2 and transferred manually to the sights. However, in
1912, trials were held in Blücher of an Elevation Telegraph, which worked with elevation
receivers in the turrets; the system was adopted as the Aw-Geber C. 12.13 The elevation
telegraph incorporated the range-clock, almost certainly the later model. Although
&ydlitz, 'General Experience' in Jutland, Later Reports, f.272, ADM 137/1644. Naval Stafl Intelligence
Department, German Gunneiy Infoimation Derived from the Inienvgatwn of P,iconers of War, October 1918
(C.B.01481), p.18, Ca 0108, AL
6 German Gunne?yMateTial, 1920 (op. cii.) p.7-8.
Royal Navy, German Warships of World War I (London, 1992) pp.4, 7, 10 and 24: this reproduces
Confidential Books dating from 1918.
8 Peter Padfield, Guns at Sea (London, 1974) p.228. The instrument was described and illustrated in
Inforznatwn from PoWs, 1918 (op. cii.) p.16-17 and Plate 3. EU (Entfernungs Unterschieds) Anzeiger means
range difference indicator and is the term used by Padfield and von Hase (q.v.). The intelligence report calls
the instrument an E U Pielscheiber (range difference bearing disc).
° Admiralty, German Xazy, Pan IV Section 4, Target Practise, Rangfivders and Control of Fire, July 1917 (C.B.
I 182A) p.5, Ca 0106, AL
to Informationfrom PoWs, 1918, p.16 and Plate 3.
" German Control ofFire, 1917 (op. cii.) p.1 0.
12 Interned German Vessels, 1919, pp.7.8 and 18.
Lautenschlager, 'Dreadnought Revolution' (op. cit.) p.135.
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Derfflinger's gunnery officer at Jutland, Commander Georg von Hase, does not give full
details, it is clear that the clock generated the gun-range and that the elevation telegraph
converted range into elevation before transmitting elevation to the guns. In the turrets, the
sights were set for elevation by following a pointer. Thus the system was identical in
principle to that in British ships with Dreyer Tables; the Connection between the
range-clock and the elevation-transmitter may have been automatic or, like the British
scheme, it may have depended on an operator following another pointer.
Unlike their opponents, the German ships at Jutland did not have full
range-and-bearing directors; instead their directors transmitted only target bearings.
However, because the main observation instrument was located in the armoured control
positions, and was used by the control officer, it also acted as the target designator.'4
Development of this training director may have begun as early as 1908 but initial trials, in
Blüc/zer, were not held until 1914, while all the true battlecruisers (except Goeben) were fitted
during 1915. One model was designated Rw-Geber C.13,' 5 while Derfflinger atJutland had
the then new C/XVH. The master instrument was periscopic, the objectives protruding
through the roof of the armoured control tower in rear of the conning tower; the control
officer viewed his target through binocular eyepieces while a separate trainer used a
monocular eyepiece at the side. Seydlisc, which had an older model than Derfflinger, found:
...the eye-piece at the side...was useless nearly the whole time, so that the Gun Control
Officer had to serve the Director Gear himself.'6
DeTfflinger's main director was also supplemented by a periscope in the fore-top; its bearing
was transmitted to the main instrument, on which the trainer could follow the aloft
pointer if he could not see the target himself. The complete installation was a true training
director, compensating for the distances between the turrets in setting the bearing
indicators in each. Thus the turret trainers only needed to follow the pointers to keep their
guns - and the turret rangefinders - on the target.'7
' Georg von Hase, ICzel and Jutland (London, 1921) pp.79-83. In the British system, the Evershed indicated
the target for director, rangefinders and turrets.
For installation dates see Lautenschlager, 'Dreadnought Revolution, p.135 and John Campbell, Wars/zip
Special 1. BaUkmszse, (London. 1978) pp.19, 22, 43 and 49; Lutzow was completed with a director and Goeben
fitted in later 1916 or 1917. Padfield, Guns at Sea (op. cit.) p.252 stares that the Germans had a partial
director system under experiment from 1908; he illustrates the wartime apparatus on p.271. German terms
for the training director were Zielgerat (target-gear) - see Lautenschlager - and Richtungsweiser Sehrohre
(direction-indicator periscope) - see German Gunne7y Matenal, 1920 (op. cit.), p.5.
16 Syd1itz, ' Experience' (op. cit.) f.271.
von Hase (op. cit.) pp.80-i.
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The German term most commonly associated with rangefinders is 'Basis Gerät'
(Bg. for short); literally translated, it means base- or pedestal-gear. Sometimes it evidently
refers only to the rangefinder, but at times it also seems to include the range transmitter
gear as well.' 8 At Jutland, all the range transmitters in Derfflinger were connected to an
instrument in the armoured fore-control tower; in British intelligence reports, this was
called the 'Mittlungs Apparat'. British intelligence believed that this had been introduced
in 1916, but von Hase (who gave no name for the equipment) did not mention that it was
a new device; thus it remains unclear whether supply had only just begun (in which case it
may not have been widely fitted) or whether it was installed in most of the big German
ships. This instrument must have been both elaborate and ingenious, since not only was it
capable of calculating the average of as many as eight ranges received, but the 'Bg.
Officer' in charge of the instrument could switch out of the calculation any ranges which
appeared to be anomalous;
...thus the average of the ranges given by all the instruments could be read off at any
time. When the action began, this range was given to all the guns by the gunnery
officer.
The Bg. Officer also reported 'the change of range per minute calculated from the
difference of the range-finder readings'.'9
Like the Dreyer time-and-range plot, the 'Mittlungs Apparat' supplied mean
values of range and rate. Near the end of the War, the British were aware that:
When it became known in the German Navy that plotting was carried out in our
Service, experiments were made with 'True course and speed' plotting. The results
however, proved unsatisfactory and plotting was abandoned.2°
All the post-war inspections of German ships concluded that there was no room for
plotting tables in their transmission stations 2', while nothing in the translated German
sources used here contradicts the conclusion that neither rate nor course plotting were
used in their control system.
18 von Hase, p.79. Gennan Control ofFü-e, 1917, p.16. Seydlit, 'Experience', p.272.
von Hase, pp.79, 131-2 and 144. Information from PoWs, 1918, p.16 and Plate 3. See also Interned German
Vessels, 1919, p.8
20 Informatthnfrom PoW:, 1918, p.14.
21 Interned Gennan Vessels, 1919, pp.8, 18, 27 and 35.
22 On the basis of the German report of their firing practices in 1913-14, a 1917 intelligence report
concluded: 'Plotting is carried out but it is believed that it is not relied on to the same extent as in the
rangefinder'. However, the German report refers to curves made after a firing run to check gun ranges
against actual ranges obtained from course plots: German Control ofFire, 1917, pp.11 and 21.
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Thus the 'Mittlungs Apparat' was an alternative source to the EUAnzeiger for
the range-rate to set on the range-clock. These older instruments for keeping the
range-rate 'had already been fitted all over the ship' when De7inger fought at Jutland.
von Hase described only one means of calculating deflection, a new instrument of which
one was positioned in her fore-top. Called the Z 31 EU/S\T Anzeiger, it had been
designed, by Commander Paschen of the Lütow, to give both range-rate and deflection.
Although, as discussed in the next section, its constructional details differed considerably
from the British Mark VI Dumaresq, it employed the same vector-based principles and
approximations. Paschen's instrument made better use of the disc by incorporating curves
for converting spccd-across into gun dcflcction corrcctcd for range and drift. 23 On thc
other hand, while it did not require gears to keep the inclination constant during a turn, it
lacked Ihe compass rings which allowed the inclination to be corrected once a turn was
complete. Thus it appears to have relied even more on the assumption that engagements
would be fought only with low bearing-rates. In any case, near the end of the War, British
intelligence concluded that the Germans used a separate instrument (though one also
based on the same principles as the basic Dumaresq) for finding deflection corrected for
wind and drift; although no details of this instrument were given, 24
 if it was like the
EU-Anzeiger, it did not have any mechanical aids to deflection-keeping through a turn.
Since Paschen's instrument was new in Derfflinger at Jutland, it may only have been
supplied to Hipper's ships at the time of the battle, while the intelligence reports suggest
that it may never have been made widely available.
In the turrets, by following their pointers, the trainers and sightsetters kept the
turrets on the target and the sights set with the latest predicted range. Thus the gunlayers
were able to aim continuously.
In spite of the rapid motion of the ship the gun-layer must make it his business to see
that the sight of the gun is ab.vrjs kept trained on the enemy...shooting on a rolling ship
was one of the most important feature of our crews' training on the high seas.
In the light cruiser Breslau, the gurilayers' continuous aim was sulficiently precise that all
the guns could be fired simultaneously with a master electric key; however, the gunlayers
preferred firing their own pieces to a gong 26
 and, for the heavy guns, this was probably the
von Hase, p.131. Padfield, Guns atSea, pp.228 and 250.
24 InformatwnfromPoWs, 1918, pp.16-17.
von Hase, pp.82-3.
Infonnatwnfrom PoWs, 1918, p.19.
XXIV: Gijur.j Fn ComlwL	 488
more practicable method. However, as the Royal Navy were well aware by early 1915,
even when the actual firing was left to the gunlayers, the German ships usually fired
salvoes with the individual shots close together in time and space; indeed, reports written
after the Battle of the Dogger Bank assumed that the Germans had fired by director and
suggested that the spread had been too small.27
German spotting to find the target used brackets, but slightly differently from the
Royal Navy. Attempts to estimate the distance over were forbidden but:
It is desirable that we should train our assistant observers to such an extent that when
short shots occur they will be able to tell the fire commander with certainty what size of
bracket will suffice.
The importance given when straddling to keeping about a quarter of shot falling short has
already been mentioned; as well as verifying that the gun range was correct, the shorts
also disrupted an opponent's fire (as Lion found to her cost at the Dogger Bank). Spotting
was assisted by electric time-of-flight indicators - the translation of von Hase's book calls
these 'hit-indicators' - which sounded buzzers in the top, control and TS when the salvo
was due to fall; these seem to have been effective though unreliable. Contrary to British
assumptions after Jutland, the German sources all indicate that, to find the target, they
fired single salvoes, spotting each before firing the next. Range-taking continued between
salvoes and was used to check the rate. However, as von Hase's account ofJutland shows,
once the target was straddled, a much higher rate of fire was used.3°
EU/SV ANZEIGER
The instrument as illustrated by Padfield is shown in Plate 53; it is set for a target
abaft the beam on a diverging course at less than 90° to own ship's course. The following
description of its components and operation are deduced from the illustration, its caption
and the general vector principles which apply to all Dumaresq-type instruments.
SU is a bar which was probably graduated for speed-across; the large block
sliding on this bar was displaced from the centre of the instrument by a distance
proportional to speed-across. The bar EU was calibrated in range-rate; it was free to slide
in the block, at right angles to the SU bar. The slider EF was set to own speed.
27 Brock to VAC, 1st BCS, 26January 1915 in ADM 137/305. Beatty, 'Notes re Lessons Learned from
Action onJanuary 24, 1915' in Brian Ranft (ed.) The Beauy Papers, Volume I(Aldershot, 1989) p.225.
3° Gennan Control ofFire, 1917, p.11.
3° von Haze, p.134. Sydlitz, 'Experience' (op. cit.) p.272 for breakdown soon after engaging atJutland.
'° German Control ofFire, 1917, p.1 1. von Hase, pp.84, 145, 148-9 and 160.
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The EU bar was pointed at the target: though sighting vanes are not shown. At
one end, it carried a circular dial with a diagonal slot. The bar sliding in this slot
represented the enemy ship. The dial was rotated so that an angular scale around its
circumference indicated the inclination. This must have required a pointer on the end of
the EU bar i.e. GL should be on this bar rather than on the dial. A scale of enemy speed
was marked on the top of the enemy bar, the enemy speed being indicated by the pointers
GF. The scale must have been graduated such that the speed was proportional to the
distance from GF to the end of the bar pivoting on the pin dropping down from the
own-speed slider.
Because the rate could be read off the EU scale, the main dial could be
graduated with curves of deflection SV (expressed in knots) and target range E. The
indicator AD, attached to the block and running parallel to the centre-line of the EU bar,
was displaced from the centre of the main dial by an amount proportional to speed-across.
The intersection of this indicator with the appropriate range line lay on or near to a
deflection line; thus the deflection could be read off, if necessary interpolating between the
curves.
The satisfactory operation of this instrument must have depended on the block
and EU slider both being free to move with minimal friction. Initially, it was probably set
by first putting own speed on EF: then rotating the main dial until the EU bar was
pointing at the target: and finally moving the block and EU-bar around until the correct
enemy course and speed were showing on the enemy dial. Assuming that own course was
constant, correct rate-keeping required that the angle of the enemy bar to the fore-and-aft
line (9) remain constant as the target bearing changed; this implies some sort of clamp to
prevent the enemy bar from rotating about the pin on the own-speed slider. However, the
desigu as illustrated does not seem to have such a clamp, nor, indeed, arrangements for
clamping own and enemy speeds. Perhaps the instrument was not intended as a rate keeper
but only as a rate calculator. 3 ' However, it seems more likely that clamps were provided,
but that they were omitted to simplify the diagram; then, as the main dial was turned to
keep the EU bar on the enemy, the bar and block could slide to register the changes in
speeds along and across. If own speed changed, the new values could be set on EF.
SI The absence of sighting vanes could support this conclusion.
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While own course remained constant, the instrument could then keep the rates
as accurately as the settings of enemy course and speed allowed. If the 'Mittlungs Apparat'
gave a different rate from that indicated, or spotting showed that the range-rate or
deflection were incorrect, the enemy bar could be unclamped, the rates corrected, then
the bar reclamped with the new values of enemy speed and inclination. This capability
(the equivalent of the British 'cross-cut') is implicit in the design of the instrument, but it
must be emphasised that the sources consulted do not mention its being used in this way.
If own ship altered course in conditions giving a low speed-across, the inclination
remained nearly constant, although the angle between courses changed considerably. To
reproduce these effects, it would have been necessary to release 'the angle-between-
courses clamp' and clamp the whole enemy dial to the EU bar so that the inclination
could not change. Once again, the existence of this 'inclination-clamp' can only be
inferred from the theory of this type of instrument. If the inference is correct, then the
EU/SV Anzeiger was based on the same approximation used in the British Mark VI
Dumaresq. However, since the German instrument had no compass rings, it would have
been more difficult to correct the inclination errors after a turn made when speed-across
was high.
PRACTICES
After the report of the 1910 practice, the Royal Navy apparently received no
further information on German ranges until, soon after the War began, they obtained full
details of the practices conducted in 1912-13; this information was promptly copied and
printed for circulation in December 1914.32 It showed that the series of practices had
begun for the capital ships in October 1912 with 'Long-range Firing under easy
Conditions'. Runs by the battlecruisers used a target 8 x 60m (26 x 197 feet) towed at only
2 knots; the firing ship proceeded at 12 knots, initially on a parallel course but with a
two-point turn about half way through. Ranges were from as little as 6,250 yards (von der
Tann: 36.1% hits on the target) to 8,100 (Moltke: 15.6% hits). 'Long-range Firing under
difficult conditions' used similar ranges. Targets (sometimes two at once) were towed at
4-5 knots and some exercises included concentration and changing target. During a run
by Ostfiiesland at 14 knots with a 2 point turn, the single target also altered course by 2
32 Admiralty War Staff; Intelligence Division, Germanj. Results of Firing Practices, 1912-13, December 1914,
ADM 137/4799. The following is based on the tables on pp.14-15, 24-27, 34-5 and 44-53.
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points, though the rate was very low; at ranges from 7,650-7,850 yards, 17 .5% hits were
made. In contrast, Westfalen approached the target more steeply, the range falling from
8,300 to 5,700 yards at some 325 yards per minute; she also altered by 2 points but also
increased speed from 12 to 14 knots. She made 5.1% hits.
Between April and July 1913, nearly all the fully worked up German battleships
and battlecruisers carried out practices which are noteworthy in two respects; the ranges
were long, especially when full charges were used: and the targets were moored ships, the
old Sac/zsen, Bayem and Oldenbwg. 33 Thus the Imperial German Navy gave most of its heavy
ships the opportunity to observe the effects of shots falling on and around actual ships: and
to do so at ranges which taxed their skills to the limit. For example, Ostfiiesland steamed at
15 knots, which gave an average rate of 250 yds/min. as the range fell from 15,100 to
13,000 yards; she made only one hit from 36 rounds (2.8%). Posen and Rzeinland, at 12
knots, concentrated on one target at ranges from 16,000 down to 13,900 yards; with the
rate of about 325, they also each made one hit from 36 shots. Both ships fired with full
charges. The new Kaiser and Friederich der Grosse used only 'large practice charges' but their
ranges were, nevertheless, from 14,100 to 12,250 yards; rates were low and they made
11.4 and 9.4% hits, respectively. von der Tann, under similar conditions, scored lO.7% hits
at 13,250-13,650 yards. In all long-range firing at ship targets, even when concentrating,
the rate of fire per gun always lay between 1.1 and 0.7 rounds per minute; this is
equivalent to a salvo every 2 7-43 seconds. These high firing rates suggest that, even in
1913, the Germans were already breaking into rapid fire as soon as they had straddled
their targets.
By 1917, the British had also obtained copies of German reports on the Firing
Practices for 1913-14. Significantly for the Dogger Bank action, one of the schemes of
firing in the long range practice was: 'A running fight from the weather position'.34
However, this information was, almost certainly, not available to Beatty inJanuary 1915,
while the report on the 1912-13 firings may not have arrived in time to warn him to
Four Xassaus, four HeI,golands, Kziser and Frederick der Grosse, Molike and von der Tann took part in the
practice. Goeben was in the Mediterranean; the remaining three Kaisers commissioned May-August 1913.
Erich Gröner, revised DieterJung and Martin Maass, German Warships 1815-1945, Volume I (London, 1990)
pp.8,9,26 and 55. The sketches illustrating Gennany. Finn8 Practices 1912-13 (op. cit.) show three target ships
moored in line.
' German Control of Fire, 1917, p.10. Admiralty, German J'Iavy, Part IVSectians 1, 2 and 4, Gunneiy Information,
November 1917 (C.B. 1182E)p.27, Ca 0105, AL
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expect accurate fire from Hipper's ships at very long range; the post-action reports all




Before the battleships of the Qyeen ElLabeth class joined the fleet, all rangetaking
by the Royal Navy's battleships and battlecruisers depended on 9-foot Barr and Stroud
FQ2 coincidence rangefinders. In theory, the uncertainty of observation for these
instruments was 85 yards at 10,000 yards, increasing to 190 yards at 15,000 yards.'
However, in service conditions and especially in action, these random errors could be
much larger. In 1913, Thunderer, taking eight ranges per minute with three rangefinders,
observed an average spread of 300 yards at 8,000 yards, 700 yards at 9,800 yards
(VanguaTd obtained 23 ranges in 7 minutes from the rangefinder on the Argo mounting).2
Earlier that year, Dreyer and Usborne had warned that, at longer ranges: 'a single range
observation may [be] at 16,000 yards easily as much as 600, 700 or even 800 yards from
the truth':3
 though they did not indicate whether these figures included systematic errors
as well as the spread due to random errors. Nonetheless, after the Dogger Bank action,
Dreyer declared that:
An inspection of a few of the Rangefinder Plots of the Fleet leads one to believe that
excellent results can be obtained roughly speaking up to 15,000 yards in clear weather,
and good results from 15,000 to 17,000 yards and fair above that.4
The Ba,r and Siniud Rangfiuzders issued by Barr and Stroud ... Glasgow, 1906, p.1 9,Ja 190, AL.2 
'Summary of Results': Thunderer, 'Report on Firings carried out at "Empress of India" 8 November
1913': and Vanguard to C.-in-C., Home Fleets in 'Gunnery Practice at Sea: Sinking of HMS Empress of
India 4/11/13' in ADM 1/8346, PRO.
F C Dreyer and C V Usbome, Pollen Aim Coirection System. Part L Technical Hictoiy and Technical Comparison
with Commander F. C. Drper's Fire Control System, printed May 1913, p.19, P.1024, AL
'A few notes on the determination of the most advantageous range at which the Grand Fleet should
engage the High Sea Fleet', n.d. but probably 1915 in DRYR 1/3, CC.
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At Jutland, h-on Dukñ Commander(G) noted: 'Error [spread] reported by Rangefinder
Plot was 500 yards. Range 11,000 yards'.5
Later in the War, the Grand fleet were informed:
An examination of rangeflnder plots obtained at full calibre firings during the third
quarter of 1917 shows that small rangefinder spreads were the exception, and that the
gun range in many cases differed from the mean of the rangefinders by as much as 1000
yds. In more than one instance, an individual rangefinder altered its divergence from
the gun range by 2000 yds. during the firing. Rangefinder rates on the whole were
good, but in some cases all rangefinders of a ship indicated a rate of 200 to 300 yds. per
minute in error.
...for want of a better exphination, these errors have been attributed to refraction, i.e.
the bending of the rays from the target to the rangefinder, due to the opacity of the
atmosphere, smoke, or light effects.
In almost all of the quoted examples (from both 9- and 15-foot rangefinders), the errors,
which did not exceed 1,000 yards, were high. 6
 However, equally large low errors were
observed on another occasion, though these were obtained only with the ship's 1 5-foot
instruments, while the 9-foot rangefmder in the foretop gave much better results. These
phenomena were investigated during and after the War; the tentative conclusion was that
they were due to a combination of the effects of atmospheric refraction and temperature,
aggravated by uneven heating of the rangefinder tube, if the instrument was in direct
sunlight.7
During post-War trials aboard the destroyer ftncIzester, a consistency8
 of 185-330
yards was obtained with the Barr and Stroud 9-foot FQ2 rangefinder when taking about
four ranges per minute between 12,500 and 14,000 yards. These results were obtained
during high-speed runs, so the conditions for rangetaking were more difficult than on a
large ship, even though the rangefinder was on a special anti-vibration mounting. 9
 The
tests used an experimental rapid method of rangetaking, which 'only very slightly
increased' the figure attainable by the usual method, which 'has been found to provide
just over four ranges per minute under vibrationless conditions....Under conditions of bad
or even moderate vibration...only about 2 ranges per minute'
Commander Blake, 'Notes made in the...Gun Control Tower' in ADM 137/302, PRO.
6 
'312. Rangefinder Errors', Grand Fket Gunne,y and Torpedo &den', p.198, ADM 137/293.
Admiralty, Technical History Section, 'Fire Control in N.M. Ships' (fH23), p.33 in The Technical Histoiy
and 1nde A Serial Histoy of Technical Problems dealt with by Admiralty Depamnentr, 1919, AL Admiralty,
Gunnery Branch, Progress in Gunne7y lt'Iatertal 1921, p.9, ADM 186/251 and Progress in Gunne?y Matenal 1922
and 1923, ADM 186/259, p.53.
8 Assumed to be half the spread: see below.





Until 8.2-metre rangefinders were installed in the turrets of Bqyern and Baden,
nearly all German battleships and battlecruisers continued to rely on Zeiss 3-metre
instruments. The tube of the turret model was under the roof, with prismatic objectives
protruding through it. On the control tower, the main tube of the rangefinder rotated
above the roof, while extension tubes brought the images down to the rangetaker in the
tower. Because of the errors arising only in the prismatic ends, the turret rangefinders may
have needed continual adjustment'° and most reliance seems to have been placed on the
control tower rangefinder;
...in the Osifriesland, it was the practice to station a very ski1fu observer [at] the
rangeflnder in the fore control tower, and to use the ranges taken by him for purposes
of controL..."
However, von Hase made no such distinction; he claimed that 'there was seldom a
variation of more than 300m. between any of the rangefmders even at the longest ranges'
and that they 'gave excellent results up to distances of 200 hm.' (20,000 rn or 21,850
yards). An indication of the expected accuracy is that the range scales were graduated in
lOOm. intervals from 10,000 to 15,000 m. and in 200 m. intervals to 20,000 rn.'2
However, if the post-War recollections of Lieutenant-Commander Renken of the German
Navy were correct,
...at the Battle of Jutland the "Derflinger" [sic] can-ied a 6-metre coincidence type
rangefinder on the roof of the gun turrets [sic].
This instrument was constructed by Messrs. Zeiss, but it was not very satisfactory, being
affected by temperature and being defective for definition. It was placed in "Derflinger"
merely to satisfy Commander Von Hasse [sic], who is stated to be a persistent officer
and an advocate of as many rangefinders as can possibly be mounted.
Commander Renken did not think this particular instrument could have been of much
real service on account of its imperfections and its exposed position.
'° Naval Staff Intelligence Department, Report on Interned Gennan Vessels. Gunnery Infonnaiwn, February 1919,
pp.8, 17 and 34-5, ADM 186/240. Naval Staff, Intelligence Division, Reports on Interned German Vessels, Fart V
Gunnery Material, October 1920 (C.B. 1516E), pp.7 and 8, ADMI86/243. Bayeni arid Bade,, had 8.2m.
turret rangefinders. The Royal Navy also believed that the Konig class had 5 and 8m rriqefinders and that
other ships carried '3m or larger': Royal Navy, German Warships of World War I (London, I 992 pp.4, 7, 10
and 24: this reproduces Confidential Books dating from 1918.
SeydliL, 'General Experience', f.272 in Jut1and, Later Reports, f 7 i, ADM 137/1644. Naval Stafl',
Intelligence Department, German Gunnery Infonnaiwn Derived from t'.e Inz€nvgati4rn of Prisoners of War, October
1918 (C.B.01481), p.18, Ca 0108, AL
£2 Georg von Hase, filet and Jutland (London, 1921) pp.1 ' j and 79. Informationfrom PaWs, 1918 (op. cit.) p.22.
The latter stated that, between 15,000 and I7. f',tJm. the graduations were at 150m. This is almost
certainly an error and it is best to ass"e 200m division from 15,000 to 20,000m. From 20,000 to
25,000m, the divisions were 500m
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Renken presented himself as a strong supporter of coincidence rather than stereoscopic
rangefinders, so he does not seem to have had any motive (other than an apparent dislike
of von Hase) for criticising this particular rangefinder more severely than it deserved. Of
course, von Hase was under no obligation to mention experimental rangefinders in his
book but, in the aftermath of defeat, he may also have been inclined to exaggerate the
accuracy of his standard equipment. If his accuracy figures for the Zeiss 3-metre
stereoscopic instrument were correct, it is understandable that the German Navy were in
no hurry to introduce a longer instrument: and general satisfaction with the stereoscopic
principle might have been expected.
In fact, Renken claimed that opinion in his navy was divided and that:
...all the officers he knows, with the exception possibly of Captain Bode, are now strong
advocates of coincidence rangefinders...
He also stated that trials between a Barr and Stroud FQ2 9-foot and a Zeiss 3-metre, held
by the German Admiralty in 1912, had demonstrated the superiority of the Barr and
Stroud instrument. However, he was giving his information to DrJ W French, a director
of the Glasgow firm, though the latter was careful to acknowledge that:
As the opinions of Commander Renken are favourable to Barr and Stroud, the
writer...wishes to emphasise his practical interest in the subject and the possibility that
his impression may unwittingly be biased.
It should be remarked, however, that Messrs. Barr and Stroud have experience of both
types of instruments, the firm having constructed stereoscopic rangefinders as large as
any made by Messrs. Zeiss.
It is even possible that Renken was deliberately misleading his interrogator. However,
French had earlier reported on the opinions of Captain Bode, who had made no attempt
to hide that he was 'an enthusiastic supporter of the stereoscopic rangefinder' and had
claimed that he had 'been responsible for the retention of stereo rangefinders against
much opposition' from officers whose principal objection was 'the small proportion of
observers available and the difficulty of checking their work'.'3
Co1p M1vE Tiuis
After the War, the Royal Navy conducted several series of comparative trials
involving rangefinders from Barr & Stroud, Thomas Cooke and Zeiss. Initially, in 1921,
opinions were still open and it was decided to manufacture a prototype duplex
rangefinder (for use . in the new design of director control tower) containing both
German Gunnery Matenal, 1920 (op. cit.) pp.8-9.
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coincidence and stereoscopic instruments in one tube. However, by 1923, the trials had
not demonstrated any clear-cut superiority of one type over the other. The results of the
fourth series are summarised in the following table, which gives average figures for the
long-term 'accuracy' (based on ranges taken over periods of weeks and months) and the
short-term 'consistency' (a measure of variation within single sequences of readings). The
data are derived from about 30,000 observations taken from June to November 1922 of
fixed objects (at ranges from 15,770 to 20,530 yards) and moving targets at ranges greater
than 10,000 yards.'4
Model Maker Length Type
	 Accuracy (yards) 	 Consistency (yards)
	 Cuts per
______ ______	 Fixed Moving	 Fixed Moving	 minute
FX2	 B&S	 30-ft.	 Coincidence	 344	 583	 104	 190	 4.9
FG4	 B&S	 30-ft.	 Stereo	 336	 671	 78	 234	 4.8
FT24 B&S
	 15-ft.	 Coincidence	 294	 618	 115	 305	 4.6
ZS	 Zeiss	 7.8-rn. Stereo	 285	 490	 144	 298	 4.6
_____ ______ 25.6-ft.
Notes. 1. The report does not give the actual formulae used to calculate accuracy and consistency. Both
were expressed in yards.
2. The consistency for a single sequence of static ranges was probably the mean of the absolute
values of the deviations of the individual ranges from the mean range of the sequence; the
consistency figures in the table were then the average of the consistencies from many sequences.
3. The accuracy figures in the tables for fixed objects were possibly calculated as the mean of the
absolute values of the deviations of the sequence means from the true range (after correction if the
instrument had been adjusted deliberately to read high or low).
4. Ranging sequences were plotted but the report does not state how accuracy and consistency
figures were obtained when objects were moving and ranges changing.
The Zeiss rangefinder was outstanding only in its long-term stability, which was attributed
not to its stereoscopic property but to its more efficient infinity adjuster and to extensive
use of Invar (an alloy with a very low coefficient of thermal expansion). The report
concluded that 'there is little to choose between the two types of rangefinder, provided the
operators observing are equally skilled in rangetaking', although it was accepted that
'under certain circumstances, the stereoscopic rangefinder can obtain ranges when the
coincidence instrument cannot', notably from 'a ship almost enveloped in smoke'.
On the other hand, the stereo rangefinder has certain disadvantages:-
:::The temperamental and physical condition of a stereo operator plays an important
part in rangetaking. Cases occurred in two German ships during the late war where in
consequence of a salvo hitting, every stereo rangetaker had been rendered mentally




incapable of taking a stereoscopic range.'5
...The limited field of selection and the difficulties arising in training and supervising
stereo operators.'6
These objections proved decisive.
It has been decided that the F.X. type of coincidence rangefinder...is better suited for
Naval Service than any other type, and the future policy will be to supply the F.X.
type...wherever conditions of space, etc., admit. This policy will be followed out iic] in
the case of the "Nelson" and "Rodney".
The F.X. type of rangefinder was produced with the idea of improving rangetaking
under poor conditions of light, its main feature being the fitting of enlarged optical parts
for this purpose.'1
However, in the middle of the next World War, even the Royal Navy's latest rangefinder
handbook admitted that:
Most foreign navies use the stereoscopic method, but, as a result of trials, the British
Navy have so far preferred the coincidence rangefinder.'8
UNITED STATES NAVY
In June 1917, Commander Richard T Down RN attended a series of liaison
meetings with the U S Navy in Washington. He reported:
Without exception they express the most profound astonishment in our placing any
reliance on the 9 ft. rangefinder except as a navigational instrument. They maintain
that it cannot be considered as accurate for practical gunnery purposes at ranges over
ten thousand yards.-
That a 12-ft. rangefinder is accurate only up to 12000 yds.
15	 "	 "	 15000"
"	 18-2Oft. "	 "	 "	 18-20000
Unfortunately, Down did not define numerically what was considered 'accurate'. He also
stated that the U S Navy preferred Bausch & Lomb to Barr & Stroud instruments and, at
the instigation of the DNO, Frederic Dreyer, examples of the former were purchased for
the Royal Navy;' 9
 however, comparative trials by Excellent and Warspite found in favour of
the British supplier, though on grounds relating principally to construction; 2° any
difference in accuracy was not mentioned.
One of these cases had been cited by Renken to French (German Gunneiy Matenal, 1920, p.9). If this was
disinformation, it had the desired effect.
16 PGM 1922-3, pp.51 and 56-7.
' ibis p.39. The FM2 duplex coincidence rangefinders installed inXelon and Rodney were designated FM2:
Han bookforN val Rang finders and Inclinometers, 1943. Volume I (p.5O) and Volume II (p.5), AL.
Rang finden and jnclinomete,y, 1943.1 (op. cit.) pp.38-40.
Commander Richard Down to C.-in-C. North America and West Indies, 2lJune and 22Ju1y, 1917 and
DNO's minute, 8 August 1917 in 'United States of America. Naval Co-operation 1918 I', ADM 137/162 1
20 Tec/mwalHistoy, 1919 (op. ciL)p.35.
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Later experience in the U S Navy suggests that the Royal Navy had been right in
1921 to propose that both coincidence and stereoscopic rangefinders should be available:
and that, in both %Vorld Wars, British ships were at some disadvantage in relying solely on
the coincidence type. During the American Long Range Battle Practice of 1939-40:
"...ships were firing into a bad sun glare [and a] surface haze about 200 feet deep which
caused a mirage effect on the horizon". Under these conditions, both Tennessee and
Maiyland found that the usually more dependable stereo range finders were less accurate
than the coincidence types.
Tennessee used two coincidence type 33 foot Mark XXII rangefinders and one 15 foot
Mark XXXVIII stereo rangefinder during the shoot, noting that "Normally the latter is
the ship's best range finder.2
CoNcwsIoNs
Do these sources permit a comparison between the accuracies of the 9-foot Barr
& Stroud FQ2 coincidence rangefinder and the Zeiss 3-metre stereoscopic instrument?
Firstly, the available figures for the FQ2 indicate that a spread of about 500
yards was attainable in good conditions, but only up to 15,000 yards or so. Secondly, Dr
French's conversations and the performance in comparative trials of the Zeiss 7.8-metre
instrument suggest that von Hase's claims (a spread of seldom more than 300m. up to
distances of 20,000m.) were exaggerated. However, while the accuracies of the Barr &
Stroud 9-foot and Zeiss 3-metre may well have been comparable below 15,000 yards, the
German instrument probably maintained its accuracy better at greater ranges. And there
is no reason to doubt that, in the hands of a steady rangetaker gifted with stereoscopic
vision, it was much better at ranging on a target almost shrouded in smoke.
These conclusions assume equally well trained rangetakers. 22 The specially
selected operators of the stereoscopic German instruments needed intensive training,23
and the accurate shooting of Flipper's ships at the Dogger Bank and Jutland leaves little
doubt that it was provided. In contrast, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 6, there must be
doubts about the general standard of training of the Royal Navy's rangetakers, though
some squadrons (the 2BS), or even individual ships within a squadron (Princess Royal), were
evidently better practised than others.
WJJurens, 'The Evolution of Battleship Gunnery in the U.S.Navy, 1920-1945' in Warship International,
Volume XXVIII, No.3, 1991, pp.252 and 269 (reference courtesy Professor Andrew Larnbert).
Comments by Captain Peter Grindal, RN on the previous draft of this appendix.
Peter Padfield, Guns at &a (London, 1974) p.259.
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I. CHARTS
The charts cited in the main text 1
 and in Note 8 are from a series: 'Prepared by
the Operations Division of the Naval Staff under the Superintendence of Captain J.E.T.
Harper MVO, RN and produced by the Hydrographic Department'. The history of
Harper's record until its eventual publication in 1927 is described in The Jellicoe Papers,
Volume 11:2 and in Captain Roskill's Bealty. 3 The Record and track charts were completed
on 2 October 1919.
The chart for the 'First phase 2 p.m. to 3.40 p.m.' shows )'Iew Zealand having
turned through 16 points to starboard from 3.34 to 3.38 and having half completed the
second 16-point turn to port at 3.40. This suggests that she steadied on course E no earlier
than 3.42.
2. HIPPER'S FIRE DISTRIBUTION SIGNAL
The German 'Sunmiary of Messages' contains the signal 'Distribution of fire
from the left' with a time received of 3.30. However, it is listed between signals received at
3.37 and 34Ø•5 '3.30' is almost certainly a misprint and should read either 3.39 or 3.40.
'Battle ofJutland. Battle Cruiser Action. First Phase 2 p.m. to 3.40 p.m. May 31st 1916', BTY 24/49
NMM.
2 A Temple Patterson (ed.) The Jellicoe Papers, Volume H (Navy Records Society, 1968) pp.399-404 and
458-490.
Stephen Roskill, Admiral of the Fleet Earl BedttJ (New York, 1981) Chapter 15.
Jel&oePapersH(op. ciL)p.464.
V E Tarrant, Jutland. German Perspective (London, 1997) Appendix 10, 'Summary of the More Important
Wireless Messages and Visual Signals Relating to the Battle ofJutland'; the iSO signals are in Appendix
XXVII.
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3. Biur,s lD RATES ON THE APPROACH
The target bearings recorded in lion and Princess Royal from the turn E at 3.30
until fire was opened were as follows. These are bearings relative to ship's head. R stands
for Red i.e. the bearings are all off the port bow.6







It is difficult to explain why Lion's target bearing at 3.35 was as high as R32. Her course
was E until at least 3.43, after which she turned 2 points onto ESE. 7
 Since speed-across
was very low throughout (see below) the target compass bearing remained almost constant.
Thus any change in relative bearing from ship's head would have been due only to course
changes. Since the bearing was R42 at 3.47'/2, it should have been R20 until Lion began
her turn at 3438 The following calculations assume this value, which is the same as
Princess Royal's at 3.39. Perhaps Lion veered momentarily to the South by one point around
3.35; this would certainly have helped Princess Royal in avoiding the flagship's smoke.
At 3.42, when Lion obtained a range of 20,000 yards, the courses and bearings
were as shown in Fig. XXVI. 1 overleaf The 1 SG had completed its 15-point turn at
about 3.39. It is therefore unlikely that they had yet worked up to the 18 knots then
ordered by Hipper; 9
 a speed of 15 knots is assumed in the following calculation of the rate.
At 3.42, from equations 2:1 to 2:6:
= 33.78(15 cos 65-24 cos - 20) = —548 yds/min.
(The rate would have been -505 yds/min. had the enemy speed been 18 knots.)
x = 15 sin 65 + 24 sin —20 = 5.386 knots.
6 
'Record of Events during Action of May 31st compiled from Records kept in Control Position and
Transmitting Station. H.M.S. lion' in BTY 6/6. 'H.M.S. "PRINCESS ROYAL", Fore T.S. Record of
Action, 31st May 1916' in ADM1 16/1487, PRO.
Lion, 'Record of Events' (op. cit.). 'Track of BCF 11.0 PM to IX.24 PM, 31/5/16 in 'Jutland. Plans,
Diagrams, Track, Charts, Photographs, &c, ADM 137/303.
Two points equals 22'/2°.
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SSE
FIG. XXVI.I: Acm OR Es vfAmt) CoURSES, Sus AI Bius
At 3.47Y2, when the true range was 16,000 yards and the iSO can be assumed to have
reached 18 knots:
= 33.78(18 cos 87— 24 cos —42) = —571 yds/min.




R	 16000 -. ysmmmm.
Thus, especially after the 1 SG altered by 2 points to SSE at 3.44, the speed-across was low
while courses were steady. Since lion probably altered course by one point each at 3.43
and 3.46, the angle between courses never varied much from 450W To estimate the earlier
actual ranges approximately, assume that the rate was -548 yds/min. until 3.44'/2 and
then -571 yds/min. Thus the ranges at 3.46 and 3.42 were about 16,900 and 19,100
yards respectively and, at 3.42:




	 19, 100	 = 1.7 yds/min.
Hence the assumption of a near-constant rate is confirmed.
4. Lu OF BEARING
If a course or intended course of ships in line ahead is such that the wind comes
from any direction on the non-engaged side, smoke is carried towards the enemy,
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resulting in smoke interference.
To avoid this, it is necessary to
I
Enemy ',earIng	
form on a line of bearing
ESE	 before it in the line.
inclined on the engaged side;
each ship can then steam ahead







three ships on course ESE at 24
knots, with an enemy bearing
East and North. In a wind from
the West of 7 knots, the smoke is
carried towards the enemy at an angle which can be obtained from the triangle of
velocities ABC; in the time the ship takes to travel from A to B, the smoke emitted at A is
carried by the wind to C.
CB 2 =7 2 ^242 -2x7x24 cos22.5
CB= 17.74
CB AC
sin 22.5 = sinfl
Therefore /1=8.7°
Fig. XXVI.3 overleaf shows how, by forming a line of bearing NW from the
leading ship, all ships on a course ESE are freed from smoke interference. How were
Beatty's ships to manoeuvre into this formation from their course E in column?
Firstly, what discretion was allowed to individual ships should they suffer from
smoke interference? Battle Orders for the battlecruisers emphasised that:
...Much must be left to the initiative and judgement of Captains. They are relied upon
to act promptly in battle on their own initiative for dealing with all cases such as the
following:-
(d) Hauling out of the wake of next ahead to avoid smoke or backwash. N. B. It is
desirable that ships should not haul out more than 1 point, lest they hamper the
squadron when turning in succession. If 1 point is insufficient, ships should avoid smoke
interference by opening out.
(e) Altering line of bearing from Flag in order to get a clearer arc of fire.
(1) Or any other case in which Captains consider that prompt action is needed, and
their movements are such as the Rear Admiral would certainly approve if they could be
made known to him beforehand. The chief limitation in these cases is that no




movement must mask the
fire of other ships, or in any
way inconvenience them







Une of bearing NW
While these orders gave sufficient
scope for adjustments to relative
bearings and distances between
ships, they did not, and could not,
cover major changes of formation,
which required clear signals from
the flagship.
The following analysis of
the signals made from Lion has benefited greatly from advice concerning fleetwork in
general and line-of-bearing manoeuvres kindly provided by Captain Peter Grindal RN,"
who emphasises that:
A key point which needs to be borne in mind in consideration of fleetwork manoeuvres
is which ship is the guide of the formation at any instant. It is the responsibility of each
ship to achieve and maintain her correct range and bearing (true or relative as
appropriate) from the Guide, not the next in line....in the absence of other orders from
Beatty and Pakenham, the Guide of the IBCS was lion and of the 2BCS, Xew Zealand
With the squadrons in one formation the Guide would, similarly, be Lion.
This last was the situation once the 2BCS had joined the line at 3.42 or shortly thereafter.
Then, at 3.43 according to Beatty's Personal Narrative, the signal to 'Form on a line of
bearing NW' was hoisted:' 2
 while both this narrative and the British 'Record of Messages'
agree that it was made executive at 3.45. However, the 'Record of Events' from Lion's TS
shows a one-point alteration to starboard at 3.43 and another starboard turn (its extent
unspecified) at 3.46.' These must be related to lion's next manoeuvring signal, 'Alter
course together to ESE', though its timing is uncertain. In the 'Record of Messages' it is
° 'Confidential Battle Orders for 1st BCS', 17 July 1913 in Brian McL Ranft (ed.) The Beaty Papers, Volume
I (Aldershot, 1989) pp.74-S.
" The present author (who must take full responsibility for any remaining errors) is very grateful for this
advice and for the many helpful comments on the previous drafts of this chapter and its appendices:
Captain Peter Grindal RN to the author, I9June 2001.
12 
'Battle of 31st May: Narrative of Events' in 'Action with the German High Sea }leet, 31st May - 1st
June 1916. VABCFs Personal Records', BTY 6/3 (Appendix XXVII1). Appendix H, 'Record of Messages
bearing on the Operation' in Baule ofjutland. Official Despatches with Appendices (London, 1920) pp.449-50
(Appendix XXVII).
" Lion, 'Record of Events'. All three sources give Lion's first salvo at 3.47/47V2 , so, at this stage, their
timings are well synchronised.







FIG. XXVL4: FoRM ON A LINE OF BEAIUNG NW
the next flag signal and also timed at 3.45. Yet the Personal Narrative puts it two minutes
later, in the same hoist as the signal to open fire. How could Beatty's ships have
interpreted these signals, made as the flagship turned to starboard to ESE?
At 3.45, the ordered course was still E. Therefore the normal response to 'Form
on a line of bearing NW' was for the Guide to maintain her E'ly course and for the other
ships to haul out to port and increase speed until they had taken up their new stations (Fig.
XXVI.4).'4
 If the normal separation between ships (3 cables or about 600 yards) was
preserved, this manoeuvre required over 10 minutes, even assuming that Lion did not
exceed 24 knots' 5
 and that Indefatigable (with the greatest distance to cover) had worked up
to 27 knots. This time could have been reduced by larger turns to port (though at the cost
of extending the line): for example, to less than 8 minutes if Indefatigable had turned by 2
points.'6
 But this would have taken her directly towards the German line, further
increasing the rate and, in effect, crossing her own 'T'. Thus, whatever the actual
stationing courses, forming the line of bearing by turns to port was certainly inappropriate
to Beatty's tactical situation.
It is therefore very unlikely that Beatty intended his first signal to be acted on in
this way. Perhaps the hoisting of the signal as Lion turned to starboard was an indication
that something different was required, though such a small turn would not have been easy
to see through smoke. However, the second signal made clear that the Guide was (or soon
' This and the next figure are redrawn from Grindal to author (op. cit.) Figs. 1 and 2.
British 'Record of Messages' (op. cit.), signals to 5BS at 4.18 and from Beatty at 3.35.
Times and distances can be calculated using relative velocity triangles.
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Course E
Alter course together to ESE
Form on a hne of bearing NW
Line of bearing
FIG. XXVLS: FORMING A Lnm OF BEARING NW, CouisE ESE	 NW
would be) steering ESE. It required the other ships to recalculate their stationing courses,
as in Fig. XXVI-5 (which assumes the simpler case of the course signal being received
before any ships actually turned to port). As it happened, Indefatigable could have held her
course E and, with the other courses shown, the line-of-bearing NW could then have been
formed in slightly less than 7 minutes. Thus, if perfectly executed, this manoeuvre was
capable of achieving the desired change in course and formation - from E in column to
ESE on a line-of-bearing NW: but no earlier than 3.52.
In reality, the conditions were hardly favourable for such a complex evolution
and, in any case, the line-of-bearing could not have been formed as intended. The smoke
which obscured the targets must also have interfered with signalling: while the Germans
opened fire at least 5 minutes before the manoeuvre could have been completed. The two
signals were made separately, perhaps with as much as two minutes between them. This
could have been yet another signalling mistake by Beatty's flag-lieutenant, Ralph
Seymour.' 7
 It was potentially confusing and, the greater the delay before the second
signal, the more likely it was that some ships would have altered course to port before
having to veer back to starboard. At 3.49, at least 3 minutes before the line of bearing NW
could have been established, Lion began a series of unsignalled turns to starboard
(XXVI-9). If further smoke interference was to be avoided, the new courses required a
line-of-bearing swinging ever more E'ly, but Beatty gave no further manoeuvring orders
and his other ships were left to use their initiative as best they could. The 2BCS held to
the course E until 3.54 and then turned sharply to SSE;'8 thus they probably never
For Seymour's record, see Andrew Gordon, The Rules ofthe Game (London, 1996) p.93 et seq.
'Tracing of track followed by Second Battle Cruiser Squadron...' in ADM 137/303 but originally
attached to 'Second Battle Cruiser Squadron. Report on Action of 31st May 1916', 3June 1916 in ADM
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received the two earlier signals. Because of smoke, it is possible that the signal also did not
reach 7Iger, but her courses are too uncertain to give any clear indication one way or the
other.
The delays and risks inherent in the two manoeuvring signals made by lion were
not even necessary.
A much neater, quicker and more firmly controlled way of achieving the formation
Beatty wanted would have been to turn in succession (a wheel) to SE, which would have
formed the line of bearing, using a simple equal-speed manoeuvre, in about 4 minutes
at 25 knots. Then, if he really wanted to steer ESE, he could have executed a turn
together, taking about a minute, once Indefaiigabk had steadied on SE....'9
A final point concerns the charts provided by Campbell and Tarrant for the
period under consideration, which are very similar to Marder's. They show the line of
bearing being established by 3.48, with all ships then turning together to ESE. In the
formation of the line of bearing, Tger is represented as maintaining the course E, with the
2BCS turning to port and the rest of the IBCS to starboard. 2° These courses would have
been a permissible response to an order to form line-of-bearing NW, but only if Tger it
had already been designated as the Guide instead of Lion. 2 ' No such signal appears in any
of the sources.
5. TURRET TRAINING ANGLES
From 3.30 to 3.43, the enemy was only about 200 off Lionc port bow. By 3.47-8,
the reported target bearings from both Lion and Princess Royal were R42 (XXVI-3);
however, notes made in Lion's TS give a bearing of R30, at the very limit of the forward
bearing of the after turrets.John Campbell concluded from her ammunition records that
Lion's initial salvoes were indeed solely from the forward turrets and that Molt/ce was still
only 300 off Tger's bow at 3.51;24 furthermore, a survivor from Qyeen Mary also recalled
that she too opened fire with only her fore turrets.25
137/302. See further XXVI-12.
Grindal to author.
20 Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnozght to Scapa Flow, Volume III (Oxford, 1978) Chart 4. NJ M Campbell,
JutlawL An analysis of the fightuzg (London, 1986) pp.44-5. Tarrant, Gennan Perspective (op. cit.) p.79. Gordon,
Rules of the Game (op. cii.) p.1 14 shows all Beatty's ships turning to port.
2! Grindal to author.
'Notes made by Sub-Lieutenant R P Selby in charge of T.S. of HMS Lion...' in papers of Captain R P
Selby, 96/20/1, IWM.
23 Plan 'HMS QjreenMay 1913' inJohn Roberts, Baa nasers (London, 1997).
Campbell, Analysis (op. cit.) p.39.
Lion, 'Record of Events'. Princess Royal, 'Record of Action' (op. cit.). Campbell, Analysis, p.39. Recollections
of Midshipman J H lloyd-Owen (X turret) in M W Williams, 'The Loss of HMS Queen Mary at Jutland'
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The 2BCS opened fire at 3.51 but they did not alter course, from E to SSE, until
3.54. Thus her first six rapid salvoes were fired with a target bearing of about R20 and
can have come only from her fore and port wing turrets.
The courses illustrated in Fig. XXVI-5 suggest that it is probable that the after
turrets of 7ger and Qlseen Maiy were at the limits of forward training, so even slight
variations in course, or momentary yaws, would have prevented their returning fire
immediately. However, this conclusion is less likely to apply to Lion or Princess RoyaL
6. WIND AND Vjsmiu-ry.
...the weather was misty in patches, the visibility varying from 12 to 6 miles; wind west,
force 3; sea calm.V
The weather was misty in patches, and the visibility was varying from eleven to six
miles. The sea was calm and there was a light westerly breeze.
The day was hazy and fine with practically no wind. I should put the visibility down as
between 7 and 10 miles, varying in patches. Smoke also added occasionally to the
haziness, but I was rather impressed by the little smoke interference there was.
At 3.57 p.m. we heard from the Lion that they were engaging the enemy....
The weather at this time was clear, but with patches of thin mist near the horizon, and
visibility approximately 16,000 yards; the wind was S.W., force 2, and the sea smooth.3°
At [4] p.m....the Indefatigable blew up....
The north-westerly wind was blowing the smoke from the English guns between them
and us. As a result of this, their view was often hampered and shooting made more
difficult.3'
As at [5.20]p.m....the visibility, which had hitherto been good, became less so. The
wind had backed from North-West through West to South-West.32
As soon as we opened fire (and by "we" I mean our B. C.'s) the Germans opened fire as
well, if not before... whilst our own B. C.'s were only a mile or so from us, the Germans
were about 20,000 [sic] yards away and against a dark grey background, whilst we were
silhouetted against the Western sky.33
in D McLean and A Preston (eds.) Wars/zip 1996(London, 1996), p.113.
'Second BCS Report' (op. ciL). H.M.S. "NEW ZEALAND", 'Action tb Gennan Fleet 31st May 1916.
Record of Ranges, Rates, etc. Compiled from Transmitting Station & Control Top Records' in
ADM1 16/1487.
27 
'Narrative of...the Gunnery Officer of H.M.S. "Tiger" in H W Fawcett and G W W Hooper, The
ghtuzg at juthind (London, 1921) p.423.
Admiral Sir Henry Peily, 300,000 Sea Miles. AnAutobigrap/y (London, 1938).
Captain, Xew Zealand to RAC, 2BCS, 'Report of Action of 31st May 1916', 2 June 1916 in ADM
137/302.
'Narrative from H.M.S. "Indomitable" in Fighting atjutland (op. ciL) p.243.
' Georg von Hase, Ale! and Jutland (London, 1921) pp.153-4.
'Report by the Commander-in-Chief of the German High Sea Fleet on the Battle ofJutland', appendix
to Battle ofjutlaiuL OjicialDespatches (op. di.).
" 
'The Diaries of Stephen King-Hall' in L King-Hall (ed.) Sea Saga (London, 1935) p.45 1. Stephen
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...whereas we had behind us to the westward a clear sky and a horizon which
silhouetted our ships clearly, the enemy ships were difficult to discern. Behind them to
the eastward there was a dull grey sky and a misty horizon; spotting for us was therefore
difficult and for him much easier.M
7. Liori's RANGES
At 3.42, Lion's TS recorded a rangefinder range of 20,000 yards, an error of
+900 yards on the calculated value (XXVI-3). The rate was estimated by her TS as -300
yds/min., though it was assumed to be falling in magnitude; the previous values were -400
yds/min. at 3.39 and -900 yds/min. at 3.35. At 3.42, the assumption was 'Enemy corse
[sic] 23 to right' i.e. the inclination was +23°. If the target bearing was then R20, this
placed the 1 SG on an almost parallel course to the British battlecruisers. It is also possible
to calculate the enemy speed (e) which must have been set on lion's Dumaresqs.
—300 = 33.78(e cos 23-24 cos - 20)
Thus	 e=14.9knots
which was reasonable enough since Hipper's ships had clearly made a large turn about;
the TS recorded their course as '130 to left' at 3.30.
Lion's second recorded rangefinder range was 18,500 yards at 3.46, 1,600 yards
higher than the estimated actual value. Even so, the two ranges show a fall of 1,500 yards
in 4 minutes, an implied rate of -375 yds/min.
At 3.47'/a, the rate in use in the TS was -150 yds/min. Their estimate of the
enemy speed is not known but they probably assumed that Hipper was still working up to
a speed nearer to that of Lion; a rate of increase of 1 knot per minute since 3.42 would
then have given a speed of almost 21 knots. It is then possible to calculate the probable
inclination (i) in use:
—150=33.78(21 cosz-24 cos —42)
Thus:	 i=50°
Since the target bearing was then 42°, this again placed the two forces on almost parallel
courses. If, instead, the TS had used the enemy course of SE sent by wireless toJellicoe,
the angle between courses would have been 22V2° and the inclination 64'/2°. Thus the
opening rate would have been:
King-Hall was the Control Officer in the After Control of Southampton
Lord Chatfield, The ..Mwy and Defince (London, 1942) P.141. Note the similarities in vocabulary with the
King-Hall diaries published earlier.
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= 33.78(21 cos 64.5-24 cos - 42) = —297 yds/min.
i.e. almost double that actually used, though still too small by -274 yds/min.
8. ENnr COURSE
The enemy course was given in Beatty's signal toJellicoe as 'S 550 E'. This is a
course relative to True North. The magnetic variation in 1916 was 131/40 W,35 so it was
equivalent to (180-55+13 '/4)= 138 1/0 Magnetic.
SE is 135° magnetic, the LSG's actual course until 3.44.
9. Lion's CouRSE 3.47-4.00
The courses (magnetic) measured off the BCF's track chart are tabulated below,
together with the times and the nearest compass point. The times without brackets appear
on the original track chart. 36 Those in brackets are taken from the charts prepared in
1919 by Captain Harper (XXVI-1); despite small angular differences, the courses shown
on these later charts differ by less than one compass point: except for the course after 3.52,
which was SEbyS rather than SE.37
Time	 Course angle	 Compass






In contrast, Lion's TS recorded 'Ship A/C to Starboard' at 3.43 (by 1 point), 3.46, 3.49,
3.50'/2, 3.52'/2, 3.55 and 4.00. Such continual course alterations compare poorly with
'that steady course which is so important for gunnery'.39
'Remarks on Lord Jellicoe's Comments' in 'Observations on the Narrative of the Battle of Jutland',
ADM 116/3188.
'Track of BCF (op. cit.).
'Battle ofJutland. Battle Cruiser Action. Second Phase 3.40 to 5 P.M., May 31st 1916', BTY 24/51.
Lion, 'Record of Events'.
Chatfield, Nary and Definc€ (op. cit.) p.134.
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F,incess Royal ________ _______	 Lion
Gun range Target	 Time	 Time Target Rangefinder
_________ bearing
	 _______ ______ bearing range
16,000	 ___________ 3.47.35 3.47'/2 R42	 ___________
R42	 3.48.05 3.48	 R45
14,600	 ___________ 3.48.53 ______ ________ ___________
14,700	 ___________ 3.49.36 3.49	 R53	 ___________
R78	 3.50.05 3.50	 R57	 15,500
14,200	 __________ 3.50.15 _____ _______ __________
13,200	 __________ 3.51.15 3.51	 R78	 __________
R893.52	 3.52	 R89	 ___________
12,800	 R108	 3.53	 3.53	 R108
3.53 .45	 ________ ___________
	
________ 3.54	 R107	 14,500
R115	 3.55.05 3.55	 R105
12,800	 ___________ 3.55.15
	
_________ __________ _______ 3.56 R115 	 15,000
_________ __________ ______ 3.57 R118 __________
________ _________ ______ 3.58 R114 _________
_________ __________ _______ 3.59 R114 __________
________ _________ ______ 4.00 R114 _________








19,100	 __________ 4.06.50 4.06	 R126
__________ _______ 4.07 R127 __________
	
4.08	 R127	 (Sight range
___________ ___________ ________ ______ ________ 21,400)
_________ __________ _______ 4.09 R120 __________
__________ __________ _______ 4.10 R102 __________




__________ _______ 4.13 R81	 __________
	
4.14 R78	 _________
18,500	 4.15.28 4.15	 R80	 (Sight range




__________ _______ 4.17 R84 	 _________
18,500	 4.18.05 4.18	 R87
18,500	 __________ 4.18.45 ______ _______ __________
18,500	 __________ 4.19.50 4.19 	 R107
	
_______ 4.20 R106	 __________
17,700	 ___________ 4.21.28 4.21 	 R107	 18,800
etc.	 etc.
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JO. TARGET BEARINGS AND RANGES
The table on the previous page is based firstly on Princess Royal's 'Fore T.S.
Record of Action' and lists the 'ranges...on the transmitter when actually firing' and the
target bearings from the first salvo until 4.19.50. Notice that the almost complete gap in
the record after the breakdown of the Argo Tower; this continued after the hit at about
4.00, following which gas and fumes reached the TS. The table also shows the target
bearings from Lion's 'Record of Events'; unfortunately, this contains only a few
rangefmder ranges and even fewer sight ranges.4°
Both sets of target bearings suggest that Lion and Princess Royal, which initially
both fired at LQLow, followed similar courses until after 4.00. lion's bearings rapidly
increase between 4.00 and 4.02 before she swung back onto her new course S; they also
confirm her turn to SE at 4.10-13 and to SSE at 4.18/19.
II. P,jiicss Roi'i
Rear-Admiral de B. Brock, who commanded the 1BCS in Princess Royal, reported
that, as the British returned fire:
The action then became general, the enemy rate of fire being greater than ours due to
conditions of light and wind.4'
The prindpal effect of wind was to cause smoke interference to those ships firing to
leeward. The Admiral may have been referring only to problems from Princess Royal's own
funnel and cordite smoke but, in a light Westerly breeze, this should not have been
serious. Princess Royal's record shows that she fired her first five salvoes in only 3 minutes,
40 seconds: but then only two more in the next four minutes. if she was attempting to
maintain her distance from the flagship, she would have found it increasingly difficult to
keep out of lion's smoke, which appears to be the most likely cause of her reduced firing
rate. Her slow firing, even before she was hit, seems to have been noticed by Beatty; at
3.55 or perhaps later, Lion made the general signal to 'Increase the rate of fire'.42
The sources for the course of Princess Royal after 4 o'clock are contradictory. The
target bearing for 4.01.20 suggests that she had already turned to course S. In contrast,
her officers later recalled:
40 Princess Royal, 'Record of Action'. Lion, 'Record of Events'.
" 'Notes on Action' with RAC 1BCS to VAC BCF, 3June 1916 in ADM 137/302.
42 British 'Record of Messages'.
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Our destroyers (at about 4.2) were between us and the enemy and their smoke together
with the smoke from Lion's guns which was drifting across our range, was becoming a
serious nuisance to our gun control. At 4.6 we altered a point to starboard, to South, to
avoid the smoke, and for 10 minutes the range opened until we were firing at ranges
between 18,000 and 19,000 yards....At 12 minutes past 4 we had to check fire for a
while and we turned back to [SSE], 20 degrees more towards the enemy, to dose the
range....
lion's relative position is not mentioned, but, wherever she was, it is difficult to understand
how a turn to starboard would have helped in avoiding her smoke. A third source is the
small track tracing submitted by Rear-Admiral Brock with his report on the battle. Prior
to the 16-point turn at 4.38, this shows only three courses:
770 after 3.29
104° after 3.45 and
158° after 4.10.
These courses must be True courses and, therefore, are equivalent to Magnetic courses of
E, ESE and SbyE respectively. However, this is the only indication that Princess Rqyal held
to course ESE and turned, but only to SbyE, as late as 4.10.
In the sketched chart (Fig. 6.1), Princess Royal and Qjseen Mary are shown turning
from SbyE to S just after 4 o'clock. However, it is also possible that this turn, and the next
turn from S to SSE, shown at 4.12, could have been later.
12. RANGES, RATES ANt) CoURSES 3.47-4.10
At the start of the action, Princess Royal, Derfflinger's target, was firing at Liitzow.
Even so, as shown by the table overleaf, until the break in Princess Royal's record at 3.55,
there is quite good agreement between her ranges and those published by von Hase for
Derffiurger, even after the German times have been advanced by one minute to synchronise
the times when fire was opened. De-ifflinger's range reached a minimum of 12,350 yards
after 3.53; by 3.54, it was 12,575 yards. Likewise, Princess Royal's range had stopped falling
at 3.53 and was still 12,800 yards at 3.55. At 3.56, Princess Royal was hit twice. At the same
time, von Hase increased the rate to +600 (+660 yds/min.). 45
 This is considerably more
than would be expected from lion's courses after 3.55 (SbyE) if it is assumed that Hipper
' 
'Narrative from Officers of H.M.S. "Princess Royal" 'in Fighting at jutland, p.19.
'PRINCESS ROYAL Enclosure 13 to BCF 01 of I2June 1916' in ADM 137/303.
Princ&cs Roya4 'Record of Action', von Hase (op. cit.) pp.l45, 147, 152 and Sketch 1. Pci,ww Royal's times
are truncated to the nearest minute. Deri,ffluziger's ranges in metres are converted at 1 metre= 1.0936 yards
and rounded to the nearest 25 yards.
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Time hinces Royal	 Deffiinger
YardS	 metres	 yards
3.47	 16,000	 15,000	 16,400
3.48	 14,600
3.49	 14,700
3.50 14,200	 ________ ________








held to SSE until 4.00. From 3.56, Lion's target bearing was almost steady at Ri 14, so the
angle between courses would have been 11 ¼° and the indination 102/4°; hence:
= 33.78(18 coslO2.75-24 cos -114)= 196 yds/min.
The high rate adopted by von Hase might explain why he did not continue hitting his
target after 3.56: except that another hit was made about 4.00, one minute after
Denfflinger's range had reached 16,625 yards; thus her mean total rate from 3.54 to 3.59
was a very high 809 yds/min. (the difference from the clock rate would be accounted for
by UP spotting corrections).
As can be seen from the previous table, Lion's rangefmder ranges show a similar
upward trend from a minimum at 3.54 of 14,500 yards. Her TS record contains very few
gun ranges, though it does give rates and spotting corrections. If, starting with the gun
range of 18,500 yards at 3.47Y2, subsequent gun ranges are calculated, they fall to a
minimum of 13,325 at 3.55/6, then increase rapidly to 15,650 at 4.00 and 16,200 at 4.01.
Thus they also show a similar though more marked trend than her rangefinder ranges.
Beatty's Personal Narrative contains two ranges: 14,300 at 3.56 and 14,600 at 4.02: but
the second (recorded when the flagship was being hit repeatedly) is probably wrong.
Thus, apart from this one anomaly, the known ranges for the leading ships show
similar trends, falling to a minimum of less than 13,000 yards before increasing again to
over 16,500 yards at about 4.00. Unfortunately, the ranges for the ships astern of
Lion, 'Record of Events'. Campbell, Anaiysis, p.70. von Haze, p.152.
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Derfflinger and Pincess Royal are more difficult to reconcile. The Qificial German Account
contains the following range'information.
...the "Indefatigable"...had hardly been under fire for 15 minutes from the "von der
Tann" when at 5.3 p.m. [4.03] it was observed from that vessel how, after several fierce
explosions , amidships and aft, the British battle cruiser disappeared....52, 11-inch and
38, 6-inch shells fired from the "von der Tann" at ranges from 17,000 yards (11-inch)
and 15,250 yards (6 inch) down to 13,450 yards had sufficed to secure this result. At the
order "change target to the left" the "von der Tann" now transferred her attention to
the fifth ship, the "New Zealand", at which 52 rounds were fired from the heavy guns at
from [sic] 13,450 yards to 17,500 yards range, before the course of the battle
necessitated a further change of target [to Barham at 4.18].
Although not unambiguous, this passage seems to imply that the range from von der Tann
did not reach 13,450 until just before the Indefatigable blew up: that the range on the sights
was not changed when von der Tann shifted her fire to Xew Zealand: but that the range then
increased. Yet, on the following page, the account continues:
...Between 5.4 p.m. and 5.8 p.m., when the range was between 11,500 and 10,400
yards, "Moltke" considered the time ripe for the employment of her torpedo
armament....She fired altogether four torpedoes at the third battle cruiser ("Queen
Maiy")....
In contrast, von Hase's next ranges for Derffiinger were 18,000 metres (19,675 yards) at
4.05 and 19,000 metres (20,775 yards) at 4.08!
Yet there are similar large differences in ranges between the leading British ships
and their consorts astern. The reported courses of the 2BCS would suggest that the actual
range fell rapidly until 3.54 but then increased more slowly until 4.00, when New Zealand
altered to course S. In fact, between 3.51 and 3.54, her gun range plummeted from
18,100 to 12,500 yards while her rate was increased from -200 to -500 yds/min; thus most
of the reduction must have been the result of very large DOWN spotting corrections.
Unfortunately, there is then a gap in her rate record, but the gun range continued to fall
to a minimum of 10,800 yards at 3.56. Just before her course alteration at 4.00, the rate
was nil: while the range of her last salvo at Moltke, at 4.01, was 13,800 yards. She then
transferred to von der Tann, the first salvo being timed at 4.04, when the rate was 250
yds/min. opening and the range 14,100; by 4.08'/2, the range was 16,000. Since she
Admiralty, Naval Staff, The Battk ofJutland (The Geiman Official Account), May 1926 from Der Kñeg zw See,
1914-1918, North Sea by Captain 0 Groos, trans. Lieut.-Commander W T Bagot, RN, pp.61-2, AL von
Hase, p.152 and Sketch I.
'Second BCS. Report on Action', 3June 1916 in ADM 137/302. New Zealand, 'Record of Ranges' (op.
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made no hits, J'Iew Zealand's ranges cannot be exact and her minimum was much lower
than von der Tann'r, nevertheless, both ships were using similar ranges just after 4 o'clock.
7ger was also shooting at Molt/ce. Like Xew Zealand, her initial range was much
too high (18,500 yards) and she was forced to make a series of large DOWN spotting
corrections; these reduced the gun range to 15,700 yards by 3.54, when both Q and X
turrets were put out of action. Thus 7ger could no longer fire salvoes; her record lists 20
ranges in the next 9^ minutes, which suggests that she was firing guns singly or in pairs
whenever they were ready (see also XXVI-16). She also continued to be hit, while her
gunnery effectiveness was further reduced by smoke interference from British destroyers
and from enemy shorts. Her ranges went on falling, to a minimum of 10,500 yards at
4.00'/2; they then increased to 11,700 at 4.02, 12,200 at 4Ø33/4 and 14,300 at 4.08.05.
Thus the range values are not greatly different from Xew Zealand's, but they tended to lag
in time; 7ger's minimum range was not reached until four minutes later. In view of her
desperate circumstances, 7ger's ranges must be suspect but, even so, she probably made
the underwater hit on Molike timed by Campbell at '1602 or just afterwards'. 5° Perhaps,
therefore, Molt/ce's range of 11,500 yards at 4.04 is not out of the question, though a
reduction to 10,400 at 4.08 remains hard to credit.
Do the ranges and rates for the leading ships follow a trend that would be
expected from the recorded courses? As described in Chapter 6, at 3.44 Hipper turned his
ships together from SE to SSE: which placed them oir a line of bearing from the flagship
of NW. From 3.49, Lion and Princess Royal made a series of small turns away which, by
3.55, brought them onto course SbyE; thus the rate of their ranges on LQtzow must have
changed from closing to opening. At 3.53, Hipper ordered the 1SG to 'Follow in the wake
of the leading ship'. Marder, Campbell and Tarrant have assumed that all the ships astern
of JJ2tow turned away for a time to a course SE until they reached their flagship's wake,
after which they turned back to SSE. 5 ' While heading SE, the angle between courses was
33^° and the inclination 80¼0 (assuming a target bearing of Ri 14). Hence the rate was:
= 33.78(18 cos 80.25-24 cos - 114) = 433 yds/min.52
H.M.S. "TIGER", Gunnery Records during Action of 31st May 1916 in ADM 116/1487.
° Campbell, Analyszs, p.85.
FDSF III (op. cit.) Chart 4. Campbell, Anavszs, pp.44-5. Tarrant, Geiman Perspective, p.82.
52 At 3.52, Hipper ordered 'Increase speed' (German 'Summary of Messages') but, since there would have
been some loss of speed in the two-point turn, it is permissible to continue using 18 knots for the 1 SG.
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This is much closer to Derfflinger's sustained high rate in use after 3.55; yet, because she
was second in line, the actual rate should have fallen again as soon as she turned back to
SSE. However, one of the German Plans in the Beatty Papers (which were lithographed
in Britain in 1920, apparently for inclusion in the Harper Record) differs from later charts
at the time when Hipper ordered his ships to follow in his wake; it shows the 1 SG
changing course and formation from a heading SSE on a line of bearing NW to course SE
in line.53
 This would have been a much simpler manoeuvre, since it was completed as
soon as all ships had turned together to SE? It would also have resulted in ranges and
rates conforming better with the records from Derfflinger and lion; furthermore von Hase's
chart also shows his ship on course SE from 3.54 until 3•59•55 It is, therefore, more likely
that, at about 3.54, the 1SG turned away; it then follows that Hipper's turn together to
SEbyS at 3.59 was a turn towards, not away.
Further astern, the 2BCS kept to course E until 3.54 before turning to SSE;
however, Molz*e and von der Tann may already have been turning away. This was probably
the moment when the ranges reached their minima, though they were unlikely to have
been as low as the 10,800 yards recorded by Xew Zealanti Thus the range from von der
Tann to Indefatigable should have increased to 13,450 yards just after 4 o'clock.
Unfortunately, the Geiman Official Account states that this was the minimum value; on the
other hand, there are no indications that von der Tann made any earlier hits, so perhaps she
consistently overestimated the range until her final salvoes at Indefatigable. While the actual
ranges must remain uncertain, the comparative trends clearly indicate that, in the period
leading up to Indefatigable's destruction, the rear ships in the two lines were considerably
closer (probably by 2,000 to 2,500 yards) than those ahead.
Tiger's ranges show a similar but delayed trend, though the initial closing rate was
not as large. She may have turned to around EbyS when firing began (Fig. XXVI.5), but
the repeated hits by Moltke until 3.57 suggest that Tiger made few significant course
" 
'German Plan IV. Battle Cruiser Action' and 'German Plan V. Movements of German High Sea Fleet
and Approximate Position of British Fleet in the Battle ofJutland 31St May 1916', 'Malby & Sons. Lith.',
BTY 24/37-38. The serial number of the latter is 'S507. 39131. SCP. 50/318. 2000. 5. 20.'
However, a more positive order would have been 'Turn together to SE': Grindal.
von Hase, Sketch I.
It is then necessary to disregard the German Official Account (op. ciL, p.60) which states that: 'Admiral
Hipper. ..bore away two points so as to throw out the enemy's rangefinding'. However, this would have
resulted in a course of SE, not the SEbyS ordered explicitly by Hipper.
Gordon, Rules of the Game, p.114 also shows the 1 SG turning together to SE but their next turn as being in
succession.
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alterations to throw out the rate. Instead, she appears to have followed a course
somewhere between those of Lion and Princess Royal to starboard and the 2BCS to port. By
turning more slowly than the rest of the 1BCS, she would have been able to keep out of
their smoke: while, if she did not turn further than to SE, her ranges would have
continued to fall until after 4 o'clock. Their general trend, and the close correspondence
with Molike's range at 4.04, indicates that, like the 2BCS, Tiger was much closer to her
opposite number than were Lion and Princess Royal to theirs.
No specific data have been found for the course of Qyeen Maiy. However, she
made three hits from 3.56 until after 4 o'clock, 57
 so she was able to fire steadily,
apparently without serious smoke interference. As soon as Lion began turning from ESE
towards the South, those astern of her, if they were to avoid smoke interference, needed to
veer Eastwards so that the line of bearing from the flagship swung towards the North and
even East of North. Princess Royal may have followed too closely in Lion's wake (see
Chapter 6 and XXVI-! 1), but this would have made it easier for Qyeen Maiy to delay her
own turns sufficiently to keep the smoke from those ahead on her unengaged side; even
so, she may also have been obliged to increase her speed to prevent an increase in her
distance from Pth2cess RoyaL While Qjieen Ma?y could have kept on the appropriate line of
bearing without deviating too far from Lion's course, Tiger would have had to delay further
before making her turns: which would explain why she followed a course well outside that
of the rest of the 1BCS.
13.2BCS: RATES
Xew Zealand did not report her target bearings. However, if it is assumed that her
lines of bearing were roughly parallel to Lion's, it is possible to estimate her rates, at least
approximately.
At 3.47'/2, Lion's course was ESE and Lütow's SSE; thus the angle between
courses was 45° converging. Since the target's relative bearing was R42, the inclination
was 87° (Fig. XXVI.!). The 2BCS were still on course E, so their target bearing was
R(42 —22.5) = R19.5. Thus the rate was:
= 33.78(18 cos87 —26 cos - 19.5) = —796 yds/min.
Campbell, AIWySi, pp.41-2 and 80-3.
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After 3.56, the 1SG had turned away to SE and the 1BCS to SbyE i.e. an angle
between courses of 333/40 diverging. The target bearing from Lion remained fairly steady
at about 114°, so the inclination was 80'/+°. Since the 2BCS were on course SSE, their
target bearing was R102 3/4 and the rate was:
= 33.78(18 cos 80.25-25 cos - 102.75) = +289 yds/min.
14. IWDEFATICJLBLE'S FINAL POSITION
After Indefatigabk was first hit, the Navigating Officer of New ea1and recalled that:
We were altering course to port at the time and apparently her steering gear was
damaged as she did not follow round in our wake but held on until she was about 500
yards on our starboard quarter.'5
Andrew Gordon reproduces a photograph of Iniefatigabk already sinking by the stern with
the bows to the left.59
 This must be the photograph mentioned by Campbell as having
been taken from New Zealand's after torpedo control position,6° and it is consistent with the
stricken ship being off her flagship's starboard quarter.
However, no other source mentions a turn to port by New zealand. The 2BCS's
track tracing shows two turns to starboard after joining the line, the second following the
sinldng of Indefatigable.6' New Zealand's 'Record of Ranges' indicates that, at 4.00, she
altered course to starboard: though it does not mention any other turns. The first hits on
Indefatigable must have caused a serious explosion, otherwise, as is clear from the
photograph, the after part of the ship would not already have been under water. Such an
explosion probably wrecked the steering gear; it may even have blown off the stern.62
Thus, rather than keeping straight on, she could just as well have veered to starboard.
Then, if New Zealand was herself turning to starboard, Indefatigable would have been on the
starboard quarter when the photograph was taken, just before the hits by the second
salvo, which blew up her forward magazines.
IS. Couisis	 RMs: SECOND PHASE
After 4 o'clock, Hipper ordered two more turns together of two points, to SEbyE
at 4.04 and, at either 4.07 or 4.10, to SbyW. He then increased speed to 23 knots at
'Narrative of the Navigating Officer of H.M.S. "New Zealand" in The Fighting aijutland, p.28.
Gordon, Rules of the Game, Plate 29.
60 Campbell,Analysis, pp.60-i.
61 2BCS Track Tracing (op. cit.).
62 Grindal to author.
63 The time of the second turn is 4.07 in the German 'Summary of Messages' but 4.10 in the Gennan Ojisial
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4.12. At 4.18, he ordered his ships to follow in his wake, but the 'German Plan IV' cited
in XXVI-12 shows IJJtow also altering course to South, and this small turn away at 4.18
has been assumed here (see Fig. 6.1). The 1 SG then held its course and speed until turning
sharply away to SE at 4.27. The earlier changes did little more than prevent the range
increasing further. However, at 4.08 or so, the 5BS had closed the range sufficiently to
open fire, first on von der Tann at 19,000 yards and then, concentrating in pairs, on MoiLke
as well. Beatty quickly responded by turning lion to SE, commencing the turn at about
4.10. The SE course, which gave a rapid (closing) rate of -702 yds/min., was held until
4.19/20, when Lion turned away to SSE, 65
 thereby reducing the calculated rate to -251
yds/min. (Chapter 2). The BCF Track Chart then shows a starboard turn to S at 4.30,
followed by a port turn to SEbyS about four minutes later, prior to the 16-point turn at
4.37 after the sighting of the High Sea fleet. However, her TS record suggests that she
made two starboard turns towards the South at 4.25'/2 and 4.28 but that she altered back
to port at 4.32. Whatever the exact details, all of these course changes appear to have
been made without signals.
Before considering the ranges, it is necessary to attempt an identification of the
targets fired at from each battlecruiser and of the hits made. Lion, Tiger and isfew zealand all
continued firing after the sinking of Indefaligabk. There is no indication in Lion's TS record
that she changed target, while she remained in view from LüLow, though not from some
of the ships astern. Yet Campbell attributes two hits on Lützow at 4.15 to Princess Royal,
principally because the latter's range (18,500 yards) was much less than lion's (actually
21,275, not 'c 23,000', which was a rangefmder range taken at 4.12).67 However, part if
not all of the difference can be explained if lion was still out of line to starboard. And, in
any case, it is surely most unlikely that Piincess Royal was still concentrating on the leading
German ship. Admittedly, no change of target is mentioned in her 'Record of Action': but
it contains only one bearing and one range between 3.55.15 and 4.15.28, the most likely
Account (p.63) and on the 'German Plan IV' (op. cit.). For this phase, the German times are given unaltered.
64 Captain A W Craig (Barham), 'Report of Action of 31st May 1916' in ADM 137/302 gives the time as
4.11: Beatty's Personal Narrative (op. cit.) and VAC BCF to C.-in-C. Grand Fleet, 12 June 19Z6 in Beatty
Papers I (op. cit.) p.326 as 4.08: and the Gennan QificialAccount, p.64, as 4.06.
The 'Track of BC? chart shows turns to SE and SSE at 4.12 and 4.20. Beatty's Personal Narrative
contains two turns, to port at 4.11 and to SE at 4.1 2'/2. Lion, 'Record of Events' states 'Ship A/C to Port' at
4.09 and 4.11 ¼ and 'Ship A/C to Starbaord' at 4.1 8¼; the changes in target bearing are consistent with
courses of SE and SSE.
'Track of BC?. See also Beatty's Personal Narrative for 4.29.
67 Lion, 'Record of Events'. Gennan Official Account, p.66. Campbell, Analysis, pp.48 and 79.
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period for her to have transferred her fire to Derffluiger. In fact, von Hase seems to imply
that his ship was being straddled before 3.55: but, even if this is incorrect, the officers in
Princess Royal must have realised, no later than the destruction of lithefatigable, that they
should engage their opposite number in the German line. Furthermore, Campbell also
points out that full details of the hits on Lutow are lacking (which is hardly surprising
since she sank before reaching harbour); thus the two hits in question may also have
been made later, when the ranges in Lion and Princess Royal were similar (see below).
Lutow began firing again at 4.15 or shortly after, 69
 but Lion herself escaped
further damage until 4.24, when she took two direct hits from LüLow and was probably
also struck by a ricochet. 70 Derfflinger had lost sight of Lion and engaged Qyeen Mwy, which
appeared to be her opposite number. 71
 von Hase thought Qjieen May was returning his
fire, but there is no apparent reason why she should have shifted target; thus Campbell's
assumption that she made the hit on Seydlit at 4.17 seems justified. Sydlit did not make
the same mistake as Derfflinger and the two German ships began the concentration which
ended with the explosion of Q,yeen Maiy at 4.26.72 She had probably been hit twice (on the
port 4-inch after battery and the quarter deck) before, at 4.21, a hit on Q turret put the
right gun out of action. There was then a delay until: 'Every shell that the Germans threw
seemed to strike the battlecruiser at once'. The first big explosion was caused by a hit on A
or B turret but there was probably a second hit on Q turret; this appears to have broken
off the left gun and started a cordite fire which resulted in a second magazine explosion.73
Campbell credits the final three hits to Derfflinger and concludes that, before 4.21, Seydlitz
made four hits, but only two will be counted here. 74
 On the other hand, the hit at 4.21
was probably also by &ydlit, not Deiffliger. It appears to belong in the first sequence of
hits, which ceased while the 1 SG were reforming into line; no further hits were made for
several minutes, which suggests that SydliL lost the rate. von Hase did not claim his first
straddle until 4.22.40. Also, Derfflinger's 'hit-indicators' were still working and proved
Piincess Royal, 'Record of Action', von Hase, p.1 50. Campbell, ibid.
Lion, Record of Events' gives the time as 4.15, von Hase, p.152, as 4.17.
70 Beatty's Personal Narrative. Campbell, Analysis, pp.67-9.
71 Lion would have been hidden from Defflinger whichever course was taken by Princess Royal and Qjieen Marj
after 4.00 - see XXVI-10 above.
72 Campbell, Analyszs, p.80. von Hase, pp.154, 157 and 159.
" Williams, 'Loss of Qieen Maiy' (op. cit.) pp.122-5 and 132; survivors from Qyeen Mary's X turret described
hits before 4.21 on the after 4-inch battery and the quarter deck: while the wreck of Qyeen Maiy shows
particularly serious damage in the vicinity of Qturret.
Campbell, Analysis, pp.62-4.
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invaluable during the concentration, whereas Seydlit's had broken down near the start of
the battle; 75
 thus it is likely that, as soon as Derfflinger found the target, and especially after
she broke into rapid fire, Seyd1it found spotting much more difficult and was unable to
fmd Ojieen Ma?, again until, perhaps, her final moments.
Between the sinking of Indefaligable and Qyeen Maiy, 7ger's 'Gunnery Records' do
not show any change of target from the' "Seydiitz" ci. 4th ship from the right'. However,
her gunnery officer later recollected that:
About 4.10 I had the greatest difficulty in making sure of my target, as the enemy had a
ship ahead of their line, probably a large light cruiser, which was sometimes there and
sometimes not, and was making volumes of smoke. For some minutes about now, we
counted her as a battle cruiser, and so engaged No. 3 instead of No. 4 of the enemy line.
Presumably as a result of the damage to Q and X turrets, he also appears to have lost
confidence in the Director and, in order to line up, at 4.05'/2 ordered individual firing for
5 minutes. Since lge had not been fitted with an Evershed installation (Chapter 3), the
rangetakers and turret personnel could then determine the target only from its position in
the enemy line. The confusion in identif ring the target probably also explains why, at
4.11.20, the 'Gunnery Record' contains the remark 'Plotted Rate 850 opening': yet this
had no apparent influence on the gun range, which continued to fluctuate, seemingly at
random (see the following table of ranges). After Qjieen Ma?, blew up, Tiger switched her
fire to the '3rd ship from the left, "Derflinger" [sic] class' which presumably means
Se)dlit: but she was no more successful than she had been against Moltk.e. Throughout the
second phase (as in the first) Moltice fired at Tiger, she made two more direct hits between
4.20 and 4.30, while a third shell which went through TigeT's middle funnel at about 4.20
was probably a ricochet.76
From 4.03, New Zealand and von der Tann exchanged fire until 4.16'/2, when New
ea1and 'Shifted to 4th Ship, 5th ship obscured'. Her record indicates that Molike remained
her target for the rest of the engagement; but still she made no hits. 77
 At 4.18, von der Tann
also changed target, to Barham leading the 5BS. Despite the extreme opening range, the
battleships made their first hit on von der Tann almost immediately, at 4.09, while:
The end ships of the German line were...soon exposed to a regular hail of 15-inch
projectiles, and salvoes fired at extremely short intervals, fell all about them.
von Hase, pp.159-160. Syd1iJz, 'General Experience', f.272 in 'Jutland. Later Reports', ADM 137/1644.
76 Tger, 'Gunnery Records' (op. cit.). Tger's Gunnery Officer (op. cit.) pp.424-5. Campbell, Analysir, pp.74-5.
" Until about 4.26, Tiger was also firing at Moükr the two British ships may again have confused one
another's spotting.
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...By altering their course and speed so as to throw out the enemy's system of fire
control, both ships succeeded, for a time at least, in avoiding the enemy salvoes, which
possessed almost too little spread.78
Even so, Moltke was hit twice at 4.17, once at 4.23 and again at 4.24. Meanwhile, von der
Tann's steering gear was damaged by the first hit, so either this or her zig-zagging
probably resulted in her veering out of line to port so that she and Xew zealand lost sight of
each other. While she was firing at Barham, she received a hit at 4.20 which jammed her
fore turret training 3Ø0 abaft the starboard beam for the rest of the battle. 79 Another hit at
4.23 put the after turret out of action until 8 o'clock. She then turned her midships turrets
back to Xew zealand and, at 4.26, secured a single hit on X barbette (which, fortunately,
was not penetrated).
Campbell, without explanation, states that the two hits on von der Tann at 4.20
and 4.23 were from 13.5in./14001b. shell and that they were made by Tiger.8° Yet Tiger's
Q and X turrets were unable to fire accurately, her control was erratic and, when her fire
strayed, it was towards the head, not the rear of the enemy line. While the possibility of
two lucky shots cannot be entirely ruled out, it is much more likely that the shell type was
misidentified and that this consistent burst of hitting was due to the rapid and accurate
salvoes of the 5BS.
After the destruction of Qjieen Maiy, Sydlit started firing at Tiger. 8' von Hase
shifted target to the left and found, to his surprise, that he was again firing at Princess Royal;
however, most of his salvoes appeared to fall short. Campbell describes three hits on
Princess Royal between about 4.27 and 4.32 but admits that they were not recorded in
detail and that he identified them from photographs.
One shell struck the muzzle of the right gun of 'Q' turret and burst about I Oft off in the
air, causing minor damage to the forecastle deck. The inner tube of the gun was cracked
for 2in and the right trunnion bush scored, but the gun continued firing.
Another shell passed through the second funnel without exploding, and a third...was
probably a ricochet...
Since the effect of the first was so slight and it is not clear how its details could have been
deduced only from photographs, neither it nor the ricochet have been attributed here to
Deiffluiiger. The final hit during the Run to the South, perhaps by Sydli rather than
Xew Zealand, 'Record of Ranges'. Gennan OfficialAccount, pp.64-5.
At the time, De1ffiinger's target bearing was 520 (von Hase, p.160). Thus the bearing of the jammed turret(1200
 to starboard) confirms that von der Tann was firing at the 5BS.
° Campbell, Analysis, pp.47-9, 76, 85-94.
81 &ydlit, 'Experience' (op. ciL).
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Time DeffThzger	 Lion	 Princess Royal	 Tger	 New ea1and1
4.00 16,625	 _________ ____________ 10,750:10,500
	 [2,300:13,200




4.05 19,675	 _________ ____________ 12,300:12,700
	 14,800
4.06	 19,100	 12,000:12,100	 16,000
4.07	 13,000:14,100:14,200 16,400
4.08	 20,775	 21,400	 14,300:14,800	 16,400
4.09	 1 3,900: 16,900








4.16	 21,000R	 17,300:17,300	 17,600
4.17	 18,100	 18,1006
4.18	 18,500:18,500 17,500	 17,600
4.19	 17,500	 18,500	 17,900	 18,000
4.20 __________________ 18,800 R ____________ 18,300
	 17,850:17,450
4.21	 17,700	 17,500:17,500:16,800
4.22	 15,300:15,200	 17,000	 16,800
4.23	 14,975	 17,400	 17,800
4.24	 14,775:14,650	 16,000 R	 16,000:15,900 16,6008
	17,750
4.25 14,650:14,425:14,325 __________ 14,900
	 15,800:15,800:16,200 17,450
4.26	 14,425	 .16,200
4.27	 13,350°	 15,500 R	 16,000:15,600	 16,400




4.31	 16,400	 13,000:13,800 12,400:12,300
	 15,200
4.32	 17,175	 12,000
4.33	 17,925	 15,000	 12,000:11,800
4.34	 15,800	 11,900
4.35 ___________________ __________ _____________ 13,000
	 17,350
4.36	 18,375	 13,600:14,500	 18,850
4.37	 15,300:15,500
4.38	 16,400
4.39 ___________________ _________ ____________ 17,500
	 _____________
NOTES
1. New 2jealand's recorded times are assumed to be 6 minutes fast.
2. All ranges in yards. Defflàzger's ranges converted to the nearest 25 yards. Ranges of individual salvoes
are listed where more than one fired in a minute;
3. All ranges are gun ranges, except for Lion's rangefinder ranges, marked R.
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4. Change of target to von der Tann.
5. This range must be mistyped, perhaps for 15,900.
6. Change of target to Mo like.
7. Possibly two 'salvoes' at 4.23.
8. Change of target to Seydli.tz. Therefore Tiger's times are 2-3 minutes fast at this point..
9. Change of target to Princess Royal.
10. This range only is from 'Notes made by Sub Lieut Selby in charge of T.S. of HMS lion...' in papers
of Captain R P Selby RN, IWM 96/20/1.
THE RUN TO THE Souri-r: TABLE OF RANGES 4.00 TO 4.39
MoltJe, was received by ?iger at about 4•35•82 Thus, during this second phase, the 1SG
made not less than 12 direct hits on Beatty's battlecruisers: which scored 3 in return, or 5
if the last two hits on von der Tann are also included. The 5BS made 5 or 7 hits on the 1 SG,
while Batham was hit once by von tier Tann.
The ranges between the battlecruisers can now be examined in more detail,
particularly for indications of the relative courses of the British ships. von tier Tann's range
on Xew zealand appears to have risen from 13,450 to 17,500 yards before she shifted to
Barham.83 Other than this, details of German ranges have been found only in von Hase's
memoir, they have been tabulated above, together with the ranges for the four surviving
British battlecruisers. von Hase was obliged to order the cease-fire soon after 4.05. He
re-opened on Qyeen May at 4.17 when 'we were converging on one another fairly
rapidly'; the range fell from 17,500 to 15,300 in the 3 minutes after 4.19, though how far
this was due to rate rather than spotting is not known. By 4.22 the rate in use was and
remained 'E-U-3' i.e. -330 yds/min., quite close to the calculated -250 yds/min. Derfflinger
spotted straddles by the salvoes timed at 4.22.40 and 4.23.45; she then broke into rapid
fire, the next six salvoes being fired from 4.24.20 to 4.26.10 i.e. at an average interval of
only 22 secondsP'
From 4.00 to 4.08, lion's ranges were similar to De 7i'zger's, but the next
rangefinder range, taken at 4.12 when she was turning SE, was a high 23,000 yards. Her
ranges then fell to reach 18,800 yards at 4.20; the actual mean rate was -525 yds/min., a
figure not greatly different from what would be expected following her 4-point turn
towards the enemy. Unfortunately, her TS once again failed to estimate the enemy course
82 von Hase, pp.162-4. Campbell, Analysic, pp.47,69,71,73 and 76.
Gennan OfficialAccount, p.61.
von Hase, pp.152 and 159-163. The tabulated British ranges are from Ian, 'Record of Events': Princess
Royal, 'Record of Action': Tiger, 'Gunnery Records': andXew Zeaknd 'Record of Ranges'.
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correctly. Probably as a result of the apparent large increase in range from 4.01 to 4.12,
the maximum rate in use just before commencing the turn to port towards SE was +500
yds/min: while, when on the new course, a new rate of Nil was adopted at 4.13 and
increased, but to only -200 yds/min., at 4.17. After the alteration to SSE (timed in the TS
at 4.l8'/2), it was only slightly decreased, to -150 yds/min; 85
 since 4.12, every spotting
correction had been DOWN, so the fire controllers were evidently beginning to revise
their estimated enemy course towards a more converging direction. Yet the spotting
corrections continued downwards to reach a total of 5,500 yards DOWN by 4.23. The
rate was almost correct at 4.21 (-200 yds/min.) but then increased further to -350
yds/min. at 4.25. If the TS record is correct, only half a minute later, Lion made the first
of two turns to starboard. By 4.29, the target bearings had increased by 26° such that A
and B turrets were no longer bearing, a minute later, a Nil rate was adopted. Assuming
that Hipper's turn away at 4.27 had not yet been detected, both bearings and rates
indicate a 2-point turn to S. Sub-Lieutenant Selby's notes confirm that, at 4.30, A and B
did not bear: but his range of 13,475 yards, is lower than would be expected.87
Once again, Lion's fire control staff had failed to detect that, on the approach, the
range was falling rapidly. Yet, if the apparent range-rate had been measured off the range
plot, it would have given a reasonably accurate estimate of the course of the 1 SG. Using
Lion target bearing at 4.17 of R84:
—525 = 33.78(23 cos z-24 cos - 84)
Therefore	 i=124.5°
Thus the angle between courses works out at 40.5° i.e. the German course could have
been estimated as 175.5° magnetic or approximately S, barely one point different from
the actual SbyW.°° At 4.24, hits on the British flagship provided direct evidence that it was
well within range; the rangefinder range taken at that time also still showed a strong
downward trend, so it probably helped to force the final realisation that the opposing sides
were still on converging courses. Lion turned away from 4.27 and avoided further hits, but
it was already too late for Qpeen Mary.
'Increase' and "decrease', when applied to rate, refers to changes in the magnitude of the rate, whether it
is positive or negative.
Lion, 'Record of Events'.
87 Selby, 'Notes' (op. ci!.).
If an enemy speed of 18 knots had been assumed, the enemy course would have been even closer to
SbyW.
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Princess Royals isolated range of 19,100 yards at 4.06.50 is only slightly below the
trend for Deifiinger and lion'. The later recollections of Princess Royal's officers stated that
their ship turned from S to SSE at 4.1 2.89 Then, when her salvo record recommenced, she
fired five salvoes at a constant range of 18,500 yards from 4.15.28 and 4.19.50 i.e. her
effective rate was nil for almost 4¼ minutes. If, as proposed earlier, her target was
Deifflinger, then her range at 4.19 was 1,000 yards higher than Derfflinger's on Qyeen Mazy. It
is possible that Princess Royal's ranging and rate-finding was thrown out at 4.18 when
DerfJlinger turned briefly onto a diverging course of SE or thereabouts, before turning again
into line headed South.
By 4.21, Princess Royal seems to have realised that her salvoes were going over
since her ranges then fell rapidly to 14,900 yards at 4.25, when they had almost
converged on the hitting range from Derfihinger. However, it is not known whether this
reduction was made entirely by DOWN spotting corrections for range or whether she also
adopted a closing rate. Particularly if the latter was the case, Princess Royal might soon have
started to even the score. Instead, there is an unexplained gap in her record from 4.25.20
to 4.31.15, during which, apparently, she fired no salvoes, although, according to her
officers, the range fell to 12,000 yards at 4.26 or 27: while they also recalled a turn
towards, to SE, at 4.24. The British 'Record of Messages' includes a wireless signal from
Lion, originated at 4.25, specifically ordering Princess Royal to 'Keep clear of smoke': while
Beatty's Personal Narrative gives a time of 4.28 for the fire in Q turret caused by the
flair-up of smouldering cordite.9° It appears, therefore, that, as in the first phase, Princess
Royal got into the smoke from lion's funnels and guns: and that the problem may soon
have been made worse by more smoke from the turret fire. When hincess Royal's record
resumed, the range was close to that noted in Lion, and increasing, both ships were
probably again on parallel courses. Princess Royal's ranges continued to be much less than
those from Derffiinger, which suggests that she underestimated the extent of the turns away
by the 1 SG from 4.27 onwards.
Despite their ineffective gunnery, the trends in the ranges of Beatty's two
rearward ships are so different that they cannot be disregarded. Tiger's was most extreme;
she remained within less than 14,000 yards from the enemy until 4.07, but her range then
See note XXVI-1 1 for the passage cited: and the problems of interpreting some of the evidence from
Princess RoyaL
° Appendices XXVII and XXVIII.
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shot up in three minutes to 17,900 yards. It then fluctuated wildly but no downward
trend is apparent until 4.21. Although, after 4 o'clock, she had difficulties in identifying
her target, the pattern of ranges suggests that she delayed her turn away for longer than
the other British battlecruisers: and that she probably remained somewhat closer to the
German line than the ships ahead, until they reduced the range again after 4.12. The
destruction of Qyeen Mary was timed in Tger's record at 4.24, when she shifted her fire to
SydliL at a range of 16,600 yards. This must be too high, because she passed through the
doud of the explosion on Qyeen Mary's engaged side;9 ' yet her ranges do not fall below
Princess Royal's until 4.31. Unlike any other ship's, they then continue to fall to a minimum
of 11,800 at 4.33.30. While she certainly failed to detect Hipper's large turn away at 4.27,
Tiger probably followed Princess Royal in turning towards the SE, and, again, did not turn
back to follow the flagship until later than the remaining battlecruisers. Perhaps the two
hits by Molz*e were made when she was in this exposed position.
During the first phase of the Run to the South, Xew ea1and's ranges did not fall
as far as Tiger's. After 4.00, they rose more slowly but, by 4.13, had reached similar values.
After this, the two rear ships appear to have followed similar courses until the sinking of
Qyeen Mary, when Xew Zealand passed the wreck on the non-engaged side. 92 Subsequently,
her apparent rate from 4.27 to 4.30 exceeded -600 yds/min., though the range then
began to increase again. Thus she probably also turned towards SE for a time, though,
having veered to starboard to avoid the stricken Qyeen Mary, she remained furthest from
the enemy. At 4.36, her range was actually higher than Derfflingei-'s, so Xew Zealand was
apparently more aware than the other British battlecruisers of the extent of Hipper's
withdrawal.
16. RATES OF FIRE
Until the hit on Q turret, Lion shot steadily, firing 19 salvoes in 12 /2 minutes i.e.
an average interval of 42 seconds. Afterwards, her rate of fire fell off significantly; from
4.01 and 4.33, she fired 30 salvoes, so the mean interval was 66 seconds.93
Piincess Royal started similarly; her first five salvoes, from 3.47.50 to 3.5 1.15, had
an average interval of 51 seconds. She then only managed two more (at intervals of 2½
Williams, 'Loss of Qyeen Mary', p.129.
92 ibid
Lion, 'Record of Events'.
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and 1 1/2 minutes) before her record stops after the hit on the Argo tower. If von Hase was
correct in claiming his first straddle at 3.52.20, Princess Royal's firing rate slowed as soon as
Derfflinger found her range: so her gunnery record rather belies the later claims of her
officers that her fire was not disrupted by shorts to the same extent as at the Dogger
Bank. At some time between 3.55 and 4.00, Beatty made a general signal, by flags and
wireless, to 'Increase the rate of fire'; 95 this was after the damaging hits on Princess Royal
and 7geir, and it must have been apparent from the flagship that the immediate loss of
gunnery superiority was already telling, especially on his second and fourth ships. After
Princess Royal's record resumes at 4.15.29, it lists 10 salvoes before the gap after 4.25.20
when she got into Lion's smoke; 8 of the 10 appear to have been fired in pairs, but the
average interval, 66 seconds, was the same as Lion's at that time. The interval for her final
4 salvoes, from 4.31.15 to 4.34.15, wasjust 60 seconds.
Qyeen Mary fired 17 rounds from each gun of Q turret until, at 4.21, its right gun
was put out of action; since Lion fired 38 salvoes in the same period it appears that Qjieen
Mary's overall firing rate was only slightly more deliberate.97
The records from Lion and Princess Royal definitely give times for each salvo.
Tiger's record looks similar, but if every time had corresponded to a salvo, she would have
fired 85 salvoes up to 4.39. In fact, the right gun of the undamaged A turret fired 27
rounds up to 5.09 (when the run-out gear failed irreparably). As already mentioned, 7ger's
Q and X turrets were damaged and, on two occasions, she had to resort to individual
firing. It seems likely that, after these hits, 7ger fired as often as she could, with whatever
guns were ready, so that many of the ranges apply to individual shots or salvoes of only
two or three guns. However, from 3.51 to 3.54, she fired four salvoes at one minute
intervals, so she probably began rather more deliberately than the other 13.5-inch ships.98
)iew Zealand began the action by firing very rapidly at Mollfr, between 3.51 and
4.01, she recorded 19 gun ranges implying an interval between salvoes of only 33 seconds.
Unfortunately, this fusillade had no effect whatsoever. Once she shifted to von der Tann and
9' 
'Officers offiiwessRoyat (op. cit.) p.19.
9' British 'Record of Messages'; Beatty's signal has times of origin and despatch of 3.58 and 3.55!
9' Princess Roya4 'Record of Action'. 'Officers of Prüzcess Royal', p.19.
Campbell, Ana'ysis, p.62. von Hase, pp.157-8 stated that Qiieen Maiy usually fired full broadsides (all eight
guns together), though these were almost always over or short. Since it is doubtful that Qyeen Maiy was
actually firing at him, and firing broadsides would have been very slow at finding a target by bracketing,
this daim has been discounted.
9' Tiger, 'Gunnery Records'. Lt.Cmdr. Macnamara, 'Gunnery Report', 4June 1916 in BTY 6/6.
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then back to MoiLke, her firing rate slowed considerably; between 4.10 and 4.31, she
recorded 23 salvoes; an average interval of 57 seconds. However, her salvoes were more
irregular than previously; in this second phase JIew Zealand still failed to make a single
hit.99
Like the British, most German ships fired salvoes with one gun per turret, though
Lütow fired alternatively from her fore and after turrets.'°° Her first five salvoes took 3
minutes, an average interval of 45 seconds, Lion being hit with the fifth. However, her
overall rate may have been higher; Campbell states that LiJtow fired her first 31 salvoes in
19 minutes, an average interval of 38 seconds. In contrast, von der Tann seems at first to
have fired deliberately - 52 shells, probably between 13 and 17 salvoes,'°' in 14-15
minutes - but she was firing rapidly when Indefatigable was sunk by two salvoes falling in
quick succession)°2
von Hase of Derffiinger published detailed information on his salvoes at several
critical moments of the engagement. At the start, Derfflinger fired six salvoes between 3.48
and 3.52.20 (an average interval of 52 secs.); she opened at 16,350 yards but spotted a
straddle with the sixth salvo at 12,975 yards after a succession of 'down' spotting
corrections totalling at least 1,600 metres (1,750 yards). She then broke into rapid fire, a
salvo every 20 seconds or so, until the target was lost. She did not succeed in hitting
F,incess Royal until 3.56, so it is not certain that these hits were made in this first burst.
von Hase also published in a table (overleaf) a. detailed record of his ship's part in
the destruction of Qjeen Mary. The intervals before the second and third salvoes were 40
and 65 seconds, respectively, each being spotted as straddling short. Since the clock rate
was -300 rn/mm., they must have been made with UP spotting corrections of + 100. After
three straddles, von Hase ordered rapid fire, the ranges (until 6.25.45) falling at the
nominal clock rate. Six salvoes were fired in 1 mm. 50 secs. i.e. a mean interval of 22
seconds. The final salvo seems to have been given a +200 spotting correction: as would be
expected since the range-rate calculated from the speeds and courses is -230 m/min. In
that case, some spotting was evidently possible in rapid fire: and, probably, the last but
one salvo (as well as or instead of the last) was spotted as short.
New Zealand, 'Record of Ranges'.
'°°P 0 Dan Sheppard, 'Notes onjutland' in Bea#, Papers I (op. cü.) p.356.
higher number would apply if her port wing turret did not bear throughout.
'°2 (n Official Account, p.61. Campbell, An4ysis, pp.40,43,61 and 364. The rate calculation assumes that
von der Tann's port wing turret was bearing throughout the first phase.
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6 22 -	 52°	 14,000	 left 10	 E-U-3!
6 22 44)	 510	 13,900	 ,, 16	 2 short!
623 45	 52°	 13,700	 ,, 14	 1 short!
6 2420	 52°	 13,500	 ,, 14	 Good, Rapid!
62440	 52°	 13,400	 ,, 14
625 -	 52°	 13,400	 ,, 14
62520	 52°	 13,200	 ,, 14
62545	 52°	 13,100	 ,, 14
6 26 10	 52°	 13,200	 ,, 10	 2 short!
Heavy explosion on our enemy!
Change of target left to the second battle-
cruiser from the left!
von Hase also commented:
It is noticeable in this list that the training angle of the turrets remained practically
unchanged and that, therefore, during these vital minutes the ship steered an admirable
course.103
DeTfflinger, like all the ships of the 1 SG, was given the opportunity to fire in optimum
conditions, thanks to the small and infrequent changes of course clearly signalled by
Hipper's flagship.
On changing target to Princess Royal, Defflinger's first salvo was spotted as '2 short'
but the next as '4 short'. In all, she fired 8 salvoes between 6.27.15 and 6.33.10, of which
the 5th and 7th also fell '4 short' i.e. an average interval of 51 seconds.
The continuing changing training angle recorded in the log show that the ship was
steering a very irregular course and was bearing to port. The enemy's bearing was now
somewhat more abaft the beam. This put successful rapid shooting out of the question.
As a rule there was a full minute between the salvoes. Each time we had to wait for the
splashes. When these were observed new orders had generally to be given for deflection,
rate and elevation.'04
103 ibiiL p.160.




TI-LE BA1TLE CRUISER FLEET
The following table gives all the signals made between Beatty's heavy ships for
the period from just before the first sighting of Hipper's First Scouting Group at 3.15 to
the turn Northwards at 4.40. Remarks and some other signals have also been included if
they appeared relevant to the gunnery of the battlecruisers of the 1st and 2nd BCS and
the battleships of the 5th BS. All times are GMT.
These signals were tabulated in Appendix II of Battle offutland 30th May So 1st
June 1916. Qificial Despatches with Appendices, Cmd 1068 (London: HMSO, 1920)
pp.446-453. The layout and typography of the original tables have been retained but
5-minute dividing-lines have been added; some redundant punctuation has been omitted.
Time of From	 To	 Sys- Message	 Time
Despatch	 tern	 of
_______ __________ __________ ____ ________________________ Origin
3.12	 SO BCF	 General	 Flags Admiral intends to proceed at 23
knots.
3.13	 SO BCF	 General	 Flags Alter course leading ships together
the rest in succession NE.
3.14	 SO5IJIBS	 5thBS	 Flags Al/errseinsuccessiontoE,sped22
3.15	 New Zealand	 -	 -	 Remarks: Sighted five Enemy ships
on starboard bow.
3.20	 SO BCF	 General	 Flags Admiral intends to proceed at 24
knots
3.21	 SO5thBS	 5thBS	 flags AlserwseinsuccessionwNE,speed23
Iøwts.
3.23	 P. Royal	 SO BCF	 Flags A#ntwn is called to E lyX
3.25	 Lion	 -	 -	 Remarks: Enemy in sight on
______ _________ _________ ____ starboard bow.	 _____
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Time of From
	 To	 Sys- Message	 Time
Despatch	 tern	 of
______ __________ __________ ____ _______________________ Origin
3.27	 SO BCF	 General	 Flags Assume complete readiness for action
in every respect.
3.30	 SO 5th BS	 5th BS
	 Flags Assume complete readinessfor action io eveiy
respect.
3.30	 SO BCF	 General	 Flags Alter course leading ships together,
the rest in succession to E, speed 25
_______ ___________ ___________ ____ knots.
3.32	 SO BCF	 General	 Flags Alter course leading ships together,
the rest in succession to East.
3.34	 SO BCF	 2nd BCS
	 Flags Prolong the line by taking station
astern.
3.35 SO BCF SO 5th BS S.L Speed 25 knot. Assume complete
readiness for action. Alter course
leading ships together the rest in
succession to E. Enemy in sight.
3.35	 SO5thBS	 5thBS	 Flags Aliersuccessionincoui.ce[sic]toE,speed
24 AnoL.
3.35	 SO BCF	 General	 Flags Admiral intends to proceed at 24
knots.
3.35	 SO BCF	 General	 Flags Enemy in sight bearing E by N.
3.36	 SO 2nd BCS	 2ndBGS	 Flags Alleicourseinsuccession l6pozntsto
starboareL
3.40	 SO BCF	 C.-in-C.	 W/T Urgent. Enemy Battle Cruisers, 1535
five in number, bearing NE,
Destroyers, large number,
bearing NE, course unknown.
Position of reporting ship Lat.
560 53' N, Long. 5028 E.
3.40	 SO5thBS	 5thBS	 Flags Admiralintendstoproceedat24'/2 knots.
3.45	 SO BCF	 Battle Cnisers	 Flags Foirm on a line of beanngXW
3.45	 SO BCF	 C.-in-C.	 W/T Urgent. Course of Enemy S 55° 1545
E. My position Lot. 56° 53' N,
Long. 5° 53' E.
3.45	 SO BCF	 General	 Flags Alter course together to ESE.
3.46	 SO BCF	 Battle Cnnsers	 Flags Lion and Princess Ri,yal concentrate on
Enemy's leading ship.
3.47	 Lion	 -	
-	 Remarks: Enemy opened fire.
3.47	 SO 5th RI	 5th BS	 Flags Enemy uz sight beanng E.
3.47	 SO BCF	 General	 Flags Open fire and engage enemy.
3.47	 Lion	 -	
-	 Remarks: Lion opened fire.
3.50	 Lion	 -	
-	 Remarks: Lion being frequently hit
________ _____________ _____________ _____ by Enemy. Turret wrecked at 4 p.m. _______
3.55	 SO BCF	 C.-in-C.	 WIT Urgent. Am engaging enemy.
	 1550
My position Lot. 56° 53' N,
Long. 5° 31' E.
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Time of From	 To	 Sys- Message	 Time
Despatch	 tern	 of
_______ ___________ __________ ____ _______________________ Origin
4.0	 SO 5th BS	 5th BS	 Flags Open fire and engage the Enemy.
	 _____
4.1	 Lion	 -	 -	 Remarks: Indefatigable blew up.
	 ______
4.10	 SOBCF	 Princess Royal	 W/T Main W/Toutofactwn. 	 1605
4.11	 Lion	 -	 -	 Remarks: Nottingham reports
Submarine on starboard side.
4.11	 SO BCF	 Destroyers	 S.L Clear range.	 ______
4.18	 SO5thBS	 5IFZBS	 Flags Shipsincolumnobethreecablesapart.
Speed 24 hzoLs.
4.20	 Lion	 -	
-	 Remarks: Queen Mary blew up.
	 ______
4.26	 SOBCF	 PrincessRoyal	 W/T ICeepclearofsmoke	 1,625
4.30	 SO 5th BS	 5th BS	 Flags Subdivirions separat4y alter course in
successwn tico points awayfrom the Enemy
presenvig theirfoimatwn.
4.30	 SO 5th BS	 5th BS
	 Flags Alter course together 4 points to port.
4.30	 SO 5th BS	 5th BS
	 Flags Negative alter course together 4 points to port ______
4.33	 Southampton	 SO BCF	 S.L Battleships SE.
4.38	 Southampton C.-in-C.
	 W/T Urgent. Priority. Have sighted
	 1638
SO BCF	 Enemy battlefleet bearing
approximately SE, course of
enemy N. My position Lat. 560
34' N, Long. 6° 20' E.
4.40	 SO 5th BS	 5th BS	 Flags Subdivisions separately alter course in
succession tico points awayfrom the Enemy
preseiving theirformation.
4.40	 SO 5th BS	 5th BS	 Flags Concentrate in pazrcfrom the rear.
4.40	 SO BCF	 General	 Flags Alter course in succession 16 points
to starboard.
GERMAN SIALS
The table below are the more important signals made to and from (mainly from)
Hipper's flagship, the Liltow, from just before the sighting of the BCF until the 1st
Scouting Group (1 SG) turned North.
The entries are taken from Appendix 10 of V E Tarrant, 3-utlaniL The Ger,nan
Perspective (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1997) pp 276-9. This, in turn, was based on
the Admiralty Intelligence Division Compilation and Translation in the Admiralty
Library. The text has been reformatted into a similar tabular form to that used for the
British signals. Times have been converted to GMT by advancing them by one hour.
All signals from Lütow to the 1 SG without a time of origin were made visually.
The remainder are assumed to be by wireless.
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From	 To	 Time of Received Message
______ _______ Origin _______ ____________________________________
Lilizow	 1SG	 2.59	 Course NNW.
Lützow	 iSO	 3.00	 Speed, 23 knots.
LüLow	 iSO	 3.15	 Course NW.




Lilizow	 ISG	 3.24	 Speed, 18 knots.
Li1tow	 ISO	 3.26	 Course, NWbyN.
Lützow	 General	 1529	 3.30	 2SG close on 1SG. Large enemy ships in sight in 15 ly.
Lilt ow	 I SG	 3.29	 Distribution of fire from the right.
Li11ow	 ISO	 3.32	 Speed, 18 knots.
LIWow	 ISG	 3.35	 Course, SE.
Liitzow	 General	 1529	 3.35	 Enemy battle fleet in sight in 15 ly. Enemy battle fleet
consists of six ships, steering N.
Liltcow	 1 SG	 3.30 [sic] Distribution of fire from the left.
Liltow	 iSO	 3.40	 Speed, 18 knots.
Liltzow	 iSO	 3.42	 Ships to be 500 metres apart.
LilIzow	 1 SG	 _______ 3.45
	 Turn together to SSE.
Lãltzow	 1SG	 3.48	 Open fire.
Láilzow	 General	 1532	 3.49	 1 SG. Position 004e. SE. Speed, 21 knots.
Liltzow	 ISO	 3.53	 Increase speed.
Liltow	 iSO	 3.54	 Follow in the wake of the leading ship.
Liltzow	 General	 1546	 3.54	 6 enemy battle cruisers, also smaller vessels in 15 ly,
steering SE. 1SG in 004g. Course SSE; 18 knots. Am in
action with 6 battle cruisers. Request position of own
battle fleet.-A.C. Scouting Forces.
Liltzow	 I SG	 4.00	 Turn together to SEbyS.
LiUzow	 1 SG	 4.04	 Turn together to SbyE.
C.-in-C. fleet and 1609
	 4.05	 Own battle fleet, 4 p.m. Position 043c Centre. Course
A.C.	 [sic]	 NW. Speed, 15 knots.
Scouting
Forces
LilIzow	 i SG	 4.07	 Turn together to SbyW.
Liltzow	 1SG	 4.12	 Speed, 23 knots.
Liltzow	 1 SG	 4.18	 Follow in the wake of the leading ship.
Liltzow	 i SG	 4.25	 Reduce speed.
Liilzow	 1 SG	 4.27	 Turn together to SE.
C.-in-C. Liltzow	 1731	 4.30	 To A.C. Scouting Forces: Own battle fleet 035c, steering
_______ ________ [sic]
	
________ N. Speed, 15 knots.
Liltzow	 1 SG	 4.34	 Turn together to ESE.
Liltzow
	 iso	 4.36	 Turn together to E.
Liltzow	 ISO	 4.38	 Turn together to SSE.
Liltow	 ISG	 4.41	 Turn together to SSW.
Liitow	 1SG	 4.44	 1SG: Open fire at battleships.
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From	 To	 Time of Received Message
______ ______ Origin ______ _________________________________
Liltzow
	
LSG	 4.46	 Turn together to SE.
Liitow	 I SG	 4.49	 Follow in the wake of leading ship.




Beatty's own tabular narrative of events can be found at the National Maritime
Museum in BTY 6/3, 'Action with the German High Sea Fleet 31st May - lstJune 1916.
VABCFs Personal Records'. The following is a transcription of the record for the Run to
the South. The first four columns appear in the narrative itself. The right-hand column of
explanatory 'Comments' and the 5-minute dividing-lines have been added by the present
author.
The interpretations of signals are based on:
i. The Fkitilla Sg-izd Bookfor the use ofHis Majesty's Reet, 1908, NMM.
ii. Captain PJ Russell, Sea Sgaalling Simp4fled (London: 1976).
BATTLE OF 31st MAY. NARRATIVE OF EVENTS
Time From To
	 Note	 Comments
3.28	 VA	 Gen	 G 25. Course E.	 Guide of fleet to make 25 knots.
3.29	 VA	 2BCS	 Prolong line ahead.
3.30	 _____	 G.25 down	 25 knot signal made executive.
3.31	 Range of enemy 23000 yds.
3.32	 2nd BCS take station astern,
	 Countermands 3.29 signal which
CHAMPION and destroyers
	 cannot have been made executive.
ahead.
3.35	 Two enemy quite distinct to me.
3.37	 H.13 pdt.	 13th flotilla to attack as previously
arranged.
3.40	 I can see 4 enemy port bow.
3.42	 VA	 Champ. Take station 2 points on Stbd
bow.
3.43	 VA BCs	 Form on line of bearing NW.
3.44	 I can see 5 enemy BCs.
3.45	 0 pdt. H down	 Signal 'Form compass line of bearing
NW' to be hauled down i.e. made
executive.





H tackline QZ - destroyers to
proceed at utmost speed [?]
3.47	 Blue pdt. CH. 5 flag.
	 Blue pendant, CH - alter course
together to ESE.
5 flag- open fire.
3.47	 Enemy opened fire.
3.47 ½	 Lion opened fire.
3.49	 Enemy salvo over.	 Liitcow's opening range too high.
3.50	 _____	 ditto.
3.50V2	 UON hit by enemy.
3.52	 LION hit by enemy centre funnel
3.54	 Enemy salvo short.
3.54½	 ditto.
3.56	 Range 14300.
3.57	 Enemy salvo 2 short & 2 over
3.57 ½	 Enemy straddled us again.
3.58	 (Flag Capt.) Tell Fore Top we are
short.
3.59	 Enemy straddled us.
	 Lützow keeping Lion's range with a
proportion of shots falling short.
3.59½	 Enemy straddled us again. ? one
hit.
4.0	 Qturret wrecked.
Dcstr-	 Attack with torpcdocs.	 This entry deleted
_ yer ______________
4.1	 Enemy hit us
4.1 ½
	 Again (1 think Indefatigable blew
up about now)
4.2	 Enemy straddled us.
Range 14600
A/c one point to Stbd.
4.3	 Enemy hit us.
4.5	 Destroyers smoke (own) obscuring
________ ______ ________ target.
	 __________________________________
4.8	 5th B.S. opened fire.
4.9	 Torpedo reported to have passed
us from Std. to Pt. Range 21100.
4.10 Landrail sighted periscope
	 Added iii Beatty's red ink.
Port Q
.
 Torpedo passed between
____ ___ _____ Tiger and NZ.
4.11	 ACtoPort.NOTTJNGHAM
reports submarine.
4.12	 Enemy salvo short. Our course
SSE.
4.12½ ____	 A/C to SE.
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Time From To	 Note	 Comments
4.17	 Enemy salvo over.
4.18	 Third enemy ship on fire?	 Probably the fire in SeydIitc's turret.
4.19	 Enemy over
4.19½	 Enemy salvo ahead.	 Deflection wrong.
4.20 _____ _______ A/C to SSE.	 ____________________________
4.24	 LION hit twice by enemy.
4.24 ½ _____ _______ Agam.	 ____________________________
4.26	 Explosion in Qeen Mary.
4.28	 Fire around Qturret of LION. 	 Cordite reignited.
4.29	 Port 5
	
50 of port helm to turn to starboard.
4.32	 Enemy salvoes short.
4.33	 A/C to SSE.
4.34	 _____ _______ Enemy salvo over.
4.38	 _____ ________ Enemy Battle Fleet ahead.
4.43	 Course North. I can see enemy
Battle fleet. Destroyers recall.
APPENDIX XXIX
Ti-rn Ti-mw BATTLE CRUTSER SQUADRON
JNVINCLBLE
Excerpts from Commander H E Dannreuther, Gunnery Officer of Inuincible, to
Captain F W Kennedy, Indomitable, 2June 1916 in ADM 137/302.
"INVINCIBLE"...came into action at about 6. 15.p.m. with the leading enemy battle
cruiser which was thought to be the "DERFFLINGER". Fire was opened at the enemy
at about 8000 yards and several hits were observed.
A few minutes before the INVINCIBLE" blew up Admiral Hood hailed the Control
Officer in the Control Top from the fore bridge "Your firing is very good", "keep at it
as quiddy as you can, every shot is telling"....
The Ship had been hit several times by heavy shell but no appredable damage had
been done when at 6.34 p.m. a heavy shell struck "Q" turret and bursting inside blew
the roof off. This was observed from the Control Top. Almost immediately following
there was tremendous explosion amidships indicating that "Q" magazine had blown up.
The ship broke in half and sank in 10 or 15 seconds.
Commander Dannreuther to the Post War Questions Committee, ADM
116/2060.
AtJutland, only instrument used at all was fore-top rangefinder, that gave a range on
opening fire, and we then went on as best we could, all other means of getting ranges
impossible, owing to smoke, spray, shell bursting short and other interference.
Q. What is your own theory as to reason for "lnvincible" blowing up.
A. Shell was seen by next astern to hit Q-turret and 2 seconds after, roof was seen to
blow off, shell burst inside and ship went up as cordite got ignited.
Q. Did you have your magazine doors open?
A. Yes, we could not help it; huge great things; cordite in trunk was absolutely
exposed.
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LVFLEXIBLE
Excerpt from Captain Heaton Ellis, Inflexible, to VAC BCF, 10 June 1916 in
BTY6/6.
6.16-6.35 Object - Green 80, battleship (believed to be "KONIG" class). Range 8000
yards. One enemy ship only could be seen at first though flashes from others astern
were visible. There was practically no rate, except towards the end of this period when
the enemy turned away and the Squadron turned twice towards them. Small
corrections were supplied to begin with as the target was hit with first salvo: afterwards
it was only possible to judge by shorts as the enemy was apparently being engaged by
whole Squadron...
6.28. At about this time, object was shifted to the next astern as the latter was becoming
visible and was apparently firing from 5 turrets and appeared herself to be unfired at.
6.30 "INVINCIBLE" was sunk. Shortly after the enemy was lost in the mist.
Apart from the turret between the funnels, the silhouettes of the lConig and
Derfflinger classes were similar. In the five-turret &ydlit, there was a much bigger gap
between the second funnel and the main mast.' Thus Inflexible, the second in the 3BCS
line, fired first at Deif/linger and then shifted to Seydli. Seydlit was hit once, at about 6.34.2
INDOMiTABLE
Excerpts from the report of the Gunnery Lieutenant-Commander with Captain
M H Hodges, Indomitable to RAC, 2nd BCS, lOjune 1916 in BTY 6/6.
6.25 p.m. "A", "Q" and "X" now opened fire on the centre enemy Battle Cruiser which
was on our beam (90 Green) and appeared to be firing at us; I considered that the third
enemy Battle Cruiser was engaged by "LION".
The range we opened fire at was 9,500, deflection -nil & rate -100; the former was by
Fore Top Range Finder, the two latter from the Dumaresq set by estimation. We soon
established the range and I saw several "Straddles" and bursts.
Another ship was firing at our target....
6.30 p.m. The Germans had found our range & appeared to be straddling us....
6.34 p.m. The "Invincible" blew up.
6.42 p.m. We "Checked Fire" as the First Battle Cruiser Squadron was coming up on
our starboard side & we were ordered to form astern.
...Range finding was most difficult. No plot was obtained.
The wording suggests that Indomitable could see only three of Hipper's five ships. From
6.17 to 6.27, 7iger was firing at the '3rd ship from left' (Sydlit.c): while P,incess Rçya1 fired
'. Erich GrOner, revd. Dieter Jung and Martin Maass, German Warships 1815-1945, Vobtme I (London,
1990) pp.27 and 55-6.
2 NJ M Campbell, JutlanL An analysis of thefightizg (London, 1986) p.1 87 attributes this hit to Indomitable.
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only one salvo between 6.17 and 6.29. Most probably, Indomitable's target was Derfflinger. In
that case, the third visible enemy battlecruiser was Seydlit, engaged not by Lion but by
Tige-. Then the other ship firing at Indomitable's target was, as already deduced, Inflexible
(before she shifted to Seydlitz). Defflinger received three 12-inch hits at this time, but no
13.5-inch;3
 thus Princess Royal's single salvo probably did not fall close and went unnoticed.
If these conclusions are correct, then Inuincibk alone was responsible for the eight
damaging hits on LiJLow.4
DIuwcF
Georg von Hase (trans. A Chambers and F A Holt), Rid and Jutland (London:
SkefFmgton & Son, 1921) p.1 82 believed that more than one ship was firing at Derfflinger.
...we were being subjected to a heavy, accurate and rapk fire from several ships at the
same time. It was clear that the enemy could now see us much better than we could see
them. This will be difficult to understand for anyone who does not know the sea, but it
is a fact that in this sort of weather the differences in visibility are very great in different
directions. A ship clear of mist is much more clearly visible from a ship actually in the
mist than vice versa. In determining visibility an important part is played by the position
of the sun. In misty weather the ships with their shady side towards the enemy are much
easier to see than those lit by the sun.
ibid. p.185.
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PATENTS
British Patents
Patentsfor Inventions. Abridgement ofSpecjflcatioru.
Class 80. Mechanism and Mill Gearing, 1901 -4 (London: HMSO, 1906)
Class 80(11). Gearin,g Vaiiabk-Speed Dzffirentiaz and Reversing, and Shafting and its Accessoiies
1909-15 (London: HMSO, 1921).
Year & Applied Complete Patentees 	 Subject
Patent	 for	 Spec.	 ____________ (not title)
1902/
6,838 20 Mar 22 Dec 02 A H Pollen 	 Machine calculating range from two
Mark Barr	 simultaneously-observed angles.
1904/	 -
9,461 25 Apr 24 Feb 05 A T Dawson Vickers Clock.
J Home
11,535 19 May 18 Feb 05 W H Lock
	 Simultaneous transmission system.
A H Pollen
17,719 15 Aug 7Jun 05
	 J S Dumaresq Dumaresq Rate Finder.
23,872 4 Nov 3 Aug 05
	 W H Lock	 Bearing observation, transmission and
A H Pollen	 course plotter.
1906/
595 9Jan	 Virtual-course range and bearing keeper
(abandoned: IDXS, pp.82 and 104).
4,422 23 Feb 3 Aug 06 A Barr
	 Transmitters and Receivers
W Stroud
13,082 6Jun	 27 Dec 06 A H Pollen	 Tactical machine (the 'crab' machine).
H Isherwood
14,305 22Jun 22Jan 07
	 ,,	 Tactical machine.
23,846 26 Oct 25 May 07
	 ,,	 Dual gyro directional reference.
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Year & Applied Complete Patentees 	 Subject
Patent	 for	 Spec.	 ____________ (not title)
1908/
2,497 4 Feb	 4 Aug 08	 ,,	 Range clock (on virtual-course principles).
14,415 7Jul	 7Jul08	 ,,	 Transmitters and dutch-operated rotary
receivers.
16,463 4 Aug	 F C Dreyer	 Rangefinder mounting, three operators
	
J T Dreyer	 (secret).
16,912 11 Aug	 ,,	 Range and rate plotter (secret).
25,654 27 Nov 27 May 09 H Isherwood Multi-speed drive (interchangeable discs).
1909/
5,031 2 Mar 13 Sep 09 A H Pollen 	 Manual course plotter.
H Isherwood
9,223 19 Apr 19 Oct 09
	 ,,	 Clock-regulated constant-speed electric
motor.
11,795 19 May 7 May 09
	 ,,	 Air-driven, continuously-running gyro.
21,733	 F C Dreyer	 Tactical plotter? (secret).
21,655 22 Sep __________	 ,,	 Hyperbolic dock? (secret).
19 10/
1,111 l5Jan	 12 Aug 10 A H Pollen	 True course plotters.
H Isherwood
	
22,140 23 Sep 12 Apr 11 F C Dreyer	 Fire Control Table (secret).
1911/
360 5Jan	 28 Jun 11 A H Pollen	 Argo Clock Mark I (complete the same as
H Isherwood	 provisional).
362 5Jan	 11Jul11	 ,,	 Range-adjustment and training of
rangefinder with variable-speed drives.
7,382	 Solving linkage (not reassigned to Pollen).
7,383 24 Mar 25 Sep 11	 ,,	 Step by step transmission gear.
19,627 4 Sep	 4 Apr 12
	 ,,	 Argo Clock Mark II (provisional) and
Mark ifi (complete).
This secret patent was never reassigned to
Pollen and hence never printed as a British
________ _______ __________ _____________ patent.
19 12/
17,441 4 Apr
	 4 Apr 12
	 ,,	 Disc-ball-rollers variable-speed drive.
21,480 20 Sep F C Dreyer Gyro compass relay to Dumaresq. Rate
transfer by step-by-step receiver motors
(secret).
	
23,349 12 Oct 11 Apr 13 A H Pollen
	 True course plotter.
H Isherwood
23,351 12 Oct 13 May 13	 ,,	 Range and bearing rate plotter.
	
25,768 9 Nov 8 May 13 A H Pollen	 Averaging range receiver.
______ ______ ________ G B Riley	 ___________________________
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Year & Applied Complete Patentees
	 Subject
Patent	 for	 Spec.	 ____________ (not title)
19 12/
30,090 31 Dec 18Ju1 13	 A H Pollen	 Rangefinder with enhanced image
______ ______	 H D Taylor	 brightness.
19 13/
11,009 9 May 8 Dec 13	 A H Pollen	 Argo Clock Mark V dumaresq.
H Isheiwood
16,373 16Ju1	 l6Jan 14	 ,,	 Argo Clock Mark V change-of bearing
mechanism.
JVtes
Other patents by Pollen and Isherwood, though not cited in the text, are:
1907/4,311 and 11,040
1908/ 1,367 and 1,368
1909/12,707
191 1/7,381 and 14,302
19 12/1,562 and 23,352
1913/4,164 and 14,521
1914/24,830.
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A H Pollen and H Isherwood, MearLs andApparatwfor Charting the Position ofS/zzs at
Sea, 5January 1915, filed (Ser. No. 788,26f) 5 September 1913.
A H Pollen and H Isherwood, Range-clock, 30 November 1915, filed (Ser.No.
788,266) 5 September 1913. [Argo Clock Mark Ill]
A H Pollen and H Isherwood, Range-clock, 30 November 1915, filed (Ser.No.
831,702)14 April 1914. [Argo Clock Mark V dumaresq]
1,232,968	 A H Pollen and H Isherwood, Apparatusfor Determining Sighting DataforXaval Gms,
I OJuly 1917, filed (Ser. No. 850,319) 11 July 1914. [Argo Clock Mark V
change-of-bearing mechanism]
	
1,317,915	 Hannibal C Ford, Mechanical Movement, 7 October 1919, filed (Ser. No. 83,749)
13 March 1916.
	
1,370,204	 Hannibal C Ford, Raizge Keeper, 1 March 1921, filed (Ser. No. 205,357)
4 December 1917.
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